LFW

LONDON

LONDON BOROUGH OF LEWISHAM
LIBRARY SERVICE

Author

Title

BOOK STORE

Books or discs must be returned on or before the last date stamped on label or on card in book pocket. Books or discs can be renewed by telephone, letter or personal call unless required by another reader. After library hours use the Ansafone Service (01-698 7347). For hours of opening and charges see notices at the above branch, but note that all lending departments close at 1 pm on Wednesday and all libraries are closed on Sundays, Good Friday, Christmas Day, Bank Holidays and Saturdays prior to Bank Holidays.

METROPOLITAN
SPECIAL COLLECTION

I. 9. 8

PROBLEMS OF GREATER BRITAIN

942.32

PROBLEMS

OF

GREATER BRITAIN

BY THE

RIGHT HON. SIR CHARLES WENTWORTH DILKE, BART.

AUTHOR OF

'GREATER BRITAIN,' 'THE FALL OF PRINCE FLORESTAN OF MONACO,'

'THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS,' AND 'THE BRITISH ARMY'

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOL. II

WITH MAP

GUILDHALL LONDON LIBRARY

TRANSFERRED TO Metropolitan Special Collections LEWISHAM.

London

MACMILLAN AND CO.

AND NEW YORK

1890

All rights reserved

1408

MSC
V600.14

GUILDHALL LIBRARY
WITHDRAWN
LONDON

CONTENTS

Part IV.—India

CHAP. PAGE

I. Indian Defence 3

II. British India 77

Part V.—Crown Colonies of the Present and of the Future . . 153

Part VI.—Colonial Problems

I. Colonial Democracy 227

II. Labour, Provident Societies, and the Poor . 284

III. Protection of Native Industries . . . 332

IV. Education 358

V. Religion 389

VI. Liquor Laws 430

Part VII.—Future Relations between the Mother-Country and the Remainder of the Empire 463

Part VIII.—Imperial Defence . 499

Conclusion . . . 576

MAP

India . . . . . *To face page* 1

GUILDHALL LONDON LIBRARY

GUILDHALL LONDON LIBRARY

Stanford's Geogl Estabt London.

Dilke's "Problems of Greater Britain"

PART IV

INDIA

CHAPTER I

INDIAN DEFENCE

India. Pre-eminence in importance of the question of defence.

THE most important question connected with India at the present time is that of defence. From the more limited or British Indian point of view it is of little use for us to concern ourselves with improvements in government if we cannot retain the country in our hands; and from the larger or British Imperial point of view the loss of India would be a crushing blow to our trade, if our rule were succeeded by that of a protectionist country or by a period of anarchy. It would constitute, moreover, so grave an encouragement to our enemies in all parts of the world that we might expect a rapid growth of separatist feeling in Canada, South Africa, and Australasia, and a general break-up of the British power. The bolder among the pessimists of the Dominion; the extreme Dutch, who may desire the creation of the United States of South Africa under republican forms; and the wilder portion of the "native" Australian party, would need no other signal—would find no longer any difference of opinion among their friends as to the nature of the action that they should take, nor would they be confronted with the same body of opposition to their views as exists in the three groups of colonies at the present time.

There are some dreamers who appear to think that

Loss of India.

we should leave India to itself, and the loss of trade, by the possible adoption of a protectionist policy in India, they would, I believe, be content to face. Besides trade there is the interest upon capital, and India remits so much money for various purposes to England that in this sense, too, a peaceful and friendly India seems almost necessary to our existence; and it is difficult for any one who knows the divisions of the peninsula to suppose that an India left to itself would see its races and its religions dwell together in amity and concord. If to speculation speculation is to be opposed, I should be inclined to fancy that some effect might be produced upon the minds of those of whom I speak by asking them to consider not only the evils of a lower kind which the loss of India would occasion, but also those of a higher nature. I would bid them reflect upon the hopeless insularity that would overtake the British people if deprived of the romantic interest that the possession of India lends to our national life. Is it conceivable, however, that India should be able to govern and to defend herself? The exactions and the quarrels of the native princes alone would set the country in a blaze, and every city of the north would be a scene of civil discord between the adherents of the chief rival creeds. Even if India did not fall at once to the lot of Russia, the recent action of Germany in Africa warns us that Germany, and Madagascar and Tonquin warn us that France, would strive to conquer or to divide that vast peninsula which we should leave wholly unable to defend itself by force of arms. A despotism less beneficent than our own would probably succeed a period of anarchy in which the good results of many years of steady progress would be lost to the subject population. There can, I think, be no two opinions among reasonable men as to the necessities

of every kind that force us to link our fate to our continued domination throughout India. It is then useless to go into inquiries about our Indian Empire unless we first make sure our ground with regard to Indian defence.

Reasons for treating the Indian Defence question separately.

There is another reason for separate treatment of the question of Indian Defence, and for its full discussion, before we reach that question of Imperial Defence in which it seems to be involved. The Indian problem is distinct from the general problem. Not only is it the most difficult branch of the defence question, and one which thoroughly deserves to be studied on the spot, but one wholly different in its nature from the British Imperial Defence question as it exists elsewhere. It is only in Canada and in India that we have land frontiers of military importance. I have already dealt in the previous volume with the question of Canadian Defence; but while in Canada there is little prospect that we shall be attacked by our peaceful neighbours, in the case of India we are face to face with a different set of circumstances. It is in fact only on this one of all the frontiers of the Empire that the British dominion is virtually conterminous with the continental possessions of a great military power. The British Empire has of late, in New Guinea and elsewhere in the Pacific, become conterminous with Germany, in Further India virtually conterminous with France, and in Africa conterminous with both Germany and France; but if we command the seas we could cut off Germany from Africa and from Polynesia, and France from Africa and from Indo-China. Russia alone is virtually our continental neighbour, in the same sense in which the United States is our neighbour on the Canadian frontier. The United States is not a military power, and, though able to crush us in Canada, will never advance except

invited by the Canadians, or driven into war, while Russia is an autocracy with untold millions of men who are ready to march at one man's will.

Consensus of opinion on importance of the Indian Defence question.

Those in England who desire to close their eyes to the importance of the question of Indian Defence are in the habit of describing as alarmists all who force them to discuss the matter. It is, therefore, right to show at the outset that those who belong to the peace section of the Liberal party, but who happen to know India well, are as thoroughly awake to the danger as are military Conservatives themselves: in fact, that there is unanimity of opinion among the well-informed, whatever may be their predispositions. For example, Sir George Campbell has argued, in a work circulated by the Cobden Club itself, that we ought not to feel easy about our military position in India; that our Indian army is, considering what it has to do, "the smallest army in the world"—an army of 200,000 men, not all fit for the most dangerous service, defending, against internal troubles and against a great military neighbour, a peninsula containing 250,000,000 of inhabitants. Sir George Campbell points out that we have to deal with tremendous risks both east and west of India, and to observe the approach of two great European powers towards our borders. He shows how our difficulties have been increased by a popular resistance to our rule in Burmah, such as we never experienced in any part of India, and such as will call for the presence of a large garrison for many years; and he says: "We can no longer consider India to be a country divided from the whole world, and our military arrangements must be modified accordingly." Radical economists and the Cobden Club are thus, it is seen, compelled by the necessities of the case to use words which would not be

disavowed by those who are looked upon, by the portion of their countrymen who are uninstructed in this particular matter, as alarmists of a military school.

The idea of a Russian alliance.

The first question that arises in connection with Indian defence is, whether our preparations for war in or near India against a European enemy are necessary at all, or whether it would be possible safely to come to terms with Russia. There is a school in England the members of which would attempt to bring about an Anglo-Russian alliance based on the general principle that Russia should be allowed to work her will on Turkey, provided our Indian North-West frontier were, through the alliance, made secure. There is this to be said for those who think thus, that it is our duty to look at such questions from a point of view less selfish than that of British interest alone, and that it is well sometimes to try to place ourselves in the position of Russian statesmen. Russia, ice-bound as she is, needs outlets; but we must remember also that she has an outlet on the Pacific which will become more and more important day by day, that the outlet through Turkey is not ours to give, and that the outlet through India is ours to refuse. Without dwelling upon the fact that under certain circumstances the possession of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles by Russia might prove a political danger to ourselves, and without urging the consideration that there is a large British trade in Turkey which would soon be destroyed by Russian protectionist feeling, it is difficult to see, if we look to the Indian side of the question, how Russia could put it out of her own power at any moment to threaten us on the North-West frontier.

What we should gain by an understanding with Russia is far from clear. No promise, especially no promise

accompanied by an advance towards our frontier, could enable us safely to reduce our Indian forces and to take less money from the Indian taxpayer. On the contrary, while I am far from agreeing with all that has been written upon the subject by the late Sir Charles MacGregor, still, in discussing the transport difficulties of a Russian advance on India, he was writing on a matter which he thoroughly understood, for he had given much time and care to it. The then Quartermaster-General in India put the most successful possible result of the first Russian campaign as the annexation by Russia of the country up to that very line of the Hindu Kush which it is now proposed by some, whose language is eagerly reprinted by the Russian press, to give to Russia voluntarily, as the result, not of a campaign, but of an understanding. Sir Charles MacGregor was of opinion, as the whole of our authorities in India at the present moment are of opinion, that once in secure possession of Herat and Balkh, Russia could afford to wait, to consolidate her power, to complete her railways, and would then, and then only, issue forth from her excellent bases to make her attack on India.

The Tsar.

Granting the pacific disposition of the present Emperor of the Russias, and supposing, for the sake of argument, that we might safely give to him personally that which his friends in England ask, is it not at least possible that in some years' time there may be at the head of affairs in Russia those who will hold different views, and who might return to the designs of General Skobeleff, to the prosecution of which they would bring the enormous advantage of a perfect base for operations virtually bestowed upon them by ourselves? Moreover, we should be giving that which is not ours to give; we should be thought by the Afghans to have

shown the utmost treachery towards their interests; we should incur their hatred, and at the same time the contempt of our Indian princes, and the Russians would be to a corresponding extent strengthened by the existence of these feelings.

Our pledges.

To willingly let Russia occupy the northern half of Afghanistan in the lifetime of the present Ameer would be a flagrant breach of faith, for, in spite of Mr. Curzon, whose recent articles made more stir in Russia than he can like, to judge from what he has since written in a book,[1] we are deeply pledged to Abdurrahman by our promises, twice at least—perhaps three times—voluntarily made. To give up Northern Afghanistan even when he is gone would be to reverse the policy which seemed wise to Mr. Gladstone's second administration as well as to their Conservative successors. What we should lose by the Anglo-Russian alliance, which seems to reduce itself, when examined, to a permission or to an encouragement to Russia to stretch herself on the one side towards the Dardanelles, and on the other side into Afghanistan, is clear: our Turkish trade, our power to use the Euphrates route or the Suez Canal during war with Russia when once she was established on the magnificent position of the Sea of Marmora, the friendship of the Afghan people now tardily obtained, and the confidence of our Indian subjects in our strength. At one blow we should have brought military Russia within possible striking distance of India, and put ourselves farther off from India by driving ourselves to the use of the Cape route even in a single-handed war. An increase of the distance from our base in England to the Helmund where we should have to fight would be

[1] *Russia in Central Asia*, by the Hon. Geo. N. Curzon, M.P. Longmans, 1889.

brought about at the same moment as a shortening of the distance between the Russian railroads and India. The story of Batoum has shown that Russian promises cannot be trusted. The reply of the friends of Russia in this case is, that the promise as to Batoum was an unwilling promise, extorted from Russia at Berlin. It was not in form unwilling, but, even admitting the fact, we may doubt whether the promises or declarations of the present Emperor of Russia would be more binding upon a successor who might very likely hold widely different views.

We are told that we might diminish our military expenditure in India if we had a Russian alliance. That cautious and economy-loving power the German Empire, at the time when her old Emperor and the Russian Emperor were bound together by the most solemn of alliances, in the Three Emperors' League, continued with feverish haste to strengthen her fortresses of Thorn, Königsberg, and Posen, useful only against Russia, while Russia strengthened Warsaw and the Polish Quadrilateral, useful only against Germany. No prudent power, with a frontier exposed to land attack, can afford to rely upon promises, however apparently binding, and relax her preparations for meeting in arms, if necessary, possible invasion by a military power of the first class. It did not need Batoum to prove that it would be unwise to trust the very life of our Empire to any promise.

Without inviting Russia into Northern Afghanistan we may, of course, be called upon to consider what we shall do when she has come there uninvited. The Russians have sufficient belief in the reality of our pledges to the present Ameer not, I think, to come there in his lifetime; but supposing that they are right in

thinking that the Ameer and Afghan rule are unpopular in Herat and Balkh, and that a successful insurrection may be organised against him, circumstances may so change as to tempt them forward. The Russians may be right, too, in thinking that if the present strong man were removed by assassination there might be civil war in Afghanistan and disorder upon their frontier sufficient to give them a fair pretext for advancing. Supposing that we fail to make those wise arrangements, with regard to the Afghan succession, and for securing tranquillity in the country on a change of sovereign, which we ought to make in time, and could make, the Russians may very likely cross the frontier with a small number of men upon some apparently excellent pretext, ready to withdraw if our Government should threaten war, and ready to remain if we should only grumble. We all of us are sometimes strangely like the Turks in thinking that what will last our own time is good enough, and in finding reasons for putting off the fight until the time of our successors. We have weakened English public opinion by the very uncertainties of our past Afghan policy, the most amazing instance of which was the sudden reversal by Lord Beaconsfield's Government in 1878 of the uniform policy of Great Britain with regard to Herat, in the offer of Herat to Persia, actually bound at the very time by a secret treaty to Russia, a portion of which has since been revealed. It is at least possible that if the Conservatives were in office in England when Russia in small force crossed the Afghan frontier, recently settled with her, there would be a coalition between the mass of the Opposition and Conservatives who hold the view that the present arrangement has no element of permanency in it which would

prevent the Government from resisting the Russian advance.

Views expressed in *Greater Britain* and in 1887.

In May 1867, when I first wrote upon Indian defence, I recommended that policy of advance upon our left which was afterwards adopted. The railway through the Bolan, and the station at some such position as Quetta has since become were among the suggestions that I made. The adoption of this policy was advised from many sides and the policy was successful; and writing again in January 1887, after nearly twenty years had passed, I was still able to take a hopeful view of the prospects of Indian defence for some time to come. It was still possible to set very high the risk to Russia of plunging into defiles inhabited by an independent population, and to lay stress upon the time that would be needed for the completion of her strategic railways in Turkestan. On the other hand, while I thus stated my own opinion, I was forced to quote the opinion of foreign military writers to the opposite effect. These think, as I showed, that it would be difficult for us to put 40,000 men at Quetta within three months of the declaration of war, and that we could do it only if we gave up all idea of offensive operations against Russia in any quarter of the globe, and confined ourselves to a defensive attitude, leaving Russia to attack us when and where she chose—in itself a serious weakness. I showed that the foreigners who had written upon this subject thought that Russia could raise trouble for us in India, and force us to leave a large proportion of our troops behind to watch narrowly the armies of the native states; and that they believed that an advance force of Mohammedans, in the Russian interest, descending from the mountains upon Kabul, might conciliate the Afghans and bring with them towards India the tribes eager for

the plunder of our plains. I ventured nevertheless to discount these alarmist views, and to suggest that pressing danger would first arise only several years after Russia had occupied Herat (should we allow her to reach that point), had finished her railways in that quarter, and had fortified her base. The Russians, it seemed to me, had every interest in postponing war, and would do so for twelve or fourteen years at least. At the same time I hinted that we were one of the least popular of powers, and that if we were attacked in India no hand would be raised in our defence.

The insufficient number and organisation of our troops.

Writing, however, a few months later, after I had received from India many answers to my earlier suggestions, I had somewhat to tone down my optimism. Sir Frederick Roberts[1] could not be quoted upon the more cheerful side, though naturally proud of an army with which he has been long and honourably connected. Lord Wolseley had thrown the gravest doubts upon our having sufficient strength to do more than remain on a strict defensive. I pointed out that it was a dangerous delusion to suppose that the whole of the Indian army could take the field against the Russians, and that English officers who knew the Russian army thought that their picked troops were admirable, while it was certain, owing to transport difficulties, that Russia would, if she attacked India, bring picked troops into the field.

[1] As I was invited by my friend Sir Frederick Roberts to accompany him in his military frontier tour of November–December 1888, and did so, and as I have dedicated to him this work, some attempt might possibly be made to commit him to the opinions put forward in this chapter, which he has not seen. It is better, therefore, that I should distinctly say that the views expressed are mine, not his, and differ indeed in several points from those of the Commander-in-Chief in India. At the same time, where my conclusions are known to me to be opposed to those of the highest military authorities in India, I have said so in the text.

I argued in favour of the creation of a separate white force for India, inasmuch as our compromise as to length of service was ruinous to India, and forbade her having any hope of keeping up a sufficient army to meet coming dangers, in return for such money as she could afford to spend, while at the same time it spoilt our home service army. I stated generally that the criticisms which had reached me showed a steady growth of pessimism among our best officers, and that it was the universal opinion in India that if the Afghans should join the Russians, the Russians would have the game in their own hands. Hence the need for first considering our relations with Afghanistan.

Mr. Gladstone's Afghan policy.

The policy of the second administration of Mr. Gladstone in the Afghan matter is of some historical and of some present importance. Mr. Gladstone recommended the removal of Lord Lytton, and reversed Lord Lytton's policy, but not to revert to the Lawrence policy. On the contrary, while he wisely evacuated Kandahar—following largely the advice of that most skilled of all observers of the Afghan question, Sir Robert Sandeman—Mr. Gladstone gave those strong pledges to the Ameer of Afghanistan to which I have alluded, and proposed the delimitation of the Afghan frontier. The arrangement declared to be binding by the Russian Emperor in 1888 was the outcome of these proposals. The Ameer of Afghanistan was subsidised and supplied with arms, and was told by Lord Dufferin, by direction of the Government, that so long as he conformed to our advice his enemies would be ours. After some hesitation the Quetta frontier was advanced, the loop strategical railway made, and the Bori valley brought under British rule. This policy of Mr. Gladstone's second administration,

followed as it has been since that time by Mr. Gladstone's third administration, and by two Conservative administrations, was wise and necessary. The policy which I have described was, then, a policy of influence at the Court of Kabul, combined with non-interference in the domestic affairs of Afghanistan, and it was a portion of this policy that we should extend either our frontiers or our authority up to the Afghan border. This was indeed the ground for that occupation of the Bori valley under Mr. Gladstone's second administration to which I have just referred. In the course of the twenty years of which I have spoken the British and the Russians have drawn 1100 miles nearer together, Russia advancing 900 and we 200 miles; and we are now—not in a straight line, but by road—500 miles apart. On this line there is no mountain chain worth naming. There are two much-travelled native roads, along one of which Ayoub marched with wheeled artillery before he beat us at Maiwand.

Afghanistan as it is.

The strong, friendly, and united Afghanistan created by our policy will exist during the life of the present Ameer, but there is too much reason to fear that his death will be the signal for confusion in Afghanistan unless we take steps ourselves to prevent anarchy; and the practicability of an invasion of India depends almost wholly upon the condition of Afghanistan and upon our relations with the Afghan ruler. It must be remembered that, if an advance should come, large offers will be made to the Afghans. Russia, besides giving money to the chiefs, will promise to Afghanistan the Peshawur valley and other former Afghan districts of the Punjab. So far as the present Ameer's life may extend, we have done our utmost to secure him. He knows that we wish his kingdom to be independent, and by our evacuation of

Kabul, Ghazni, and Kandahar we have proved to the Afghans that we do not desire to take their country. He understands us to have promised him to see that the Russians do not take it, and he undoubtedly believes that we should resist, with the whole force of the Empire, and in all parts of the world, any attempt to pass the line of pillars which the joint Commission has set up. He is persuaded that by himself, and without our guarantee or virtual guarantee, he could not hope to keep the Russians out of Herat and Balkh. The position, although our policy has been successful up to the present time, is one necessarily full of anxiety. It is difficult for us to guarantee the succession of the son of the present Ameer, who may not be the best candidate for the throne. It is difficult for us to accept responsibility for the Afghan proceedings upon the Russian frontier while we have no officer within hundreds of miles of Balkh, and yet the presence of British officers upon the frontier, advised by Mr. Curzon, would probably involve responsibilities even greater than those which it might prevent. Still, what is done is done. It was hopeless to expect that the Ameer would be our friend so long as the most valuable portion of his dominions was in our possession. His very existence as ruler of Afghanistan was involved in the Kandahar question, and necessitated our restoration of the city. The result has been that the present ruler of Afghanistan has complete trust and confidence in us, and has done everything in his power, which in such a matter is but limited, to make his people friendly. Sir Lepel Griffin has said[1] that when he first met this remarkable man, at the time when we were about to place him upon the throne, Abdurrahman had never

[1] *Asiatic Quarterly Review*, October 1888.

known an Englishman. At least one had, however, stayed with that Afghan prince as his guest near Samarcand, and had long been familiar with his character. The impression which he made upon the first Englishman who ever saw him was as favourable as that which he produced on Sir Lepel Griffin; and his first English friend, now dead, was equally struck by his remarkable information, self-possession, and knowledge of the world. Brave, strong, and ready, it seemed certain that he would one day succeed. The speculation, however, as to the Afghan throne, which is the most interesting, concerns not the present Ameer but his successor, and to discuss this subject in the present state of our relations with the Ameer would be unwise.

Possibilities of Russian invasion.

When the question is asked whether it is possible as a fact for Russia to invade India, the answer must, in my opinion, be that Russia could not invade India with a good chance of success if she started from her present frontier. At any time between 1879 and 1885 we might have had some difficulty in resisting, but in consequence of the Indian military measures of the last few years we could place in line upon her flank an army which, did the Afghans continue friendly to us, ought to give a good account of any force for which the Russians could at present find transport across the desert. This is not the opinion of Sir Charles MacGregor in his "confidential" book, which was, unfortunately, so largely circulated that it has been thought that copies were purchased for use in Russia. He laid down for the Russians every step of their march, and worked out for them every figure of their transport, but I think that, for the purpose of rousing our military authorities, he lessened the difficulties which the enemy would have to meet. On one point, indeed, Sir Charles MacGregor

erred in the opposite direction. He underrated the total military force of Russia, and then proceeded to make such large deductions from it for garrisons and armies to watch European and other frontiers as to leave the Russians with a limited number of men, although, in his opinion, a sufficient number for attempting the invasion. It would be more accurate to look upon Russian numbers as unlimited for this purpose, but, while unlimited upon their own frontier, sharply limited as long as that frontier is where it is, and so long as Herat is not connected with the Russian railroads, by transport difficulties. One natural result of this fact is that any Russian invading army would come in the form of a force of carefully-selected men. To allude only to the extracts that were published from Sir Charles MacGregor's book, he thought the invasion of India already then a possibility. Since that time Russia's peace footing has been increased and her war footing almost doubled, as shorter service has gradually affected her reserves. Russia has advanced from Sarakhs to Penjdeh, within easy striking distance of Herat. If Sir Charles MacGregor was right in thinking that Russian Central Asia can produce 30,000 camels, and that vastly greater numbers can be obtained from the Persian frontier, then indeed advance across the desert is robbed of half its difficulty.

Sir Charles MacGregor is, rightly enough, considered in England to have been an alarmist, but there are signs that he was not in all cases inclined to overrate our difficulties. For example, in the opinion of skilled observers of our Indian position, he underrates the danger to us from the armies of the independent princes of the south in the event of a rising; and again, it is known that it was his opinion that in the event of

invasion all troops might be withdrawn both from Burmah and Assam, on the ground that it would not be difficult to reconquer these great provinces if we repulsed the Russians—certainly not an alarmist view.

Difficulties in way of Russian advance.

It is believed in India that the Russians will advance by Balkh and also from Penjdeh through Maimena with small forces upon Kabul; with a small force and mule transport by Chitral upon Jelalabad; and with a small force by Gilgit upon Kashmir, although, according to Sir Charles MacGregor, the last route would be possible in July and August only. These small forces would be from one to two months on the road, and their marches would be extremely difficult at the present time; but, according to Sir Charles MacGregor, if the Russians were established in Balkh, at the frontier which we are now asked to willingly give them, and which Sir Charles MacGregor said they would obtain as the result of their first successful campaign, these marches would become "a perfectly feasible operation of war." The large force of the invader, with his siege train, would of course come by Herat to Kabul unless we beat him, or to Ghazni, and then, if not defeated, by the Kuram river, which he could reach during eight months of the year, or by the Tochi valley towards Lahore, and by the Gomul pass towards Dera Ismail Khan and the south. Some think that Russia will advance also by Seistan towards Kandahar; but she would have to pass through districts where the people are friendly to ourselves, thanks chiefly to Sir Robert Sandeman's popularity, for he is looked upon as the best friend both of chiefs and people, and as justice incarnate. At Quetta we are strongly established on the flank of the Russians, whose main force, advancing over fairly level ground, and not, like the small forces, over passes of 10,000 feet, would

have to march 350 miles from Herat—against the 200 from Balkh of the small forces—before reaching us.

Results of Russian advance.

It is often said that if success or failure depends upon the attitude of the Afghans, as is frequently alleged by Indian officers, we had better let the Russians be the first to enter Afghanistan, as then the Afghans would turn against them. Russian credit has stood very low in Afghanistan since 1878, because the Afghans thought that the Russians behaved meanly in not defending them against us at that time; and similar views, in a more aggravated form, would be conceived of us if we took no notice of Russian entry into Afghanistan. The Russians were not pledged to defend the Afghans. We are pledged, in fact, to the present Ameer, and in universal Afghan belief to the Afghans generally. Sir Robert Sandeman's chief assistant, one of the men who know the Afghans best, said to me at Quetta last year that there was no greater fallacy than to suppose that the occupation of a part of Afghanistan by Russia would make the mass of the Afghans her foes, for that they respected power, and would be more likely to turn against us for refusing to defend them than against Russia for advancing, and when once shaken would begin to look, as they have looked before, for their share of Indian plunder. I have said but little of the intrigue which would go on in the still "independent," or British, part of Afghanistan, and in India, when the Russians were established on the new frontier which some would give them. I agree with Sir R. Temple that it would be impossible to preserve Kabul from the interference of a European power established at Herat. To say, too, that there would be intrigue in India itself is not to direct special blame against the Russians. For example, the Russians are aware that

Indian officers have proposed to the Indian Government to prepare rebellion among the Turcoman tribes, and it is not, therefore, impolite to suppose that the compliment has been returned. We have never taken any actual steps to disquiet the Russians in Central Asia, and it is possible that they have never taken any actual steps, as yet, to disquiet us in India; but there can be no doubt that, if they advanced to the proposed frontier, and if our relations became unfriendly, Russian agents would swarm at the native Courts. In short, it seems plain that the nearer Russia is allowed to come to India the more we must increase our army and our military expenditure. As the Government of India are said to have put the matter in August 1888, the division of Afghanistan between England and Russia, or the advance of Russia across her present frontier into Afghanistan, would be ruinous to India in expense, and our position in India would under such circumstances become intolerable.

Importance to Russia of Afghan co-operation.

Those who best know Afghanistan are then of opinion that invasion of India by Russia is possible, and would in the event of war certainly be undertaken provided that Russian influence were dominant in Kabul, and that this could hardly fail to be the case were Russia at Herat and Balkh. The co-operation of Afghanistan would be of such essential moment to the Russians that any gifts or promises would be cheap payment for it, and it is certain that such promises would not be wanting after the Russians had been allowed to establish themselves at Herat.

The problem of defence.

We have now to consider by what means the danger of invasion is guarded against at the present moment, and what further steps would be necessary if, by the adoption of a foolish policy, the danger should increase.

Schemes for defence. What has actually been done.

The original idea was to watch the outlet of the passes and have our main armies on the plains; but this plan involved, in time of peace, the keeping of our chief garrisons in an unhealthy valley, and in time of war the abandonment of the whole of the right bank of the Indus without a serious struggle. The effect in India, in the event of invasion, of the important stations of Peshawur, Nowshera, Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ghazi Khan, and Dera Ismail Khan being abandoned to our enemies would have been disastrous. Yet it would have been impossible to fight a battle between the Indus and the hills unless at a fortified position at Attock crossing. When this plan was given up, the next suggestion was to fortify the whole length of our new frontier. It was, however, found not only that the fortifications would have cost a great deal of money, and that, for them to be worth much, they would have required larger garrisons than our small army could provide, but that there was an alternative course which, in a military sense, was a wiser one. The third scheme was to strongly fortify not only Quetta but Peshawur. Here again the inadequacy of our army would have made the step perhaps a mistaken one, committing us to fighting in strength upon two lines, or else to wasting a large garrison upon Peshawur—an unhealthy place and not a naturally strong position.

The two lines of defence.

The course which has been taken is that of deciding to fight with our field army upon the Quetta line, and of resisting upon the Khyber line, first in the defiles, and then at Attock, only sufficiently to delay the enemy while we attacked him upon the flank. But the arsenal at Rawul Pindi is to be defended on account of the possibility of descent from Kashmir upon our great railway line, and also as the last position for the defence of

the Khyber route. We have made an excellent military road through Kohat and Bannu to Dera Ismail Khan, as well as the perfect road from Dera Ghazi Khan to Pishin, which I traversed in the cold weather of 1888-89, and which enables troops from the Punjab to march to the Pishin valley on the road towards Giriskh or Kandahar without going round by Sindh.

The Quetta line.

We have made excellent military roads round Quetta, and, besides our tunnel through the Khojak, which will be finished some time between April and November 1890, an excellent military road over the summit of that pass. There has been constructed a twofold line of broad-gauge railroad to the frontier with a bridge across the Indus at Sukkur; Quetta has been strongly fortified as a base, and the position is one naturally so nearly impregnable that even the fact that the new fortifications would not stand against the "high" explosives with which foreign field artillery may soon be armed hardly weakens the value of the Quetta base. The Baleli position in front of Quetta can be easily strengthened by inundations, with the curious result that those of the enemy advancing upon it who do not die of thirst in the "country of sand" will, when they meet water for the first time, find too much of it. Quetta, in short, with its system of roads and railways, now forms a magnificent base for a field force, but for the liability of the Indus valley and even of the Afghan passes to occasional July floods. The material sufficient for completing the railway to Kandahar is at the front. The Khyber, on the other hand, is prepared at Lundi Kotal to resist attack by a small party, and, if it is forced, the intention is to fall back first upon the Attock positions and then upon Rawul Pindi, while our main army operates upon the

flank of the invader in the neighbourhood of the Helmund or of Kandahar.

Fortifications.

Fortifications in India are mainly needed by us for securing an advanced base such as Quetta is, and such as, in the event of a break-up of Afghanistan, some point upon the Helmund would become; for the protection of arsenals, such as Quetta and Rawul Pindi, and for the protection of strategic points such as the crossing of the Indus at Attock. Generally speaking it must be understood that the policy which has rightly prevailed in India is that our defence must be by the offensive with a field army, and that the less we have to do with fortifications the better. We have therefore fortified a perfect base, and we are fortifying our arsenal at Rawul Pindi, but are not attempting to cover the whole frontier by a line of fortified positions, such as that which defends France against the German Empire. By roads and railways we are obtaining the power of rapidly concentrating our troops for offensive action upon the invader's flank. In short, the military policy contemplated is the defensive in the extreme North West combined with a vigorous offensive from Quetta or Kandahar. Our Indian army, if the improvement in its transport which, as will be seen, has already been brought about within the last two years be rapidly continued, may be looked upon as an excellent army for the purpose of offensive action from the Quetta base, provided with a system of communications and with an impregnable position in its rear.

The Khyber line.

There may be some who are inclined to think that the Indian Government show a want of caution in proposing to act offensively upon the single line from Quetta, and who believe that the invader would come through Kabul and the Khyber, and would be joined by the

LONDON LIBRARY

Afghan tribes. They point to a supposed necessity of our resisting in strength upon the Khyber line; but the best defence for the Khyber would be attack on the Kandahar side or from a new base to be occupied between Ghazni and the Gomul, the fortification of which would both defend the Tochi and Gomul passes, and afford a starting-point for an advance to Ghazni for ourselves. The position of Peshawur, and the probable hostility to us of the tribes in the event of a Russian advance, make resistance in the Peshawur valley impossible. All we could do would be to delay the enemy in the pass, gain time for orderly retirement, fall back, in the first instance, upon our position at the Indus crossing, and, as a last stand, upon the entrenchments at Rawul Pindi. It should be remembered also that the supply of the army, and its reinforcement, if necessary, from home, are easier by Karachi and Quetta than by Bombay and Peshawur. These considerations form a complete defence for the policy which has won the day.

Transport.

While the Indian authorities are, as I have said, pessimists with regard to matters bearing upon Indian defence which are not within their own control, they are of opinion that India is better prepared for war than is admitted by their critics. The considerable length of time which would be needed before concentration at or near Kandahar is chiefly caused, they think, by the distances which have to be travelled. The funds for the purchase of 5000 mules which were provided in 1889 will bring the number of mules for transport, exclusive of those in Burmah, to upwards of 13,000. The army have also a thousand camels; and an immense number of mules, donkeys, and ponies are available for purchase or hire in the Punjab and North West, while the frontier itself can supply a vast number of slow camels. It is

supposed that in any future war wheeled transport will be again resorted to, although there were immense losses in connection with wheeled transport in the last Afghan campaign. In 1880 the whole road from Kandahar to Sibi was strewn with the wreckage of thousands of broken-down carts, but it is thought that the new carts which are being made for transport will be really strong and serviceable, and the roads to the extreme military frontier have been much improved. India is at least well prepared for war as compared with England.

Steps to be taken.

While the measures that have been taken are sufficient for the present upon the Quetta line, and those which are being taken at this moment are sufficient upon the Khyber line, it is necessary to take immediately certain other steps, either in other places or of a general nature. Above all, it is necessary to still further increase the reserve of mules and the reserve of horses, with all the necessary saddlery, harness, and carts, and to provide the whole army with the latest weapons. The delay in deciding about the new magazine rifle has been serious, as we are unable to arm the whole of the native infantry with Martini-Henry rifles until the British troops in India have received the new rifle. The question of ammunition is also difficult. So long as some of our Indian forces are armed with the Snider rifle we must keep up a reserve of Snider ammunition, and, in the hope that the British soldiers will soon have the magazine rifle, Government are unwilling to keep a large reserve of even Martini-Henry ammunition. The ammunition difficulty extends also to the artillery, of which some batteries have the new twelve-pounder breech-loading guns, while others are still armed with the old nine-pounder muzzle-loading guns. The Indian authorities are of opinion that the dependence of India

upon the War Office for arms and stores should be brought to an end, and India, like the Colonies, allowed to buy them in the open market. The Indian railway bridges should be made fit for the passage of troops on foot; rolling stock on the railways—terribly deficient—increased to enable troops to be conveyed with rapidity by our strategic lines. The bridges of boats that have been taken away should be replaced; the Indus ferries kept up; the railway should be made to Bannu; the Tochi valley surveyed and opened to trade, and the tribes as far as the Afghan posts brought into relations with ourselves. It is known to the Indian Government, since the recent visits of Sir Robert Sandeman and of General Prendergast, that the Zhob valley would pay for occupation, and that the chiefs and people desire our protection. During the Viceroy's visit to the frontier in November 1889 it was rightly decided to annex the Zhob, and in December Sir R. Sandeman marched through the Gomul Pass. The Kuram line—which would have to be defended, first at Peiwar Kotal, then in the defiles, and then at Kalabagh, where a bridge head is needed—would become also a valuable alternative line of advance for ourselves. Bridge fortifications are also needed for the defence of the Sukkur position. In the meantime surveys should be carried on between the Zhob and Ghazni, with the view of the selection of the strongest point that can be found as a more northern base for our field army. Such a spot is already marked upon our military maps, but it is perhaps better that its name should not be divulged.

The frontier.

It would be an excellent military step, and, as I think, an excellent civil step as well, to put the whole of the frontier policy and all dealings with the tribes under one man. At the present moment the Punjab Government

are allowed to pursue a useless course of blockade, and of the taking of hostages, when it is a well-known fact that the blockaded tribes are glad to have some of their chiefs kept for them in comfort, and are always able to obtain the goods they want from their next neighbours. When Sir Frederick Roberts commanded at Kuram he was also chief political officer there, and it was at one time proposed to divide the frontier between Sir Robert Sandeman and himself, Sir Frederick Roberts taking the north part, and Sir Robert Sandeman the south, or, in other words, that which he has now, but with, I fancy, although I did not hear it from himself, a general control over the whole. This arrangement was prevented by the Afghan War and Sir Frederick Roberts's promotion. The civil officers of the frontier, who have to do with Districts, cannot possibly find time, in executing their continually increasing duties, to carry on relations with the border tribes in that slow manner which is necessary for success. The Commissioner of the frontier might be given a district as large as possible, from Gilgit to the Persian Gulf, provided that he had nothing to do but travel about and meet the chiefs, and preside over their councils. They need not see him often—once a year in each part of his district would be enough, so that one progress along it each year would suffice, and this could be accomplished in the cold weather between October and March. Of course he must have good men under him, as Sir Robert Sandeman has good men now.

Soldiers less experienced than Sir Frederick Roberts are sometimes inclined to resent the authority given to political officers upon the military frontier; but the work cannot be done by the soldiers themselves. On the one hand they are apt to be a little rough in dealing with the tribes, and on the other, they shrink

from the often necessary advance of posts, on account of the unpopularity in the army of frontier stations, where both officers and men are literally bored to death. The army, generally speaking, are as much opposed to advancing our posts into the Zhob—as advised by Sir Frederick Roberts and Sir Robert Sandeman—as were the navy to the retention of Port Hamilton, and for the same reason. They look upon this service on the extreme frontier much as the Egyptian army look upon service in the Soudan.

Sir Robert Sandeman.

Sir Robert Sandeman's one idea is said to be to retire from India and take service of some sort in Ireland, in which idea his enemies, if he has any, will hope that he may succeed, and all his friends will hope that he may fail. If the Government of India would consent to place the whole of the frontier in Sir Robert Sandeman's hands no better arrangement could be made. If they will not do so, then, upon the retirement of Sir Robert Sandeman, I should be glad myself to see the whole frontier given to the Viceroy and controlled directly by himself. The one thing that ought not to be is that the present jealousies of the Governments of the northern portion of the frontier should continue. It is a singular example of the way in which Governments go on in old-fashioned lines that we keep up separate establishments with separate Governors at places like Madras and Bombay, of which the first is unimportant and the second important only as far as trade is concerned, whereas the vital point of the whole Empire is partly left in the excellent hands of Sir Robert Sandeman, but partly left to chance. While Sir Robert Sandeman is a kind of king of the whole country between Persia and the Punjab, beyond Sir Robert Sandeman we come first to the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazi,

then to the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail, then to three other Deputy Commissioners, and then to Colonel Warburton, all of them being more or less hampered by the Punjab Government. The Governor-General of Russian-Turkestan keeps the frontier question in his own hands, and unless the Indian Government is content to put the whole question into the hands of Sir Robert Sandeman, who would be cheap at a peerage and the salary of Madras or Bombay, then our frontier should be in the Viceroy's direct control.

Need for uniform policy.

There should not be one policy for the Bolan, another for the Khyber, and a third for the Tochi valley and Gomul pass, but one policy for the frontier, the passes, and the tribes. The object of a frontier policy is to protect the peasantry of India against raids; to protect the merchants who use the passes against exaction; to allow our survey parties to do their work without being fired at, as they have been fired at in the Mangrotha and the Gomul; to organise transport for the possibility of our advance; to make such military roads as we think necessary. In certain eventualities, moreover, after advancing through the passes we must be able to count on finding the people friendly, and, when we reach the other side of them, must be certain of tranquillity in our rear. All this has been attained in British Baluchistan, and can be attained farther north by the adoption of Sir Robert Sandeman's tribal and local levy system. So complete is the belief in the Indian military and foreign departments that the side which has the tribes with it in a frontier war will win, that it is difficult to explain how it is that the Khyber system of Colonel Warburton has not been extended to the Afridis of the Bazar valley

and to the Kohat pass, or the Sandeman system to the Wazaris behind the Gomul. Not only should we gain security in time of peace, but the advantage of large numbers of recruits of warlike tribes, who could be brought into our ranks against the time of war. Our local levies are expected gradually both to develop their military efficiency (as the Khyber rifles have already done : witness their excellent performance in the Black Mountain expedition) and to extend the recruiting ground for our regular native force. It is also possible that the improved levies may find suitable employment for the best of the native officers of our own army.

The Sandeman system.

The local levy system—which is an aristocratic tribal system under British protection, which answers perfectly, secures peace and order, the arrest of criminals, the guarding of roads, the protection of trade and of telegraphs, and the partial cessation of blood feuds—rests upon our maintenance of the authority of the chiefs and the decision of all tribal questions, according to the will of the majority of the sirdars and according to tribal custom. In the districts of strong chiefs the system is very similar to that by which the Dutch have long ruled Java, although the Baluch population is as independent as the Javanese Malays are cringing. Sir Robert Sandeman answers to the Dutch Resident, and princes like Jam Ali of Lus Beyla to the Dutch Java-Sultan. We have also an analogous system of government in the British dominions in our new colony of Fiji, but there we have, living side by side with the chiefs, white planters, who make a grievance of the favour shown to the chiefs for the purpose of upholding their influence with the tribes. The Sandeman system could not exist if there were a British population settled in Baluchistan.

Other steps to be taken.

One of the many matters that I would deal with as a whole by extending the Sandeman system over all the tribes between ourselves and the Afghan posts, and by employing them on road-making, is that of the road from Peshawur to Kohat, which should be properly made, and arrangements entered into for keeping it open. We must speedily erect forts, similar to that which has just been finished to block the Khyber, in the cross valleys which form alternative routes from Jelalabad to the Peshawur valley. It is useless to waste much money upon important forts in this neighbourhood, because they could not be held if the tribes rose against us, and we should have to fall back at once to the Attock position on the Indus, where, it should be observed, the Attock forts have still to be completed. One of the further steps which will, sooner or later, need to be undertaken, is an extension of the railway from Quetta towards the west, in the direction of Nushki—a matter to which I shall be forced to return. A difficulty is at present caused by Karachi, the base for the defensive action, being in the hands of the Bombay Government, while the army which would be supplied through Karachi and Quetta would be a Bengal army; but this difficulty is only one of those which are caused by the Presidency system, the abolition of which is of the first necessity.

Kafristan and Kashmir.

I have now named the various steps that should at once be taken, with this addition, that in the north we should make friends of, and employ as soldiers, the inhabitants of Kafristan, and so defend the passes of Chitral. It is understood that the visit of Sir Frederick Roberts to Kashmir in May 1889 was connected with a scheme for raising a local force for the frontier defence, and for improving the

Kashmir organisation for the defence of Gilgit. This was very necessary, as, though in the event of a Russian advance on India the main attack would doubtless come by the road which offers the fewest difficulties, namely, through Herat, smaller columns of infantry, with mountain guns, would attempt to pass through Gilgit as well as across the Pamir to Swat, and through Leh into Kashmir.

Action in the event of further Russian advance.

Now there comes the question of the steps that should be taken if, under one pretext or another, the Russians should advance to Herat or Balkh, or both. I have already stated that I believe that the announcement of the promises we have made to the Ameer would be sufficient to prevent advance, but failing that announcement the advance may come. If it come during the life of the Ameer, which is unlikely, I assume that war would be the result; but if it come under the other circumstances which have been described as possible, and if public or parliamentary opinion at home would not support resistance, what are the steps which should be taken? The railway would at once be laid to Kandahar, although I should strongly advocate the policy of stopping short of that city, and not attempting ourselves to undertake the government of the town or province. In the opinion of high military authorities a railroad equipped with defensive posts must then also be made to Nushki and towards Farrah, and there are some who would have this line begun at once. Mr. George Curzon, in a paper read before the British Association, in 1889, advocated the pushing forward of railways into Seistan mainly for purposes of trade, and there can be little doubt that the future communication with Europe will pass between India and Persia by this route. The Russians have taught us, as American

example seems not previously to have done so, that railways need not be as costly as ours in India, and that lines useful both for trading and for strategic purposes can be made at little cost even in difficult countries. The Russians have bridged a far more difficult river than any we should have to cross, with a bridge of wood brought to the spot at greater cost than would be incurred by taking American wood to Seistan, and, according to Mr. Curzon, the Russian bridge across the Oxus cost only £30,000, whereas we should probably have spent upon it from half a million to a million. In the opinion of many who have given consideration to the question our position on the North-West frontier will never be thoroughly secure until we have two lines of railway meeting in Seistan—one connected with India, probably by our Quetta route, and the other with a point on the Persian Gulf. The country between the Persian Gulf and Seistan must be surveyed, for with our present knowledge it is impossible to say whether the line should be from Gwadur or from some other port farther westward. The Nushki lines are not the only additional strategic lines of railway which will have to be constructed if Russia comes to Herat or Balkh, and to make railways in such difficult country as the Afghan frontier takes so much time that there will be no room for delay. The heavy rains of 1889 showed that neither the Bolan nor the Sibi-Pishin railway can be depended upon when the floods are higher than is usual, and it is scarcely possible to provide sufficient culverts for the immense volume of water which sometimes comes off the high hills surrounding both these railways. The want of cross communication also between our line of defence in the front of the Khyber and our Quetta line is too complete for safety. The only railway communi-

cation from Quetta or from Sibi with Peshawur, or with Rawul Pindi, or the Attock crossing, goes round by Lalla Musa or by Lahore. The Zhob stream rises not far from Pishin, and is easily accessible from a point between Pishin and Loralai. It flows into the Gomul stream, and forms a natural line of communication between Dera Ismail Khan and Quetta, and saves 200 miles, while the construction along it of a railway would bring a vast tract of disturbed country under quiet rule. In the course of November and December 1889 the military authorities have been carrying out a survey of the Indus between Kalabagh and Dera Ismail Khan with a view to the ultimate construction of a bridge, and with the hope that some day Attock will be connected by a line upon the Indian or eastern side of the Indus with the routes through the Gomul and the Bolan, so as to give the necessary mobility to the forces engaged in the defence of the right and centre of our position on the North-West frontier. Above all—and in this would lie the great permanent expenditure—the trustworthy portion of our Indian army, both white and native, must be increased; and it is in the necessary increase of the European army in India, already so tremendous a burden to that country, that lies the immense danger in allowing a Russian advance to the Hindu Kush.

Increase of force in that event.

A regimental reserve has lately been established in India for the native army, and a reserve which, unlike our so-called reserve in England, is to be trained; but this excellent force, should it grow as is hoped in numbers, will only increase the disproportion between the native and white troops, and, unless there is a proportional augmentation in the number of white troops serving in India, will not increase as against Russia our fighting

The reserve.

strength. At present the reserve is small, and would not fill up the ranks to their usual numbers after the losses of a single battle.

Insufficiency of present force for the eventuality,

Our Indian army is possibly sufficient for our present Indian needs and dangers; that is, while the Russians keep behind the frontier lately marked by us and them with much solemnity, and recognised, as previously mentioned, by the Russian Emperor—as lately as the 8th June 1888. Our army is, however, as will be shown, insufficient for the other eventuality. The mobilisation scheme which was prepared in India and sent home contemplates, I believe, that India should take the field with two army corps and a reserve division, and some 250 guns; but it asks for six battalions of British infantry, so that perhaps it will be desirable to neglect the reserve division. If the Afghans were with us we should be able to advance beyond Kandahar with 55,000 picked troops, which would be sufficient to meet such an army as the Russians could bring against us if they had to start from their present frontier, with the enormous difficulties of transport across the desert. In the event, however, of a long war beyond Kandahar, or of a Russian advance from a new frontier on the Indian side of Herat, India would need a large force from England to reinforce the garrisons of the Indian towns, to make further provision for lines of communication, and also to replace casualties. The coming of these troops would enable every good man now in India to be sent to the front, and the men from England might be recruits, except for the fact that men of very youthful age die in large numbers from the climate. The stores for the first army corps would be ready at Quetta, and those for the second at Rawul Pindi. It has been suggested that the second army corps is mythical, like the second army corps in

England, and when I set out to pay my last visit to India, to look into the Defence question, I was inclined to be sarcastic about the probable results of an encounter between the Indian second army corps and the second army corps at home; but as a fact all is ready for the second army corps except the transport, and there is, as I have shown, a great deal of country transport to be obtained in India, while the Russians at the present moment are also not without their transport difficulties.

and of transport.

There can be no doubt that our transport in India is still defective, although immense progress has been made since Sir Frederick Roberts has held command and been assisted in this matter by his late Quarter-master-General and by General Chesney. As matters stand our transport difficulties would be all but overwhelming if the tribes opposed us, but would present far less difficulty if they were friendly. Sir Robert Sandeman was able in the period from 1879 to 1881 to assure the armies that passed through the Bolan and that occupied Kandahar that he would see that they should not starve; and, even after Maiwand, he had no difficulty in procuring supplies through his own people, although he was attacked by those people from beyond his northern frontier with whom he had, owing to the opposition of the Punjab Government, not been allowed to deal. We have now two perfectly open lines of communication, yielding a good deal of local camel transport, both of which I myself have crossed. The more northerly, however, of these lines has been carried at vast cost over the summit of a mountain 6000 feet in height, when the line might have been made shorter, and have crossed the Sulieman range through an easy pass at a height of only 800 feet. At last, owing to a positive declaration on the part of the Commander-in-Chief and of the

The tribes.

late Quartermaster-General that the opening of the Gomul is a military necessity, the posts are being advanced; but the jealousy of the Punjab Government continues to be marked. The questions of frontier arrangement and of transport are closely connected, and our soldiers appear to be right in their contention that we can do everything if the tribes are with us, and nothing if they are against us. From the Sandeman frontier in the Zhob southwards they are with us: northward they are hostile or almost ignorant of our existence, because the Punjab Government has pretended to have a defined frontier at the mountain foot, and has not established with them those relations which we should have fostered. A thoroughly friendly support from the tribes as far as the Afghan posts is easy of attainment, and to get as loyal a support from the tribes who lie between the Afridis and the Lunis as we have from the Lunis and from the Afridis themselves is essential to our position. When in November-December 1888 Sir Robert Sandeman marched to Khan Mahomet Kot, Morgha, and Mina Bazar, he made it possible to survey the Gomul and to give us a far shorter road from India to the new frontier. By every such step fresh tribes of ex-robbers will become our best supporters, camel transport will be locally obtained, and our position upon the frontier made daily more secure.

The native army.

The native army in India is only partly good enough to be used in the field against the Russians. In writing a few months ago upon the subject I was forced to frankly state the opinion of the best impartial military judges upon a portion of the southern infantry. This was converted into an attack upon the whole Bombay army by some critics, for the Madras army was generally

given up as regards service against a European enemy. I was far from attacking the Bombay army generally, for I praised its cavalry, its mountain batteries, and its pioneers, and praised indeed its infantry so far as old-fashioned Indian service was concerned, merely pointing out—what is notorious to those who are not partial—that the Bombay infantry are not fit to cope with picked Russian infantry, who are the possible enemy for whom in India we have to prepare. It is a curious fact that I was criticised on both sides at once—by Bombay officers and writers for depreciating native troops, and by English military authorities for rating them too high in stating my firm belief that our Indian native cavalry are, for service in India or upon the Indian frontier, as good as any cavalry that could be put in line against them. The gallant service of some Bombay troops in the Karen field force was brought up against me, as though I had for one moment pretended that Bombay troops, with their admirable discipline, would not get the better of irregular native levies. My point, and the only point worth discussing, is whether Bombay troops are fit, in the usual proportions of native troops to British troops, to stand against the advance of picked Russians. Another form of criticism on my remarks was to be found in the *Times of India*, which took the line of asserting that, if Madras and Bombay infantry could not be employed against Russians, "Bengal proper" was on a par with them, and that when "the Bengalis boast of their troops they" were "referring to their . . . frontier troops and Sikhs." This is good criticism, and I fully admit that down-country Bengal troops would be of as little use against Russians as troops from the Southern Presidencies, and that the only native infantry which ought to be placed in the field in Afghanistan is that

composed of Goorkhas, Sikhs, Pathans, Afridis, and the best of the Punjab Mohammedans. The critic, however, went on to urge that what was wanted was "marching power, discipline, and a thorough musketry training, in each of which most of the native Indian regiments are exceptionally good." The writer seems to leave out of account that power of standing up against European attack which is not exactly the same thing as mere courage, and which, once present among the Southern Indian races, seems to have died out among them in the opinion of those of the best judges who are not as it were personally enlisted upon the other side. I fear then that I cannot modify the view which I expressed with regard to the southern infantry, and that, while probably the seven regiments of Bombay cavalry and the two Bombay mountain batteries might be used on active service against a Russian attack, the twenty-six regiments of Bombay infantry (including their excellent pioneers) could not be put in the front line. So too, while the four regiments of Madras cavalry and the five regiments of Hyderabad Contingent cavalry could be used, if their regimental system should be modified as will be explained, the thirty-two regiments of Madras infantry or pioneers and the six regiments of Hyderabad Contingent infantry could not be safely put in the front line. The Hyderabad Contingent artillery are on mobilisation to become ammunition columns, as were some of our own artillery under the War Office scheme of 1887, now nominally abandoned for another system, which has, however, no real existence.

Number of good troops.

In the Bengal army and Punjab Frontier Force there are sixty-seven regiments of infantry or pioneers, of which, by careful inquiry, I made out forty-nine, besides pioneers, or fifty-two in all, to be good. There are

twenty-four regiments of cavalry of the Bengal army or Frontier Force and six mountain batteries. The result of the most elaborate inquiries into the character of each regiment in the whole Native Army led me to believe that the forty regiments of cavalry are as good as anything that could be brought against them; the eight mountain batteries could all be used in the field, if sufficient money were spent on them in advance; and forty-nine regiments of infantry for the front line, besides the six regiments of pioneers, which might be employed on their own work. This leaves seventy battalions of infantry which could not be put in the field against the Russians and are not really worth the money they cost. If we take the infantry as averaging 800 men to a battalion, we shall find that there are 56,000 infantry that are not good enough to use against a European enemy. On the other hand, there are 44,000 infantry or pioneers good enough, if in combination with an equal number of white troops, to use against a European enemy. If we take the cavalry regiments as averaging 550 horses, 22,000 native cavalry can be used; and the eight batteries at an average of 250 men would give 2000 men for use; that is, 68,000 good, as against 56,000 not fit to take the field against a Russian advance. There are also in various parts of India certain irregular troops which are fit for use, such, for example, as the excellent Khyber rifles. Now it is an accepted principle that we must put into the field almost as many white as native troops, and that we must leave a large number of trustworthy garrisons in India. As we have about the same number of trustworthy troops and white troops in India the proportions seem easy to observe, provided we neglect the less efficient troops, which, in my opinion, ought to be gradually reduced.

Army should be recruited from certain races only.

It will have been seen from what I have written that I have formed a distinct opinion that we should cease to enlist men from the unwarlike races. We have already ceased to enlist Bengalis, and I should wish that the same principle should be extended, and that we should no longer enlist men from Southern India. When I come to discuss the Presidency system I will consider whether there is any political danger in enlisting only men from the Punjab and North West, and from outside our frontier; but for the moment I will lay down the preliminary view that our native infantry is of the most varying degrees of merit; that no one would dream of sending Madras, Bombay, or down-country infantry regiments against Russians; yet that our native infantry can produce troops as good as any in the world. We can show in the 4th Goorkhas, or the 44th Goorkhas, indeed in Goorkha regiments generally, unequalled dash; and in the 2d Sikhs, or 14th or 15th Sikhs, and many other Sikh regiments, a steadiness able to resist any shock, and men fit for any service except, indeed, one of those prolonged campaigns in which scurvy plays havoc in their ranks. As we can obtain in India recruits from several warlike races, and of more than one religion, it seems clear that we should cease to raise mere peace troops, and to tax the Indian people for their support. It is possible that we can for the present not find an increased supply of Goorkhas, but we have not quite reached our limit as regards Sikhs, and we have hardly tapped the resources of the Afridis and the other frontier tribes. For my own part, failing Goorkhas, I should prefer frontier men to the ordinary Indian Mohammedans. When we were sending Moslem troops to the Soudan an agitator appeared among them, and was ultimately tried at Loodiana for attempting to induce them not to

fight against their Arab co-religionists. If we should ever find ourselves exposed to a Russian invasion, headed by Turcoman levies, these agitators will appear, not by ones or twos, but by hundreds, among our Indian troops. I had sooner trust Afridis than Indian Mohammedans to resist them. It should also be remembered that the British Empire contains vast numbers of warlike races, and that among the Chins of the Burmah hills, whom we are now fighting, and the Malays, not to speak of the Houssas and other African subjects, we might find magnificent recruiting grounds.

Impossibility of safely using southern troops in Afghanistan,

While then a large portion of our Indian army is so composed that it would not be possible to place it in the field against Russian troops, that part of our Indian army which is good is all but perfect—as good in prosperous times as the best British troops. The drill, even of the Bombay troops, is admirable, but those who have had experience of them in battle know that, in spite of their drill, fierce Arabs can go through them as they please. When they are considered as troops to hold lines of communication, and to do police work, it should be remembered that every additional mouth in Afghanistan is a serious matter, and that the better the troops the fewer the men that are employed. Moreover, it is costly to employ the southern troops in Afghanistan, because they are invalided in great numbers on account of the inclemency of the climate, and hate the service. The Telegu family Sepoy of the Madras army is essentially a well-drilled policeman and not a fighting soldier, and I myself do not think that, whatever was once the case, even the Rajput foot-soldier that we now attract to our standard is good enough for our service. Our Indian mobilisation plans ought (they do not) to frankly take into account the uselessness, as

regards field service, of a large portion of the native infantry. It has to be virtually recognised in this way that the regiments for war service are brigaded three together, and that the inferior ones would be left upon the lines of communication, and would have to give up a portion of their white officers to the regiments at the front. Sir Richard Temple has said that it is important not to allow the Madras and Bombay armies to feel any sense of inferiority, or the Bengal army to regard itself as occupying a superior position, and as being indispensable to the State. There is much apparent wisdom in this view, but it is altogether too late to urge it. Since the Russian danger has come upon us the Madras and Bombay infantry, being notoriously inferior to a portion of the Bengal army, as being recruited from less warlike races, are well aware that they will not be used in the field, while the Bengal army is fully persuaded that it alone will fight. It is perfectly well known throughout India that no general chosen to command in the field would allow even the very few southern regiments which nominally form part of the first and second army corps to appear in the fighting line. It is too late for Sir Richard Temple's natural objection, and this points to the dissolution of the southern armies as separate organisations, and to the unification of the native force with fighting men only in its ranks.

and for chief garrisons.

Many of the "garrisons" will require troops trustworthy as regards mutiny, although not necessarily of high efficiency for the field; but I fear that the southern troops would not be used largely even for this purpose. There are a great number of garrisons in India which are called "obligatory," but these include a force for places which are really on the line of communications, such as Quetta, Rawul Pindi, Loralai, Peshawur, Kohat,

Dera Ghazi Khan, and Dera Ismail Khan. Of course the garrisons of Rawul Pindi, Peshawur, and the places lying between and in the neighbourhood, would be intended in the first place for the defence of the Khyber and of the Attock positions, and in the second place for that of the Pindi entrenched camp.

The force in India.

We have in India at the present time about eleven horse artillery batteries, forty-two field artillery batteries, four heavy batteries, sixteen mountain batteries, and twenty-three garrison batteries of artillery. We have nine regiments of British cavalry, and forty regiments of native cavalry if we count the Hyderabad Contingent, which should certainly be counted, or forty-one with the Central India Horse. We have about fifty-three battalions of British infantry, and about one hundred and twenty-two battalions of native infantry, with some irregular forces. The two army corps would take for the field army about eight horse artillery batteries, about seventeen field batteries, about three heavy batteries, and about eleven mountain batteries, some six regiments of British cavalry, and fifteen of native cavalry, twenty-seven battalions of British infantry, and thirty-four of native infantry. There would, therefore, as is seen at a glance, be a large force left behind—a larger force indeed staying behind than would go into the field; but the artillery would be crippled by mobilisation, as horses would be taken from the batteries in India for the benefit of those mobilised. Moreover, it is only the batteries for the field army which are as yet armed with the new gun. The infantry and cavalry would, however, be in a far better position than would be the case in England with the troops left behind after mobilisation. An altogether unnecessarily large force of magnificent native cavalry would remain behind in India under this scheme.

Mobilisation.

The weak point of all Indian mobilisation proposals, those of 1887 and 1888 included, has always been that the Indian Government asked for a good deal from England which there would be but little chance of their obtaining. I believe that the Indian authorities think that they require some 500 captains or subalterns, some 200 medical or veterinary officers, and some 20,000 men upon the outbreak of war, and 10,000 for casualties in the first campaign, or about 1000 men a month. I cannot myself but believe that the wisest course would be for the Indian Government to recognise the fact that they will not get officers from England in the event of a general war, and to arrange for promoting non-commissioned officers and utilising their own reserve of officers, now in course of formation, and also for obtaining skilled volunteers who have gone through their training well. The best of the officers from the Madras and Bombay infantry should, of course, be utilised to fill vacancies in the fighting regiments, and their places filled by British non-commissioned officers, able to speak native languages. Difficulties are thrown in the way of all such proposals by the separation between the Bengal, Madras, and Bombay armies; but every vestige of this separation must be swept away at once if India is ever to be successful in a war.

Cavalry.

The infantry and cavalry in India can be mobilised without trouble. The artillery, as I have said, is in much the same position in this respect as the artillery at home. For example, of the eight native mountain batteries in India only five are reckoned upon for service in the field; but the other three are perfectly useless when left behind, for there are no reserve gun mules, and as a fact three batteries out of eight are completely sacrificed to make five for the field army. Looking to

the character of our native cavalry, and to the fact that the Cossacks and the Turcoman horse, which alone the Russians would be likely to bring against them after a desert march which would be destructive to their European cavalry, would be troops of the same class, I doubt myself whether it be necessary to have British cavalry in India. British cavalry would, of course, be of the greatest service in the event of a defeat, when the Indian cavalry could not be counted upon; but we must not look forward to a defeat upon our North-West frontier, for our rule in India will not survive such reverses. The mobilisation scheme contemplates the placing of about four out of five thousand British cavalry in the field; but I think, though military opinion is against me, that we might safely employ the whole of our native cavalry in the field, and cease to send British cavalry to India, with a great saving to the finances of that country, and with an augmentation to our strength at home in the very point where we are weakest. At the same time, when Lord Randolph Churchill was at the India Office, I believe that he was on the point of reducing the number of British officers in the Indian army, and of substituting natives, but Anglo-Indian military opinion would strongly disapprove of our relying upon native cavalry unless the present number of white officers were kept up or increased. I know that many Bengal officers believe that the Madras cavalry are, although smart-looking upon parade, made useless by the immense number of their followers and by their bad arrangements for cutting grass. But I cannot believe that these are "fixed points" of the Madras service, and one result of the abolition of the separate Madras command would be to assimilate the cavalry system of Madras to the cavalry system of Bengal.

Commanding officers.

Great pains have been taken lately to have the best of soldiers at the head of regiments as commanding officers and as second in command. One special reason why care is even more needed in this matter in India than elsewhere is because the choice of recruits rests with the commanding officer, and by this choice he may make or mar his regiment. We have among the people of India the best and the worst fighting material in the world, and merely to decide that a particular regiment or company is to consist, say, for example, of Punjab Mohammedans, is not sufficient to give uniformity of type. For instance, there are Northern Indian Mohammedans who cannot be counted upon to fight, while those from Chilianwala and the Salt Range, and from near Rawul Pindi, are as good as any recruits that can be found. On the whole, although I should prefer to see a smaller force of artillery more completely provided for war and easier to mobilise, and although I should wish to see the arrangements hastened for buying transport, I consider that the Indian army, when the abolition of the Presidency commands is complete, will be in an efficient condition for the service that it has at present to perform, and that invasion is impossible until the frontiers of any possible enemy have been advanced. In this event the army will have to be rapidly increased.

The Presidency system.

The Presidency system places directly under the Commander-in-Chief in India only the Bengal Army and the Frontier Force, and in a certain degree the Hyderabad Contingent and the Central India Horse, or less than two-thirds of our native army. Seventy-nine battalions of infantry of one sort and another are under the Commander-in-Chief in India, and fifty-eight battalions are under the Commanders-in-Chief in Madras or Bombay.

It is essential to both strength and economy to abolish the Madras and Bombay commands, and to concentrate the whole army under the Commander-in-Chief in India and the Viceroy.

It need not be supposed that there never was anything to be said for the Presidency system. The old Indian view, before we had to face the prospect of Russian neighbourhood, was that the organisation of the Indian army must be largely governed by internal political considerations as well as by those external considerations which are alone in view in the case of Continental armies. While it is necessary to make our Indian army as efficient a fighting machine as possible, we have also to remember that we are an alien race, holding by force an enormous territory, and compelled to rely in great measure on native troops, kept together only by bonds of self-interest and discipline. We are forced, therefore, not to trust entirely to one class of recruits, and this is the defence offered for the maintenance of separate Presidency armies. Although they arose, in the first instance, not through the exercise of any political foresight, but simply by chance, nevertheless they now give us, it is pretended by their supporters, who are chiefly to be found in England, a valuable guarantee against military combination or mutiny. I have never for one moment argued in favour of our taking all our troops from one class or one race, but I have condemned the Presidency system, because its absurd administrative complications, and the present distressing conflicts of authority, are admitted by the Government of India to be fatal obstacles to vigour of action in case of war. I grant that during the prevalence of political excitement in India it would be a great advantage to be able to bring troops

from one part of India to another for the purpose of garrisoning or occupying the country. But it is not necessary for this purpose to keep up that Presidency system which the military authorities of India have almost universally condemned. Under the Presidency system the military administration is divided as well as the organisation of the troops. There are, for example, still at Quetta Bombay troops under Bombay administration, although the Quetta force is supposed to be specially under the Commander-in-Chief in India.

Reforms.

Some advance in the direction of simplification has been made. The Ordnance, the Remount, and the Military Finance Departments have been brought under the Government of India; but while the Punjab Frontier Force has been placed under the Commander-in-Chief, the Madras and Bombay armies are still maintained on the Presidency system, although the Presidency Governments have really very little power in the matter except by way of obstruction.

The Simla Commission.

The Army Commission of 1879 pronounced strongly in favour of the abolition of the Presidency system, and adopted the proposals on this subject which had been made by General Chesney as long ago as 1868. They stated that an economical administration of the Indian armies was incompatible with the maintenance of the Presidency system, and that its continuance would be fatal to vigour and efficiency in the conduct of military operations out of India. The recommendation of the Commission was adopted by Lord Lytton and by Lord Ripon, but, although it was toned down to suit the Government at home, it was vetoed successively by Lord Hartington and by Lord Kimberley. In 1885 the matter was again warmly taken up by Lord Dufferin and his Government; but

their proposals were vetoed by Lord Randolph Churchill, who, however, did not base his opposition on the merits of the question, but merely upon his well-known opinion in favour of a parliamentary inquiry into the whole question of Indian administration. The proposal for this general inquiry was, however, dropped, and it has not again been heard of.

The Indian Government pointed out to the Govern- 1888.
ment at home in 1888 that, while the garrison of Quetta and the force in Baluchistan have been placed under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief in India as regards the movements of troops, the stations they occupy, and the duties upon which they are employed, the selection of troops for relief, and the inspection and administration of the force, remain in the hands of the Bombay Government. At one time there were Madras troops at Quetta, but the Madras regiment sent there was transferred to the Bengal establishment. A sort of working arrangement has been arrived at, but both in Baluchistan and in Burmah there exist the elements of friction. It was necessary to put the General commanding in Upper Burmah directly under the Commander-in-Chief, leaving Lower Burmah under the Government of Madras. There is only a small remnant left of the old Presidency system, but this remnant still does much harm. All the inconveniences and embarrassments which occurred during the last Afghan campaign, and which it was predicted by the Government of India would certainly occur again, arose once more in Upper Burmah, after the repeated rejection of the proposals of the Indian Government by the advisers of the Secretary of State.

The Military Member of Council himself has reported that it is difficult to describe in adequate terms the extraordinary embarrassment caused by carrying on military

operations under such conditions. He has said that the amount of needless trouble that the Presidency system involves can only be appreciated by those who have to encounter it.

It is also the case that the Bombay authorities have tried to recruit surreptitiously from the Punjab and North-West provinces, notwithstanding a distinct prohibition which was issued in consequence of the objections of the Government to having the Indian armies homogeneous. I am convinced myself of the groundlessness of the fears as to danger arising from the homogeneous nature of an army recruited only in the Punjab and North West. The Punjab and North West, with the addition of the states outside our border which furnish us with men, give us recruits of most varied kinds. We have Punjab Mohammedans speaking one tongue, Mohammedans of the North West who speak another, Sikhs of a different religion, Goorkhas of a different religion again, as well as a different race and tongue, and Afridis and Pathans—Mohammedans, but divided from the Mohammedans of India by race feeling.

My own belief is that the Presidency system is as unnecessary and as evil in its results in civil as in military affairs; but, while in civil affairs its consequence is only waste and muddle, in military affairs its consequence is danger, and may be the loss of a campaign and destruction of our Empire. If the Indian Council insist on keeping up the Presidency system they may disappear along with it, and certainly their fight for the Presidency system has been a complete condemnation of the wisdom of their own advice. As has been said of it by a former Foreign Minister of France, a friend of England, M. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire, in his work on India: "When will the reform be brought about? . . . The

sooner the better. The existing state of things is intolerable. No doubt there are many obstacles—the resistance of routine and of private interests—but all these obstacles will be surmounted."

1888-89. In 1888 the Secretary of State asked the Government of India to prepare, through their military department, a draft general order based on the supposition that the unification of the Indian military system had been actually sanctioned, and notifying to all concerned how the arrangements were to be carried out. The work, which was one of great labour, was cheerfully undertaken, because Lord Dufferin's Government fancied that the India Office had really given way or changed its mind; but a year after, in the middle of 1889, the Government of India were informed by the Secretary of State that, Lord Cross. while he recognised the completeness of the scheme and the thoroughness with which it had been prepared, he regretted his inability to sanction it, as it would involve legislation for which he did not feel in a position to ask. If this reply on the part of Lord Cross did not merely conceal continued difference of opinion among his advisers, it, being interpreted, must be read to imply that the Secretary of State is afraid to bring India in any form before the House of Commons lest faddists should give trouble. There is another example of the same kind of difficulty. It is admitted by all the authorities of the Church of England that some legislation is needed upon Church matters; but it is difficult to obtain this legislation from a House of Commons in which there is a large Roman Catholic and Presbyterian and a large Nonconformist element, and in which only a small minority are Churchmen interested in ecclesiastical affairs. The result of the impossibility of legislating about the Church of England in the House of Commons must inevitably be, sooner or

later, the disestablishment of the Church; and if Lord Cross be not unduly timid in thinking it impossible to legislate about India in the House of Commons, the result of the impossibility of legislation will be the loss of India. In the refusal of Lord Cross to initiate legislation (if legislation be indeed necessary, which I doubt) to secure the unification of the military command in India, there is a special and peculiar excess of timidity caused by the fact that he is assured of the support of Lord Ripon and of Lord Dufferin, and that he knows that the former of these ex-Viceroys feels so strongly upon the subject as to make it certain that he would be able to secure the support of Mr. Gladstone for the reform. Lord Cross will now bear the blame which might have fallen upon Lord Kimberley. His decision has probably been the last that could be taken in time upon this question. The favourable opportunity may never recur, and to adopt the change when war may threaten, or when the Russian throne may be occupied by one less favourable to peace, will afford us no breathing period to bring the new system into working order.

Force otherwise fit to cope with present difficulties,

When, if ever, the Presidency system has been abolished, the Indian army will be fit for all which at present it has to do. The field army is a nearly perfect force, soon to be supplied with a perfect weapon, and needing only additional transport mules to be able to move rapidly to the front.

but not with future.

Now comes the question of what should be done as regards men and transport if the Russians are unfortunately encouraged or allowed to establish themselves within striking distance, for our military establishment in India, already small when we consider the size of the country and the numbers of its people, will then become ridiculously inadequate for its

duties. When the Russians have connected Herat and Balkh with their European steam communications, and made an impregnable and well-provided base at Herat, our numbers of men in India will have to be regulated by no consideration except that of the completeness of Russian transport. We shall have to be ready to place immediately in the field at Quetta not one army corps alone, or two army corps, but any number of army corps which may be necessary to meet those parts of the innumerable Russian hosts that can find transport to march from Herat to Kandahar. Our own transport difficulties in India show that this, for the Russians, would be entirely a question of cost. We need for the mobilisation of two army corps 20,000 mules, 25,000 camels, and 4000 bullocks. We are able to find a great deal of bullock transport in Sindh, and large numbers of camels in the plains of India, but the plain camels do not stand the Afghan climate. Of hill camels the Brahouis can supply 8000; but these would have to be bought right out at a high price, as the Brahouis themselves will not go out to war. The large amount of transport that I have named contemplates the advance of two army corps each consisting of about 35,000 men and 26,000 followers. The Russians would probably advance without followers except so far as the followers were able to provide for themselves. We have only at the present moment 13,000 transport mules permanently in the hands of the Government of India, and, in the event of the Russians being established at Herat and Balkh, a complete reserve of horses and a provision of transport sufficient to meet the Russian provision of transport must be kept. The Russians are short of mules in Central Asia, but are said to be able to find camels without limit. A vast increase in our infantry

and artillery will be needed if the Russians come to Herat and Balkh.

Separate army.

When we contemplate the increase of the Indian army in the event of Russia being allowed to settle herself in Herat we cannot do so without taking into view the desirability of the creation of a separate army, which is indeed forced upon us by financial considerations. The present system is too ruinous to India to allow of a sufficient force being kept on foot, and we shall court disaster unless we speedily change it, though it is perhaps already too late to do so with safety. India with an increased British force will be drained dry by the money asked of her for a system which is not suited to her needs. When I say a separate army, of course I do not mean a return to the old Company's system. Both the home short service army and the army in India would be under the same supreme authority of the throne. They would be alike in drill, exercises, and discipline, but separate in the existence of two systems of recruiting; one for not more than three years for home service, and one for long service for India and the Colonies.

Inviolability of Afghanistan as opposed to partition.

In the event of Russia coming towards or to Herat and Balkh, and in the course of time organising an attack upon us, which may, it is only fair to note, be precipitated by a policy on our own part offensive to Russia in European affairs, we have to consider at what point she would be vulnerable, because it is difficult to defend our Indian Empire if we are to remain only upon the defensive. The Indian school, as I have pointed out, would wish to strike at Russia from an Indian base. The War Office school would aim against her an expedition from a naval base on the Black Sea coast. Both schools, however, agree in objecting to the only line of

attack which to me seems possible. The Indian Mobilisation Committee, the best known members of which were Generals Roberts, Chesney, Chapman, and Elles, I believe, considered carefully the whole problem a year or two ago, and, although their report was confidential, it is pretty well known to all interested in the question what their general conclusions were. They thought that Russia would be not unlikely, if ultimately she comes to Herat, to hand over that town and valley to Persia as far as civil administration goes, reserving special treaty rights to herself for military purposes—in fact to adopt the policy suddenly and strangely resolved upon as regards ourselves and Herat by Lord Beaconsfield's Government in 1879. The Indian generals were agreed in thinking that in any case Herat would form the base for Russia's main advance, and Balkh for her secondary advance. Holding us to be absolutely bound to the present Ameer for his life, they thought that anarchy might be avoided on his death if the Afghan army were guaranteed its pay pending unanimous selection by the sirdars of a new Ameer.

Our hold over Afghanistan is being increased by the growth of trade, and the small beginning which has been made by the Ameer in working mines will also have favourable results. Captain Griesbach, a deputy superintendent in the Geological Survey of India, who was deputed at the Ameer's request to go to Kabul and report upon the mineral products of Afghanistan, became a trusted counsellor of the Ameer, and went with him to Turkestan in the expedition of 1888-89, returning to India in July 1889. His reports of the Ameer's health are understood to have been to the effect that it is far stronger than has been supposed, and that he may live for many years.

Kandahar

There is a certain danger to our policy involved in the strong desire of many Indian soldiers to occupy Kandahar. It is doubtful to my mind whether even in a military sense, until Russia actually comes to Herat, if we allow her to do so, it would not be better to stay at Chaman rather than to advance to Kandahar. The soldiers seem to think that, while no large army could advance upon the Khyber leaving us in unbroken strength at Kandahar, it is possible that the Russians might pass Quetta. But if enough transport mules are purchased, long before a Russian army could advance in force from Herat towards the Khyber we could be in, or in front of, Kandahar. Coming to it then, we should come as deliverers; advancing to it now, we should reach it as the enemies of the Afghan. Of course, if the Ameer should be brought to wish, owing to trade or other reasons, for the completion of our railway to Kandahar or to the Helmund, it should be made at once; but failing such a wish on the part of the Afghans I do not think that an actual advance should be contemplated until compelled by military necessity.

Indian military opinion.

The generals who served upon the Mobilisation Committee, I believe, calculated that transport difficulties would at present prevent the Russians advancing with more than 60,000 picked troops from Herat, and that, at the outside, Russia could at the same time, by sending small parties across the passes, gradually collect 20,000 men in the neighbourhood of Kabul or the Khyber, feeding them, however, with much difficulty. This is a computation based on the existing state of things, and not on a consideration of what would happen if Russia had been some time established at Herat. The Mobilisation Committee, I believe, assumed that we should insist on the inviolability of Afghanistan, and declare a violation of the frontier lately settled between us and

Russia a *casus belli*, even after the death of the present Ameer. They doubtless argued that we are but a handful in India; that, although our frontier is the portion of the country which is animated by the most friendly intentions towards ourselves, yet there is danger behind us farther east and farther south.

After the battle of Maiwand the Bombay troops and a part of the Bengal army were dispirited, and there were signs that the native states would not stand by us in the event of a considerable defeat. While some of our leading officers in India have protested against the policy of relying upon the armies of the native states, and while the other party, who wish to use them, have won the day, the latter officers consider the maintenance of our prestige, by treating any invasion of Afghanistan as a *casus belli*, an essential portion of their policy, and if they were persuaded that after the next vacancy in the Afghan throne Russia would be allowed to settle herself at Herat and Balkh, they would change their view and agree that we could not afford to utilise the forces of the independent states. They think, moreover, that for us to look quietly on while Afghanistan is gradually absorbed by Russia will only make an ultimate attack on India the more certain, and the more likely to be successful when it comes. India will be ruined by the expense of keeping up the army which would then be necessary to face the millions of armed men of Russia, and the excitement produced in every native Court by the close neighbourhood of a great power would be unbearable. At the same time the publication of our pledges to the Ameer would for the present prevent a Russian advance. Our Indian officers are unanimous in thinking that in the event of Russia being allowed by England to advance to Herat we should advance to Jelalabad and Kandahar,

and this, of course, would be a virtual partition of the greater part of Afghanistan; but they are opposed to a policy of partition because of the strain and drain upon India which would follow, and they would therefore resist a Russian occupation of Herat.

Present vulnerability of Russia in the Pacific.

The weak point in the Indian argument is that, supposing that a publication of our pledges proved insufficient to prevent a violation of the Afghan frontier, it is difficult to see where we can reach Russia. In my opinion we could do so for some time from the Pacific, especially with the Chinese alliance; but this is not the view of our Indian officers, some of whom think, however, that we could anticipate, or, if not anticipate, then successfully attack, Russia at Herat. It is to me inconceivable that we should be able to anticipate Russia at Herat; but other Indian generals think that we should be able to supply officers to the Afghans to conduct the defence, and that if the Afghans knew that we were coming to their help they could keep out the Russians. Those who hold such views underrate, I am convinced, the power of Russia and the enterprise of her soldiers. Many Indian officers believe that Persia should be enlisted, and could be enlisted, on our side; but Russia can place with ease an immense force upon the Persian northern coast, having a large fleet of steamships on the Volga and Caspian line—the main artery of her Empire. The Indian officers have an easier task when they point out the impossibility of attacking Russia in the manner which has been proposed by strategists at home. The distances in each case are enormous; and it is hard to see where, without powerful alliances, we could attack Russia (except indeed for a time on the Pacific) or where she would not fight us at an advantage. On the other hand, the policy of permanent

alliance with the Central Powers put forward by Colonel Maurice has been rejected by Government.

Invulnerability of Russia elsewhere, and, in the future, everywhere.

It is difficult for me to maintain successfully a defence of my suggested temporary policy, of defending India against Russian invasion by attacking Russia upon the Pacific, against the combined weight of authority presented by our Indian officers and our generals at home. While, however, the policy of an attack on Russia at the Armenian frontier from a Black Sea base rests absolutely upon the Turkish alliance, which may not be obtainable, the policy of an attack on Russia from a Pacific base does not rest wholly upon the Chinese alliance, but would, in my belief, be feasible without it. As long as Russia has not developed steam communication by land with Vladivostock, but yet looks upon this stronghold as an essential portion of her Empire, and one from which everything is to be expected in the future, Russia, it seems to me, must fight at Vladivostock, while she would fight at a great disadvantage. The position is strong, and it is probable that our fleet could not safely force an entrance to the well-protected bay; but if we sat down at Vladivostock with an expeditionary force the tables would be turned. The policy which exhausted Russia in the Crimea would be revived, and revived at present with, I am convinced, the same result. The weak point in the whole policy is that before we are attacked in India Russia will probably have completed her steam communication with her Pacific strongholds, and be able to meet us in superior force even at those distant points.

The Turkish alliance.

The home school in their writings upon the subject assume, as I have said, a European alliance, at least with Turkey. Not only is this an alliance which we may be unable to secure, but the Bosphorus (and, therefore,

ultimately the Dardanelles) could, in the present state of things, easily be seized by suddenly landing a well-equipped and not large Russian force, and it is probable that even with Turkey willing to ally herself to us Russia might not give her the opportunity. Russia is building a fleet of ironclads in the Black Sea to which Turkey has now little to oppose. The sum which was wasted on presents to the German Emperor would have defended Constantinople against a rapid land attack, according to the plans of von der Goltz Pasha, but the money has been steadily refused for the latter purpose, for fear of offending Russia. It seems to me probable that, when the struggle between Russia and England comes, Russia, for whom we are not in diplomacy a match, will have contrived to isolate us from the remainder of the world. What could we then do? Sir Charles MacGregor suggested that we should bring Russia to terms by an atack upon her trade, but I fail myself to see that we could do her much harm even if we blockaded every port and cleared the seas of all her ships. It is difficult to cripple a trade which has so little necessary dependence upon sea routes. Indeed there is much reason to suppose that, although she is never likely to be a match for us at sea, she would do us more harm by interfering with our trade than we could do to her, looking to the fact of her enormous territory and to the smallness of that portion of her foreign trade which is necessarily sea-borne. Unless we had the Turkish alliance, and could confine ourselves to co-operating with the Turks in what would be limited operations upon the Armenian frontier, from a Black Sea base, it is hard to see where in Europe, or in Western or Southern Asia, we could strike a blow. To send an expedition from the Mediterranean or from the Euphrates

against Russia, as seemed in contemplation at the time when certain speeches were made about the value of Cyprus as a base, would be wild in the extreme, and the six or seven hundred miles which our armies would have to march would lie through Turkish or through Persian territory: the country could, moreover, be traversed by a British force during only half the year.

Persia. We could divide Persia with Russia at any time, but to reach Russia through Persia is an operation beyond our strength. The Russians are far nearer to the Persian capital than we are. They could occupy it before we really started upon our march, and in Northern Persia they could easily overwhelm us with their numbers.

Herat. The Indian view, that it would be possible to attack Russia at Herat, is one which seems to me still less tenable, even supposing that the Afghan tribes were friendly and anxious to provide us with supplies. By the time we reached the Russians we should be suffering from the long march, and should be greatly weakened in numbers; and it is difficult to see how we could hope to beat them. While we were marching upon Herat the Russians would send a great number of small columns across the mountains from Maimena and Balkh, and there they would have the country with them. People in India would grow nervous, and expect the Khyber to be both forced and turned through Kashmir, and panic would be not unlikely to result. Instead of our taking the Russians in the flank, as we could do from Quetta if they advanced from Herat on Kabul, they would reverse the process, and take us on the flank as we advanced from Quetta towards Herat. In short, it is certain that no advance in the direction of Herat by a field army would be possible for us, unless we were prepared to

denude Great Britain of troops and to reinforce the Indian army of reserve by every man that we could command for foreign service. Even then the experiment would be a doubtful one. The smallest reverse, it must be remembered, would bring all the lawless elements of India upon our rear, would convert the Afghans into our enemies, and dangerously disturb the native princes. With regard to the attitude of the Afghans it should be remembered that, while they desire to preserve their independence, if a collision occurs between their two great neighbours, in which their government is destroyed, they will prefer to side with the Russians rather than with ourselves. Upon this point there is no doubt among the best authorities. They all agree that, while the Afghans will fight with us against the Russians as long as they have a fair chance of keeping both sides out, they will prefer to become Russian rather than to become Indian subjects of Great Britain. They hate and despise our Indian subjects. They look upon themselves as their superiors and our equals, and they believe that under Russian rule they would play a greater part than is possible to them in the event of absorption by the Government of India. They know our system and dislike it. They know little or nothing of the Russian, but they have a general belief that the Russians allow more local independence in their subject peoples than we ourselves. Even if they become Russian, they think they would be allowed to do as they please, whereas if they became British the laws of India, they fear, would be applied to them.

Virtual partition

There is a policy of second line upon which it would be possible to fall back if the country should reject the Indian policy of declaring to Russia that she must not

cross the frontier lately fixed. It is a policy of partition, or virtual partition, of Afghanistan. Actual partition would, in my mind, be undoubtedly a mistake. At the next vacancy in the Afghan throne, should this country allow the Russians to advance to the line of the Hindu Kush and to occupy Herat, and should we refuse to take steps to keep Afghanistan together and to guarantee the new Ameer, it would, in my belief, be unwise, as I have already argued, to accept the suggestions which have been thrown out to us by Russian officers that we should occupy Kabul. But, short of becoming the apparent destroyers of Afghan independence and the nominal masters of the turbulent and fanatic tribes, we could, in the event of Russia being settled at Herat, advance our position to the Helmund, make our railways and our military roads, prepare our supplies and transport, and take up our position at a spot which would allow us to enter into close relations with the Hazaras, a friendly Tartar people who are hostile to the true Afghans and who occupy the hills to the north-west of Kandahar.

Difference of opinion between the India Office and the Indian Government.

It is hardly possible for those who have given careful attention to this subject to realise how little it is understood by many of those in England who are supposed to be authorities upon the question, and who, to the great danger of the Empire, are allowed to throw difficulties in the Indian Viceroy's way. For example, a powerful party at home has been trying until recently to force upon the Government of India the fortification of Multan. No doubt the fortification of Multan, like that of Peshawur, was at one time wished for by the Indian Government; but times have changed and we have moved, and, now that we occupy an impregnable position at Quetta, it is impossible to suppose that it is worth

wasting the money of India upon the fortification of a place which lies so far behind our frontier. If ever we were driven to Multan we should have to give up or to reconquer India. The energy which the Government of India have of late displayed in fighting against the proposals—which at one time had, I believe, been suggested by the Indian Defence Committee, and agreed to by Sir Donald Stewart—for fortifying Peshawur and Multan, and pushing forward a railway to Kabul at the cost of some four millions sterling, would have sufficed for providing that transport in which we are at present still deficient.

Armies of native states.

We must always remember that it is necessary for us to win the first big battle that we fight, otherwise we shall have to cope with a worse storm than that of 1857 in our rear, while the greater part of our army is at the front. Even supposing that no one of the Indian fighting races should turn against us, we have always the opposition of the rough part of the population, and in the event of our defeat we should have, as in 1857, the indifference of the vast majority and no armed support. The rebellion would be helped by the leadership of more capable men than could be found in 1857, as a result of what we have rightly and necessarily done for education and enlightenment. The native states have armies which could not, under such circumstances, be counted upon to be friendly, and which Sir Charles MacGregor, after omitting the minor states and all troops that are clearly not worthy to be counted, estimated at 350,000 cavalry and infantry, with a large force of artillery possessing over 1000 really serviceable guns. The native states keep up, besides their so-called "regulars," a large force of irregular troops, of which it is said by themselves that, to use the words of the

Hyderabad memorandum of 1886, "it must be admitted . . . that . . . their cost is unduly large when compared with their efficiency."

All admit that the armies of Hyderabad and some other of the Southern principalities are far too large, a burden to the people, a danger to ourselves, useless except for evil; but, of course, there are native states in which the so-called army is in fact a police. As regards Hyderabad, however, a dispassionate observer, Baron von Hübner, stated in his well-known book that, "according to the highest military authorities, the Nizam could at any moment become the arbiter of the destinies of the Indian Empire." This is not true, but it is sufficiently near the truth to startle some into seeing the gravity of the danger and the need of remedy. The editor of the *Asiatic Quarterly Review*, Mr. Boulger, has admirably pointed out in his *England and Russia in Central Asia* the danger of the present position as regards the native armies, and he adds Indore and other states to Hyderabad as having armies, in his opinion, after careful examination, enormously costly, and useless except against ourselves. The native states have a far larger force of men and of guns in proportion to the numbers of their people than has the British Indian Empire, although the native states have no frontiers to defend. It is a question whether we ought not, in the interests of the population as well as in our own interest, to put down these unwieldy and dangerous armies, and increase the small contributions of the native states towards our revenue, which really provides for their defence. At the present moment it may be said that their fifty millions of people are looked after by nearly twice as many troops as the two hundred millions of British India proper.

The native states and defence.

It seems to me only fair that the native states contained within our territories—the existence of which depends wholly upon our good pleasure, and which are freed from all fear of war, all chance of invasion by their neighbours, all risk even of serious civil disturbances—should be called upon either to make a large money contribution or to keep up efficient troops under our command. The defence of the peninsula as a whole is an object towards which those whose security is guaranteed by our position should contribute, and it is not fair to the people of British India that they alone should supply the effective means of defence. When the matter was discussed in 1888 the general view adopted was that which I think was held by the Commander-in-Chief, though not unanimously by the staff or the Viceroy's council. The policy which prevailed is that we should communicate to the respective native Governments our opinion concerning the number of troops that each should supply for foreign service, and that we should agree to arm and inspect these troops; and this scheme has been carried out in the Punjab. I have doubts as to the wisdom of applying this plan outside of the Punjab and Kashmir. I altogether reject the idea that the contingents of the native states would be likely to be fit, unless a large supply of European officers were given them, to fight against picked Russian troops, which is the force that, if any, we have to meet. On the other hand, as regards lines of communication, as long as we keep up the Madras and Bombay infantry in their present form we have in all seventy battalions of our own which would perform such service in districts in which they would be safe against Russian attack.

The first necessity of India is to add to the troops of the quality of British infantry or artillery, or of

Goorkha, Pathan, Afridi, and the best of the Sikh infantry; we have no need to increase the number of inferior regiments, but, on the contrary, shall only encumber ourselves with useless men if we add to our "communications troops." Moreover, even for communications, posts held by the armies of the native states would always give anxiety. They would be held in greater strength than would be necessary if they were held by British troops or Goorkhas under white officers, and this is a serious matter when the food and transport difficulties are remembered; and if they were held in strong force without support there would always be some doubt in the mind of the General-in-Command as to the disposition of the men. I venture to differ from the Commander-in-Chief in India upon this point, and believe that the only sound policy was the bold policy of enforcing upon the great Southern states disarmament, or at least considerable reduction of force, combined with military contribution in money and transport towards defence. On the other hand, I would have lightened the blow by relaxing the supervision over the internal affairs of these states, and I would, of course, allow their rulers to keep up bodyguards and police. The rights and privileges of the feudatory chiefs are secured by treaty, but I believe that almost the whole of these treaties contain limitations of numbers as regards the armies, and that they have all been broken or evaded, so that they would form no difficulty in our way. We are, very properly, anxious to observe our stipulations towards the native states, but an arrangement might be made with them upon this head. We certainly cannot be acting wisely in encouraging the princes to keep up forces which are not good enough to be used against the Russians, and which are sufficiently numerous to

overrun India in our rear if we lost the first battle in Afghanistan.

Kashmir. Kashmir should, perhaps, unless it should pass under British rule, form an exception to my general principle. If we can make the Kashmir force efficient for the defence of the Gilgit passes, we shall be able, in the event of war, to save one or two divisions which could ill be spared from the Helmund army. It is essential that Kashmir should be made a source of strength, and the Kashmir forces, if placed under British officers, could be made capable of acting in their own mountains against Russian troops. The position of Kashmir is so important in our scheme of frontier defence that the Maharajah's offer of his army, made before his outbreak of 1889, should be accepted in this form. We have already obtained military control of the Sikh states, which have the best native force in India, and we are to inspect their army by British officers and to make them thoroughly efficient. These, however, are trustworthy forces. The case of the Southern states is different.

The Sikh states.

Arms. We are also confronted with the arms difficulty when dealing with the armies of the native states. If we put good arms into their hands they constitute a certain danger to ourselves. At the same time it is not difficult, I think, to prevent their use against ourselves by limiting the supply of ammunition in time of peace, and ascertaining, by inspection, that the amount supplied is actually used for practice.

The Russians and the natives. If we were upon better terms with the natives in the Eastern and Southern parts of India we could more easily afford to disarm the forces of the princes. The Russians have the reputation of being more successful than ourselves in this respect. A foreign corre-

spondent, who advanced with Skobeleff when he marched against Geok-Tepe, says that, immediately after the battle and massacre, the Russian officers came to the field chosen for a Durbar with utter absence of display and with perfect simplicity and geniality. They shook hands with the chiefs, offered cigarettes from their cases, and then strolled about unconcernedly with their hands in their pockets and a smile on their faces, and in a day or two were on friendly terms with all the population. He contrasts this course with that of the British, who try, he says, to behave on such occasions as if they were "at the Field of the Cloth of Gold."

Comparison between ourselves and the Russians.

The Russians have recently annexed countries that looked like desert; and we had taken under our charge a few years earlier, and have now annexed, other countries of similar appearance. Both tracts consist largely of irrigable land which would have been cultivated had tribal feuds and raids allowed water to be brought to it. Large districts of Central Asia have already been colonised by the Russians with their own people. We are unable, even did we wish to do so, to persuade our colonists to go to British Baluchistan, for, unless tempted by the presence of precious minerals, they do not settle willingly in countries inhabited by dark-skinned people. They go chiefly to the United States, the Transvaal, and the Argentine Republic, where their presence is of no military utility to the Empire. While we stand still in India as regards numbers, Russia in a military sense grows stronger every day. We must look forward to the time when the Merv oasis will become as Russian as the Caucasus has become, and as great a military strength to the Russian Empire in the East. We must make up our minds to the fact that we shall be fighting, if we are at war

Advantages possessed by Russia.

with Russia, against the most patriotic army in the world with a mercenary army on our side, and it is, of course, a commonplace that the best mercenary army of a conquered race cannot be counted upon to fight to the last, under disadvantageous conditions, as the Russians would fight, or as our own white troops would fight. The best native soldier, Sikh, or Goorkha, or Afridi, or Pathan, serves because he is a fighting man, and loves the horse, the rifle, and the uniform, and fighting for its own sake. He likes his pay and he likes his pension, but, above all, he rejoices in being a warrior and looking down upon the peasant. He is proud of the military history of his regiment, of medals and orders and titles of honour: but he cannot be expected to continue faithful after severe and general defeat.

Indian opinion.

I believe that of late there has been, except as regards the armies or contributions of native states, general agreement in India upon the necessities of the position. The Military Member of Council has fallen in with the views of the Commander-in-Chief, the late and present Quartermasters-General, and the other army authorities. The Foreign Secretary has followed suit. During Lord Dufferin's viceroyalty, the Viceroy and his private secretary were in agreement with the members of the Government, and opposition came only from the quarters from which it might naturally be expected—from those who were especially concerned with the state of the finances, and with the civil public works, which often have to be suspended when pressing military measures must be undertaken. If it were a matured, decided, and well-known policy that Great Britain would resist with all her strength the partition of Afghanistan, or the settlement of Russia at Herat and Balkh, much of

the expenditure which is now becoming necessary might be avoided. I have shown that we are in a position, as soon as a few necessary but not very considerable measures are completed, to repulse any attack which might be made from such a distance as the present Russian frontier. It is, however, impossible to be blind to the risk there is that that frontier may before long be advanced—chiefly through people at home not realising the true facts of the position—and further military measures become necessary. It is commonly assumed by soldiers that we suffer in India and in England by the politician's unwillingness to risk his position by telling the people unpalatable truths. The timidity is foolish, and statesmen would find it wisest to speak out. If, for example, Mr. Stanhope had refused to reduce artillery in 1887, and told the public why he did so, he would have gained rather than have lost in strength.

Position of the Russians in Central Asia.

It has been said that the Financial Member of Council in 1887 argued, against his colleagues, that there might be some danger that if we were too thoroughly well prepared in India we should be likely to test our preparedness by making an attack on Russia. The military position, however, of Russia is such that there is not the slightest risk of this, which is a real danger in some countries at some times. The Russians are far too firmly seated in Central Asia to give our soldiers the slightest encouragement to march across the intervening country and attack them in their home. It is perhaps a reproach to our rule in India that the Russians who have been so short a time in Sarakhs and Merv, and even Tashkend and Samarcand, should be so much stronger there than we are in India, where we have been for a much longer period; but I fear that there can be no doubt about the fact.

Mistaken notions.

It is a pity that false views as to our ability to attack Russia in Central Asia, or to defend Northern Persia against her, should be held and expressed by persons of great authority, because there is nothing so dangerous as living in a fool's paradise. One of the very highest of authorities on this subject, for example, in writing upon England and Persia, has recently quoted, with approval, some words of the late General Jacob about co-operating with a Turkish army "to drive the Russians behind the Caucasus and to keep them there"—a proposal the fatuousness of which is inconceivable to those who have seen the military power of Russia in the Southern Caucasus, and the attachment to her rule of the population of a district which has been hers for a long period, and which has never been known to rise. The districts behind the mountains which were hostile, and which were annexed at a later period, have been, as is well known, repeopled with loyal Russians. Any operations by us in aid of a Turkish army on the Armenian frontier would be of a less ambitious kind. Then again this writer says that we must be prepared to prevent the Shah of Persia from becoming another Ameer of Bokhara. Our interference in Persia is likely to have the same result as Russian interference in Afghanistan in 1878. We should at any time be unable to defend the Persian capital against Russia, just as Russia in 1878 was unable to defend the Afghan capital against us; for Teheran is even more open to Russia than Kabul to us. Such writers are on safer ground when they advocate a Chinese alliance. China is not a Persia, and Pekin is not within a short march of the Caspian. The Russians have already shown that they have as high an opinion of the military strength of China as they have a low opinion of the military strength

of Persia; and there can be no doubt that an alliance between England and China in Central Asia is a natural result of the present state of things.

China. Russia and China have 4000 miles of common frontier, and England and China desire to maintain the *status quo*, and are able to strike powerful blows for its maintenance. China will have for some years to come a considerable superiority over Russia at certain points upon the frontier, and could take offensive action against Russia more easily than could either Great Britain or Afghanistan. If China were inclined to join an Asiatic league for the maintenance of the *status quo* she would have more temporary power even than England of enforcing the decisions of the alliance. The alliance of China, which is very important in a general scheme of imperial defence, has, however, little bearing upon the special Indian problem. Yarkand is too distant from Pekin to afford any prospect of the rapid advance of a Chinese force into Russian Central Asia, at a time when it could have much effect upon the fortunes of the war, especially as there are no troops in Chinese Turkestan capable of standing for a moment against even a Russian militia force. On the other hand, in the policy of attacking Russia on the Pacific, which for some years to come, until her communications are complete, will be the most effective way of meeting an attack by her on us, the Chinese alliance would be of moment and would paralyse the Russian advance.

The Indian Government have been advised that the Chinese alliance is worthless to us, because our spies in Chinese Turkestan have found no proper fighting force; but it is in the north, and not in Turkestan, that the Chinese could give Russia trouble; and it was not the Chinese force in Turkestan, but that on the north of

Pekin, which alarmed Russia at the time when she gave back to China the province of Ili. The weak point in the Chinese alliance is that, when the Russian railways have been made and steam communication completed throughout Siberia, China, unless she moves with extraordinary rapidity within the next few years, will have lost the military advantage that at present she does undoubtedly possess. There is, however, a great point of superiority in the Chinese alliance over any other that Asia offers. While the Persians would lie down before the invader, and the Afghans, after fighting, take his side, the Chinese would fight on, and in these days it is difficult indeed, as the French well know, to sign a treaty of peace with China. In spite of the activity of the Japanese, the only three powers in Asia which can be said to count are Russia, China, and Great Britain. The best defence of India lies, however, in the completeness of our own Indian preparations.

CHAPTER II

BRITISH INDIA

Special importance, in the case of India, of finance.

THE subjects to be discussed in the present chapter connect themselves with those treated in the last through finance, for there seems reason to believe that military and financial problems lie at the root of the Indian difficulties of the present, and will greatly affect the decisions that must be taken in India in the future. For that reason I have placed the statement of my views upon Indian defence before those which I have to express on India generally, and I now proceed to touch briefly on questions of finance. Most of our difficulties in India are indeed obviously financial. The fear of Russia is financial, for no one doubts that the courage and military aptitude of our race would prove sufficient for the defence of India were we not hampered by the difficulties of paying for an army, both efficient and sufficient in numbers, under conditions of voluntary enlistment—by the difficulty of imposing fresh taxation upon India. The greatest of domestic drawbacks to our rule, namely, the occasional corruption of the native police, may also be looked upon as a financial question, for a higher class of service could be secured at a higher rate of pay. In writing, too, as long ago as 1867 I showed the financial side of the dispute as to the relative numbers of natives and of Englishmen to be employed

in the civil administration of the country. As regards defence, the reply always made to those who insist on the need for further measures is that India is poor and overtaxed, and, in the present state of her finances, cannot afford them. A military expenditure of twenty millions is so large that there could be produced for it even the costly luxury of a sufficiently numerous white army, provided that India were not in fact taxed to provide us for home use with short service, unsuitable to her needs.

Supposing even that the cost of a separate army of long service should imply increase, instead of that reduction which I should myself expect, of Indian military expenditure, or supposing that home resistance, upon political or military grounds, to this change should prevent the possibility of its accomplishment, we have to inquire whether in fact India be so poor that she cannot provide for her defence, or whether there is still behind Indian finance the possibility of raising more money by taxes. No doubt it is the case that taxation under British rule in India is lighter in proportion to the income of the country than was that of the Moghul emperors. Under our regimen profound peace has given rise to much, if partial, prosperity ; and most of the money that has been freely spent has gone towards providing India with the appliances of civilisation, with roads, telegraphs, railways, vast irrigation works, and public buildings, and in assistance to public education, while the fall in the opium revenue has itself been the result of concessions to the Chinese growing out of our own sense of the duties we think we owe to the principles of international morality. In these circumstances can the loss under the head of opium, and the additional charge on the Indian budget by reason of the

fall in the value of silver, be met from other sources, and yet means be found for providing against the possible need of increased expenditure upon men, transport, strategic roads and railways, and fortification?

Possibility of imposing a higher land-tax, or of reducing civil expenditure.

Many suggestions have been made for raising larger sums of money for the wants of the peninsula of India. It has been suggested that the "permanent settlement" might itself be revised, but at the fourth National Congress the landlord party was strongly represented, and all but carried a proposal to ask Government to introduce a permanent land settlement throughout India. The abolition of the separate Governments of Madras and Bombay, and the getting rid of the political governors and of the separate commanders-in-chief, and ruling those Presidencies through the Civil Service of India, while an excellent reform, and calculated to effect a saving, would not produce any large financial results. Neither would the more doubtful measure of the abolition of the Council of the Secretary of State. Inquiry into the home charges of the government of India, which can at no time do anything but good, especially if the question should ever be treated broadly enough to raise that of the separate white army, would itself not produce considerable results, although Lord Randolph Churchill had reason upon his side in proposing a general parliamentary inquiry into the position of our Government in India. Parliament used from time to time to have the opportunity, before the transfer of India to the Crown, of instituting a full examination into the administration of the East India Company. There is a dread on the part of the Indian Government of such inquiry, which, however, in my opinion, is desirable in the interest of that Government itself, inasmuch as public confidence

at home has been tried by the criticisms of the native press and of the speakers at the National Congress; while the Indian Government should remember that in these days no institution not supported by the constituencies at home can long survive, and those who think, as I think, that the government of India by the Civil Service has been a good government, should not shrink from public inquiry into its merits. Still, any financial reforms by reduction of expenditure are not likely to be large, and, if more money has to be raised in India for defence, we must extend our survey.

Nature of the revenue.

The greater portion of the present revenue of India is obtained from sources not, strictly speaking, consisting of taxes proper, and the taxation of India is light in proportion to the population, but that population is poor—although it does not suffer, in normal years, the profound misery which afflicts parts of Europe. The risk of famine, though lessened since the introduction and extension of railways, is still frightful, and while the farming people are not, as a rule, so ill fed as is supposed, they are altogether without a margin of income beyond their expenditure. The great nobles and the semi-independent princes of Hindostan do not contribute sufficiently towards good government and the appliances which it introduces to their own benefit; but political reasons are supposed to exist making it unwise to rapidly tighten our hold upon them. As regards taxation of the rich within our own dominion of British India, we have indeed introduced a slight trace of the principle of graduation of income-tax, as, in addition to the exemption of incomes below a certain sum, there is in India a higher and a lower scale of charge, though the difference is merely that between 2 per cent and 2·6 per cent. Not only is the revenue

insufficient, and the difficulty of raising new taxes great, but a portion of the revenue is of an uncertain kind, and the long continuance even of a decreasing opium revenue cannot be counted on. While I agree with many of the suggestions of the native reforming party, as I shall presently explain, I differ from them on this important point of taxation, because I think that Indian defence must be first considered, and that, if a complete revolution in her military system is not entertained by the authorities, heavier taxation will be needed, although I am well aware of the difficulty of introducing fresh taxes in a country where rich people bear so small a proportion to the whole population as they do in India. It is the fact, however, that this main difference between myself and the more moderate of the reformers is upon the one subject on which they have with them, on the whole, the European press of India and a large portion of European opinion in India, because salaries have been reduced and profits of trade have fallen since the days of the pagoda tree, while the silver difficulty has pressed hardly upon many. As even the present taxes hit the small white population hard, they, not unnaturally, join their voices to those of the native inhabitants to oppose the imposition and the increase of income-taxes and other duties. But it must be remembered that nowhere has trade increased so rapidly, since the world-wide depression of 1874, as it has in India, and, under Free Trade, the growth of the factory system has almost kept pace with the general increase of trade.

Nature of the debt.

A large portion of the Indian debt is, like those of Australia, a debt for public works which are returning good interest upon the expenditure both in direct and in indirect form, and the true debt of India,

in the English sense, is small as compared with her revenue or her trade, far smaller than that of most of the European states, including her great rival—Russia.

Railways.

One of the advantages to India of the British connection has been the enormous investment of money in State railroads, and, on a guarantee, in those of the railroads that are not the property of the State. The greatest change, indeed, in India since my first visit in 1867 concerns railways and trade. The development of railways and trade has been immense; British capital to the extent of three hundred and fifty millions sterling has been sunk in Indian enterprises, on official or quasi-official guarantee; and a further vast amount of British capital is employed by purely private British enterprise in industry, as Lord Dufferin thinks, "on the assumption that English rule and English justice would remain dominant in India." There are more than 16,000 miles of railway open in India. The Indus has already been twice bridged, and the Government of India now begin to look forward to the time when new railways will be made in India by unassisted private enterprise. The result of the making of railways in India has been a vast development of the grain and jute trades, and a considerable development of the trade in piece goods. India has benefited, as Australia has benefited, by the lines being under Government control, and by the consequent prevention of the competitive waste which takes place in the case of the railways of the United States. One remarkable feature in Indian trade, which is all to the advantage of India, has been the immense increase of trade between India and civilised countries other than the United Kingdom. The increase of the Indian trade with France, always large, has been considerable. The recent growth of trade between India

and Italy has been immense, though it has now received a check; and a rapid increase is taking place in the trade between India and the United States. Trade between India and the great countries of the Pacific—China, Australia, and Japan—is large and growing. The net result has been that the trade of India has recently been expanding more rapidly than that of almost any other country in the world; more rapidly, perhaps, than that of any country except the Argentine Republic. The other side of this picture is that the railways of India, though of considerable mileage, are still very few in number as compared with the population, and that the Government of India are now beginning to suspend construction, being a little out of pocket on their present lines.

Trade.

Ten years ago opium was by far the largest Indian export. Now raw cotton has passed it in the list, although the export of raw cotton has fluctuated of late; and while ten years ago the export of all the grains together was inferior to that of opium, both rice and wheat now almost equal the opium export, which was then nearly one-fifth, and which is now less than one-eighth, of the total exports. The trade in cinchona, in jute, and in tea has increased with rapidity equal to the rise in the wheat trade, and is very large. Although in tea India is now meeting with a serious competitor in Ceylon, the trade in tea from China to England is dwindling with rapidity equal to the Indian and Cinghalese increase; and India and Ceylon have sent us in 1889 twice as many pounds of tea as China. India is also beginning to supply the Australians—the greatest tea drinkers of the world. Indian coffee and tobacco are already remarkable for their excellence, and are certain soon to attract notice in the best markets. Her fibres, her

oils and seeds, her indigo and other dyes, are all playing a daily greater part in foreign trade. While new resources have been opened to India in recent years, the ancient art work of the country has not on the whole undergone decline: her wrought metal, filigree and inlaid work, her enamels and precious stuffs, are attracting fresh buyers without suffering, speaking generally, by deterioration through increased production. No doubt the muslins have declined in quality, and the use of European dyes has destroyed the beauty of a portion of the shawl and carpet work; but with few exceptions the native manufactures of India have improved in volume without losing their perfect Oriental charm. The export of cotton yarns and of cotton manufactures has grown rapidly, and in almost every article the commerce of India must be looked upon as sound, while her manufactures are thriving under a policy of Free Trade. India still imports, however, a far greater quantity of manufactured cotton goods from England than she exports; and as a curious example of the old-fashioned ways of the peninsula it may be noted that a Blue-book records the fact that an increase in the imports of English cotton goods in a recent year was caused by "the fact that the year was considered by astrologers in India an auspicious one for marriages."

India as a manufacturing country.

While there is a good deal of doubt among the natives whether the increase of their export trade in grain is a real advantage to the people, and while they point out that the landless members of the population in some parts of the country have suffered through the rise of prices, there is general rejoicing over the recent increase in Indian manufactures, not unmixed with some amusement that Lancashire, which insisted on the removal of the Indian duties upon cotton goods, has now

to meet a considerable export of Indian cotton goods to the east coast of Africa and of yarns to the markets of China and Japan. India has indeed such considerable advantages upon her side in textile manufacture, as has been admirably pointed out by Sir William Hunter, that it is certain that her export trade in manufactured articles will rapidly increase. Our government of India, giving absolute peace to the peninsula, and raising her credit to a point which provides her with capital as cheap as is enjoyed by the wealthiest of the continental countries of Europe, has made Bombay a great manufacturing city, and Indian mills have doubled their production in the last ten years. That which has happened with regard to coarse cotton yarns and cotton goods at Bombay, and to coarse jute fabrics at Calcutta, will happen also as regards iron smelting and very possibly as regards many classes of manufactures. India has cheap labour and cheap raw material, and as regards the markets of the farther East less distance to face than has Great Britain in placing the goods produced in the customer's hands. The cost of fuel is decreasing as railways open up her coal-fields, and our manufacturers must look forward to serious Indian competition. Already we see in Lancashire an agitation for forcing limitation of hours of labour upon the Indian factories, as well as periodical days of rest—action on the part of England which will be opposed by the Indian Government, and not carried out without much native outcry. The bearing of cheap Indian production of manufactured goods upon the project of imperial customs union deserves notice. A commercial federation of the Empire which did not include the most populous and, after the United Kingdom itself, the most trading member of the Queen's dominions would be but an inadequate solution of the imperial problem. Yet the

highly paid colonial workmen who complain of the pauper labour of Europe, and drive away the cheap Chinese, are hardly likely to view with enthusiasm the idea of admitting Indian manufactured goods to Australia and Canada without a duty, and will think Protection against the goods of Germany or France or Belgium a very incomplete Protection if they have to face the free admission of the goods not only of Lancashire but of Bombay.

Future of Indian trade and manufactures.

Sir Richard Temple has rightly pointed out that in India there is still a vast expanse of cultivable waste, and there is every reason to believe that her wheat export will continue to grow rapidly, and that her finer classes of tobacco will render her a dangerous rival to Cuba and to the rising cigar industry of our own Jamaica. The fertile peninsula—shut off from the cold winds of the north by the stupendous ranges of the Himalaya, which at the same time provide the water for that irrigation which is needed for the production of the heaviest crops, containing within its limits perhaps a sixth of all mankind, and possessing all the climates of production, from that of the equatorial belt to that of wheat districts with a prolonged if lovely winter—is likely to contribute more and more to the raw material of the world, while its cheap labour is likely also to give it an increasing share of manufactures. Irrigation works, although checked in many districts which might produce an excellent supply of grain, by the curious Anglo-Indian prejudice against lands which when treated with water show saline efflorescence—a prejudice which those who know the irrigated districts of Australia and of the United States are unable to understand—will be extended, and there will, if only peace be maintained, undoubtedly come in India a rapid growth of material prosperity, which,

however, upon the present revenue system of the country, will not produce a corresponding increase in the prosperity of Indian finance.

Drawbacks.

To the eye of the English commercial magnate no doubt Indian progress wears a singular form. He is disposed to doubt whether the management of Indian railways gives us much of which to boast. A distinguished Anglo-Indian in writing of the Indian railroads has spoken of the natives as being now "borne on the wind with the speed of lightning." It is nevertheless the case that I myself have done a better twenty-four hours' journey in Siberia behind Russian "couriers' horses" than in India upon branch railroads. We have to compare India in this matter, not with England or with Germany or France or the United States or our own colonies, but with countries such as Egypt, and the advance in material prosperity in the past twenty years has been amazing. On my last visit I travelled through hundreds of miles of country which I had already traversed in 1867, and found that the wastes of that day had become the corn-fields of the present. There must be a greater diffusion of wealth through India, but argument founded on this fact is met with the statement that the misery of the cultivator is greater than it was before. It cannot be said that the people look unhappy; on the contrary, the patient contentment of the natives is as remarkable to the traveller as it always has been since India has been known. At the same time it cannot be denied that many who are highly competent to speak upon the question share the doubts of native critics, and one of the most distinguished of India Office authorities upon Indian trade and agriculture, Sir George Birdwood, has told us that those who write of India "do not sufficiently distinguish

between the prosperity of the country and the felicity of its inhabitants." The remarkable material prosperity of India, and the immense volume of her trade with ourselves, will no doubt strengthen the feeling among Englishmen of the necessity of providing for the retention of our rule. Our kingdom and our people together draw from India some sixty or seventy millions sterling a year in direct income, the greater part of which would probably disappear in case of Russian conquest, and the whole vanish in the event of the destruction of the fabric of civilised administration by domestic anarchy. Moreover, we shall find that native opinion is with us in resisting unprovoked attack on India, and even in making defensive preparation in advance to meet attack, though still characteristically Oriental in the rapidity of detecting signs of fear or weakness in its rulers and turning against them when it sees such portents. On the other hand, even English opinion in India is indisposed to fresh taxation. The increase of material prosperity has not brought about an improvement, and has possibly caused a decrease, in the tax-bearing capacity of the landless portion of the natives, and we are still far from having found our ways and means.

Need for increased military expenditure may, however, be avoided.

Under the circumstances which have been described it is only vital necessity which can justify further inroads upon the Indian budget, and there can be no one who will not shrink from the supposed necessity of imposing further taxes upon such a country, or that of suspending the civil works upon which its future prosperity must depend. As has been seen in the last chapter, our present provision for defence is virtually sufficient unless we should tempt Russia to advance within striking distance; and the want of elasticity of the Indian revenue, and the poverty of a large portion

of the people of the peninsula, are additional reasons why we should do nothing to assist in bringing Russia to Herat or to the Hindu Kush. Should the evil day of further Russian advance arrive, further taxation will have become necessary, unless we are prepared to levy large contributions, as I think we reasonably might, from the native states, as their share in defence.

Increased revenue from the native states.

I cannot but think that the cheapness and increasing excellence of Indian tobacco offer a prospect of swelling the revenue by means which have proved efficacious in a great number of well-governed countries, and that the Indian Government, by taking the whole tobacco trade of the country into their own hands, establishing, and at the same time well advertising their monopoly, might find millions flowing into their purse from a source from which as yet scarcely anything has been drawn.

Tobacco-tax or *régie*.

The question of an Indian tobacco *régie* was under discussion for many years before 1871, when a Bill was actually drafted upon the subject, but withdrawn by order of the Duke of Argyll. The India Office are opposed to a tobacco *régie*, on the ground that it would not bring in much revenue and might call forth oppression. The Office consider that the fact that tobacco is in almost universal use in India, and is grown in every garden, is a conclusive argument against the *régie*. But if such a Government as that of Turkey can successfully work the *régie*, and obtain revenue, without raising price more than proportionately to the improvement in quality, I cannot believe that it is out of the power of the Indian Government to do so. The India Office seem to think that it would be impossible either to levy any duty upon tobacco where grown for the consumption of the grower or to collect the tax when

the tobacco was moved. It is a fact that in France, large portions of the centre and south of which are mountainous, and where in the south and centre almost every one of the millions of peasants makes both wine and brandy for his own consumption, a very productive duty is levied upon all movement of wine or brandy, and is collected without the smallest difficulty. I cannot but think that the Indian Government were right in the principle of their Bill of 1871, and that the India Office were wrong in causing it to be withdrawn. Surely, too, in such a matter the Indian Government ought to be the judges and not the India Office, as it is upon the Indian Government that the difficulty and unpopularity, if any, would be sure to fall.

Sir John Strachey, who is opposed to a tobacco-tax, has, nevertheless, estimated that, if the difficulties of detail could be got over, a monopoly of the sale of tobacco in India might yield between three and four millions sterling a year. All who know the finances of Turkey or of Egypt are aware that there is a large revenue to be obtained from tobacco, even in countries where the administration is not highly organised. In Egypt the tobacco revenue has been increased from £80,000 to £450,000 in four years without oppression. A tax of £30 an acre is raised in Egypt on every acre cultivated with tobacco. Control is found easy, and a customs duty of 1s. 3d. a pound is levied on foreign tobacco. The Turkish authorities with their own experience of a *régie* are not very much in favour of it, and think that the Egyptian plan of a direct tax on land growing tobacco, combined with a tax on imported tobacco, is better, as causing less friction and irritation, and the revenue produced as great. Such strides have been made of late years in the manufacture of Indian tobacco that

some Indian cigars are now superior to those of any district in the world except the Vuelta Abajo of Cuba, and the best of them are now able to hold their own with Havana cigars of ten times their price. The revolution which has occurred in the manufacture of Indian tobacco is as yet appreciated only by Anglo-Indians, and not known to Europe, but it cannot fail shortly to produce an enormous trade. Some indeed pretend that the best cigars of India are made of Java tobacco; but I am assured by those who know that the tobacco is really Indian, and, whatever it may be, it is certainly not from Java, as it is free from the peculiar flavour of the tobacco of the Dutch Indies.

Other possible sources of revenue.

Although Sir John Strachey admits that the poverty of the cultivating masses makes it most undesirable to impose new taxes if the necessity can be avoided without absolute danger to the State, he is of opinion that India is the most lightly taxed country in the world. He has pointed out the possibility of raising three millions sterling additional taxation on land in Bengal, one million and a half additional from licenses, and half a million additional from stamps, or five millions sterling of additional taxation, besides three or four millions from a tobacco monopoly if that were, as I think it is, possible of adoption. We see here eight millions sterling a year towards meeting further depreciation in the rupee, the falling off in the opium revenue, and the additional military charges which would become necessary if Russia crossed the present Afghan frontier. These additional military charges themselves might be reduced if the separate European army system which I have advocated were frankly accepted by the authorities at home.

Moral as contrasted with

It follows from what has been said above that there is reason to suppose that India has made substantial

material progress.

material progress during the thirty-two years of the direct rule of the Queen. There is perhaps more doubt as to the reality of the moral progress which has been made in the same time. Change there has been, by universal admission; more rapid, however, upon the surface than in the depths. To attempt to give, in a work covering the whole of Greater Britain, a complete view of the moral and material position of India would be as foolish as to try to do the same with regard to the United States; perhaps more so, because, while the importance of a comparison between American and British-colonial problems has more interest than any possible direct relation between British India and the other dependencies of the Crown, such is the diversity prevailing in India as regards religion, race, and conditions of life, that general observations are less possible than in the case of the United States. All, therefore, that can be done in giving India her place in a general survey of the countries under British government is to select the points of the most pressing political moment, which are those of defence (to which the last chapter has been given), of finance, which is closely connected with defence, and of the present relations between Government and people, upon which I have now to put forward some considerations.

Literature which illustrates.

While, as I have stated, there is a singular absence of general political or social books in the English tongue upon the British self-governing colonies, there is happily no such want in the case of India. Not to speak of the well-known works upon its history, its government, and its resources which have appeared with frequency for many years, or of excellent works of travel, such as those of Sir E. Arnold, and to mention only one recent book, Sir John Strachey's

volume in itself is a serious and able examination of Indian problems and principles of government by one of our most skilled officials. If Sir John Strachey writes (as might be expected from a former member of the Governor-General's Council, once acting Viceroy, former Lieutenant-Governor, and present member of the Council of India) on those general lines of thought which may be called "Governmental," all that is necessary, in order to obtain absence of prejudice and a complete view of the subject, is that the student should find for himself that there is another side by reading such a volume as the *New India* of Mr. Cotton, the articles of Sir William Hunter, or the annual reports of the Congress at which the natives and their sympathisers state their grievances. If these works be found somewhat heavy reading by the trivial-minded, it is possible to relieve their monotony, and yet to continue to gain some insight into Indian problems, by the perusal of much brilliant Anglo-Indian satire of Anglo-Indian rule in the pages of novels such as the well-known *Dustypore*, or of the light poems of Sir Alfred Lyall and Mr. Kipling. Brilliant though it be, Anglo-Indian poetry, as compared with the fresh verse-writing of Australia, is dyspeptic, and reeks of the hot weather.

Sir John Strachey's *India*.

Mr. Cotton's *New India*.

Sir W. W. Hunter.

Anglo-Indian satire.

There is one great difference which I experience in writing with regard to India from the frame of mind in which I sat down to write of our self-governing Colonies. With regard to these I was able to feel that the views which I put forward were, generally speaking, those entertained by many besides myself, and that, while I should meet with criticism upon certain topics, the views expressed by me as a whole would probably not be open to serious attack. But when I write of India I do so knowing that I agree with neither of the great

Difficulty in stating opinion upon Indian problems.

parties who hold strong views upon Indian questions: neither with the official party in India as a whole and their Conservative friends at home—for I differ from them, or from the more extreme among them, in thinking that, for reasons which I shall give, it is out of the question that the Indian Government should long continue to be a benevolent paternal Government substantially uncontrolled either by organised native opinion in India or by the House of Commons—nor with what are known as the Congress people and their Radical friends at home, because I differ from them as to the absolute necessity of a vast expenditure upon the army, fortifications, and strategic railways.

The two commonplaces.

There are two commonplaces in the discussion of Indian problems upon which, though much has been said, much remains to be said. The one is that general observations upon India are invariably mistaken, because India is a continent rather than a single country; and the second that, while India is in many matters stationary beyond the possibility of European comprehension, it is in other matters a country of rapid change.

India not one country.

The main contention of the official class of writers is one in which they have truth upon their side: that India is a name given by ourselves to an enormous tract of Asia containing a great number of people who, speaking generally, know nothing of one another, and are more separated by language and by national history than are the various peoples of Europe. On the other hand, writing even as long ago as 1867, I had to point out how much our Government has done to create an India, in the minds at all events of the most active and thoughtful among the small instructed minority of the peninsula. Still, the supporters of the Congress movement are inclined to somewhat overrate the amount of

unity which has been attained. At the Calcutta meeting Rajah Rampal Singh spoke, by an extraordinary confusion of metaphors, of our "converting a race of soldiers and heroes into a timid flock of quill-driving sheep." What we have done has been rather, like the other conquerors of Hindostan, to occupy and rule a peninsula inhabited by races which, in their aptitude for war, are partly "heroes" and partly "sheep." The official writers are able to show too that the District or Provincial rather than the Indian Government is the authority which is present to the people's minds, and that that military union which the Government of India are trying to bring about is not in itself likely to lead to the growth of an Indian national feeling. As between foreigner and foreigner, the native of the Punjab prefers to be ruled by us rather than to be ruled by a down-country native, for whom he has as little sympathy and far more dislike; and while in no part of the peninsula is there any feeling that the people are now living under a national government—for even the rulers of the native states are in most cases foreigners—there is no recollection of a time of national government in the past, and no regret for a nationality that has been lost.

It may be admitted, then, that the inhabitants of India are not one people, but a number of diverse races speaking different tongues, knowing nothing of one another, and possessing religions which are as hostile to one another as the Orangism and the Roman Catholicism of Toronto and of Montreal. But although this is a commonplace, because it is the observation first made by every fairly well-informed person who writes or speaks of India, it is a commonplace of the well informed alone, and is almost as far now as it ever was from having made its way into

the minds of the English constituencies. On the other hand, although still true and likely to be true for a period of incalculable length, it is not true in so high a degree as it once was. The tendency of our Government is necessarily in many matters to fuse India, and to cause a steady extension of that process of bringing the people of India together, and leading them to know one another and share one another's views about themselves and us and the peninsula, which is already in operation among the native barristers and newspaper writers. There are some of the half informed who are willing to admit that there are still great racial, religious, and linguistic differences in India, but who fancy that railway communication in itself is putting an end to them, as it is putting an end to them in France. But India is a very different country, and its size is so great, its railways, in comparison to its size, so few, that not much movement in the direction of a homogeneous India has been produced by these appliances of civilisation. The greatest political or governmental change that has taken place in India since I published *Greater Britain* in 1868 has been in the opposite direction. Decentralisation, which was begun shortly after that time, has been pushed farther year by year, and India, so far as it is a state at all, has become something of a Federal State since 1870. The Provincial Governments have received, and will receive, greater and greater powers. Strongly as I myself condemn the exaggerated autonomy and cost of the Governments of Madras and Bombay, and absolutely as I condemn the conflict of separate systems in the case of that service which above all needs centralisation, namely, the military service, I am a hearty sympathiser in the general Indian tendency towards Provincialism, and think it should be much

extended in connection with schemes for calling forth, in support of Government, educated native opinion.

Want of unity illustrated by proceedings of the National Congress.

The view that India has not yet become a nation, but that Hindostan contains many nations and many creeds, is illustrated by the able preface to the "official" report of the proceedings of one of the National Congresses, which frankly states that most of the delegates have to leave their homes "to make long journeys into, to them, unknown provinces, inhabited by populations speaking unknown languages." If Bengal and the capital of the Indian Empire form to the majority of the Indian lawyers and Indian native editors an unknown country inhabited by people speaking unknown tongues, what must they be to the cultivators who practically form the whole population of India, so inappreciable a part of the inhabitants are the people of the towns? The average Punjabi knows less of Bengal or Madras or Bombay than does the average Spaniard about Finland or the average Norwegian about Sicily. There is, as yet, not only no community of race in India, but no feeling of Indian nationality except among the handful of educated men. In the rural districts, which contain the vast majority of the people, there is local patriotism. The Rajput is proud of being a Rajput; the Sikh of being a Sikh; and the Indian Mohammedan proud of not being what he calls an idolater—that is, a Hindoo: but no one of these is proud of any fancied general Indian nationality, and our Government is as little unpopular in these rural districts as any Government is likely to be, and, as Sir George Campbell has well shown, most nearly popular when it leaves the people most alone. India has been the meeting ground of races extraordinarily diverse, and exhibits still every phase of racial life, from that of savagery fighting

against us with arrows dipped in aconite, up to the most sublime elevation of spiritual ideas, existing unfortunately side by side with amazing superstition. There are among our Indian fellow-subjects men speaking tongues as rude as those of the Australian aborigines, and close to them priests learned in the philosophy and the classics of one of the highest civilisations ever known to man. Moreover, the caste side of Indian religion increases the amount of separation which would in any case have been marked in Hindostan, and the only bond of unity which has existed as yet in British India has been the link of common conquest by outside authorities. The problem, therefore, of the scientific government of the peninsula is one which makes high demands upon our powers, for it is hard to conceive of one more difficult of solution.

Professor Seeley.

Those who attempt to write on India may indeed stand appalled at the complexity of situation which has been brought about by her past history. Professor Seeley, who has written more suggestively and more profoundly upon the history of British government in all parts of the world than has any other writer, has become involved by the difficulties of the Indian problem in a curious contradiction. He speaks of India as having been to us "a prize of absolutely incalculable value," but yet he is obliged to say, in the same part of his work, that it may be questioned whether the possession of India does or ever can increase our power—that it is "doubtful whether we reap any balance of advantage"—while he admits that it vastly increases the dangers of our Empire, and, wearily, almost hopelessly, goes on to say that when we inquire "into the Greater Britain of the future we ought to think much more of our Colonial than of our Indian Empire."

But if it is the case, as Professor Seeley himself thinks, that we must keep India and must keep it by force against invasion, and if the difficulties of our rule are greater in India than in any other portion of the world, we should try to face them and to form for ourselves some notion of what those difficulties are and how they can best be met. Professor Seeley has pointed, as among the greatest of our dangers, to our possible inability to face at the same time a mutiny and an invasion, and has told us that we have little strength to spare. He has warned us that if there should ever arise in India a national movement, similar to that which was witnessed in Italy, the English power must succumb at once, and that if even the feeling of a common nationality began to exist there only feebly, without inspiring an active desire to drive out the foreigner, but merely creating the notion that it was shameful to assist him in maintaining his dominion—from that time our rule would cease to exist. It is that glimmering of the idea of nationality that some find in India at the present time, and there can be no more urgent problem in connection with the Empire than that of tracing its extent and seeing how far we can meet or guide the movement.

India not yet fused.

The danger, however, of a common internal movement against our rule is as yet far from us. Just as the proceedings of the National Congress have illustrated the difficulties in which the delegates have found themselves, through the diversity of tongues and races, so, too, in another instance has it served to display racial jealousies. At the Calcutta Congress the separate feeling of the extreme North West came out, and a warlike frontier-man from Dera Ismail Khan cried to an audience largely consisting of Calcutta clerks and shopkeepers, "Do I look like a Bengali Baboo?"

Conservatism and change.

The second great commonplace of which I spoke is one also to be noted: that, while in many matters India is stagnant beyond conception, in other matters it changes so rapidly that even those who knew it well twenty years ago are apt to commit grievous errors when they write or speak of its condition at the present time. The change, however, which has occurred of recent years is such as was certain to come about and might easily have been foreseen. To merely rail against the Congress movement, and all that excitement of the educated native mind of which it is an outcome, is doubtless idle, because they are but an inevitable result of the nature of our rule. When we decided, mainly under the influence of Macaulay, to impart to the people of India a modern and largely Western education, for which they did not ask, we settled for good or ill the character, and to some extent the pace, of their social and political development. Macaulay prepared our minds for this "proudest day in English history," and it has come. Moreover, to the practical Englishman, even if he be deeply steeped in official prejudice, the fact that it is impossible to put down the movement is one that should commend itself to notice.

Interference by the House of Commons.

Just as dislike of the Congress movement will not stop it, so too interference by the House of Commons in the details of the government of India cannot be checked by a mere statement to the House, on the part of the home Government, that the interference is undesirable. In a Parliament with no Radical majority, and in the teeth of strong declarations by the representative of the Government of India that the motion was uncalled for and would weaken the hands of Government, a resolution censuring the Government of India was lately carried;

and indeed on two recent occasions the Indian Government has been forced to reverse its policy by parliamentary interference. On both these occasions native opinion in India was on the side of those who moved; but in the case of the abolition of the cotton duties, which was, more gradually, forced upon India by the constituencies of England, native opinion was hostile to the change, and the same is the case as regards the proposed interference with labour in India by fresh factory legislation. It is possible that interference by the House of Commons, which may have been right on the various occasions on which it has already occurred, but which may probably be wrong on future occasions, as the House of Commons and the constituencies must necessarily be ignorant in Indian affairs, might be checked by consulting that very native opinion in India of which officials wedded to past traditions are inclined to be afraid. But native control itself is, for other reasons, difficult of introduction. However willing they may be to accept our rule, it cannot be supposed that the educated natives are inclined willingly to submit to grinding taxation in order that we and not the Russians should be their masters; and here is a danger against which it is of course difficult to guard. At the same time the Government of India enjoy the advantage of having two sets of critics and opponents with whom to deal — parties which, agreeing as they do upon some questions, and upon these all-powerful, may upon others take different views. But a mere bureaucracy, however able and however well informed, must necessarily have great difficulty in maintaining itself against House of Commons censure unless backed by something more than the mere dumb acquiescence of the less intelligent portion of the Indian people.

Not prevented by the Council of India.

In *Greater Britain* I threw doubt upon the value to India of the Indian Council, though there is much to be said for it from some points of view. The Council is out of touch with the House of Commons, and adds no element of security to the side of the Indian Government in contests with that House, which has little regard for its opinion. When Mr. Bradlaugh or Mr. Caine, or any members of the House of Commons who have given some attention to Indian affairs, bring forward resolutions, the opinion of the Council, even if unanimous, weighs not one feather's weight in the balance. The Viceroy and his Council in Calcutta are face to face with the House of Commons with little to protect them except the single voice of the Under-Secretary of State, or of the Secretary of State when he happens to be a member of the House of Commons; and even their official representative himself is subject to pressure from his constituency which may render him upon some questions but a half-hearted friend.

Its result.

Interference with the Government of India by the House of Commons may indeed become a cause of a closer connection between the policy of the Indian Government and native opinion than has hitherto been often observed. When Mr. Caine's views upon the subject of the liquor excise prevailed over Sir John Gorst's opposition in 1889, several of the Indian native newspapers, and of the English newspapers in India circulating chiefly among natives, foresaw the danger that the House of Commons might on other subjects, in which it had not native opinion with it, commit itself to decisions in ignorance of facts, and they pointed out that after all the House of Commons was a House in which the English people were represented and the inhabitants of India were not, and that there might be many

subjects upon which the Government of India might take a view far more free from British prejudice than would be taken by the House of Commons.

Its partial nature.

Moreover, the House of Commons, which interferes where there is either a British interest involved or some social question on which there exists strong feeling in England itself, does not interfere in questions not so recommended to it. The repeal of the duty, for example, upon Indian silver plate—a tax the effect of which is to check and hamper what might be an important Indian trade—is refused by the Treasury, without effective protest by the House of Commons, although the repeal would involve the loss of only a small amount of money to the Exchequer of the United Kingdom. At the time when the Indian cotton duties were given up in the name of Free Trade, but against Indian native opinion, the opportunity should undoubtedly have been taken to sweep away the silver duty, which tells heavily against India. But the House of Commons effectively took up only the one side of the question, and not the other. The repeal of the cotton duties was in my opinion wise in the interest of India, but we must face the fact that it was carried out in the teeth of an almost unanimous local native opinion—that is, opinion among the comparatively small number of people in Hindostan who have any knowledge of, or take any concern at all in, public affairs. The application to India of more stringent factory laws might also be beneficial to India, but would have to be carried from London in the teeth of a similarly unanimous local opinion. These are questions of the class, which day by day will increase in number, in which the Government of India would have a general local opinion upon its side; and as we should not dream of imposing our

ideas in such matters by force upon self-governing colonies, and as we do not in fact impose them upon many of the Crown Colonies, there is a great deal to be said for allowing Home Rule to India with regard to them. As it is not easy for a Viceroy and his Council in Calcutta or in Simla to stand up against the House of Commons, they will be tempted to call in organised native opinion in their support. There is, however, a difficulty in trusting largely in India to native opinion, caused by the consideration that it is impossible to call out the opinion upon public questions of the great majority of the Indian people, who are not in a sufficiently advanced state of political development to have, and consequently to give one, and a danger which arises from the importance in India of the taxation question.

Municipal institutions.

The recent development of partly representative municipal institutions in India is connected with both the great commonplaces which I have named, and with all the subjects which we have been discussing. The want of unity in India, and the non-existence of an Indian nationality, suggest both the difficulty of calling out native opinion for India as a whole, and the expediency of obtaining it by municipal institutions in the districts. The rapid change in modern India is illustrated by this greatest of all changes of recent years —the successful growth of representative municipal institutions ; and the taxation difficulty itself is in part relieved by our calling upon those chosen by the people of the various districts to vote taxes for their own local public needs. As day by day the facilities of travel lead the English rulers of India to live less in their districts ; to send their wives and children to Europe or to the hills, and themselves to be more often absent upon leave ; as

the race of officers who were well-versed in the tongues of India and never went home becomes extinct; and as the English in India grow daily more into a separate caste, so facts force on us the continual development of municipal institutions. We seem indeed in India to be experimenting on the plan—of which Russian autocracy made trial under Alexander II, with temporary success —of the development of local representative institutions under central autocratic rule. The fact that Alexander III has taken steps in the other direction, and has deprived Russia of a large part of her local elective freedom, does not imply that our attempt will break down, because it is far from certain that even in Russia herself the system of the father had proved a failure, or that there was any real necessity for the change which was brought about by timidity in the son.

There are now in India about 3500 elected members of municipal bodies, and a still larger number of elected members of rural district boards; but in the latter case the electoral bodies themselves are, generally speaking, nominated—a system which is curiously at variance with the ordinary British ideas upon the subject of election. It has, however, been proposed by the last National Congress to extend it—a suggestion thrown out no doubt with a view to conciliate opponents. One of the main objects in view in the establishment of that amount of local self-government which exists in India was to train the community in the management of their own local affairs; but another object was to relieve the Government of the odium of petty interference and of small unpopular acts, and in fact to place a buffer between the people and the British administration. There can be no doubt that local government upon an elective system has had, in the parts of India where it has been freely applied, this result.

Wisdom of extending the system,

I confess that, after hearing all that the Civilian objectors have to say, it seems to me that there can be no question that the time has come when, looking to the success of the elective local self-government system, it might be extended to the greater part of the districts of India, if not to the whole of those inhabited by a settled village population. A gradual extension was long since recommended by Sir Richard Temple, who is a Conservative, but who probably feels the value of municipal institutions in enabling us to gather the local feeling of the ruled, which Oriental courtesy makes it hard to learn from individuals.

but difficulty in the extension.

Many indeed of the difficulties with which in India we have to deal seem at first sight to be solved by handing them over to municipalities elected by local majorities, but there is in India a danger in this matter from which Russia with her all but complete religious unity is wholly free. The Hindoo majority have been in the past inclined to ill-treat or to neglect the interests of the Mohammedan minority, and if we were so to extend the municipal system as to force ourselves to carry out the decrees of municipalities by our police, we might possibly appear as the oppressors of the Mohammedans, and alienate the powerful support of a population in some parts of the country warlike, and amounting in numbers to over fifty millions. The Congress speakers will honestly deny the existence of the risk, and they have now with them a large number of Mohammedans, who are among their most active and enthusiastic members, and to whom they are giving a leading place. After the Delhi riots of three years ago (unfortunately renewed in September 1889) and the hanging of a pig in the Jumna Musjid, we had firmly to take the side of the Mohammedans, and

did it with success, but under free municipal institutions might have found great difficulty in so doing. Otherwise there is but little religious difficulty in the government of India, because the religions are mixed together throughout the country, and nowhere in British India do we find a compact Mohammedan Quebec. We may wisely give the go-by to this consideration, but must not ignore it, although the supporters of the Congress contend that the majority of the Mohammedans are on their side. At present Indian elective institutions are under our control, and the district officer in some cases, and the Commissioner in others, has over them something of the powers of a Continental prefect. The municipal system is fairly popular with the natives, although they undoubtedly regard it as bringing trouble as well as conferring dignity. One old native gentleman, who had had the working of municipal institutions in his town carefully explained to him, observed that he thought he began to understand. "It means, does it not," said he, "that, while you formerly got out of us rupees, you now hope to get both rupees and work?"

Extension of the system to Provinces.

When it is proposed not only to extend elective local institutions, but also to at once make use of those which already exist, as constituencies for the election of some of the members of the Councils of the Provinces, it must be remembered that in India, as in Russia, the towns contain but a very small percentage of the population, and that in the Punjab and some other Provinces the inhabitants of towns do not form even an appreciable proportion of the people. In the rural districts outside a portion of those of the North-West Provinces and of Bengal the elective system has not yet been carried far, and to rely, therefore, at present upon the municipali-

ties to elect representatives to the various Provincial Councils, would be to govern a vast rural majority through an insignificant urban minority, having in some cases conflicting interests, and in all very different ideas.

Federation of Provinces.

The spirit of decentralisation which has presided over the creation of the modern municipal system of India has in itself suggested the increase of the self-governing character of the Provinces.

General Chesney's views.

In his most able work, *Indian Polity*, published now more than one-and-twenty years ago, Sir George Chesney recommended a more distinct and definite recognition of the form of organisation of the Indian Empire, which already exists in fact, as a number of separate civil Governments, with a more equal relation of the general Government towards them. He proposed that the great difference between Madras and Bombay, and such Provincial Governments as those of Bengal should be done away with, while the fiction of three separate establishments for the army should be abolished and the troops of India placed under one Commander-in-Chief, without the intervention of local Governments and their separate departments. As far as names went he suggested levelling up rather than levelling down, and proposed that there should be ten Presidencies with Governors, instead of abolishing in name the Governors of Madras and Bombay. No importance need be attached to the question of name, but it is indeed an amazing example of the routine conservatism of British Governments that so necessary a change as that recommended by Sir G. Chesney and many others should not yet have been carried into effect. The cessation of direct correspondence between the India Office and the Governments of Madras and Bombay as regards military matters is, as I have shown,

Expediency of acting on them.

essential; but as regards all matters it would be in the highest degree convenient, and the time has certainly come for formally recognising the fact that the Governments of the North West and of the Punjab are even more important in these days than are those of the Southern Presidencies. Subject to the necessity of providing upon a uniform system for military matters and for finance, we have little imperial interest in Indian unity, and may well push decentralisation to the utmost limits, taking care that there should be a strong central Government armed with powers over Madras and Bombay equal to those which it possesses over Bengal, the Punjab, or the North West. Bengal, Madras, Bombay, the North-West Provinces, the Punjab, the Frontier, and possibly some other subdivisions, would under this system have complete local freedom except in military matters and in taxation, the Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief having supreme power over all. Provided that military and financial unity be secured we have much to gain by not attempting to reduce India to one dead level in other matters, and may be glad, not sorry, that linguistic and racial differences, a varied history, and diverse extent of social development, form obstacles to unity. There is indeed little prospect that, for a great time to come, either the English language or the Hindostani camp tongue will establish itself throughout rural India. Neither, in spite of the efforts of the missionaries of many Churches, does there seem a prospect that Christianity will rapidly spread throughout the peninsula, and no native creed is in the least likely to establish itself as even approximately universal.

Provincial federation upon an

It would of course be possible, if it were wise, to push farther in India the federal idea, and to do so

aristocratic base possible, but of doubtful expediency.

consistently with safety to our rule (provided always that military and financial supremacy were complete) by governing in the name of native rulers of good family. The government of the Provincial groups upon a democratic basis would present dangers from which a highly developed local government of an aristocratic type would certainly be free; but, on the other hand, the latter form of government, if applied throughout India, would be open to the charge of being a mere pretence, veiling a completely English system. At the same time it is well to remember that there is much to be said for the system of selection of the best native talent, as suitable to the present condition of development reached by India, in contrast to the elective system, of the working of which upon a large scale there has been but little example as yet in Asia. Any purely elective system may be found in practice to be unfair to the large Mohammedan minority.

Provincial federation consistent with British interests.

Given that unity for defensive purposes, under a single will and single hand, to which we have unfortunately not yet attained, given also fiscal and commercial unity, no British interest opposes the gradual development of local self-government in the Provinces; and the loss of a few salaries, in the time of the next generation, is as nothing when compared with the calling out of our full defensive strength, and securing the permanence of our Empire by rendering it more acceptable to the people. Given, too, the fact, frequently admitted by ourselves, that the happiness of the people should be the first consideration, it must be held to be doubtful whether it is better secured by direct British rule or by a system which makes a place for the ablest native administrators trained under our educational

system, such as may be found already existing in the best of the feudatory principalities.

Political representative institutions.

Those among the natives and among our own politicians who advocate the general introduction of political representative institutions into India argue that the native is more intelligent, more accustomed to the idea of government, more docile, more patient, than vast numbers of those who exercise the suffrage in European countries, and that is so; but what is not sufficiently borne in mind is the fact that, while natives are as intelligent, they are quite different, and that as regards the vast majority—the cultivating class—they neither demand nor understand the political franchise. It is, too, possible that, in its gradual development, modern Indian thought may strike out some system more suited to Indian needs than the parliamentary system of the United Kingdom; and the example of Russia, where the popular party itself is for the most part opposed to parliamentary institutions, is a warning against the complacent British belief in the existence of an absolute best in government, combined with the possession of that best in our own constitution. I may perhaps find a careful study of Russia, in the course of five journeys in that country, of some use in connection with this topic, as it cannot but familiarise an observer with the condition of a patriotic and advancing country in which the idea of the value of parliamentary institutions is as generally rejected by Radical reformers as by Conservatives. While then after three visits to India, two of them very short, I must necessarily be almost as ignorant of India, so far as personal observation goes, as are those who have not been there at all, yet having given time to the study of authorities, native and British, upon the subject, I favour the general

development of the representative system for local purposes, but continue to be as strongly opposed as I was when writing *Greater Britain* and discussing the question as regards Ceylon, to the creation of parliamentary institutions for India treated as a whole. The Native Congress does not ask for them. If it were to do so we should at present have to answer that the vast majority of the people—the cultivating class—would not find their lot improved by a system which would form at present but a mere pretence, and which would commit their interests to the people of the towns, intelligent, and rapidly improving in European education, but having in many matters an interest opposed to that of the far larger rural class.

French example.

The great authority of M. Paul Leroy-Beaulieu may indeed be quoted upon the side of the extension of representative political institutions to people commonly supposed to be unfitted for them by their social condition and their history. He thinks the introduction of representative government among the Arabs of Algeria certain at a much earlier date than is generally expected by his countrymen, and considers it impossible long to refuse the franchise to those who speak French and have served France in the army. Under the pressure of such feelings the French Republic has granted electoral representation, not only on a Council General, but also in the Chamber of Deputies at Paris and in the Senate, to her Indian natives, and at Pondicherry that wide political franchise is given to the dark-skinned inhabitants for which the Allahabad Congress did not even so much as ask. M. Leroy-Beaulieu declares it impossible in these days to refuse political representative institutions to persons, not savages, on account of religion or of race. He follows Macaulay in the

view that the conquering race must spread its tongue throughout the conquered country, and that conquest upon any other system must be precarious. It is difficult to look forward to the time when the English tongue and English education will have spread through India, although the complete substitution of the religion and language of the Spaniards or Portuguese for those of all American people south of the boundary of the United States is an example of a still more startling change. We have little to learn from the Algerian French, and the conditions of India and of Algeria are so different that even the great authority of the French political philosopher forms an insufficient guide for us. Neither is the Pondicherry precedent of much value, for in a small community a representation may be freely given without that chance of faulty expression of public feeling which is risked by the representation of two hundred millions of people, of many tongues and creeds and races, in one Parliament. As Dr. Cust has admirably shown, the vast superiority of our rule in India over the French government of Algeria has lain in the subordination among ourselves of the military to the civil power, although sometimes in the frontier districts, and especially during some warlike expeditions, the principle has been pushed by us too far. In spite of our having refused all political authority to our soldiers, we have been far more successful in completely pacifying great fighting nations like the Rajputs and the Sikhs than the French have been in managing a very small native population in Algeria, consisting only of between two and three millions of people, of whom but a part are warlike. The French have been inconsistent and uncertain in their dealing with the subject of the extension of parliamentary institutions among dark-skinned

and conquered peoples. They represent the blacks of Martinique and Guadeloupe, of Réunion and French Guiana, in their parliament at Paris, as well as the Hindoos of French India, while, on the other hand, they at present refuse all representation to the great mass of their Algerian subjects, as well as to the natives of Senegal and Cochin-China.

Inevitable extension of representative government.

There are many strong imperialists among ourselves who think that the Empire would be better governed without giving votes in any form to British subjects belonging to what they look upon as inferior races. They point to the occasional burlesque of English political fashions by those Hindoos of the towns and of the commercial classes whom they lump together under the title "Bengali Baboos," and they ask whether these men can be anything but a source of weakness to the Empire. Without arguing the question as one of right or wrong, and without entering upon any of those considerations of justice which are often impossible of satisfactory decision, it may be permissible to ask such men whether in these days it is possible to contemplate the prolonged exclusion from all political power in any form of races which are extraordinarily numerous, which are becoming rich, and which are receiving in many cases the best education that the world can give. Is it not certain that, not as regards the British Empire only, but as regards all countries, the subject races will make their influence felt, and win their way to some real share of power? No people are more jealous of the privileges of colour than the French, who are admitting, as we see, to political power the native population of their "Indian" and West Indian colonies, though not of Cochin-China and Tonquin. As the peoples of British India learn the English tongue and become powerful in

trade, it seems certain that in a greater or less degree they will be admitted to take part in Government; and a democratic House of Commons, whether under the leadership of Radicals or of Tory Democrats, will not long refuse to the whole Indian dark-skinned population all share in political power simply on account of colour. I would say, to those who would wish, were they able to have their way, to remain as we are, that it is better to prepare ourselves for that which it is impossible to prevent. It may be said that the Americans, in nominally granting political privileges to the blacks of the Southern States, have managed to exclude them from all real power; but in America it has been difficult for the Federal Government, or for the American people as a whole, to impose their views upon the whites of the Southern States, protected as they are by a Federal system. In the case of the British Empire, where India is in the long-run governed directly from home, and where the handful of whites in India will have little voice in shaping its political future, I am convinced that the Imperial Parliament, when it grants some political privileges to the dark-skinned majority of British subjects, will insist on the powers dealt with by legislation being actually, as well as nominally, conferred. The question that lies open is not whether the Indian natives should receive a share in the government of the peninsula in which they live, but what form that share should take. I have shown why we are not driven by considerations which touch their happiness to work towards the unity of India; but in the development of the Provincial system, which ought gradually to create a federal India, except for fiscal and military purposes, the natives must undoubtedly play a leading part. At the present moment the Councils contain native members, and a demand is

made for their election. That demand may be resisted for a considerable time if it is thought necessary to resist it, provided that the men selected for membership of the Councils possess real governing capacity.

Native states.

It must be borne in mind that we do not declare, and have never held, that subjection to direct British rule throughout the peninsula is necessary for the safety or good government of the people. We leave sixty millions of the population, without counting Nepal and Afghanistan, under native rulers, advised by ourselves, and removed when they commit great crimes. Our general military and financial control over the native states is in various forms preserved, although it is far from being so effective and complete as I would make it; but in all the affairs of purely domestic concern the native states are free. As an Englishman, who knows Asiatics as thoroughly as any one who has ever held Indian office, has well said, "Extensive provinces are left with native sovereigns," who "are deemed capable of exercising the highest offices of State over" peoples "who are of precisely the same" religions, races, and tongues as our own subjects. He has warned us that, in some cases, in Provinces of British India natives of high ability, equal to those who form the distinguished body of Prime Ministers of the native states, are from a narrow jealousy too often excluded from their fair share of high civil office for which they notoriously are fit, and that no nation that hopes to perpetuate its rule can safely act in this way. The attitude of haughty exclusion must lead sooner or later to expulsion, and the successful government of Akbar, who made great use of the conquered people in high office, of the Romans, who gave their citizenship to the picked men of all the subject races, and of the

Russians, is held up to us as an example. I have read, on this last point, in a moderate Indian paper, a biography of the famous Russian Colonel Alikhanoff, with the note, "We feel proud of Ali Khan Saheb as an Asiatic. But it is the 'barbarous Russ' that has given him the opportunity for greatness. Which of us Indians has had anything like the same chance of distinction at the hands of the liberal and enlightened British?" The retired Civilian from whom I just now quoted might add that such statements are called by us "seditious," but that they are in a measure true, although Mr. Curzon has well shown that there is some exaggeration prevalent as to the general treatment of Asiatics by the Russians.

Native rulers.

It is a remarkable fact that many of the most experienced of our own civilians are, against their personal interest, very willing to admit that the fairly well governed or average native state makes its people happier than we can by our more scientific but more rigid system. This fact points to a possible future for our Indian Government, if it is to be a lasting system, through its gradual conversion into a federation of provinces governed as a rule by natives, and on their own plan, with the concentration in the capital of the organisation of taxes and of defence. The unchangeable side of Hindostan is curiously illustrated by the native states of Rajputana and of Central India, incomparably more interesting to the traveller in search of the picturesque than any portions of our Empire. In the heart of India we seem to find the despots, the courtiers, the retainers, the capitals, described by our ambassadors in the time of Elizabeth, or even those found by the Papal legates in their memorable journeys in the days of our Norman kings. Yet these native states are mere bits of India, chosen as it were almost at random, with no barrier of

race or of religion between them and the countries which we directly govern, and with no definite natural boundaries, while their kings are commonly late comers and mere strangers, "more modern than the British power," as Sir Lepel Griffin puts it; differing often from their people in the two essential points of creed and blood. The native states are in many cases the mere creatures and almost the fictions of our own Government, and, built up as they are by us for portions of the country, might be built up equally throughout the Bombay Presidency or the Punjab. If the rulers of the native states are often tyrannous and corrupt, as Sir Lepel Griffin thinks, it can hardly be our duty in cases where states have long been administered by ourselves to hand them over to fresh sets of native rulers, and it is difficult to explain why statistics do not show a more general emigration of their people into adjoining provinces under our direct rule than is the case. But, while we may look forward to an increase rather than a decrease in the number of people in India living by our permission and their own choice under native rulers, yet, just as I would tighten our rule over the native states for army and finance, and put down their separate military forces, so I would go with Sir Lepel Griffin in taking even farther steps than those which we take at present for securing good government, by the removal of corrupt judges and tyrannous subordinates.

Kashmir.

As regards one native state, indeed, I agree with Sir Lepel Griffin. Already in 1867 I pointed out how great was the misgovernment of Kashmir. In the hands of its present Maharajah that government has not improved. Sir Lepel Griffin has proposed the introduction of European settlers into portions of Kashmir, and it is certain that there are districts, not only

in that state, but along the Afghan and Baluch frontiers, which are at present unoccupied by man, yet suited for European settlement. If there is military danger, too, in native Governments, it is on the Kashmir side that that danger is the most acute. But if Kashmir is to be settled by a European population it cannot be left under native rule, or difficulties with the settlers will arise. A preferable scheme would be to make it the headquarters of that separate frontier district the creation of which I have recommended in the last chapter, and over which there should be a large measure of authority left in the hands of the Viceroy and of his Commander-in-Chief.

Officials of native states on British rule.

A great Oriental scholar, the latest and one of the ablest of writers upon India, has described our position in Hindostan as it is viewed by some of his native friends concerned in the administration of semi-independent states. With the exception of a little cheap satire upon the commercial nature of our relations with the princes (such as the communication of a bill, duly dated and payable in rupees at the rate of exchange for the day, for 36 lb. of powder used in firing a salute at "your arrival," "ditto at your departure," with an item for "wear and tear of guns") the observations of the sirdars were based upon the feeling with which they had witnessed at Tashkend the wearing of the ordinary uniform of Russian officers by the Mohammedan gentry of Central Asia. The friendly foreigner, who has much praise for our rule, reports a comparison, drawn by one of his native friends, between the Russians and the English, in which the Indian native says that by the side of the first he finds his comrades of the same colour and the same religion holding equal rank, whereas in British India, he complains, the attitude of the con-

queror towards the representatives of his race is one of haughty disregard.

Foreign observers.

I had carefully read for myself and noted the works of the foreign observers of our Indian rule when I first saw an article, excellent, though too governmental to be strictly accurate, on India under the Marquis of Dufferin, in one of the great Reviews in 1889. Its author has undertaken the same inquiry into the opinions of foreign writers as that on which I had entered, but we have come to different conclusions. On the whole the attitude of our foreign critics is one of admiration for what we have done, combined with much doubt as to the possibility of our continuing to proceed upon the same lines. Baron von Hübner has pointed out that the fact that the white man can travel by day or night in perfect safety from Cape Comorin to the Himalaya, and from Assam to the Khyber pass, under the talismanic protection of his white skin, even through districts where native travellers are molested by thieves, is conclusive proof of the total absence of resistance to our rule. There is no hatred of British government, but no special feeling in its favour, and this although Mr. J. S. Mill was right in thinking that there never was on the whole a better government of the autocratic type. To say so, however, is not to maintain that it is therefore necessarily possible to long continue to conduct Indian government upon its present lines, and the reasons for and against that view are perhaps as deserving of attention at the present moment as any matters connected with the Empire.

It is undoubtedly of interest to note the fact that the great majority of foreign observers of our rule in India take a most optimistic view with regard to its past and present, and French and German travellers

vie with one another in their expressions of admiration for the government that we have established in the peninsula. The opinion expressed by the great majority of foreign travellers who have written upon India is that the country is not only prosperous from a material point of view, but governed with an integrity and a wisdom which are recognised by the population, and that the countries under the direct rule of Great Britain are visibly more happy than the countries under the administration of native princes. They point out how much has been done by the moral effect of missionary effort; the liberality of the Government in allowing a freedom of speech and of the press greater than that which exists in Ireland and in most of the continental countries of Europe; and the success of the British Government in securing perfect order without interference with religious prejudice or with the usages of the people. While we are apt, with our curious habit of self-depreciation, to think our own rule costly, foreign observers generally pronounce it singularly cheap, when account is taken of the value of the expenditure upon public works and railways. As to the material prosperity of India under our rule there can be, they think, but little doubt. The whole of the ancient trade of the country has been retained, while an immense development has been given by railways to branches of commerce which until lately did not exist; and considerable as has been the recent increase of taxation, there is, they tell us, much evidence that the condition of the people has, in spite of it, improved.

Foreign observers are, however, given to severely criticising our pretence that our government of India is not a despotism; and, on the contrary, they defend it as the perfection of an autocracy, a benevolent and

intelligent rule which in their opinion suits the people governed more closely than is the case with any other government on the earth's surface. It is indeed difficult to see upon what ground it can be contended that our Indian government is not despotic. The people who pay the taxes have no control over the administration. The rulers of the country are nominated from abroad. The laws are made by them without the assent of representatives of the people. Moreover, that is the case which, as has been seen, was not the case under the despotism of Rome, or in India itself under the despotism of the Moghuls, namely, that the people of the country are excluded almost universally from high military rank, and generally from high rank in the Civil Service. The nomination of a few natives to positions upon the Councils is clearly in this matter but a blind, and it cannot be seriously contended that the Government of India ceases to be a despotism because it acknowledges a body of laws. On this principle the Russian Government is not a despotism, because the Emperor never takes a decision without some support for his views in the Imperial Senate.

Such, generally speaking, is the view taken by Baron von Hübner, by M. Darmesteter, by M. Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, by M. Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, and by the other foreign students and observers of our rule, while the most friendly of all our critics is one who, though he writes after profound study, and with an accuracy that is remarkable, has never visited the Indian peninsula. M. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire says of our rule, "India never knew its like, . . . never obeyed a Government so gentle, so enlightened, so liberal;" and declares that for Russia to interfere with the British rule of the peninsula would be "the greatest and most odious

of disasters." The view which is taken by foreign writers of such standing is better deserving of attention than can be the criticisms of many travellers, whose state of information is generally illustrated by the old Anglo-Indian story of one of them asking to be helped to the wing of a "Bombay duck." While, however, we may quote with complacency the praises of our rule by foreign critics, we must in so doing remember that most, if not all, of them point out the difficulties of the future.

M. Darmesteter. M. Darmesteter, the ablest, on the whole, of all foreign writers upon India—while he speaks of our rule as based on kindness and on justice, giving to the peninsula that boon of peace which it had never previously known, suppressing thuggism and suttee, diminishing infanticide and famine, and covering India with a network of railways and irrigation canals—says that the natives know all this, but do not love the English, although they believe in the truth of the Englishman, and respect as well as fear him. M. Darmesteter tells us that it would be impossible to find in a foreign Government more conscience, more straightforwardness, more sincere desire to do good, and that "there never was in the Roman provinces, even under the Antonines, so much power, so much temptation, so little abuse of power"; but the high qualities of British rule are unfortunately, he thinks, accompanied by a total lack of that true sympathy without which inferiority cannot pardon superior strength. The English are unable "to enter into the heart of these vast multitudes, so gentle, so weak, so ready to open and to give themselves if only one could speak with them. . . . As India becomes more European the gulf between the races grows deeper, for the apparent

drawing together only brings out more strongly the natural antipathy—profound and incurable." At the same time M. Darmesteter thinks that without us India would merely go to pieces, and that the Sikh and the Bengali, the Hindoo and the Mohammedan, could not live side by side under a single native rule. India is destined to remain English unless or until Russia beats us; Russia can never be a peaceful neighbour to India; the great fight will one day come, and come with doubtful chances, and if Russia wins, India will not be the gainer by the loss of her "silent and haughty but conscientious masters." Such are the words of no ordinary observer, who spent a whole year in the country, and whose language is the more noticeable because he agrees generally with the other foreigners who have written upon our rule. That able traveller, M. Bonvalot, agrees with M. Darmesteter's view as to our unpopularity.

M. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire.

M. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire has, as I see is pointed out in the Review article which I have referred to above, entitled his first chapter "England and Russia," and has begun his book by declaring that every lover of mankind and of civilisation must wish the English success in the task that they have set themselves in India, but asks whether England will be allowed by Russia to complete her work. The belief, then, of foreign observers is that our Indian Government has been one of the best Governments in the world, but that it needs to place itself in closer sympathy with the natives in order that it may be free to turn its attention in undisturbed strength to military defence.

Drawbacks to the goodness of our Government.

It is the case that the vast majority of the men who take part in the government of India have a sincere desire to promote the welfare of that country, but it is,

LONDON

as has been seen, also true that, with modern facilities for coming home and for reaching the hill stations, the present generation, both of soldiers and civilians, are less identified with India than was the case with their predecessors; and as regards soldiers, there is less sympathy between them and the natives because less knowledge on their part of the natives than was the case under the former system. Moreover, it must be constantly borne in mind that the great majority of the people of India are credulous and superstitious, and given to believing the most extraordinary inventions without the smallest evidence, and that there constantly circulate in India rumours as to the actions and the intentions of the Government, which are generally believed, although entirely without foundation, and which affect prejudicially the view taken of the rulers by the ruled. For example, incredible though it may seem in England, it is a well-known fact in India that it is thought by the majority of the population that the English are in the habit of killing natives by way of sacrifice at the inauguration of new works.

The police.

It must also be borne in mind that government comes closest to the cultivators, in the uniform of the police; and the memorandum published by the India Office in 1889, upon the Indian administration of the past thirty years and results of British rule in India, frankly admitted that "the police department is now, as heretofore, a weak point in the administration," and stated that "from time to time cases of extortion or of oppression by the police come to light." As a fact, the practice of torture by the police for the purpose of obtaining evidence, to which I alluded in *Greater Britain*, still exists, and was proved in a recent case in Calcutta itself, while in the rural districts it is certainly

easier to practise without detection than in the Bengal capital. The administrative report for the North-West Provinces for a single year records four cases of torture in which nine police officers were concerned and prosecuted to conviction, to which must be added the larger number of cases in which the police may have so acted as to secure their own safety. The Bengal Government in their annual report for the same year (the latest) state that the working of the town police system continues to be unsatisfactory, while amending Acts do not seem to have effected much improvement in the village police; that two cases of torture and four of ill treatment of accused prisoners were brought against police officers in the year; that in two of the cases convictions were obtained; in two others the officers concerned were dismissed or degraded, while in two only were they exonerated. A very large number of false charges are also reported in Bengal. While, then, no Government was ever more benevolent to begin with than the British rule in India, by the time its good intentions have filtered down to the peasant majority its benevolence has become so corrupted in its agents that there is not much to choose between it and the government of a bad native state.

Unpopularity of retrenchment.

There is also a fresh crop of difficulties caused for us by retrenchment. Great efforts have been made in recent years to reduce expenditure, and unfortunately the reduction achieved has in some degree fallen upon useful objects of the public care, whereas dissatisfied natives are able to point with justice to the scandal that in some matters where reduction of expenditure would be positively useful to the State, but where it would cut off patronage—as, for example, in the crying cases of the separate political Governors and Commanders-in-

Chief for Madras and Bombay—no reduction has been made.

Other grievances which are much put forward by native writers concern the imposition upon India of English ideas and some matters connected with the pastimes and pleasures and habits of the ruling class. The abolition of import duties in India has been a triumphant success, but unfortunately it was carried, as has been shown, by interested pressure from Lancashire and against a considerable amount of Indian feeling; and the objectors have been able up to the present time to continue to point to the retention of the English duties upon Indian gold and silver plate as a remarkable example of self-contradiction upon our part. The virtual preservation of wild beasts for sport in shooting, in a country in which the population are disarmed, is also a grievance, as is, with less obvious reason, the State provision made for the religious worship of the English official and military settlers. Other grievances.

The existence of these and other grievances and of a powerful movement for reform makes it in my belief desirable that we should adopt the proposals of Lord Randolph Churchill for a general inquiry, which, on the one hand, would bring home to our own people the wisdom of our Indian government, and, on the other hand, should prepare the way for those changes which are needful to enlist in its favour a larger measure of popular support. The committee proposed in 1886 by Lord Kimberley, but not appointed, was of too official a nature, and its inquiries would have been of too limited a scope. Sir Roper Lethbridge was, in my opinion, right in his action in preventing its appointment, as such a committee could not have fully dealt with the demand of the natives for a larger share in the Inquiry.

administration. Inquiry, moreover, will be useless unless the reforms recommended are carried out; and it must be remembered that the report of the army committee, known as the Simla Committee (which was one of the strongest committees that ever sat), was vetoed by Lord Kimberley himself. Sir Richard Temple has suggested sufficient limitations upon a general scheme of Indian inquiry, and the best course would probably be to appoint a commission in India—with the Viceroy for president, to prevent its detracting from his dignity or undermining his position—which should inquire into finance in the widest sense, into the extent to which natives should be employed in the administration, and into the extension of representative institutions, either upon a universal district system or in Provincial government. The fact that our government of India has been a success up to the present time, which must be looked upon as an undoubted fact, is by no means a proof that no change is needed; and that very danger of the advance and close neighbourhood of a great military power which I have discussed in the last chapter makes it a concern of urgent importance that the better order of native opinion should receive satisfaction.

Baron von Hübner.

Baron von Hübner, who is a strong Conservative, has summed up the question upon each side in the words of leading Civilians whom he consulted. On the one hand he shows how since the days of Macaulay's famous minute we have passed two generations of natives through our schools, imparting to them the highest European instruction in our colleges and universities, and yet continuing to leave nearly the whole administration in the hands of a dominant class of foreigners. Baron von Hübner proves indeed that, whether we were right or wrong in adopting the system of education that we chose, our course was

deliberately taken, and that the results of that education are a solid fact which must be recognised, for it is too late to retrace our steps or to destroy the ideas which we have long been implanting. The pressure brought to bear, through the native press, by the educated natives who have passed through the State colleges and universities, backed as it is by the social grievances of the Indian upper classes and by a large amount of Radical support in England, is irresistible. Baron von Hübner points out that we had in fact no choice; that we could not adopt an Oriental system of teaching, because we should have had to teach the mutually destructive doctrines of the Koran and of the sacred books of the Hindoos. In Cairo I believe there are at present two universities, of which one teaches that the earth is circular and goes round the sun, and the other teaches that the sun goes round the earth, which is as flat as any pancake; but it was doubtless difficult for us to adopt a similar scientific impartiality. Given the fact that we introduced English teaching into India, we could not do otherwise than create an educated native class, who could not in turn do otherwise than oust us from a large part of the administration.

Mr. Meredith Townsend.

In all these controversies as to the past, present, and future of our rule I find little reason, apart from the risks of ultimate foreign invasion which we have discussed in the last chapter, to anticipate that we shall ever be forced to leave India. A distinguished writer, whose knowledge of India was at one time profound, but who has perhaps hardly kept pace with the latest changes in that country, has tried to prepare the English people for the ultimate loss of the peninsula. No doubt the hold of a nation at a great distance over a vastly more numerous

people, to the great mass of whom it has failed to teach its tongue, and whom it does not entrust with power, must at first sight seem precarious. But the statesmanship of our race will, so far as civil difficulties go, cope with them, and the nature of our rule will change with the times sufficiently to enable us to preserve our hold on India. No doubt we are a mere handful. There were at the last census under 90,000 British-born subjects in India; or, omitting the army, 34,000, of whom half were women and children. If from the 17,000 men that remain the members of the Civil Service are deducted, it will be found what a small number of railway labourers, merchants, tea-planters, pilots, teachers, servants, and others are left. Since the date of the census the white army has been increased, but the civil white inhabitants have remained almost stationary in numbers. In enormous districts inhabited by many millions of natives a European population, other than soldiers and "Civilians," that is, members of the Civil Service, may be said to be non-existent, and the English tongue, spoken as it is chiefly by the half-castes, stands twenty-second in the list of the languages of India. Though a mere handful, we are, however, necessary for the purpose of keeping the peace between rival creeds and rival races. Mr. Meredith Townsend, in his brilliant paper, seems to think that the proof of the feebleness of our numbers and of the separation that exists between the rulers and the ruled is a sufficient demonstration of the precarious nature of our tenure of the country, even if we put out of sight the possibility of invasion; but Mr. Townsend himself admits that as regards the vast majority—the agricultural people—their attitude towards all Governments has always been one of passive acquiescence, and

that we may leave out of account the probability of their taking part actively against ourselves. The educated people we have trained, while they have everything to hope for from our rule, and while many think, with myself, that we should put them frankly upon our side by a large measure of concession to their views, are men whose very existence depends upon our government, for in such a period of anarchy as would ensue upon our defeat they would be crushed by the hatred of the fanatics. Mr. Townsend's article will have done good, however, even though its conclusions be incorrect, if, as can hardly fail to be the case, he has suggested to his readers the weakness of our rule, and has directed men's minds towards plans of remedy. The one danger is the threatening neighbourhood of the forces of a great European military power. Lord Lawrence himself said of the native army that it cannot be supposed that mercenaries of wholly different race and religion will "sacrifice everything for us"; that there is a point up to which they will stand by us, "for they know that we always have been eventually successful, and that we are good masters; but go beyond this point, and every man will look to his immediate benefit."

The future.

Our rule in India, giving peace, the absence of disturbance, increasing manufactures, and flourishing trade, is insecure upon one side only, and not mined by any new dangers having to do with the relations of the two colours, provided those modifications in our system of government which wisdom and prudence suggest are made from time to time. There would be danger if English opinion were to prompt the continuance, in face of the education of picked natives in European learning and ideas, of the treatment of all natives as inferiors

by a handful of virtually unprotected whites. When it has been recognised that the natives form in fact an admirable working population, having among them magnificent fighting men, and trained administrators who must be given that fair share in government which they may claim to have won by reason of their prowess and of their talents, there will be no home or internal risk. The wealth which has been brought to the Indian towns by the opening of the Suez Canal—a doubtful gain to England, but an undoubted gain to India—has caused a growing belief among rich natives that the material prosperity of India is best secured by British rule, and this, as well as the influence of a system of education created by ourselves, must be taken into account. It is not necessary to urge the wisdom of reform upon the grounds of justice or injustice. It is not necessary to point out that, if entrance to the services is to be by examination, regard to our solemn promises demands that examinations should be held under conditions equal as between native and European, and that all the Queen's subjects who can pass them should be treated alike, whatever their colour or religion. It is sufficient to argue from mere considerations of expediency that the time has come when it would be hopeless to expect to remain with perfect safety as we are. I do not contend that mere examination is necessarily the best way of finding Indian natives whom other Indian natives will obey; but that Indian natives must be found, and the highest local power enlisted on our side, is to my mind certain.

Position of educated natives.

Whatever may have been the merits of the Ilbert Bill, much of the agitation which arose upon it was mischievous in its effect, tending as it did to delay

inevitable concession in the direction of throwing open more responsible posts to natives, a change which, owing to interested opposition, will necessarily come rather too slowly than too fast. While the writings of men like Sir John Strachey, who sincerely desire the good of India, but who are imbued with officialism, suggest that it is possible to maintain an attitude of resistance towards the aspirations of the educated natives (though the writers are willing to admit not only that our government of India is not popular, but that it is impossible that it should ever become popular), non-official Englishmen, trying to discover for themselves where lies the wisest course, are likely to come to the opposite conclusion. These will believe that, for the sake of the permanence of our rule, we must bend in a considerable degree before the breeze of the new opinion, and also that it would be possible to do so in such a manner as to strengthen rather than weaken our hold upon the country. In the first place it must be remembered that there is nothing before the native mind to replace our Government, and that even among the wilder spirits of the Opposition there is no intention of attempting to replace it, although there may be that of altering it to an extent which it will not bear. It is for us to see in what degree it is possible to give satisfaction to the critics, without weakening, although we may modify, the nature of the fabric. Above all, it is essential to the continuation of our rule under the changed conditions that the individual Englishman in India should behave towards the people as the best behave at present. Sir John Strachey himself has written, "It cannot be denied that the ordinary Englishman is too rough, and vigorous, and straightforward to be a very agreeable person to a majority of

the natives in India;" but, while straightforwardness and vigour are admirable qualities, roughness, such as would not be for one moment borne by the meanest man at home, is less worthy of imitation when we are dealing with a population courteous and submissive beyond the conception of home-staying Britons.

Sir John Strachey.

In what I have said I may perhaps have made it seem as though Sir John Strachey were a representative of non-progressive officialism. That is not so. He represents, on the contrary, what is best in the Governmental school, and I have named him both for that reason and because his book is the most recent as well as, with those of Sir Richard Temple, the most able upon that side. Sir John Strachey has written in favour of virtually giving to the natives the whole of the judicial appointments of India—a change for which the greater number of officials are far from being prepared, although the number of natives admitted to high judicial rank has increased since the assumption of the Government of India by the Queen. On the other hand, the tone in which he has written of the National Congresses which have been held for some years past is unfortunate, for on the whole those meetings have been characterised by remarkable moderation, and, as they are an inevitable consequence of the nature of our rule, it would seem better to consider dispassionately the views put forward by those taking part in them than to point out the weakest side of the gatherings in the strongest language. It may be true that the native reformers do not sufficiently denounce what Sir John Strachey calls "the atrocious practices which, under the cover of immemorial custom, are followed throughout India"; but to attack "political agitators" for "sedition and hatred of the British Government, thinly veiled under frequent

and fulsome expressions of devotion and loyalty," is not to advance matters, but, on the contrary, only to increase the want of sympathy between our Government and those who have been trained by our own acts to be our critics.

The National Congress movement is based upon our declarations of 1833 and 1835, and 1858. The spokesmen of the natives point out that in 1833, after much debate, Parliament declared "that no native of India shall by reason only of his religion, place of birth, descent, or any of them, be disabled from holding any place," and that in the proclamation of 1858 these words occur: "Our subjects, of whatever race or creed, be freely and impartially admitted to offices in our service, the duties of which they may be qualified by their education, ability, and integrity duly to discharge." The natives declare that these promises have been violated in the past, and assure us that if in these days of extending education we alienate the educated class, and force them to believe that as long as the English remain in India there will be no place in Government for them, we shall weaken our hold upon the country, and our ability to tax it sufficiently to provide for military defence against the armies of a first-class power. The National Congress.

Lord Macaulay in his minutes and his speeches foresaw all the difficulties of the present time, and was for facing them. After the Mutiny, when the country was crammed with British troops, we were tempted to withdraw from the position of 1833 and of 1835; but, instead of withdrawing from it, we deliberately reaffirmed it. Since that time we have extended English education and the use of the English tongue, but looking to the present diffusion of administrative power among natives

it must be confessed that we have in some degree disregarded our own promises. This is shown by the class of men who go from our Indian colleges to take part in ruling native states, because they have not sufficient openings under us. The result is a natural, though a partial, discontent, and in creating a single India for governmental purposes we have not only erected a fabric which in itself does much to unite native discontent throughout India, but have, in our own tongue, given the discontented a common language known to all journalists and barristers and most clerks—known, that is, to the whole of those likely to furnish the spokesmen of discontent.

The other view.

The reply that is made takes the shape of criticism in detail of the proposals put forward by the reformers; opposition by a section of Mohammedans; interested, though not consciously interested, opposition by some of those who would be displaced by a more free employment of natives; and some sarcasm and some bad language. One critic, who deals largely in such words as "agitators" and such phrases as "revolutionary propaganda," seems to think that it is a condemnation of the Congress movement that it "must receive much pecuniary support from natives of high position who do not choose publicly to avow their sympathy with the movement;" a fact making it the more necessary to pay attention to the proceedings of the Congress, which, however, the writer proposes to put down by force. In the meantime the Congress goes its way, and meets with increasing success each year. The fourth Congress, which was held at Allahabad in the winter of 1888-89, was interesting as taking place in a centre of European and Mohammedan opposition to the movement; but, of the 1400 delegates, more than 200 were Mohammedans,

there was a large attendance at the meetings, a European president—an ex-sheriff of Calcutta and ex-president of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce—who made a most able and moderate speech, and every sign of general adherence among the educated classes. The Congress of Christmas 1889 was of a similar nature. One attack which has been made upon the spokesmen of the native movement, charges them with being indifferent to the moral evils which exist among their own community, while alive to those which are found among ourselves. As Sir William Hunter, a friendly critic, has pointed out, improvement in the position of women in India has not kept pace with general progress, and he condemns harem seclusion, enforced celibacy of widows, and child marriage. The Zenana Medical Missions meet with opposition from Indian gentlemen, who fear propagandism and espionage. But the Congress is not specially to blame, and it was evident at Allahabad last year that, concurrently with the demand for political advance, there was a movement among the delegates in the direction of social reform.

"The Rajah of Bhinga's" anti-Congress pamphlet.

By far the ablest work in the anti-Congress literature is a pamphlet which bears the name of Oday Pertap Singh, Rajah of Bhinga, a landowner in the North-West Provinces, of Rajput race. I say "bears the name," because while the native races produce men who, under immense difficulties, attain to a high standard, judged by our Western tests of scholarship, Indian landowners are seldom found in the first ranks of writers of English. It is the fashion throughout the Civil Service to declare as an article of faith that the Rajah of Bhinga wrote his pamphlet with his own hand, but, as no declarations on this subject have been sufficient to remove my doubts, I think it better to state them. At all events

the pamphlet is there, and forms a most able English essay against the Congress. The title is "Democracy not suited to India"—a phrase which in itself seems to have the ring of a Lieutenant-Governor's study. All must agree that Hindostan does not form at present a promising field for certain democratic experiments, but to declare that democracy is not suited to India is by no means necessarily to pronounce in favour of a centralised administration of a foreign type; nor is it to reject a large amount of native help in offices of trust. Government through native gentlemen may prove to be government of an aristocratic and Conservative type. It is at least possible that the form of government which may best "suit" "India"—most conduce to the military and financial strength of the British Indian Empire, and best tend to secure its permanence—will be one in which the natives feel themselves secure under the rule of their own gentry, in their own districts, assisted by their ablest men; we looking after India as a whole in the matters of the taxes and the army. Even those, then, who think that "Democracy" is "not suited to" the India of our time, may possibly find themselves able to go a long way with the Congress, which in many matters is far from "Democratic" in its ideas. All men who think must recognise the unwisdom of suddenly overturning in an Oriental country a long-existing blend of an ancient Asiatic civilisation with excellent administration from the West. The doubt is whether gradual change, such as is advocated by the Congress, will not in the long-run conduce to the happiness of the people and to their more uniform advance, as well as to the wealth and strength of our own Empire. Greatly as I differ upon many points from "the Rajah," I agree with him in thinking that the cultivators of, for example, the

Punjab, would prefer the rule of their own gentry to that of a native clerk from Bengal. It is, however, in the badly paid Bengal clerk, useful to the English because he speaks and writes our tongue, that the Punjabi knows British administration now, while the proposals of the Congress would give the Punjab its autonomy under the civil direction of people of Punjabi race controlled by us. Even to those who do not share its ideas the Congress movement should be useful as a reminder and as a counterpoise, and this was the view taken of it in its early days by a Conservative Indian statesman, Sir Richard Temple, and said by him to be that generally held by his friends concerned in Indian government.

Attitude towards the Congress of Sir William Hunter and others.

The recent attitude of the leading Anglo-Indians towards the Indian National Congress has been confused, and we gain no certain guidance from it when considered as a whole. The general position has been hostile, but some of the thoughtful men, as, for example, Sir William Wedderburn, the President of the National Congress of December 1889, have given, under the form of benevolent neutrality, a full and general approval. The high authority of Sir William Hunter has been set upon the side of approbation, and his pen has conferred upon the last three Congresses a considerable publicity—the meetings of 1885 and 1886 having passed almost unnoticed. Sir William Hunter's support outweighs much opposition. His unrivalled knowledge of India makes him a most trustworthy guide, in everything, may I say, but spelling. The attention which was excited in the United Kingdom by the Congress of December 1888 was, curiously enough, aroused by Mohammedan opposition to it. Some leading Indian Mussulmans, able to write an excellent letter

of the orthodox English type, stated their views in opposition to the Congress through the most influential English journals. The result of this opposition was to attract much notice in England, which led to an examination of first principles that had not the result that the Mohammedan gentlemen intended, and a study of Sir William Hunter's letters and articles has completed the educating process. He has conclusively shown, with the calm of the historian rather than with the partial spirit of a contemporary writer, that the present native movement is the necessary outcome of the principles on which our rule of India has been based, and that it is to our interest, as much as it would be to our honour, to satisfy it in some measure.

Policy and demands of National Congress.

The Congress of 1885 was small, and the representative nature of a true congress was at that time wanting. It was a first attempt, and, like all first attempts in a new direction in such a place as India, was necessarily somewhat of a failure. The Congress of 1886 at Calcutta was a more considerable undertaking: all the religions were represented, and all parts of the country, although the nobles and the leading Mohammedans held aloof. The Congresses of 1887 at Madras, and of December 1888 at Allahabad, were even more remarkable, and considerable sacrifices of time and money were necessary to secure the large attendance of delegates from great distances. The object of the Congresses, as officially put forward, has been excellent. The leaders have asked the delegates to give a popular countenance to the empire of Great Britain in India as the bestower of peace and order; they have expressed their determination to promote friendliness between the races; but, in urging the delegates to discuss the lines upon which it

is desirable for native politicians to work, they have demanded that the basis of government should be widened. Just as when the Slavonic delegates from all parts of the Slavonic world came together on two occasions, once at Prague and once at Moscow—as it was said, by their critics rather than by themselves, to denounce Germany—German was found to be the only language in which they could communicate their ideas to one another—so of English at the Indian National Congresses. The language used in the Congress is often necessarily English, because that is a tongue which the lawyers and the newspaper editors from all parts of India understand, and though it is not spoken by all the delegates, it is the tongue in which a majority can most easily communicate with one another. The Congress, by the speeches of its leading men, has asked that a portion of the members of the Legislative Councils should be elected by the natives in electoral colleges by classes, care being taken to represent all the various interests. One base which has been proposed for the future councils is that one-fourth should consist of *ex-officio* members, one-fourth of selected members, and half of members elected by classes. But power is given to the executive Government to select a portion of the electorate, as well as overrule the decisions of the Councils. It may be safely conceded that a constitution of this kind would be workable, and would not produce any revolutionary change in India; in fact, bodies so composed would probably be excessively Conservative; but opponents are inclined to think that these proposals may form but a first step, and that the idea behind them is the adoption of those parliamentary institutions for which the peninsula of Hindostan, with its extraordinary diversity of races,

tongues, and religions, appears to be unfit or unprepared. Another main proposal of the Congress is that natives should no longer be practically excluded from competition for the Indian Civil Service. In regard to this matter there can be no doubt that promises made to the late Professor Fawcett have not been kept. It would, however, be better to leave this matter for the present as it is than to tantalise the feelings of educated natives by the adoption of some transparent fraud. It is no fulfilment of our promises to invite gentlemen to come to England from Hindostan (which creed forbids many of the best of them to do) in order to compete with Englishmen in subjects specially chosen to exclude them. Affairs of a different kind are touched by the Congresses in the proposal, not made, however, in the last one or two of them, that there should be no future increase in military expenditure—a matter on which the Congress may have voted in order to please its electors, without any very real regard to the nature of the military necessities of the country. A vast number of topics of less importance, or less interest to ourselves, have also been dealt with by motions.

The great transition.

Sir William Hunter in his wise articles has shown the impossibility of governing India either by an absolute despotism or by parliamentary forms, and the necessity of treating the present period as one of transition and development. He points out that if the question is whether the United Kingdom, supported only by a white garrison and a small close Civil Service, can permanently hold India, Mr. Meredith Townsend is justified in thinking that it cannot; but Sir William Hunter believes that we have already taken some steps in the direction of reconstitution on a broader base, and that, proceeding steadily in the same direction, we can make

our rule more lasting. He shows how the people of India having been promised admission to public office, their education, ability, and integrity, to use the words of the Queen's proclamation, are now such that no ground can be found under these heads for refusing them admission. He points out how we have trained the picked youth of India in the literature of English freedom and inspired them with British political ideas, and how impracticable it is to continue to refuse all possibility of growth, even though we may think that growth of free institutions in India should naturally be slow. Sir William Hunter also shows how we have modernised the intellectual class of India, without leavening the whole mass of the population with modern ideas, and how therefore we have two peoples in India in the sense of civilisation—a great mass unchanged, and a small number highly trained in British notions. Sir William Hunter maintains silence upon what may be called the political demands of the Congress, but he supports its view with regard to the reform of judicial procedure, the production of an Indian budget in legislative council, the modification of the Arms Act to prevent the destruction of the population by wild beasts, and a partial admission of natives to the Covenanted Civil Service. Sir William Hunter knows, however, as well as any one, that reform could not long stop here, and that the political demands of the Congress for some introduction of the representative system into the Provincial Governments are the demands which lie behind the rest and upon which the future in India turns.

Views of the British press in India.

It is curious in this connection to read the comments of the Anglo-Indian newspapers upon Mr. Meredith Townsend's article on the retention of India by England which I have named above. Many of them seem to

think that England can easily hold India by arms, and that no change in the form of government is necessary, and they differ widely from Sir William Hunter in these respects. The native papers, and some of the English papers published in India, agree in declaring Mr. Townsend wrong; they think that England will retain India, but naturally assume that it will retain it by having that regard to the wishes of the governed which Sir William Hunter proposes. One English weekly newspaper of Calcutta summed up the question very plainly when it said that the leaden dulness of British rule constituted its most serious danger, and that it was a disaster that we should "deny a career to the ambitious youth of the country," and "jealously exclude the people from participation in the government." An excellent journal, the *Voice of India*, which gives extracts from the native papers of all types, should be closely studied by those who wish to keep themselves informed upon the changing aspects of Indian problems.

The Congress movement natural.

That gatherings in the nature of the National Congress should take place was to be expected, and was in fact inevitable, and the demands which have been made—both those which are reasonable and those which, though made in reasonable language, are unreasonable—are also such as might have been foreseen. As has been pointed out by Sir Henry Leland Harrison (who has had great experience, as Chairman of the Corporation of Calcutta and Commissioner of Police, and also by reason of his membership of the Legislative Council of Bengal), much of the opposition to Congress ideas arises from the personal unpopularity of those who advocate them—men who in a Conservative country have been branded by the repellent name of "agitators." Although it may be true that the Indian "agitator" is unwarlike; that

he is despised by the fighting classes, and disliked by the religious; yet, as he is the advocate of principles to which concessions must undoubtedly be made, it is worse than useless to attack the agitator while we are daily yielding to the agitation. The agitator may be admitted to be ambitious, but I fail to see why the possession of ambition should be denied to him. That those who are disagreeably criticised by agitators, and who may conceivably be thereby displeased, should be jealous of the notice which has been accorded to them is natural, but can form in itself no reason for denying claims which apparently are in a large degree consistent with the interests of the Empire. As has been well shown, men who speak better English than most Englishmen; who conduct able newspapers in our tongue; who form the majority on town councils which admirably supervise the affairs of great cities; who, as native judges, have reached the highest judicial posts; who occupy seats on the Provincial, the Presidency, and the Viceregal Councils, or, as powerful ministers, excellently rule vast native states,—can no longer be treated as hopelessly inferior to ourselves in governmental power. These men look upon the Queen's proclamations as their charters, and point out that, while there is no legal reason against their filling some proportion, at all events, of the highest executive posts, there are as a fact virtually no natives high up in the Covenanted Civil Service. That service, although an admirable instrument of government, is becoming more, instead of less, of a close service, and its members less and less Indian and more and more English in their lives. To those who take a purely selfish view it may be urged that we can hardly long go on as we are, refusing to proceed further in the direction of the employment of

natives in high office, with the Russians at our door pursuing the other policy, although pursuing it in a less degree than is commonly believed. The unshared rule of a close bureaucracy from across the seas cannot last in the face of widespread modern education of a people so intelligent as Indian natives. On the other hand, British military supremacy sufficient to preserve peace, and British control sufficient to raise the necessary taxes and to prevent the imposition of customs duties, can be more easily maintained if a large measure of local independence is conceded to the Provinces.

Not so much real difference upon the question as generally thought.

It is after all only a question of degree that separates the two sides, not one of principle. It is possible to combine the views of men who at first sight appear to hold most opposite opinions—Sir William Hunter, Sir William Wedderburn, Sir H. L. Harrison, Mr. Yule, and Mr. Cotton on the one side, and Sir Lepel Griffin and Sir John Strachey on the other. The former support and the latter attack the National Congress; but nothing that its opponents have said runs counter to the idea of local representative institutions, while the class of outside supporters do not propose to govern Rajputs and Mahrattas and Sikhs by Bengalis, or to constitute an Indian Parliament. Unpopular as was Lord Ripon with the English official class in India, his policy of increasing the powers of municipalities was a mere expansion of Lord Mayo's policy, and is generally though not universally approved.

Spirit in which the Congress movement should be met.

Argument upon the matter is to be desired, but not invective, and there is so much reason to think that the Congress movement really represents the cultivated intelligence of the country that those who ridicule it do harm to the imperial interests of Great Britain, bitterly wounding and alienating men who are justified in what

they do, who do it in reasonable and cautious form, and who ought to be conciliated by being met half-way. The official class themselves admit that many of the natives who attack the Congress do so to ingratiate themselves with their British rulers and to push their claims for decorations: and, while I am on this point, I may add that it is an almost universal opinion among officials themselves that some of the recent appointments in the various classes of our orders have been unfortunate. Our first duty in India is that of defending the country against anarchy and invasion, with which I have dealt in the last chapter; but our other greatest duty is to learn how to live with what is commonly called the Congress movement, namely, with the development of that new India which we have ourselves created. Our past work in India has been a splendid task, splendidly performed, but there is a still nobler one before us, and one larger even than that labour on the Irish problem to which our public men on both sides seem too much inclined to give their whole attention.

Great change at hand.

When last I came from India I did so with a feeling that my third visit had been paid at the end of the old period; at a moment when little real change had yet taken place in the state of things which had previously existed, but when great changes were in view. In the matter of Indian defence I have shown how the presence of Russia upon our frontier has modified the problem, and how, while our means of meeting attack have grown, they have grown as yet upon old lines. Our army in India is essentially an army of the same class as that which I had found there before. It is the same army with modifications; in those days strong for its work, and now weak for its work; but with the probability before it that a complete change of system is at hand,

although it may come too late. So with Indian politics. We still find the courteous and able Civilian ruling India upon the same system in all essentials which existed when I was there before, but with a general admission among all who have come unprejudiced to the matter that the system cannot long endure unchanged; and I have thought it wise to devote this chapter to the consideration of the alterations proposed and likely soon to come, their advantages and their dangers.

Persons in India less important than system.

Persons do not count for much in India. The Indian governmental system is too regular, the codes are too complete, traditions too strong, to give much room to human personality. No one man can really change the policy, and the greatest alterations of recent times have taken place gradually by the help of scores of distinguished men. While in young colonies a single governor or a single minister may bring about a change which will alter the whole future of the country, in India talent can expect no such results. Climate, too, shortens the time during which men can remain in the Indian service after they have reached high rank, and they are inclined to answer in the affirmative Sir Alfred Lyall's question—

> "With the sweets of authority sated,
> Would he give up his throne to be cool?"

Statesmen who have completed their Indian career, and left the country never to return, come home and spend another twenty years of useful life—serving their country in Parliament, or their counties or their parishes at Quarter Sessions or on Boards of Guardians, or themselves upon directorates. The most interesting man in India at the present moment is Sir Frederick Roberts; but he is an exception among soldiers on Indian service in having a close connection with the country—his father having been an Indian officer and he himself having served in

Sir Frederick Roberts.

India almost all his life. Hence his personal popularity is as great with the native army as with that white army to which he commends himself as a fine specimen of an Etonian. The influence of his name among the natives generally is considerable, even in the remotest parts of India. Supplies were wanted once in the neighbourhood of the Khojak pass when "Sir Fred" was coming, and appeals were made to the local chiefs and head men of villages, in which the title of Commander-in-Chief and its native equivalent "The Lord of War" were freely used with no result, when at last a staff officer happened to say "Roberts." Then in chorus the chiefs broke in to say that if the great personage was "General Lobbet Sahib" it was a very different matter, and that the stores should be forthcoming. A man of will, a man of action, and a good writer all in one, it could not but be that Sir Frederick Roberts would make his mark in India, and for the sake of the relations between all classes it is to be wished that others like him, if possible, may be found in the future.

Indian scenes.

There is in India no more striking scene than one of those great reviews which foreign writers have frequently described, and on which Lady Dufferin has lately written with much success. An ancient city stands near by, with grand Moghul walls; the parade ground is covered with masses of men of the most martial aspect, in costumes of gorgeous colour, with a background of the great elephants of the siege train, and behind all are the snow crests of the Himalaya; but the military strength which is exhibited upon the field is in itself, except as against a foreign enemy, less valuable to our rule than the perpetual courtesy, cheeriness, and good humour of the old Indian generals in command, which explain the delight with which the white-headed native officers,

with whom the generals are personally acquainted, step forward to touch swords when visited at the quarters of their regiments. But India is full of striking scenes. Nothing can be more different from a grand review than an early service at a Christian mission church in a great town, where all are natives—the preacher, the verger, and the congregation. Hundreds of thousands of dark-skinned people live round the church within the gates of a walled town guarded by dark-skinned police, and one may walk for hours through the streets about this church in which are sung the familiar English hymns without seeing a white face.

The enormous size of India is brought home to us by the variety of the pictures offered to the traveller's gaze; for the peninsula presents us in the south and centre with the perfection of the scenery of the tropics; in the north centre with plains uglier than the ugliest of Australia, more destitute of shadow, more parched, green in the winter only, and sun-baked by far the greater portion of the year; and then in the extreme north with the grandest mountain landscapes that are known. As the country varies from a sterile waste to a natural garden, so does the climate from almost the hottest of the globe to that of cold table-lands and frozen peaks. The driest and the wettest parts of the whole world are both in India, and the colour of the people varies from the black of the peasantry of the Ganges delta to the white of the aristocracy of Kashmir, while the features range from the low types of the Mongolians, and of the aborigines of the Bengal hills, to a purely classic type in the far North West. I have described in *Greater Britain* the river front of Benares, the Golden Temple at Amritsir, the Taj —incomparably the finest building in the world—

and the walls of Agra, the pearl mosques of that city and of Delhi, and the scenery of Central India. I have written of the street life, of the water-carriers and the pariah dogs, of the crows and the screaming kites, of the cream-coloured humped cattle, of the strange music, of the green parrots in the trees, of the never-ending sunshine, of the bronze-statue-like figures of the women bearing loads; and all that I at that time saw I have seen again, except that the cantonments, which at my first visit were so many brickfields, now resemble Batavia in being so many cities of trees in which one can hardly find the houses for the forest—the only change to the eye in India. But in my last visit I was able twice to realise the feeling with which the successive waves of conquerors have seen the dark plains of India from the grand passes of the Afghan hills, with the glittering serpent streaks of the Indus and its tributaries standing out before them in the dust and smoke.

Impossibility of grasping the difficulties of the Indian Problem in the cold weather.

The English tourists who visit India each year in increasing numbers, which would grow, I am sure, more rapidly were it not for the fear of overtaxing the hospitality of Indian friends, resort to the interior of the peninsula in that cold weather when the fields are green, the towns a garden, and the air in the soft sunshine the most balmy that can be found. They can bring back with them but little notion of the real terrors of an Indian life, and those who would judge for themselves of one of the greatest difficulties of Indian rule should follow the example of Professor Robert Wallace, recorded in his *India in 1887*, and visit the country in the other two-thirds of the year. The idea of the possibility of British settlement, unless it is in the hills of the North-West Frontier or in Kashmir,

will be speedily dispelled. From March to November in the south, from April to October in the north, the plains of India are a furnace from which all who can escape. The only relief is in the rain storms, and the rain storms are more unhealthy than the heat. In the hot weather there are delights, however, which make the joy of travellers, but which have a different aspect to those who are condemned to dwell in the plains unceasingly. Dawn is beautiful, and sunrise with its flecks of scarlet, and at night the Eastern russet moon rising from the smoking plains, heavy with their perpetual dust, until it becomes silver as it bathes them in its light and extinguishes the starlight from overhead; but from sunrise until the hour when the brick-red sun sets in a black strip of sky there is nothing before even travellers except the deadly monotony of the long Indian hot-weather day. Beautiful as is India in its cold season, there are few Englishmen who would not prefer to live amid the colossal masses of the silent hills of the North West, rising range upon range from the steaming plains, rather than in the more fertile country, with the flowery winter season, but destructive through its summer to the English race.

PART V

CROWN COLONIES OF THE PRESENT AND OF THE FUTURE

PART V

CROWN COLONIES OF THE PRESENT AND OF THE FUTURE

Popular and scientific meanings of the term Crown Colonies.

UNDER the convenient popular name of "Crown Colonies" I have to treat of those colonies, dependencies, protectorates, and spheres of influence of Great Britain which remain for notice after India and the North American, Australasian, and South African groups have been disposed of. We have dealt with the present position of colonies possessed of responsible government, in which the Crown has only a veto on legislation, and the Colonial Office no control over any public officer except the Governor. We have now to deal with the position and prospects of the Crown Colonies proper, in which the Colonial Office possesses the control of legislation and administration, and with those of an intermediate class of colonies, which possess representative institutions, but not responsible government, while the Colonial Office retains control over their public officers. The Crown Colonies proper include some in which laws may be made by the Governor alone, while in others they are made by the Governor with the concurrence of a nominated Council. In a portion of the latter class, as, for example, in Ceylon and Mauritius, the authority of the Council rests only on prerogative. In others, as, for example, the Straits Settlements, it is based on statute,

though in most of these a power is reserved to make laws by Order in Council. The intermediate class of colonies—which, so far as they have not already been described, will, for the sake of convenience, be dealt with also in this chapter, as, like the others, they are chiefly tropical plantations—are considered "Crown Colonies" by the public though not by the Colonial Office. In these the Crown cannot, as a general rule, legislate by Order in Council, and laws are made by the Governor with the concurrence of one or two legislative bodies, of which one at least is wholly or for the most part representative. In Bahamas, Barbados, and Bermuda, for example, there is a nominated Council and an elective Assembly; while in Natal and Western Australia, already named, we have specimens of colonies possessing representative but not responsible institutions, in which there is a single Legislative Chamber partly elective and partly nominated by the Crown. The public, however, are substantially in the right in classing the intermediate group as "Crown Colonies," inasmuch as executive power is in fact in the hands of persons selected by the Colonial Office.

Varieties of Crown Colonies.

It will be seen that even before we come to consider dependencies of colonies, possessions of the Crown which lie altogether outside of the colonial system, protectorates, and spheres of influence, we have to do with settlements of many kinds. In some Crown Colonies the primary object in the occupation is the maintenance of a fortress or of a coaling station. In others the matter in view is plantation, or foreign trade. In some the population is all white; in others the white population is considerable, but there is a large native black or "coloured" population to whom representative institutions, if limited by a high franchise, might be un-

favourable; in others the population is almost wholly black. The West Indies present us with examples of colonies formerly possessing a large share of self-government, but a share virtually confined to the white race, in which the constitutions have been surrendered and the power of the Crown brought in for the protection of the blacks. In some of the colonies possessing representative but not responsible institutions the local Parliaments are very strong, but represent only the white minority—the imported blacks or the natives being almost unheard—while in others power is passing to the dark-skinned races.

Dependencies of Dependencies.

Besides, then, the great colonies and India, which have been dealt with, we find British colonies and dependencies scattered over the whole earth and administered on every system known to political man. India has her dependencies. Burmah, which is sometimes mentioned as though a separate dependency, is politically a part of India, as are the Andamans and Aden; but Perim is a dependency of Aden, the Laccadives are a dependency of India, and the protectorate over Baluchistan — so real as to make the country virtually British—is an Indian protectorate. As India has her dependencies, so have New Zealand and New South Wales, Mauritius, the Straits Settlements, and Ceylon. Lord Howe Island, 600 miles from Sydney, is part of New South Wales, while Norfolk Island and Pitcairn are British territory, and under the Governor of New South Wales, but do not form part of that colony. Chatham Island and the Kermadec Islands, even farther removed from Wellington and from Auckland respectively than is Lord Howe Island from Sydney, are dependencies of New Zealand. Chatham Island, on which there is both a white and an imported native-

population, is governed by a representative of the New Zealand administration, who has lately had his difficulties, caused by the worrying of flocks by dogs belonging to the decreasing Moriori tribe, and has had to send for troops. The Seychelles are dependencies of Mauritius, from which they are distant nearly a thousand miles; the Maldives are tributary to Ceylon, and the Cocos dependencies of the Straits. In South Africa the dependencies of the Cape and of Natal have been mentioned, as have the new British colonies, protectorates, and sphere of influence, and the detached colony of St. Helena and the Admiralty post of Ascension.

British territory separate from United Kingdom, Colonies, and India.

More peculiar than even the dependencies of dependencies are the parcels of British territory separate from the United Kingdom, and yet altogether outside the Colonial and Indian systems, such, for example, as the Isle of Man with its curious constitution, and the Channel Islands, the most ancient of the dominions of the Crown, the inhabitants of which declare that the United Kingdom is a dependency of theirs.

Tropical Settlements.

In this chapter I shall have to deal mainly with Crown Colonies in the popular or wider sense of the term, but must mention our protectorates and our "spheres of British interest," "British influence," or "British activity," to use the cant phrases which came in in 1885, after the African Conference at Berlin; and I shall also name the new chartered companies, such as those for the Lower Niger, the Zanzibar coast, and for North Borneo, to which indeed, on account of their novelty and of the future which they seem to have before them, I shall assign priority over the old Crown Colonies. As I have been dealing hitherto with the Empire of India, or with our offshoot the United States, or with

colonies in which white men of our race can work on the land and bring up healthy children, so now I have to investigate the condition of what are called tropical colonies, in which the white men induce others to do their work. The British, the Russian, the Hispano-American, and the Chinese races hold between them almost all the temperate lands of the globe outside of Europe. Germany and France in their recent occupations of territory in Africa and the Pacific have been driven to found colonies of the tropical type; while the Dutch, Spanish, and Portuguese, as well as the French themselves, already had great dominions of the kind. By their population, their extent of territory, their trade, and their resources, the British tropical colonies outside India form only one (ranking at present fourth) of several groups which from year to year may vary in relative importance. When books are written, as many have been, upon the colonies of France, they naturally give enormous space to the discussion of problems which, except so far as they concern comparatively small parts of Hindostan, are for the British Empire of secondary importance. The masters of India, the explorers of Australia, cannot give so great a share of their attention to the British West Indies, Ceylon, Mauritius, and such dependencies, as Holland gives to Java, or France to Martinique, Guadeloupe, Réunion, and Cochin-China.

Two classes of English-governed countries across the seas.

Among the English-governed countries there are then two great groups. To the one belong Canada, Australia except its northern coast, New Zealand, Cape Colony, and Bechuanaland; to the other India, a large part of the British African coast, the Northern Territory of Australia, as well as Ceylon, Mauritius, Labuan, and North Borneo, British Guiana, British Honduras, the West India and other islands, and the territories under

the control of the Niger Company and of the East Africa Company. The former group are the temperate colonies, where, even as near to the equator as Queensland, the English race can labour in the open air, and where the native races consisted mainly of peoples like the Red Indian or the Australian aboriginal, of small numbers, who lived by the chase and made little or no use of the soil. In the other group, of which India is the great example, the English find themselves ruling nations and races that they cannot hope to replace. We may indeed try to change them in the islands or the small peninsulas; to substitute one black or yellow people for another, as the negroes have been substituted for the Caribs in the West India Islands, and as Hindoos are being in turn substituted for negroes as labourers in some of these; or as the Chinese in parts of British Malaya have taken as workers the place of the Malays; but we cannot do without the coloured man, nor conveniently till the soil. Most of these countries of dark-skinned labour which are under British rule are Crown Colonies (except India, of which we have already treated, and which is indeed in a similar position), and most of the Crown Colonies consist of countries of this description. There are a few military stations and a few trading posts, some of which lie outside the tropics, where Englishmen could work if the local resources were sufficient to attract them; but in the main the Crown Colonies and the habitation colonies form two separate classes. In some parts of India, as, for example, in the tea districts of Assam and the coffee districts of Madras, we encourage English and Scotch planters, but in the old settled districts of Hindostan the native landlords will continue to exist, and the social problems there presented to us are different from those of our Crown

Colonies, or of the tropical colonies of France, Holland, Spain, Portugal, and the German Empire. The advance made during the Queen's reign by the self-governing colonies of the Empire has been so remarkable, in regard alike to the growth of population, the development of resources, and intellectual and social progress, that the Crown Colonies, on which in former days was concentrated most of the interest that was felt in British enterprise beyond the seas, have been thrown by comparison into the background.

The colonies and dependencies of which I have now to treat do not at first sight seem to illustrate the expansive power of our race to the same extent as do Australasia, North America, or South Africa. The old tropical colonies, as, for example, those of the West Indies, appear to the eyes of some observers to have exhausted their vitality and entered upon a period of decline. There are, however, new fields open to British energy in tropical Africa which present us with an early view of the colonial problems of the twentieth century, for the development of Africa by railroad enterprise must be the work mainly of the next generation. As regards the older tropical colonies, it would be unfair to apply to them the same standard by which we measure the growth of the self-governing colonies. With the exception of those military or naval stations to which I have referred, the Crown Colonies are either situate in low ground within the tropics, or, like Cyprus, Bermuda, and the extra-tropical portion of Bahamas, possess a similar climate. They are unsuited to European labour, and in some degree to permanent European residence, inasmuch as upon their rich low lands European children pine or die.

Moreover, instead of having wide fields for settlement,

our older tropical colonies are either small or densely inhabited by dark-skinned races. In most of them the British planters incurred in the last generation great losses in consequence of the cessation of slave labour, and found much difficulty in obtaining an efficient substitute, while the consequent increase in cost of production was followed by so heavy a fall in the price of the chief among the articles which they produced as seemed to have consummated the ruin of the colonies themselves. Observers at home naturally turned away from the contemplation of what they thought was a picture of decay to the consideration of the brighter prospects of the larger colonies, inhabited, except in the cases of South Africa and of Quebec, by a homogeneous population, and having about them infinite power of development—life, hope, and promise. At the same time the Crown Colonies are important to us still, and their decay, if decay there was, is at an end. They include in Europe the stations of Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, and Heligoland, the chief of which will be dealt with under the head of Imperial Defence; in America little besides British Guiana, British Honduras, and the West-India Islands; in Africa the West Coast Settlements, Mauritius with its dependencies, and Natal and others which have been described under the head of South Africa; in Australasia, Fiji and British New Guinea, besides that Western Australia to which responsible government is immediately to be given; and in Asia, Ceylon, the Straits Settlements, Labuan, and Hong-Kong. If even we exclude from view the British spheres of influence, or, as the Germans say, of "interest," upon the Niger, in East Africa, in North Borneo, and in Northern Bechuanaland, as well as the protectorates, the population in Crown Colonies under direct British rule is almost equal

Slavery.

Sugar.

Of what the Crown Colonies consist.

to the population of all the rest of the colonies put together, and the volume of external trade of the Crown Colonies greatly in excess of that of the other colonies if those of the Australian continent be omitted.

Protectorates and spheres of influence.

I have already foreshadowed the view that in our new protectorates, and in the spheres of influence which have been reserved to us in Africa, are to be found the more important Crown Colonies of the future, in which the problems that have been presented by the older tropical plantations of the West Indies, Mauritius and Ceylon and the West Coast settlements will be solved in the next century upon a larger scale. As the interest, then, of our new African and Pacific tropical dependencies is greater than that which attaches even to the West Indian colonies with their romantic history, I deal first with Africa and with the Pacific. No apology is needed for omitting from consideration here those groups which have been already dealt with in the South African part, and Western Australia—included in that Australian continent which has been treated as a whole. Fiji too has been already named as represented on the Federal Council of Australasia, and New Guinea as a dependency of Australia, although I shall have a few more words to say of the Papuan island. Among the protectorates, which I have as yet left out of account, are the protected States of the Malay peninsula; the protected islands of the Pacific; the northern Somali Territory, or southern shore of the Gulf of Aden from the mouth of the Red Sea towards Cape Guardafui; as well as Sarawak and Brunei, which have also lately come under our protection. More important, however, are the vast "spheres of influence," full of the possibilities of the future,—new Indias of the next generation, like the Niger; twentieth-century Australias, like the tablelands of the Zambesi banks

and the high lands of East Africa. Recent annexations, proclamations, and treaties of delimitation have given indeed to Great Britain, in Southern, and in Eastern Africa, and between the Gulf of Guinea and the Soudan, as well as in the South-Western Pacific, regions which possess the highest prospective value, and two out of four of which may ultimately be found to have the advantage over India of being better suited, as regards their vast tablelands, to the health of the white race.

Change of policy in 1884.

Great Britain has been forced by stress of circumstances to suddenly alter her policy in Africa. Up to the winter of 1884-85 she had refused as a rule to make annexations of territory, and preferred to deal by treaty with the savage chiefs, insisting only upon order and free trade. As late as 1883 it was laid down in a text-book upon the subject,[1] "that the policy of England discourages any increase of territory in tropical countries already occupied by native races." We had allowed the French to occupy New Caledonia, and other Pacific groups and single islands, which had been discovered, named, and taken possession of for the British Crown by British navigators. We had declined a protectorate of Zanzibar: we had refused the heirship to the late Sultan of Zanzibar, with the reversion of his dominions. We had repeatedly declined the Cameroons. We had declined to ratify the annexation by the Australians of half New Guinea. We had refused to accept the Cameron treaty yielding to us the Congo basin of Central Africa. Both political parties had followed this policy: Mr. Disraeli had refused the Congo and the Cameroons; Mr. Gladstone had refused the Cameroons, Zanzibar, and half New Guinea. The annexation of Fiji, as I shall have to show, was, under the circum-

[1] *The Colonies*, by E. J. Payne. Macmillan and Co.

stances in which it happened, hardly an exception. In consequence of French and German annexations, and the fear of the possible exclusion of our trade from the countries taken by our rivals, a change of policy began in the time of Mr. Gladstone's second administration. After refusing the Cameroons and half New Guinea, and while refusing Zanzibar, he ended by hoisting the British flag in more than a quarter of New Guinea. The question of the acceptance of the Cameroons was reopened, and was actually under the consideration of the Treasury at the moment when the Germans occupied that district. A sudden change of policy had occurred on the part of two other powers, and we followed suit. For some time before 1884 there had been but little seen of the annexation of whole countries for the sake of trade, and the grant of the North Borneo charter at the end of 1881 was a curious exception to a general rule, in which at first the responsibility of the United Kingdom and of Government was purposely made small. The British Empire and the Russian Empire had spread rapidly no doubt, but the annexations had hardly been made with the deliberate design of subduing new countries for commercial reasons. By their attack upon the regions of the Upper Niger, by their annexation of Tunis and Tonquin, and by their war in Madagascar the French, and by the annexation of the west coast of South Africa the Germans, gave the signal for what has been called the "scramble" of 1885, which seems to have swallowed up all Africa and the Pacific islands, at all events as far as the map-makers are concerned, for the profit of North-Western Europe. The change of policy on the part of the United Kingdom was the consequence of the action of her would-be colonial rivals. The administration which had refused all eastern New

Guinea was glad to secure the south-eastern portion of that island; and its successors—the same men who had declined the Congo basin when it had been offered in the treaties of an explorer—were glad to receive European acknowledgment for spheres of influence on the Lower Niger and the northern part of the Zanzibar coast.

Results.

On the whole, we have probably been no losers by not being among the first when the European Powers rushed upon Africa and the Pacific like so many birds of prey. In Western Africa, indeed, we lost by our delay the mountains of the Cameroons, which had twice been ceded to us, and where alone in Western Africa a station might have been formed for white inhabitants; but our South African and East African spheres of influence contain high and healthy plains, and if the Niger banks, North Borneo, and south-east New Guinea be unhealthy, the first two at least are rich, while some of the Pacific islands within our sphere are habitable by whites. It is difficult to decide to which of the two groups of countries named above pertain the high lands in the territory within the limits of the charter of the British East Africa Company, for it is asserted by explorers that, in spite of their nearness to the equator, they may be placed in the category to which Australia and Canada belong. It is, however, to my mind doubtful if it will prove possible to bring up white children in such a country.

The Berlin Conference.

I have used language not altogether complimentary with regard to the recent action in Africa of the European powers; but that action has been of a mixed nature. The motives put forward and the principles proclaimed at the African Conference at Berlin were satisfactory. It is only when we find the nature of the measures by which the powers have been forced in many cases to

make good their paper annexations, and when we note how large a proportion of the commodities which their subjects send to the black people of Central Africa consists of arms and spirits, that we must confess that the facts are not in accord with the views officially avowed. Free Trade and total absence of import duties for many years to come are excellent things for us; but the existing free trade of Africa largely takes the form of free trade in muskets and in drink. Great portions of the countries which in various parts of the globe have been wantonly disturbed by European intervention are inhabited by industrious natives, and there are no white settlers in them to protect. In the Pacific, annexations may be necessary, if only for the purpose of preventing criminal acts being perpetrated against peaceful tribes by white aggressors; but in the greater part of the African countries which have recently come under some slight European control, with a view to the creation of European government in the future, it would have been difficult indeed to make out a fair case for annexation. When the process had begun, however, it was equally difficult for our Government not to claim its share, for fear that the exclusion of our goods by means of differential duties, which had been already seen in many of the colonies of France, should be imitated in other portions of the world. It would doubtless have been difficult in the long-run to keep white men out of Central Africa, and we may be thankful that an immense tract, running from sea to sea, and including the whole centre of the continent and a vast portion of the east coast, with, on the west coast, a strip sufficient to control the waterway of the Congo, has been freed from commercial barriers, thrown open to missionary effort,

and given a fair chance of obtaining neutrality in the event of general war. Some of the principles laid down for Central Africa were indeed so excellent that one can only wish that they may be applied to all parts of the world not under regular government.

Present position of Africa.

Africa is about ten times as large as British India, and far more than half of the vast continent—almost two-thirds of it—is now in some degree attached to one or other of the European powers. The north and north centre are greatly occupied by desert, and thinly peopled, and on these portions of the Dark Continent the French, Spaniards, and Italians have set their eyes. South of the deserts of the Soudan, Africa may be said to have been divided between England, France, Germany, Portugal, and the Congo State.

Egypt.

The special interest which we have in Cape Town and its neighbourhood, on account of one route to India, we have also in Egypt on account of our other route to India through the Canal. It was, indeed, universally admitted at the time of the expedition that we had a high interest in the preservation of domestic peace at Cairo, although there was ground for much difference of opinion about the wisdom of our remaining there after peace had been restored. By our occupation we have improved the government of Egypt, have weeded out adventurers, and have caused Egypt to be well served, and as well governed as is possible in the case of a country which has to bear so fearful a burden of foreign debt; but we find ourselves in a vicious circle. We are to stay until our work is done and Egypt is fully able to stand alone, but as long as we stay the certainty that Egypt will be able to stand alone can never be made apparent. It would have been easy to have left the country immediately after Tel-el-Kebir, placing

LONDON LIBRARY

there a few good officers to organise a small picked force to defend the country against attack from the south; and it was owing to the obstinacy of the Egyptian statesmen, in insisting upon sending an expedition to reconquer the Soudan, that the Hicks disaster followed, bringing all the later evils in its train. Great Britain finds itself with a "temporary" occupation of the country upon its hands, which, although temporary, is apparently meant to last as long as there are fanatical Mohammedans in the Soudan. The pledges as to the temporary nature of the occupation, which were given in 1882 by Mr. Gladstone, were virtually renewed in 1885 by Lord Salisbury; but we continue to stay on in Egypt, although some of those who are not unmindful of the necessities of our military and naval position, as, for example, Lord Charles Beresford, believe that the Canal route is one which could not be made use of in time of serious war, and seem to think that our occupation is rather a source of military weakness than of strength in time of danger. Considered from a military point of view, it is an occupation which too much reminds observers of that French occupation of Rome which lasted from the time of the Second Republic through the whole life of the Second Empire, but came to an end the moment that France was plunged into a dangerous war and had need of the two regiments that were employed there.

East Africa.

Somali coast.

As we pass from Egypt round the African coast we reach our Somali protectorate—a paper annexation of the feeding-ground of Aden and Perim. The Somali coast was occupied in 1887 in the form prescribed by the Berlin Act of 1885, and the Consul who looks after it is paid by the India Office. In 1886 a treaty was concluded between the Viceroy of India and the Sultan

of Socotra for a protectorate, and the British flag was hoisted by General Hogg, the political resident at Aden.

Soon we come, as we journey southward, to the sphere of influence which is occupied by the British East Africa Company, the most favourable part of all tropical Africa for European enterprise. This district is certain to be well developed under the chief proprietor of the British India Steam Navigation line (possessed of the whole traffic of the coast north of Mozambique), who is President of the company. The best port in the sphere of British influence is Mombassa, familiar to readers of the *Lusiad* of Camoens, where there is an excellent harbour. The principal trade of this part of the coast has hitherto been in ivory, but such vast quantities are yearly secured by Arab hunters that, unless the British company should be successful in preserving the elephant in a portion of their territories, no ivory is likely to be obtained after the next fifteen or twenty years. The summit of Kilimandjaro is within the German sphere of influence, but the best parts of its slopes are said to be those upon the north, which are within our sphere and capable of cultivation of all kinds. Mount Kenia, which lies on our side the border, is more lofty than the German giant, and rears a snowy summit to the height of 19,000 feet exactly under the equator. Of the less known among British tropical countries, destined in all probability to great prosperity in the future, the sphere of influence reserved to us in East Africa by the arrangement come to concerning the Zanzibar coast is, indeed, probably the most important. The charter of the company follows generally the lines laid down by the Foreign Office and the Law Officers of the Crown in the North Borneo case. It contains a stipulation with regard to the slave trade which shows

Imperial British East Africa Company.

one of the conveniences of such charters from a political point of view. The 10th article binds the company to "abolish by degrees any system of slave trade" "in the company's territories." In Province Wellesley and other parts of the British dominions much difficulty has been caused by the necessity for the complete and immediate abolition not only of the slave trade, but of slavery. Still, the anti-slavery party may reasonably think it is "going a long way" to countenance the temporary continuance of the slave trade itself in territories under the control of a company chartered by the British Crown, and flying a "distinctive flag indicating the British character of the company."

Chartered Companies.

The government of territories by merchant organisations contains, according to some observers, in each case within itself the seeds of its own ultimate dissolution. "The self-interest, however enlightened, which brings a dividend to stockholders is opposed to the high impartiality and absence of individualism which should characterise a true Government," as was said of the Hudson Bay Company;—and of the companies generally —"They must either insensibly measure their dealings by consequences, as affecting gain, or be suspected of doing so." A Government which buys and sells, which is the great merchant and storekeeper of the country, but which appoints governors and commissioners, judges and magistrates, and virtually administers the law even against its rivals and trade competitors, is in an unsound position and one not likely to be permanent. If, too, the expectations of the companies which have been formed for the East African and the Northern Bechuanaland spheres of influence should be realised, and a white population should settle within their territories, the example of the Hudson Bay Company goes to show that

their difficulties would only become the greater. By our grant of charters during the last eight years we have been trying to keep out other powers from valuable fields, while avoiding direct responsibility for the maintenance of peace; but it is questionable whether the House of Commons has yet faced the difficulties in which the charters may involve us. If the companies embark in war, strong pressure will be exercised to make us fight for them. If their native agents engage in or aid the slave trade, an outcry will arise at home which may lead to the destruction of the companies, and the substitution of direct British government. The Congo State seems to employ Tippoo Tib in the way in which General Gordon wished to employ Zebehr Pasha; but, as Mr. W. E. Forster prevented the employment of Zebehr, his successors will probably make the employment of such agents by the British East Africa Company difficult. On the other hand, it has been already said that this company is supplying guns (to be used in collecting ivory) to Arabs, who are engaged in the slave trade; and it is a fact, though one for which the East Africa Company are in no way responsible, that the rifles of the Arabs who are fighting against our mission stations on the Lakes are British-made. There are those who agree with the able writer of an article in the *Edinburgh Review* of October 1889, that the "caricature of sovereignty" recently set up under the Great Powers in Central Africa is likely to lead to a widening rather than a contraction of the area of slave-raiding and devastation.

Value of the country dealt with by the East African Charter.

Whatever may be the wisdom of setting up such companies, there can be no doubt as to the value of the country which in the case of the East Africa Company has been handed over to a mercantile Government. The territory within the control of the chartered company

may on the whole be looked upon as one of the natural outlets of the Soudan. So vast is the size of Africa, and so curious its shape and the nature of its navigable streams, that there is much doubt which of several points, removed from one another as regards sea journeys by distances almost as great as any in the globe, will be chosen as the port of the equatorial provinces and central portions of the continent. At the present moment some of the trade from Central Africa comes out through Tripoli to the Mediterranean; some by the tributaries of the Niger to the Gulf of Guinea; some by the Congo; some by the Lakes, and through the Portuguese territory of Mozambique; and some by Zanzibar. More natural roads for commerce would be the old routes down the Nile, or by the Nile and across the narrow strip from Berber to Suakim, if peace were restored and the railway made; or by Abyssinia to Massowa; but we can hardly count upon tranquillity at Khartoum, and British East Africa reaches the Victoria Nyanza lake, and taps for the Indian Ocean the sources of the Nile. In the days of Ismail Pasha Egypt so clearly saw the resources of the Mombassa port as an outlet for Central African trade, and as a door to the equatorial provinces, that she tried to seize it. Just as in the battles between the fleets of Chili and Peru the ironclads on both sides were largely manned by Britons from the Clyde, so, also, when two Mohammedan powers, represented by the Turks of the Egyptian dynasty and the Arab Sultan of Zanzibar, were face to face upon the East African shores, the forces of each were commanded by a Briton. A Scotch Pasha was kept out of Mombassa by our Consul-General, Sir John Kirk. Once a settlement of the Portuguese, and afterwards, under their Arab conquerors, a station of the Church Missionary

Society, Mombassa is now virtually a British station. East Africa is likely to be the home of the Alpine Club of the next century, containing as it does scenery which is probably as grand as any in the world.

German East Africa.

South of the British sphere of influence comes the larger, but probably less valuable, German sphere, in which there are at present but few signs of German occupation, and the whole trade of which is now in the hands of Asiatics, chiefly British subjects from Bombay. Indeed the commerce of East Africa from Natal northwards may be said to be in the hands of the people roughly described in Swaziland as Arabs, and from Delagoa Bay to Guardafui known as Banyans, who are in fact Hindoos and Mohammedans from the west coast of India; and throughout the whole of this vast stretch of coast—whether sovereignty be in British, in German, in Arab, or in Portuguese hands—the currency consists of Indian rupees. It is not generally noticed that the German sphere of influence upon the Zanzibar coast contains within it an actual German protectorate over a more limited district. While the Sultan of Zanzibar has conceded to the British and the German companies the levying of duties, a rent out of them being payable to the Sultan, as regards the German protectorate there is a separate arrangement. It is understood that the German company is not successful, and that the German Government are resolved not to send German troops to Africa, and are half-hearted in its support. Although the concession of 1888 nominally leaves the administration under the flag of the Sultan of Zanzibar, without detriment to his sovereign rights, in practice his people are in arms to defend their independence against the Germans; and as we are popular upon the coast, and our Indian traders are its merchants, and our Indian

money its circulating medium, it is not impossible that the German may ultimately give way to the British company.

East of the German sphere lies the Nyassa region, the trade of which is in the hands of a Glasgow company called the African Lakes Company, possessing a steamer upon Lake Nyassa and carrying on its communications through the Portuguese harbour of Quilimane, where Vasco da Gama stayed a month, as related in the *Lusiad*. This company, which has a reputation for repressing the sale of drink, is intimately connected with the Scotch Free Church Missions, and less closely with the Established Church of Scotland Mission, all of which are seated in the neighbourhood of the southern lakes. It is understood that during 1889 there was an idea of declaring the territory under the control of the missionary societies and of the African Lakes Company, from Pambete on Lake Tanganyika to the junction of the Shire and the Zambesi, a sphere of British influence, and so endeavouring to join hands between the Nyassa and Matabeleland across the Zambesi and behind the Portuguese. The Germans, who foresaw the immense importance of the future of the waterway between the Lakes (connecting itself, with short land transits, on the north with the Nile, and the south with the Zambesi, and again, by another short land transit, with the Upper Congo), favour the Portuguese opposition to the British scheme. The Portuguese set up a claim on paper to stretch across the continent from their territory at Mozambique to their territory upon the Guinea coast; but it is 2000 miles in a straight line from Quilimane to Benguela, and the Portuguese will hardly be able to make good their right to set a toll bar across the northern road from South Africa to the Lakes. The territory, however, if declared British,

The Lakes.

would be without a British port, for the coast is undoubtedly Portuguese, and the dispute will probably be settled by a compromise. There is a good deal of difference between Germany and Portugal and ourselves with regard to the boundary upon the lakes. The Germans claim the southern half of Lake Victoria Nyanza, and we deny the justice of that claim. The Portuguese claim the greater portion of Nyassa; but we do not recognise their title, and our Consul there is accredited to the chiefs. Portugal was engaged in fortifying a post at the southern entrance to Lake Nyassa when Lord Salisbury warned her off. The Arab slave hunters, who are powerful upon the Nyassa shores, have lately come into collision with the missionaries and with the African Lakes Company, which, obtaining some support not only from all sections of Scotch Presbyterians, and from the Universities Mission of the Church of England, but more or less from all the missionary bodies, have a powerful combination at their backs, which may possibly induce our Government to take up the difficult task of their defence. We have ourselves, in the past, laid down the principle that arms should not be introduced into Central Africa, and when lately, upon several occasions, we have had to ask the Portuguese to allow the passage of arms for use by British subjects upon the Nyassa, they not unnaturally have placed some difficulties in the way, but have ended by allowing them to pass.

Portuguese claims.

The Portuguese have conventions with France and Germany which recognise in some measure the claim of Portugal to stretch from sea to sea; but these Powers point out to us that they have merely recognised Portugal as against themselves, or, in other words, have stated to Portugal that it is not their intention to interfere with

her in this sphere, but have not presumed to settle questions of right between ourselves and the Portuguese. Upon our side we are able to contend that the conventions of Portugal with France and Germany, so far from causing difficulty to us, may make things easy for the expansion of British influence towards the north, as it is difficult for Portugal to seriously attempt to hold territories where no Portuguese official is ever seen, while the conventions have the effect of preventing Germany from herself standing in our way. But for the question of access to the coast the interior is of far more importance than the low-lying lands, for the malaria makes the latter all but uninhabitable by whites. Moreover, in whatever hands the coast may be, there can be no doubt that the trade will belong to the Hindoo and Mohammedan subjects of the British Crown, and that goods sold will be chiefly goods of British or Indian manufacture.

German claims.

While it is certain that Portugal will have to come to terms with us as to the free navigation of the Zambesi, and with regard also to a route northwards to the Nyassa, and so to Lake Tanganyika, there may be more difficulty in making an arrangement with Germany as to the district lying between the latter lake and the Victoria Nyanza, and allowing of through communication between our north-eastern and our southern spheres of influence. It is perhaps lucky that there is a good deal of room in Africa, and that white men there are as yet few in number, inasmuch as there is some chance that these questions may be settled by negotiation before they lead to actual conflict upon the spot. When the offer of our Arab friends at Zanzibar, to make over to us the whole of their dominions, was refused, it was declined only on the ground that our

interest on the Zanzibar coast and the lakes behind it was so well established that no Government would dispute it. Not only, however, do we seem to have lost to Germany on the east coast a territory as large as Egypt or Algeria or Morocco, and on the west coast, at the Cameroons, a door to the Soudan, but we have to take care in the south that our Northern Bechuanaland sphere of influence is not curtailed. I have already described, in the chapter on South Africa, a Portuguese map of Africa; but it is also interesting to contrast the German and the British maps. The former extend the eastern boundary of German Damaraland to Bamangwato and to the Victoria Falls of the Zambesi, and it is possible that we may be one day told that the African Niagara was named, not after a Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, but after a German Empress. The German map-makers leave us but a narrow neck of Khama's Land to connect our Bechuanaland protectorate with our Matabeleland "interest-sphere." So general has been the "scramble" of the last five years that in the whole of Africa south of the equator the only bit which is at present recognised by map-makers as truly belonging to the dark-skinned races is a tiny morsel, about one-third the size of the South African Republic, which lies in the dangerous neighbourhood of "German East Africa," Portuguese Mozambique, and the Congo State, but which is crossed by our own road of the future, already known to the African Lakes Company as the Stevenson Road, between the Nyassa and Tanganyika lakes. Even this patch too is included in the territory dealt with at the Berlin Conference as within the control of the European diplomatic world, and is not unlikely to be handed over to a British chartered company.

As upon the north-east, so upon the west of Africa,

England has no reason to feel dissatisfied with the share which she has obtained in the recent "scramble." Upon the Lower Niger we have a sphere of influence which affords as valuable a route towards the centre of the continent as that offered by our East African sphere; and upon the coast we hold in our old colonies some of the best trade stations of the continent. Of the total present external trade of Africa the United Kingdom and British India have almost one-half, and France, which shares with us the best stations of the west, comes next with a quarter of the trade. The West Coast.

Of the old colonies not much needs to be here said. The Gambia has indeed been cut off from the interior by recent extensions of French territory, and can never receive much development. Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast, and Lagos, though valuable, are territories of no large possibilities, and the greatest British interests of the future on the West Coast are those which concern our protectorate of the basin of the Lower Niger. Our West Coast settlements do a considerable trade with England, but also a large trade with Hamburg and with Marseilles. The Gambia sends its products more freely to France than to ourselves, and Lagos appears to export its produce more largely to Germany than to the United Kingdom, according to the tables of Sir Rawson Rawson, although it is not quite certain that the figures are exact. We have not, it would seem, fully done our duty in our old settlements of the West Coast, which possess no railroads, although the Portuguese, who are looked upon as the most backward of European powers having settlements in Africa, are constructing railroads in their West African possessions, as are the French. The climate, no doubt, makes government and progress difficult; but the French The Gambia. Sierra Leone, Gold Coast, and Lagos.

and the Portuguese have also a bad climate to contend with on the coast, and, as the interior is more healthy, the very unhealthiness of the low-lying tract is an additional reason, besides those of trade, for pushing on inland communication. On the other hand, the French have spent national money freely upon Senegambia, while the Imperial Parliament is not likely to follow the example by entering on a fresh course of national expenditure on Sierra Leone. Still, it seems strange, looking to the fact that at a short distance from the coast there are vast tracts of grassy country, high, and not unhealthy, that the people who have made the success of Northern Queensland as a cattle country should not have started cattle stations ; and the secret must be found in the dread of that Mohammedan invasion from the north, which, although it has avoided the coast tracts where the Arab cavalry cannot act, has conquered the inland country. We have, however, upon the coast a large force of Mohammedan negroes doing excellent service in our military police, and the Englishman or Dutchman of the Cape, or the Englishman of Queensland, would have taken them on a long journey into the interior. The West African colonies must have been paralysed by the feebleness of Government, caused by the unhealthiness of the coast tracts from which that Government has been conducted. The settlements have been looked upon as mere trading stations, and planting has not been largely pursued upon the coast, nor cattle-raising in the interior, and as the French sweep round the back country, defeating the Mohammedan invaders, our coast settlements, unless extended inland, must be starved.

The Niger.

The Royal Niger Company, as it has been called since the date of its charter, formerly the National

African Company, already carries on a large but not very profitable trade, limited only by an amount of hostility and suspicion existing between the company and the German traders, which is happily unknown elsewhere. The Lower Niger forms so valuable a portion of our new fields of activity in Africa that the recognition of the British company, as in exclusive possession of the Niger trade, by the Conference at Berlin, was to us one of the most useful outcomes of that meeting. The freeing of the navigation of the Lower Niger by the Conference is no loss to us, as we only seek for a fair field; but the freeing of the Congo in a fashion still more complete is a gain to us inasmuch as France and the Congo State, which have ousted Portugal from her historic place upon the Congo, are now bound to give us there that fair field for which we ask. It may be said that the Congo State, at least, would by its constitution always have given freedom; but we know how near its territories have once already been to passing into the hands of France, and it is far from unlikely that at some future time they may pass to either France or Germany, and but for the Berlin Act they might easily have become, like Senegal, subject to protectionist legislation. The House of Commons took a short-sighted view when it refused to accept our treaty with Portugal, recognising the historic Portuguese claims upon the Congo, and providing for the virtual freedom of trade, because there was every reason to suspect at the moment that the choice lay between Portugal under her treaty with us and an unfettered France, which means a protectionist France. Germany at the Conference at Berlin saved us from the ill consequences of the Manchester dislike of Portugal.

The Congo.

The Oil rivers, so called from their export of palm

The Oil rivers.

oil, are those rivers or branches of rivers which lie between the British colony of Lagos and the German protectorate of the Cameroons. The greater portion of the country is the delta of the Niger. The main stream of the Niger and a good deal of the country on either side of it are under the administration of the chartered company; but the greater portion of the delta and the whole of the remainder of the country between the boundary of Lagos and the boundary of the German protectorate are administered by British consular officers under various Orders in Council.

On the whole, our commercial position upon the West Coast is satisfactory, and if the King of the Belgians should succeed in his attempt to develop the Congo region, it is certain that the greater portion of the trade will fall to our own share.

Spheres of influence become protectorates, and protectorates grow into colonies.

In dealing with protectorates and with territories within the sphere of British influence, or included within the territorial limits named in charters to British subjects, we must contemplate the possible future hoisting of the British flag by the Imperial Government in all of them. Protectorates of uncivilised countries tend to become national territory; spheres of influence tend to become protectorates; and chartered companies sooner or later get into trouble and are absorbed. The difficulty of dealing with offences committed by foreigners against natives, which was the reason for rapidly converting the protectorate of New Guinea into annexation, operates powerfully in all parts of the world. The only class of protectorate which is free from considerable difficulty is that exercised over countries possessing settled government, such as Johore and Sarawak. At one time the set of opinion was against chartered companies, and the old English system—under

which not only had companies of adventurers occupied great portions of what are now the United States, but others had founded, in the Hudson Bay Company and the East India Company, bodies of immense power which lasted to our time—became all but extinct. The fashion now sets the other way, and while we have lately granted charters to four new companies, the German Government have handed over the whole of their quarter of New Guinea to one company, the German East African sphere of influence to another, and Damaraland to a third. It has been reserved for our time to try the experiment of the occupation of vast territories by a sort of colony of no known nationality, obtaining by treaty a nationality for itself; and if it be possible to secure the continued existence of the Congo State, and to prevent the ultimate absorption of its dominions by sale to France, the experiment will well suit the interests of Great Britain. The territories of the Congo State, as well as those annexed by Germany, Portugal, and France in the same neighbourhood, are declared by the powers to be free from import duties and from the possibility of differential treatment of the subjects of particular states, and form, therefore, a vast district in which British traders will receive all that they demand—"a fair field and no favour." The fact that the Germans have complained of the non-observance by our Niger Company of somewhat similar stipulations shows, however, that difficulties may arise which would have been avoided if we had ourselves accepted the protectorate offered us of the whole coast at that time claimed by Zanzibar, and the sovereignty of the Cameroons, and carried through our Congo Treaty made with Portugal—a weak power, amenable to our influence.

There can be no two parts of the world more different

The Pacific.

than Africa and the Pacific islands, but since 1885, as I have shown, the same fate has attended both, and partition between England, Germany and France has gone on fast until almost every island in the Pacific has been coloured by the map-makers with the tints which denote protectorate or annexation, or has been the subject of agreements between the powers. The countries dealt with in the Pacific are geographically small, but they have, owing to considerations connected with naval warfare and with the coaling and telegraph requirements of trade, a special importance of their own. Had the Australian colonies combined freely among themselves; had New South Wales and New Zealand, which do the largest trade with the Pacific, joined the Federal Council of Australasia when it first came into existence, it may be safely asserted that our share in the partition would have been larger than it is; but just as in Central Africa we have secured through German action that advantage of the absence of differential duties which may render us indifferent to actual geographical extension, so in the Western Pacific a similar immunity has been secured as between Germany and the United Kingdom by an agreement between those two powers. The right to trade freely in the German islands is one which may become to us of considerable importance, for New Ireland and New Britain — which have been born again as New Hanover, New Mecklenburg, and New Pomerania, in the Bismarck Archipelago, attached to Kaiser Wilhelm Land or German New Guinea — are islands of great value. It is curious that, in the recent division of the Admiralty group, the Solomon group, and the Louisiade Archipelago, Germany has obtained the islands with English names, and England the islands with

French names; but New Ireland and New Britain were better worth taking than the Louisiades. Australians should remember that there is still some danger of the French seizing the unoccupied portion of the southern isles, inasmuch as they lay claim to them by right of discovery, and are being strongly urged by the New Caledonian colonists to dispute the possession of those in which no British settlements as yet exist.

New Guinea.

I have already mentioned some of the circumstances connected with our annexation of south-eastern New Guinea. It is a country with an unhealthy coast, and has been annexed apparently to content Australian feeling and in order to protect the natives against outrages on the part of white men. We have long had in the Pacific a High Commissioner with elaborate powers; but the system of jurisdiction has been a failure, and international agreement for the Pacific, as for Africa, ought to have been resorted to a long time ago, for a frank agreement between Great Britain, Germany, France, and the United States would have been the means of preventing much crime, and much suffering to the natives. The difficulty is as to jurisdiction over foreigners. White criminals always declare that they are foreign, and it is difficult to prove to what nationality they belong, and impossible, without annexation and consequent rights of sovereignty, to punish them. The British Parliament has passed more than one Act for the protection of Pacific islanders, and the High Commissioner is armed with a code of portentous magnitude; but his jurisdiction in New Guinea under the protectorate was so complete a failure that annexation became necessary almost at once. Protectorates may, as has been pointed out, be useful in the case of countries possessing settled government, in order to

prevent annexation by other powers; but they are useless in cases where we have to deal, as in New Guinea, only with a tribal system. Our present government of south-east New Guinea must be looked upon as an interesting experiment; it is paid for by the Australians of Queensland, Victoria, and New South Wales, but they cannot be said at present to get much for their money. The great Tamate (the Rev. Mr. Chalmers) is all-powerful, and he has declared that, while he is as anxious as the Australians to keep out the foreigner, the country is not suited for white settlement, and that the coast is unhealthy and densely inhabited by natives, who possess a system of settled cultivation. We have indeed in New Guinea fully recognised the right of the native inhabitants to the soil, and we seem occupied in trying to undo the recollection of the deeds of the white ruffians who in the past have sullied our fame by acts of cruelty. At the same time there have been two recent attacks on British parties by the natives upon the mainland, and the Governor has been forced to hang a number of the inhabitants.

Fiji. In Fiji we have adopted a somewhat different system. We have imported immigrants, and we have introduced a culture system, worked through the chiefs, which has produced considerable trade results, but is of doubtful political wisdom. Still, even in Fiji we have given great powers, by the institution of village, district, and provincial councils, to the native race, and may claim to have conferred upon them a fairer chance for life than is extended to Polynesians by the French or Germans. If we contrast the manner in which we have treated the natives of Fiji with that in which the French have dealt with the natives in New Caledonia, which lies in the direct line between Fiji and Queensland, we shall see that

the French, as has been shown by Mr. Julian Thomas, who is friendly to them, have displayed utter disregard of any native rights or property, seizing the fertile valleys in which the natives had their arable settlements; while we have recognised native property. It is not strange that the natives of the Pacific islands should detest the "We-wes," as they call the French. Throughout the Pacific the Polynesian race is dwindling under contact with the whites. In the Fiji group we keep out liquor and forbid war, but, in spite of the trouble that we have taken with regard to sanitation, European epidemics are committing frightful ravages among the population. Fiji is, as regards plantation, a favoured land, because able to grow tropical crops of the most varied kinds, and crops for which the neighbourhood of Australia and New Zealand will give in future, as for those of Mauritius, a ready market. We were, no doubt, forced to annex Fiji—which we did very much against our will, for it was before the commencement of the annexation period of the last four years—by the fact that the islands had become, as New Zealand had been many years before, the Alsatia of the Pacific. We are able to show in some points excellent results, for, although the natives may be declining in numbers, they seem happy enough, and the white population has become one of a very different kind from that which, on the whole, disgraced the islands a few years ago.

Future of the Pacific.

I said in *Greater Britain* that in the relations of America to Australia lay the key to the future of the Pacific, and the Americanisation of Hawaii—the most important group of islands in Polynesia, and one by its central situation destined to become more and more flourishing as time goes on—as well as the recent action of the United States with regard to Samoa, go to

show that I was not far wrong. Germany in 1868 had hardly been heard of as a Pacific power, but even now her hold upon the islands that are mainly under German influence is rather commercial than political, and caused by the enterprise of the Hamburg houses, which, at the time when *Greater Britain* appeared, already had their branches in the Western Pacific. We may possibly one day obtain by exchange New Caledonia, which lies in the very centre of the sphere of British influence in the Western Pacific, or, at all events, bring about the neutralisation of the group with stipulations against differential duties, and that cessation of transportation for which we have successfully bargained with the Germans. Australia and New Zealand and Fiji form neighbours too powerful for the continued independence of the French settlement in their midst, unless it should become wholly harmless, after the manner in which the French settlements in the neighbourhood of Calcutta and Madras and in other parts of India have been brought within the British Indian system.

Protectorates in the Malay Archipelago.

While at one end of the Malay Archipelago we have annexed south-eastern New Guinea, at the other end we have obtained a dominant position in the northern portion of the island of Borneo. The first of the modern charters to great trading companies for the occupation of territorial dominions, as I have pointed out, was that granted by Mr. Gladstone's second administration to the British North Borneo Company in the immediate neighbourhood of our island colony of Labuan. More recently we have obtained protectorates over Brunei and Sarawak, chiefly for the purpose of preventing the possibility of the interference of any foreign power in those countries, which lie close to our great commercial settlement of Singapore and upon the track of our Australian

trade through Torres Straits. In the Malay peninsula, off which Borneo lies, we have also recently undertaken the protectorate—already, in fact, virtually ours before that time—of Johore and other of the Malay states. The western states, which face India and lie upon our track of trade, have long been within our influence; but our direct action in the north-eastern Malay country is more recent. The extraordinary development of trade at Singapore is a matter rather for statisticians than for me, except as regards mere mention; but I may point out the not altogether encouraging fact that the increase appears to be with foreign countries (and with our colonies and dependencies) rather than with ourselves. Our great success in the Malay peninsula has lain in enlisting upon our side the warm and even enthusiastic co-operation of the Chinese. We may congratulate ourselves upon the fact that, while the French have failed to sufficiently conciliate the Chinese race to induce them to confer prosperity upon the French colonies in Further India, we, on the contrary, have tempted the Chinese to settle in the Malay peninsula now for many generations. I have seen Chinese magistrates at Penang whose ancestors have been magistrates there since immediately after the foundation of our settlement one hundred and five years ago, and who have completely identified themselves with the interests of Great Britain. The latest of the Malay states to come within the circle of our protection has been Pahang, which will follow Perak and the others in the growth of cultivation and of trade. In no part of the world can we point to more obvious results from good government than throughout the Malay peninsula, where England in fact presides over a federation of Malay princes to whom we have taught the arts of success, but to

whose former subjects we have added a vast immigrant population of Chinese. In Upper Burmah, recently annexed to India, the Chinese are pushing their way at every centre of activity. They have flowed into the country since our troops have occupied it, and many of them have married Burmese women, who much prefer to be kept in plenty by the Chinamen to being the drudges of men of their own race. The future of the Burmese Provinces of India, as that of Malaya, lies in the development of great natural mineral and agricultural wealth by patient Chinese labour.

Policy of extension of territory or responsibility.

In summing up what we have discovered with regard to our new protectorates and our recent annexations, we have then to note that until about 1884 we had for some time almost consistently refused offers of territory which had been pressed upon us. Lord Palmerston had declined such gifts as firmly as had Mr. Disraeli or Mr. Gladstone. The semi-annexation of Cyprus was defended solely upon military grounds. In the case of Fiji the annexation had been forced upon us, as had, at an earlier time, the annexation of New Zealand, by the impossibility of putting down ruffianism in any other way. The grant of a charter to the North Borneo Company had been a remarkable exception to the rule of abstention from fresh responsibilities, and, to judge from the debate which occurred in the House of Commons upon the subject, Mr. Gladstone himself was, although Prime Minister, personally as much opposed to the grant of the North Borneo charter as he had been to the annexation of Fiji. While Mr. Gladstone minimised the effect of the charter in his speech, Mr. Arthur Balfour and Mr. (now Sir John) Gorst condemned it. The Conservatives, who had refused to ratify the treaties by which the centre of Africa had been conferred upon us by the

explorer of the Congo, seemed by no means anxious to censure the Liberals for refusing the immediate possession of Zanzibar as a protectorate, or the reversion of that country as a colony. But the quarrel between the Colonial Office and the Australians over the annexation of that half of New Guinea which has since been divided between the Germans and ourselves, and the action of Germany at that moment in the Pacific and at Angra Pequena, coming after that of France in Tunis, Madagascar, and Tonquin, brought about a sudden change of feeling which could not but influence the politicians upon both sides. A necessary change of policy followed on the discovery that Germany and France appeared to intend to lay hands between them upon almost all those territories in the globe which did not belong to the European races. The movement of Germany and France seemed to foreshadow the possibility of large markets being gradually closed to our trade by paper annexations, followed, certainly in the case of France, and probably in the long-run in that of Germany, by the imposition of differential duties.

M. Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, who has discussed the whole question with much fulness of detail in his work on modern colonisation, has argued that the "foundation of a great African empire and of a lesser Asiatic empire is the only great enterprise which destiny permits us," that is, to France. "At the beginning of the twentieth century Russia will have one hundred and twenty millions of prolific inhabitants occupying enormous spaces; sixty millions of Germans, supported by thirty millions of Austrians, will dominate Central Europe. One hundred and twenty millions of Anglo-Saxons will occupy the finest countries in the world, and will all but impose on civilised man their tongue, which

is already dominant at the present day in territories inhabited by more than three hundred millions of men. Place by these great peoples the Chinese Empire, which by that time without doubt will recover a new life. By the side of these giants what will be France? Of the great part which she has played in the past, of the influence, often decisive, which she has exercised over the direction of the civilised peoples of the world, what will remain? A memory, dying day by day. . . . Either France will become a great African power or, in a century or two, she will be only a secondary European power; she will count in the world about as Greece or Roumania counts in Europe." Under the influence of these sentiments even moderate and reasonable men, like the author we have been quoting, have been driven, first in France and then in Germany, to think it necessary to hoist the national flag upon all the "unoccupied" countries of the globe. M. Paul Leroy-Beaulieu is so honest that he left standing in the last edition of his book, in the text, his proof of how much better it would have been, even for the English in India, to have only held trading stations and not to have established political authority, and in his note the diametrical and admitted contradiction by himself of his own views. In the text he said: "Taught by the errors of our fathers, become ourselves more practical and more moderate, less taken with the idea of a false glory, more respectful of the principles of justice, we are trying to found in the East, on a policy of good faith, of European solidarity, and of non-intervention in native affairs, that commerce which it was formerly thought possible to establish and to develop by deceit, violence, and oppression only." In his note he says: "We reproduce without change the opinion given by us in the first

edition. But we must not hide the fact that our ideas have undergone a modification. We approve the principle that the European nations should establish an effective rule in the countries of peoples who are either barbarous or have fallen into anarchy, and have not the principle of regular and progressive government." Hence M. Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, who once talked of the French becoming "more respectful of the principles of justice," became himself the apologist of the attempted conquest of Madagascar and destruction of the independence of a most interesting black Christian people who were trying the experiment of self-government with every prospect of success. England could not well but follow the lead given, as she has done since 1884, and a more monotonous uniformity than would otherwise have existed has been prepared for the twentieth century.

Value of what we have obtained.

Starting as we did after France and Germany to take part in the "scramble" in the Pacific and in Africa, we have not been less successful than those powers, and, as far as our present knowledge goes, have no reason to be dissatisfied with the regions which we have appropriated, or those over which we have proclaimed our influence or granted charters. Our South African "sphere" seems better suited for European settlement than is the Tunisian protectorate of France; and the territories included in the charters of the three new tropical companies are probably about the richest tropical countries in the world. If, as regards East Africa, it is still a puzzle why Lord Salisbury so easily abandoned the Sultan of Zanzibar, looking to the virtual protectorate over his dominions which we had long ago assumed, it may nevertheless be admitted that our share, although smaller, is better than the German, and that the doors which we

have gained to the African lakes give us the fairest possible opening to the interior. It is nevertheless difficult to restrain a feeling of regret that in African partition we have been forced to follow France and Germany upon a path which we had in former times deliberately abandoned. The Germans already, both in Western Africa at the Cameroons and in East Africa on the Zanzibar coast, have had to fight the natives, who, formerly glad to receive foreign travellers bringing foreign trade, are now banded together against all white men, to defend their country from seizure. It is hard to say what reply we can make to those who charge us with having taken away the territory of others; with giving to France and Germany that which was not ours to give; and with receiving, in other cases, by agreement with Germany and France, that which was not theirs to bestow upon us. It is easy, no doubt, to say that the native tribes have not made the best use of their own countries. Perhaps we have not made the best use of our own either; but when we speak of bringing the blessings of civilisation to these peoples, we must remember that we are not dealing with small savage tribes wandering about over an enormous country, like the Australian aborigines, or even with hunting tribes, somewhat more numerous, like the Indians of North America, but with a dense settled village population, having its own municipal and general government; and that these people will not even work for us, but will have to make room as labourers for the Hindoos who will follow in our train. The only excuse that we can make is that if we had not laid hands upon their territory France or Germany would have done so. At the Berlin Conference we even failed to prevent the destruction of the natives by an unchecked liquor traffic.

If we turn from the new protectorates and spheres of influence—from Africa and from the Pacific, full of the possibilities of the future—to the Crown Colonies that have long been ours, we may begin by passing over for the present those which, like Gibraltar, are merely naval or military stations, and must be named later when we consider imperial defence, and those which, like Singapore and Hong-Kong, are partly naval stations and partly trade posts, possessing vast commercial importance but little territory. Some of the Crown Colonies, like the Falkland Islands, are too limited in population and resources, some, like Heligoland, are too small, to possess much interest from a governmental point of view, although even the least important of our dependencies, such, for example, as Pitcairn Island and Tristan d'Acunha, lost in ocean solitudes, make up for their smallness by the romance of the history of their settlement.

Old Crown Colonies.

The Military Stations.

Naval and Trade Posts.

During the last few years there has been discernible a certain revival of interest in the old Crown Colonies, and the rapid growth of that interest is due, in no small degree, to Mr. Froude, whose writings on the West Indies have excited controversy. On the other side there have appeared from the pen of Mr. Salmon several volumes which have been largely circulated by the Cobden Club, and a book by a gentleman of colour—the late Mr. Thomas. *The West Indies*, by Mr. Washington Eves,[1] may be looked upon as impartial. In these works and others, of which the latest in date have been called into existence by *The English in the West Indies* of Mr. Froude, the relations that subsist between the Govern-

The West Indies.

[1] Sampson Low and Co., 1889. (Published under the auspices of the Royal Colonial Institute.)

ment and the people, the methods of administration, and the system of taxation in force in Crown Colonies, have been discussed. It is to be hoped that the result of some effort to understand will be a corresponding effort to redress the grievances of which complaint is made in the West Indies, and to prepare the way for changes which will prove of social and economic advantage to these colonies.

Results of emancipation.

After the loss of cheap labour by the abolition of slavery the blight or the curse of the former system lay upon the planters, who seemed stunned, and wholly unable to strike out new methods, while the emancipated negro showed, and indeed still in a great measure manifests to this day, disinclination to labour upon the large estates. In his mind such work is, and not unnaturally, associated with the bitter memories of the past. Another matter which told against the planter, though it benefited the West Indian merchant, was a priority given by the Encumbered Estates Court to the lien of a consignee over charges previously laid on the estate, a point to which great importance is attached by Mr. Salmon. Capital was driven away from the West Indies by this provision, inasmuch as no sufficient security could be obtained for advances upon mortgage. It was only in 1886, long after the steed was stolen, that the stable door was shut and the liens of consignees finally abolished. In the meantime efforts had been made to reduce the cost of production by the importation of Indian coolies, an immigration which had the effect of somewhat interfering with the well-being of the negro population, but from the planter's point of view met with success, as it produced a period of comparative prosperity. A fresh depression was soon, however, brought about by a fall in the price of sugar caused by

Coolie immigration.

increased competition on the part of the beetroot-growing countries of the Continent of Europe. Beetroot sugar.

It would be of little use to discuss at length the probable effects of the passing of a Bill founded on the Sugar Convention of 1888-89, inasmuch as there seems but little prospect of such a measure becoming law. If it should at any time do so, we should soon find ourselves engaged in commercial warfare, not only with France, but even possibly with New South Wales and some other of our self-governing colonies, to which we should be forced to apply differential treatment, on account of their very probable refusal to accept the Convention. As regards the West Indies, legislation based on the Convention would confer an immediate boon on the owners of sugar estates, but it is not altogether certain whether the advantage would long continue. If, under such laws, England were to direct differential duties against the goods of the United States—the chief market for West Indian sugar, as well as the largest market for West Indian fruit and other produce—retaliation would be the inevitable consequence, and the last state of our West Indian colonies would be worse by far than their present condition. The depression in the West Indian sugar trade, while, no doubt, in part due to the existence of bounties upon beet sugar, is also in some degree accounted for by the failure on the part of many planters to adopt the best methods of cultivation and the most recent improvements in machinery. Where the planters have moved with the times—as, for example, in British Guiana—they have, comparatively speaking, prospered. The Sugar Convention. Process of manufacture. British Guiana.

In St. Lucia, loveliest of lovely islands, the Government of the colony have tried for some years past the plan of taking a large pecuniary interest (£30,000 worth The St. Lucia experiment.

of shares) in a central sugar factory—an imitation of a policy which has long prevailed in the French island of Martinique. The experiment in St. Lucia has been a financial success, and other islands are expressing a desire for the introduction of similar establishments. It may be doubted whether, as a general principle, the Governments of the West Indian colonies should be encouraged to share in enterprises of a speculative nature, the failure of which would be attended with deplorable consequences to the community as a whole. The present benefit, however, to the planters of St. Lucia is incontestable, for, like those of the other islands, they had continued to use small and antiquated machinery, instead of combining together, as we have seen is the custom in Queensland, to send the sugar to one large factory, fitted with the most recent improvements of all kinds. It is stated upon good authority that the amount of sugar extracted from cane might easily be increased by a large percentage, were means adopted analogous to those which have been employed in the case of beetroot.

Mauritius.

If we turn from the West Indies to another sugar-growing colony, we find that in Mauritius a strong demand has arisen for imperial aid in the form of the systematic diffusion of information relating to sugar manufacture, and of the sending out of men of science who have turned their attention to the recent inventions and discoveries connected with the sugar industry. The same result that is looked for might perhaps be attained if a larger number of planters would send their sons to Europe to study the progress which has been made. The Mauritian planters have derived from the existence of a silver standard a slight temporary advantage, inasmuch as in the British "Isle of France" the planters have been able to pay their labourers in the depreciated

rupee, while selling at least a portion of their sugar in markets where the standard of value is gold. That advantage, however, which cannot last long, has been neutralised by a certain exhaustion of the soil.

Other tropical colonial products.

Although sugar still constitutes the staple product of several of the British West Indian colonies, such as Barbados and British Guiana, it no longer occupies the position of universal predominance which it once held.

Cacao.

Cacao competes with sugar in the large plantations of Trinidad and other islands, while in Grenada it takes the foremost place. Jamaica and Dominica possess vast resources, as yet almost wholly undeveloped, and, while coffee cultivation may be extended, there is a possible future for many of the islands in the growth of cigar tobacco upon the low grounds, and of tea in the mountain districts. As tea has partly replaced coffee in Ceylon, and fibre, under the auspices of Sir Ambrose Shea, is making the prosperity of Bahamas, so in the West Indies also a transformation of estates as regards their produce is now in progress. Oranges, bananas, and other fruits, mostly sent to the United States, form the chief articles of export from Jamaica. In Montserrat the lime reigns supreme, and in British Honduras logwood and mahogany, though fruit cultivation is fast extending.

Fruit.

The rapid increase in the growth of fruit production has been partly caused by that depression of the sugar industry to which I have referred, and is in part also the result of the division of property among negro peasant owners, to whom fruit growing presents no difficulty. As has been well shown by Mr. Morris (in an admirable paper read before the Royal Colonial Institute), to the late Sir Anthony Musgrave belongs the credit of pushing the fruit trade of Jamaica, with the result of

Negro peasant proprietors.

giving an immense impulse to the prosperity of the small landowners of that colony. The very natural land hunger of the sons of the emancipated slaves has led to the rise of a class of small proprietors, whose existence seems likely to become in the British islands, as it is already in the French, the dominant factor of the West Indian problem. The white population of the islands, both British and French, is on the decline; the black and "coloured" population is increasing upon the whole, though in some of our own colonies there is a falling off. But the colonies that show prosperity of any kind exhibit an increase in the numbers of the people seated upon the land. The great majority of the Jamaica holdings are now under five acres each, and four-fifths of them are under ten acres each. The statistics do not give the number of those who work for wages on the estates of others besides cultivating their own plot of land, but except at crop-time it is not large. If the estimate quoted by Sir George Baden-Powell and Sir William Crossman in 1884, in the Report of a Royal Commission, be correct, "thirty days' labour on an acre of good land in Jamaica will, in addition to providing a family with . . . food for the year, yield a surplus saleable in the market for from £10 to £30." It is no wonder that, under such conditions, the small holders who own their land, and till it by their exertions, should thrive where great proprietors, who have to make use of hired labour, too often fail. It is chiefly to the success of the small holders that must be attributed the remarkable increase in the revenue of the West Indian colonies during the last half-century, in spite of the losses which the planters have incurred. It has been computed by the Rev. George Sargeant, President of the West Indian Wesleyan Conference, that, while the revenue of the

Crop-time.

slave colonies at the time of emancipation amounted to less than £450,000, it had, in 1887, risen to two millions sterling, or far more than four times as much as in the days of slavery.

Taxation

The revenue is raised mainly by means of import duties, the burthen of which falls upon the mass of the negro people, and were it not for the immense improvement in their condition, consequent on the firm hold which they have acquired of the land, no such increase would have been possible.

upon necessaries.

In almost all of our Crown Colonies taxation falls largely upon the necessaries of life, and were it not for this fact we should see among their people a more considerable amount of comfort and of savings, and a greater expenditure on British manufactured goods.

Export duties.

Some of these colonies have also export duties, and that upon articles of which they possess no monopoly; but the export duties of Jamaica on rum and sugar have lately been reduced, and the export duties of Grenada and some other West-India Islands, as well as those of several of the colonies of the West Coast of Africa, have been suspended or abolished.

Taxes on land.

The taxation on land in the Crown Colonies is, generally speaking, light. In the great island of Jamaica some £12,000 a year only is raised by land-tax and property-tax together. In British Honduras a considerable revenue is obtained by letting Crown lands on lease, but such a system is not of general application.

Trade.

It has been already stated, in the chapter on the relations of Canada and the West Indies with the United States, that the West Indies trade more largely with the United States than with us. This fact constitutes indeed a remarkable difference between the group consisting of India, Australia, and South

Africa on the one side, and the group consisting of Canada and the greater portion of the Crown Colonies on the other. While the West Indies do nearly double as much trade with foreign countries (that is, mainly with the United States) as with the United Kingdom, and while many other of the Crown Colonies, and the Dominion of Canada itself, trade as largely with others as with us, Australia and South Africa do nearly all their trade with the United Kingdom or with the British colonies. The intercolonial trade between Mauritius and Australia is represented in the Atlantic by the trade between Canada and the West Indies; but although a customs union between the latter colonies has sometimes been proposed, it is in the United States that the West-India Islands find the market for their commodities.

Effect of Coolie immigration on the negro proprietors.

The Commission which I have already named reported strongly in favour of an extended use of "indentured" labour, and quoted the beneficial results which had been obtained in Trinidad and Demerara as reasons for a spread of the system. The Commissioners believed the importation of coolie labour good not only for the planters but for the negroes. Without immigration, the great estates, they thought, would all be broken up, or go out of cultivation, and the negroes would lose their harvesting work, or "crop-time" as it is called. But the great plantations no longer form the chief interest in the West Indies, and by the importation of East Indian coolies the earnings of the people of the islands are cut down, mainly for the benefit of immigrants with a low standard of comfort, who have no permanent interest in the colonies. The more enlightened Governors, such as Sir William Robinson—the Governor of Trinidad, who must not be confused with his name-

sake the Governor of Western Australia—and the late Sir Anthony Musgrave, have done their best to discourage the system.

The negro view of these questions.

As the government of the British West India Islands becomes with the lapse of time more democratic and more in the hands of the inhabitants, it is probable that the Indian immigration, which seems necessary to the cultivation of large estates in the hands of white owners, will cease, and that the estates will be day by day more and more cut up into smaller properties in the hands of blacks or "coloured" people. M. de Lanessan, who has given attention to the labour problem as it affects Martinique and Guadeloupe, believes that Indian immigration will in those islands speedily be suppressed, with the result of breaking up the remaining large estates; but he considers that the change will be for the benefit of the colonies and their people considered as a whole. There can, indeed, be little doubt that if the mass of the people of our West-India Islands had a direct voice in the management of their own affairs, as have the inhabitants of the French islands, they would soon remove those of their grievances which are connected with the taxation upon necessaries of life, and the artificial supply of cheap labour.

Negro democracy.

Some who think the negro unfitted for self-government point to Hayti: they might, however, reflect that Liberia presents a different picture, and that in the French islands of Martinique and Guadeloupe power is in the hands of the "coloured" population, while the islands prosper. The experience, indeed, of those islands in which the negroes and "coloured" people have been entrusted with a large share in government, and the use which they make of representative institutions, seem to show that their detractors are in the wrong. The

friends of the negro are able now to point to the progress effected by West Indian peasant proprietors, to the spread of education, to the undoubted rise in the standard of comfort, and to the prominent place already taken by individuals of the African race. The Chief Justice of Barbados and the wealthiest inhabitant of Jamaica are both what some would call "black men," and in the West African settlements negroes are being increasingly employed in government, with excellent results. It stands to reason that between the interests of the large landowners, whether resident or absentee, and the interests of the peasant cultivators of the soil, points of divergence exist, and that, owing to the almost complete non-representation of the latter outside Barbados, their wants and wishes have hitherto not received the attention they deserve. The example of Martinique and Guadeloupe under French democratic institutions goes to show that it is time that we should make trial of a more liberal system.

Representative institutions.

The most democratic of our dependencies is Norfolk Island, which is under the Governor of New South Wales, but not a part of that colony. A popular Assembly, which includes every male over twenty-five years of age, meets four times a year; and Norfolk Island is also peculiar in another respect, for I believe that it excludes immigrants of all kinds. Bahamas, Barbados, and Bermuda are the only Crown Colonies in which the legislative assemblies are wholly elective at the present time, and in the former two the franchise rests on a fairly wide base, especially in Barbados, and the contentment of the population affords an indication of the benefits of self-government. The "Bims," as the people of Barbados are called, have enjoyed representative institutions since the days

of King Charles the First, and by the free extension of such institutions among the black majority race hatreds have been extinguished, while race prejudices are fast dying out in this old colony. In British Guiana there exists a curious and complicated survival from the days of the Dutch rule in the Court of Policy, which constitutes the legislative body, and half of whose members are nominated, while the other half are elected by a tiny body known as "The College of Kiezers." The Kiezers are themselves elected for life; and the same constituencies which elect them return Financial Representatives, who, together with the Court of Policy, form the Combined Court for finance. The number of electors is very small, and the whole constitution is an oligarchic survival from the last century, guaranteed to the Dutch colonists by the terms of the surrender. In the majority of the West Indian colonies the legislatures are now nominated in their entirety by the Crown, former representative institutions having in several cases been only recently destroyed. In some of the islands the legislative bodies are partly nominated and partly elected. Several of the now extinct legislative bodies asked for their own destruction; and in Grenada, where formerly the House of Assembly was wholly elective, and afterwards altered so as to consist of eight elected and nine nominated members, the changed Assembly at its very first meeting voted an address to the Queen informing Her Majesty that it had passed a Bill providing for its own extinction, and leaving it to Her Majesty's "wisdom and discretion" to set up such form of government as Her Majesty might deem most desirable. This was sudden action with a vengeance, and such as would hardly have been taken had the matter rested with the dark-skinned majority

of the population, who would have preferred to see the representative institutions widened.

The constitutions of the three more liberal Atlantic colonies already named bear a certain likeness to those of Western Australia and of Natal. Sir William Robinson, the present Governor of Western Australia, in a lecture which he gave at Adelaide a few years back, pointed out that the government of an ordinary Crown Colony is a simple matter, as is that of a colony under responsible government, but that the intermediate form, in which the Governor is also, in some measure, a sort of irremovable and irresponsible Prime Minister, working through a freely elected legislature, is most difficult to manage. The success in practice of the mixed constitution of Barbados is the more encouraging from this fact. The ordinary Crown Colony system of nominated or partly nominated legislatures, in the latter case with a high franchise for the elected portion, is defended on the ground of the numerical preponderance of the less civilised over the more civilised race. The mass of the population of the Crown Colonies properly so called consists of negroes or of coolies, and the legislatures represent the interests of the planters. It must not be supposed, however, that these bodies and this class greatly abuse their powers. If they have not done so much as might be wished for the education of the black majority, they are, at least, able to point with pride to their medical care of the negro poor, and to the existence of sanitary departments which are an honour to the colonies. Mr. Salmon has attacked even this side of existing Crown Colony institutions, but, right as he is in many matters, I cannot but feel that on this head he is in some degree mistaken.

It is contended that where representatives of the

people are elected by manhood suffrage, as is the case in the French islands of Martinique, Guadeloupe, and Réunion, the result has been (as it has in the Southern States of the American Union) a recrudescence of race hatreds, and in the French colonies the political subjection of the whites to the men of colour. The organisation of many of the English tropical colonies is, indeed, of a more oligarchic type than that which now prevails in the island colonies of France, of which the prosperity is remarkable. While we have a certain contempt for the French considered as a colonising people, every English writer on the West Indies admits that the French have been more successful in Martinique and Guadeloupe than we have been in similar and closely adjoining islands. M. de Lanessan has told us that excellent results have been attained by the French of late through frankly accepting the principle that the "coloured" race is better suited to the West Indies than is the white, and that France has encouraged and helped the "coloured" people to become dominant in the French islands. In the meantime the trade of two French islands is, roughly speaking, one-third that of all our own, vastly greater in size and population, and our "Dominica stands between the two French colonies, showing," says Mr. Eves, "a lamentable contrast to their prosperity." The suffrage was conferred on the negroes of Martinique, Guadeloupe, Réunion, and French Guiana in 1848 at the time of the abolition of slavery. At the same moment the suffrage was given to a large proportion of the natives of French India. The electoral right was in the latter case shortly afterwards taken away, but was restored under the third Republic. The negro electors of the French Antilles and of Réunion speak French, are Roman Catholics, and live under

In French Colonies.

French laws; but the natives of French India, as a rule, do not speak French, and are not Christians, yet nevertheless possess the franchise. In Tonquin and in Algeria the suffrage has, as I have said, not been given to the natives; and in the protectorates—such as Tunis and Annam—the French inhabitants themselves, like the English in India, have no votes. In Cochin-China representative government is a farce, inasmuch as the great majority of the electors are in the employment of the French Government; but in the French Antilles it is a reality. In all, it may be said that four senators and seven deputies are elected to the French Chambers by constituencies in which power is in the hands of the coloured or black people. Such is the prosperity of the French West Indies that it would seem that we are wrong in not trusting the West Indian negroes and coloured people with a larger voice in their own future, though it may be admitted that if the choice lies only between Crown government and planter Parliaments they are better off under autocratic than they would be under oligarchic institutions.

White population.

The white population of the West Indies has been described as declining, and it is certainly the case that the British population bears a smaller proportion to the white population of the West Indies of two hundred years ago than does the French or Dutch or Spanish population. In Central America there are a large number of men of Spanish race, and, in parts of the West Indies, of French and Spanish race, whose ancestors have lived for a great time in tropical countries without returning to their homes in the old world. With the English this is in a less degree the case, although there are in Bahamas the descendants of American Loyalists who show no sign of degeneracy of race, and a small number of whites

in the West Indies proper who are of old British race. At the same time there is little trace to be found now of the convict element which thronged the West Indies before the Commonwealth. Although it is known that as late as the time of Charles II the Council of Foreign Plantations had under their consideration the question "How noxious and unprofitable persons may be transplanted to the general advantage of the public and commodity of our foreign plantations;" and although great numbers of such persons were shipped to the West Indies in the seventeenth century, yet, while the descendants of some of the wealthy planters survive, the convict race has become extinct. There is no reason to believe that the British people are less able by nature than the French and Spanish to live within the tropics, but some think that their habits of life, until recently, have not been such as to conduce to the perpetuation of the race under circumstances of long exposure to sun-heat. As it is, we find ourselves with several colonies which have been ours for a considerable period, but in which there is a large white foreign element and hardly any English element to counterbalance it.

Crown Colonies with a white foreign element.

Complicated questions arise in Crown Colonies in which a large population of European, though not of British, descent is found interposed between the English element on the one hand and the negro and coolie element on the other. This is the case in Trinidad, in which a large number of Frenchmen and Spaniards are settled, and in Dominica, where the French are strong.

Trinidad.

Mauritius.

In Mauritius there dwells a highly cultivated population of French descent, side by side with the British officials, and with a far larger dark-skinned population, chiefly Hindoo, and an increasing number of Chinese immigrants. Most of the French energetically support,

but many of the French planters oppose, the extension of self-government (already partially conceded to the rich inhabitants of Mauritius), which increases the strength of the French element, but may lead in the long-run to the predominance of the Asiatic races.

France and Madagascar.

The French island of Réunion lies close to the Ile de France, now held by us under the name of Mauritius, and the French pay great attention to this part of the Indian Ocean, and have waged a war with the Hova Government of Madagascar in order to seize, at the north point of that island, a fine harbour, which lies half-way between Mauritius and Zanzibar. The Patrimonio Treaty which concluded that war is a stain on the reputation of the third Republic: its French text wholly differs from the Malagasy text, as the French text of the French treaties with China for many years differed from the Chinese text. The difference was explained away in a public letter to the Hova Government from the French envoy; but the letter was disavowed in the French Chamber, and the French text, never agreed to by the Hova Queen, alone is recognised by France.

If, as seems probable, the French are going to make a fortress near the easily defended bay and superb anchorage of British Sound, or, as it is now coming to be universally called, Diego Suarez, the possession of Mauritius will involve the placing at Port Louis a considerable garrison and its becoming the centre for the operations in war-time of a formidable British fleet. As M. de Lanessan has pointed out in his work on the colonial expansion of France, the French possessions in and about Madagascar "command the route of all ships sailing upwards from the Cape of Good Hope towards the Indian Ocean or the Pacific, and assure to France incontestable preponderance and authority upon the east coast of

Africa." This declaration, which is well supported by the facts, is not pleasant reading when we remember that we could not safely run our trade through the Mediterranean if France were hostile, and should be driven to make use of this very Cape route which the able deputy of the Seine proves to be commanded also by French establishments, the chief of which has been lately occupied after a costly war undertaken, it would seem, only for the purpose of securing this dangerous point of menace to our trade. M. de Lanessan shows in another portion of his book that "the bay of Diego Suarez is rivalled in size only by those of Rio de Janeiro, San Francisco, and Sydney. It is one of the finest in the world, and one of those which could render the greatest service to our navy as a port for repair, and would be the most sure and impregnable of war ports." The French have now a small garrison at Diego Suarez, have removed thither the administration of their colony of Nossi-Bé, and are engaged in making there a military port. In another passage, again (for he returns to it in all parts of his work on account of its importance), M. de Lanessan says that by basing its operations upon this "impregnable" port, "an East African fleet would be able to worry the advance of an enemy's fleet forced to go by the Cape to the help of Australia or of India." The "enemy" meant must obviously be Great Britain, inasmuch as Great Britain alone could need to go to the help "of Australia or of India." M. de Lanessan concludes his whole view of the subject by saying of the occupation of portions of Madagascar: "The new establishments which we have just founded in the East African seas are of advantage to France not only from the resources which they will furnish to her trade and industry, but also from the

strength which they add to her naval power." When he discusses the position of France in "Indo-China" he again points out that the French fleet, acting at once from "Indo-China" and from Madagascar, would, in the event of war "between the two greatest naval powers in the world," "put an end to all commercial relations between England and India, Hong-Kong, and China, and even menace India herself." The best French book on the French colonies, that of M. Gaffarel (who finds it a little difficult to defend on moral grounds the occupation of portions of Madagascar), contains these words: "Madagascar would replace with advantage our lost colonies. Moreover, with the exception of the still unknown countries of Central Africa and the mysterious regions of the two poles, there is no longer on the globe any other vacant land to occupy." The gallant black Christian people of Madagascar, it seems, do not count.

But we have to deal with facts rather than with useless regrets, and the Government of the United Kingdom, having offered no resistance to French domination in Madagascar, must now face the fact

Mauritius.

that both the importance of Mauritius and the difficulty of holding it in war-time have of late enormously increased. As the old authoritative system of government has broken down in the island, it might be wiser to make trial of a more completely elective government, founded on a wider franchise, instead of relying mainly on the French element as we do at present. The laws of Mauritius are an adaptation of the Code Napoléon, as those of British Guiana and Ceylon are founded on Roman-Dutch jurisprudence.

Local Government

In many of the Crown Colonies the inhabitants have had, at all events in recent years, the advantage of the training which results from the practice of self-govern-

ment in small areas. In the British West Indies and Atlantic islands we find, for instance, that Jamaica, Barbados, Bermuda, Grenada, and British Guiana possess parochial boards, of which all, or nearly all, the members are elected, and which have power to authorise expenditure, and, as a rule, to impose taxation for local purposes, though the Jamaican boards are only able to control the expenditure of funds allotted to them by the Government of the colony. The Jamaica "parishes" are mostly considerable districts, as there are but fourteen of them in the large island. In Ceylon the councils of the native village communities exercise over their own localities functions that partake at once of a legislative, administrative, and judicial character. Even in Fiji, as I have shown, the system of local district institutions has been highly developed, and a congress of head men, presided over by the Governor, meets every year for the purpose of giving and taking advice, and somewhat resembles Sir Robert Sandeman's Durbar of the sirdars of Baluchistan.

in the West Indies,

in Ceylon,

in Fiji.

The tendency to unite several of our dependencies under the same government, shown, for example, since early in 1889 in the case of Trinidad and Tobago, and since 1848 in that of Jamaica and Turks Islands, as well as by the formation of the Leeward Islands Confederacy, and the grouping together of the Windward Islands, marks an advance in the direction of increased economy in Crown Colony rule. The various West Indian unions and federations are of very different kinds, but generally speaking, in the union of islands, while the smaller island has a local government, and is separate as regards revenue, expenditure, and debt, the laws of the larger apply to it.

Local Confederation.

The Leeward Islands, which had enjoyed a federal

The Leeward Islands Confederacy.

constitution from the time of William and Mary up to the end of the last century, were again constituted a single federal colony by an imperial Act in the time of Mr. Gladstone's first administration. It consists of five Presidencies, of which the chief is the group containing St. Kitts, Nevis, and Anguilla, united in 1882 under the name of "St. Christopher (St. Kitts)-Nevis," which pays six of the sixteenths into which the common charges of the federation are divided. Next comes Antigua, which includes the island of Barbuda as a dependency, and which pays five-sixteenths, contains the seat of government and of the legislature, has a partly representative constitution, and returns elected members to the general or federal legislature. Other members of the federation are Dominica (three-sixteenths), Montserrat, and the Virgin Islands. The colony has power to alter its constitution by an ordinary Act, and the Crown has power to include in the federation any other West Indian colony upon an address from both Councils concerned. As in the case of the Federal Council of Australasia, there are two classes of questions with which the federal legislature may deal: those given to it by the statutory constitution, and those referred to it by the local governing bodies. Many of the local Acts may be repealed or amended by the federal legislature, and all of them are void if they conflict with the laws of the general body, so that the constitution is hardly one which would suit colonies with responsible government, as questions of legality would be certain to arise.

The Windward Islands.

Three of the Windward Islands—Grenada, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent—are now under one Governor-in-Chief, and possess, as West Indians put it, "one lunatic asylum and one Court of Appeal," but have no federal

legislative body. Sir Walter Sendall, who has just given up the government of the group for that of Barbados, is the excellent official Natal refused to receive because he was supposed to be likely to be placed under the control of the Governor of the Cape; and another West Indian government—that of Jamaica—is also admirably administered by another rejected Governor, Sir Henry Blake.

West Indian Federation of the future.

Mr. Salmon, in his "Plan for the Union of the fifteen British West Indian Colonies," has thrown the weight of his official experience on the side of confederation. At the same time, in the case of the Leeward Islands the results are not so satisfactory as might have been anticipated, and in West Africa attempts to connect settlements have been abortive. If a scheme for the establishment of a British West Indian Confederacy is ever worked out in practice, it will be necessary to interfere as little as possible with the elements of self-government already existing in the various colonies, and to rest the federal government upon those Provincial systems, after having reformed and developed them. The difficulties in the way of complete West Indian federation are considerable, but not too great to be overcome, and not greater than those which were conquered by the founders of the Canadian Dominion. The local jealousies are as fierce as those of the chief Australian colonies; there is no West Indian Rome to which West Indian Turins and Milans can give way. Most of the islands have a noble history of their own, and they are unwilling to merge their individuality in a new country. There is a fear of being taxed for the benefit of the island in which the federal legislature may sit or the Governor live. There are local paid offices to be absorbed, and local councillors who

may suffer loss of dignity. There is the inevitable struggle to be faced as to whether the federal assembly should be nominated or elective. On the other hand, there would be financial economy in a complete scheme, and chances of development which are lacking now; and the islands would be better able to find the few statesmen, white, black, and "coloured," who would be needed for their government as a group, than they are to produce the highest level of governing power in the hordes of councillors who are now needed. It is possible that the informal negotiations between Canada and the West Indies which have been named in the chapter on "The United States, Canada, and the West Indies," may one day be resumed, and that it may be the lot of Canada to bring about West Indian Federation.

Cyprus. The dependency of Cyprus, administered by the Colonial Office, though, strictly speaking, not a colony, and Ceylon, are the two chief British-governed islands of which I have still to write. In Cyprus we have introduced since 1882 a fairly liberal constitution, which presents the peculiarity of the division of the island into electoral districts in each of which the Mohammedan voters elect one member, and the non-Mohammedan, that is, Greek-Cypriote, voters three members, to the Legislative Council—a division of electors according to creed which is unknown, I think, elsewhere in our dominions. Electoral separation of a particular race, as, for example, of the Maori people in New Zealand, is uncommon, but electoral separation of a religion perhaps unique. While the old Turkish religious courts are kept up for Mohammedan cases, the six district courts for the administration of the ordinary laws are each of them composed of a president and of two other members,

of whom one is a Christian and the other a Mohammedan. Our administration is too costly for the island, although there is still a parliamentary grant-in-aid, and the establishment of a High Commissioner at a salary of £4000 a year will have sooner or later to be reduced, as the trade and position of the island make such an expenditure unjustifiable. The remedies proposed by the Cypriote-Greeks for the present poverty of Cyprus are curious, and the reasons given for proposing them stranger still. They ask, for instance, that the wine duties of the United Kingdom should be remitted on Cyprus wines, apparently thinking that no duty is levied on the wines of British colonies, for they argue that Cyprus is in fact, though not in law, a colony; and they urge that what they wish could be done without loss to the Exchequer, as Cyprus wines do not reach England now. That, if the wines of the dependencies of the Empire were admitted duty free, other and duty-paying wines would be displaced from consumption, to the detriment of the public purse, is a consideration which has not entered into the minds of the Archbishop and his friends. Substantially, however, they are in the right in thinking that they are still overtaxed all round.

Ceylon.

Ceylon may not have met as yet with the recent success of Mauritius in establishing for itself a market in our great Southern colonies, and since the drop caused by the ravages of the coffee-fungus it has not seen its trade increase with the bounds which have marked the growth of the trade of the Straits Settlements, as superior to Ceylon in volume of commerce as in the flavour of the mangosteen. Still, Ceylon is a country which among the old Crown Colonies has most of all exhibited the interesting quality of British pluck. When its planters found themselves face to face with

the total failure of that coffee crop on which they were almost wholly dependent, instead of allowing their colony to pine, as the West Indian colonies dwindled in importance after emancipation and the fall in the price of sugar, they set to work and created for Ceylon that marvellous tea trade, the sudden growth of which has become one of the chief wonders of the British world.

Tea.

The export, indeed, of tea from Ceylon to England is so vast a trade for so small a colony as to deserve special notice. As late as 1878 Ceylon was sending us no tea, while China was sending us tea to the value of ten millions sterling, and India tea to the value of nearly three millions sterling. The Indian export of tea to the United Kingdom (virtually India's only present market, for the taste for Indian tea has not spread as yet to the other great tea-drinking countries) has steadily increased; but the export of tea from Ceylon to Great Britain has risen with extraordinary bounds, and, while the Chinese export has steadily declined, Ceylon is rapidly gaining upon India. In 1889 Ceylon sent us exactly half as much tea as did China. When I was in Ceylon in 1867 the first trials of tea seed had just been made, but the coffee trade was flourishing, and coffee was to Ceylon what wool was to New Zealand. When I revisited the colony in 1876 the exportation of coffee was still immense, and a rise of price in the article had concealed a falling off in production, so that the coffee export still figured as of the value of four millions sterling. Tea-growing was then in its infancy, but two growers were supplying local wants. Since that time the tea industry has increased so fast, and coffee so rapidly declined, that the Ceylon tea export already exceeds the coffee export in value, and it is computed that in 1890 the export of Ceylon tea will be forty million pounds weight. The

Ceylon planters have every reason to be proud of the enterprise and energy which they displayed in refusing to sit still and see their island ruined by the coffee blight. Ceylon has rapidly produced the tea which on the average commands the highest price, and yet is the cheapest to the consumer, and will year by year increasingly displace China tea and rival Indian tea in the market of the United Kingdom. Great Britain draws from Ceylon some ten or twelve millions sterling of interest on capital, and the planters of the island prosper. Ceylon is likely sooner or later to command the Australian market, an important one, for the Australians, as I have said, stand first as tea-drinkers, and easily beat us of the United Kingdom, who stand next. Whether Ceylon will ultimately obtain the market of the United States, where at present Chinese and Japanese teas are drunk, will depend on the success of tea as a crop in Central America and the West-India Islands. One of the oddities of the British Empire lies in the fact that the Canadians, who in many points closely resemble the Australians, drink tea only upon the scale of the inhabitants of the United States, and not on that of the Australians or even of the home-staying Britons. The coldness of the long Canadian winter can hardly be the explanation, as the Russians of the extreme north drink tea in winter with a freedom which is limited only by its heavy price and their own poverty, and hold it to be the best of drinks for coachmen and others whose vocations expose them to the severest cold.

General fruitfulness of the island.

It is not only tea and coffee that Ceylon produces, for the island has few rivals in fruitfulness, and none in charm. Spice, cacao, and cinchona plantations thrive; the cocoa-nut palm yields freely of its varied crops, and in precious stones Ceylon stands first in all except

diamonds and rubies. The island is also interesting on account of its presenting to us a picture of a settled and orderly Buddhist system which once prevailed throughout India and the Malay Archipelago. On the other hand, Ceylon is the home of Government monopolies, or "farms," such as those of salt, of forests, of pearls and of liquor, and the Government has unfortunately, on account of the last-named monopoly, an interest in pushing the sale of drink.

Drawbacks.

Not only is the liquor monopoly objectionable from the point of view of the interest of the natives, but their well-wishers complain also of the exaction of forced labour, redeemable by fine—a custom which exists, however, as regards road-making in many other Crown Colonies, and lingers on in some parts of Europe. In Ceylon Indian coolies employed as agricultural labourers are exempted from this work or tax, an exemption obviously created to favour planter interests. There is also a tax on imported grain, and other heavy import duties, from which are exempted machinery and goods necessary to the planting industry. There is an export duty on coffee, tea, cacao, and cinchona, which is almost as objectionable in principle as the duty upon imported grain, but presses upon the planter as well as on the community at large. The effeminacy of the Cinghalese is to be accounted for by that want of variety in their food for which taxation is in part responsible. In the case of Ceylon, as in the case of other colonies of a similar type, we may agree with Mr. Salmon in supporting M. Leroy-Beaulieu's desire to see taxation take the form of heavy duties on intoxicating liquors and tobacco, light *ad valorem* duties on all other articles except food, and taxes upon land. The present position of Ceylon presents a picture of both the advantages and

the drawbacks of a good specimen of the autocratic Crown Colony system. The friends of the native are opposed to the suggested introduction of so-called self-government into the island, because they fear the rise of a planter oligarchy, and prefer direct Crown rule until the time comes for Ceylon to receive a government resting upon the representation of the majority.

Hong-Kong.

As successful, on a smaller scale, as Singapore itself, Hong-Kong is also a settlement of which we may be proud, and Victoria is indeed one of the most beautiful and well kept of cities. The joint English and American town which divides European Shanghai with the "French Concession," and which is a republic in which the British element preponderates over the American, is also a flourishing part of Greater Britain.

Shanghai.

Peculiarities of Crown Colony legislation.

In addition to those political peculiarities of Crown Colonies which have been already noted, I may name the fact that in the Straits and several of the old Crown Colonies native education is free to natives, while fees are charged to natives for learning English. In Heligoland both English and German are taught to all the children, although their mother-tongue is a Frisian dialect. In Malta the composition of the Council of Government is as complicated as is that of the Court of Policy of British Guiana, already described. Four of the elected members are chosen by a body of special electors from the classes of ecclesiastics, nobles and landed gentry, graduates of the University, and members of the Commercial Exchange. The other ten elected members are chosen by single-member constituencies of "general electors," and not more than two ecclesiastics may be so chosen. Previously to the recent adoption of the present constitution of Malta, and under the ordinance of 1861, the elective members were elected in one list with the

limited vote. The destruction of direct minority representation in Malta leaves the constitution of the Cape unique, I think, in the colonial world of politics in making the attempt to carry out any form of proportional representation.

Conclusions.

On the whole it will be seen that while in the French colonies property as well as power is passing into the hands of the "coloured" population and of the blacks, in their English neighbours this is the case only in a less degree, while the importation of Indian labour has enabled the old system of large properties to be kept up in many of our Crown Colonies. It has been shown also by our inquiries that it is a mistake to suppose that our tropical colonies are in a condition of decline. They hold a secondary place in our attention because of the immense development of Canadian and Australasian interests; but they are on the whole fairly prosperous and progressive. There is indeed in our Crown Colonies a remarkable expansion of trade and revenue, although the growth of population is more rapid still. The West Indies, which were once most important to our Empire, now figure only for 1 per cent in our trade, but they give us naval stations, and they permit us to try experiments which are useful to the world in the production of the fruits of tropical labour. We have seen that the British West Indies, like Canada, are feeling to some extent the attraction of the enormous neighbouring body of the United States, and there is now an American party in the West Indies. In my opinion the islands will remain British and not become American, but will more and more be "black countries." Already the decline in the white population has been considerable, and it is perhaps worthy of note that there were vastly more white settlers in Barbados, for example, in

its palmy days of the time of Charles I and Charles II and James II than there are at the present moment.

The Crown Colonies have not been dealt with here at such great length as have the self-governing communities, because, although the former try some experiments, these are not spontaneously introduced by democratic electorates or assemblies of our countrymen, but are the suggestion of officials sent out from home, and are of less importance and less interest to ourselves as an example. The chief need of the Crown Colonies is that the feelings and the wishes of their peoples should be better known and understood by the Imperial Parliament, so that Secretaries of State may be urged to grant more liberal institutions to the most advanced in public intelligence among these colonies. France has tried to meet the difficulty by the establishment of communal and general councils, and the return to the Chamber of Deputies, as we have seen, of colonial representatives, some of them men of colour, of whom one occupied a seat in a French Cabinet not long ago. With us, however, the population of colonies and of dependencies bears to the population of the United Kingdom so different a proportion that no such complete solution of our difficulties would be possible without a revolutionary change in the whole fabric of the Empire. So long, therefore, as the Crown Colonies continue to be governed from Downing Street to the present extent, so long will it be desirable that a well-informed public opinion in the United Kingdom should be brought to bear upon administrative acts, on the nature of which depends in a large measure the well-being of many millions of our fellow-countrymen.

Tropical scenes.

The Crown Colonies of the British Empire contain some of the loveliest countries of the world, and tempt

the traveller by their beauty as strongly as do Canada and Australia by the interesting nature of their social and political institutions. St. Lucia and Ceylon are superior even to Java in their landscapes, and, with British Guiana, present a perfect picture of tropical scenery. There is no more beautiful island than Ceylon, for if the glimpses of its sacred peak and its dark ranges, caught through the cocoa-nut groves that fringe its golden sands and purple seas, are equalled, though in a different style, by the glories of New Zealand's Southern Alps, the brilliant colouring of the mingled crowds of Hindoo, of "Moorish," and of Cinghalese-Buddhist people that throng its busy roads, adds an element of romantic charm that must needs be lacking in new countries peopled by the English, the Irish, and the Scotch.

PART VI

COLONIAL PROBLEMS

CHAPTER I

COLONIAL DEMOCRACY

In entering upon a brief general account of the tendencies of society in the colonies of Canada, or Australasia, and of South Africa, I have in the first place to remark that some considerations bearing upon the subject have been dealt with in the chapters on Canada, Victoria, and New South Wales. With regard indeed to many of the social and political changes which the English in the colonies have worked out for themselves it is difficult to generalise, because Canadian practice is closer to that of the United States than is Australian; and Australian, on the other hand, more interesting, experimentally considered, to ourselves. For example, when I come to mention State-socialism I shall have to show the curious difference which exists between Canada and Australasia in this respect, and how that difference is, day by day, growing greater instead of less. The minor differences between Canada on the one hand, and the Australasian and South African colonies on the other, have been to some extent brought about by the severe climate of Canada, and the slow growth of the country through the absence of gold rushes, while the existence in its neighbourhood of the tempting El Dorados of the western States of the American Union has drawn away from Canada a certain

proportion of the more adventurous among its youth. The resemblances, however, which are found in the social and political systems of the self-governing colonies are many, and they are not all of them to be discovered in the politics and society of the United States.

Australian as compared with American Democracy.

One reason for many of the distinctions that may be drawn between Australian democracy and that of the United States is to be found in the fact that the United States are mainly ruled by small owners of land tilling their own holdings (a point in which Canada resembles the United States), while Australasia is chiefly governed by the town democracy, and the workmen in their trade unions are far more powerful than upon the continent of America. In the most remarkable case that has been seen of the adoption of an extreme Radical policy, by a state mainly English in the composition of its people—the carrying of the Kearney constitution in the State of California—the workmen, as has been well shown by Mr. Bryce, would have been powerless had they not made an alliance with the landed democracy of the State, and the virtual abandonment in practice of many of the principles of this constitution was brought about by the weakening, and ultimate disruption, of the alliance. In Australia, on the other hand, the advance of the leading colonies in the direction of democracy and State-socialism has been steady, and has been conducted under the leadership in the main of a single class, who have, however, used their power, on the whole, with moderation and with skill.

Absence in colonial Democracy of faults attributed to Democracies.

Mr. Bryce[1] has pointed out the fact that the vast majority of the faults ordinarily attributed to democracies are not observable in the policy or in the social

[1] *The American Commonwealth*, by James Bryce, M.P. Macmillan and Co., 1889.

life of the United States, but has suggested that there are some exceptions. The laws are not always steadily enforced. There is consequently a slight tendency in some parts of the country to replace law by an organised mob rule. There is much legislative corruption. There exists, he thinks, a certain commonness in mind and tone, or want of dignity and elevation, rather of style than of character; a certain apathy among the fastidious as regards public life; a certain want of knowledge in matters of legislation and administration; an inadequate recognition of the value of experience in dealing with them, and some laxity in the management of public business. I am not here concerned with the inquiry how far Mr. Bryce is right or wrong as regards that nation the affairs of which he has investigated, with so much patience that we may be content with the result of his observations instead of being tempted to make our own. But it is remarkable that none of these exceptions, or at the most not more than one of them, applies to the democracy of the colonial Greater Britain. If we take Victoria as our example, for the reasons which I have stated in the Victorian chapter (remembering that in most points the other Australasian colonies, and that in many Canada, can point to similar conditions), we find the laws as well enforced as they are in England. There is no tendency to lynch law. There is as little public corruption as in the mother-country. It is impossible to ascribe commonness in mind and tone, or want of dignity and elevation, to a people who select men such as Mr. Higinbotham, Mr. Service, Mr. Deakin, Professor Pearson, or, to turn to a neighbouring colony, Sir Alfred Stephen, as the most worthy of public esteem. There is less want of knowledge as regards

legislation and administration observable generally in our self-governing colonies than in the United Kingdom itself. The long career in office in Canada of Sir John Macdonald, the permanency of the popularity in Victoria of Mr. Higinbotham, and, I would add, in New South Wales of Sir Henry Parkes, are evidences that there is in our chief colonies no inadequate recognition of the worth of experience in dealing with legislation and administration; and no one who knows the public offices of South Australia, or Victoria, or Tasmania can accuse them of more laxity in the management of public business than is to be found in Downing Street itself, while the apathy among the fastidious, which was at one time noticeable in New South Wales, seems, to the great advantage of the colony, to have disappeared.

Merits of colonial Democracy.

Neither is there to be discerned in Greater Britain any of that jealousy of eminence, or that reluctance to pay sufficient salaries to obtain good service for the State, which has, by philosophic historians earlier than Mr. Bryce, been thought a characteristic of democracy. I ventured to foretell in 1868 that in Australia no such dangers would arise, and so far as there has been change in the last twenty years the change has all been in a good direction. Class animosities are less strong throughout the colonies than they were. There is a more general acceptance of democracy, and a more general recognition of its success, than I found in 1867 prevailing among the wealthier classes of the colonies; and there is more and more reason to think that, while such colonies as Victoria point out to us now, as they pointed out to us then, the road that we shall take, that road will lead us towards general contentment and greatly increased prosperity. In many matters we have followed the example of our colonies. On

the other hand, they have taken fresh strides towards democracy, as, for example, in the widespread adoption of the principle of the payment of members of Parliament, and—in Australasia—of the principle of the graduation of death duties according to the amount of property bequeathed. In these points, too, we shall follow them, and, their present position shows, follow them with good results. No possibility exists of contending that colonial, any more than American, democracy has crushed out individuality of character, as Alexis de Tocqueville thought it would; while the cheerfulness and pleasantness of life in our self-governing colonies—more remarkable on the whole in the Southern colonies than in the United States—allow us to draw a picture of a beautiful national existence as the future state of New Zealand and Australia, of South Africa, and of Canada so far as climate admits, with the certainty that it will be realised.

No class tyranny.

There are some who have got over their fear of American democracy, and who are inclined to think that a territorial democracy may safely be trusted with the affairs of great communities, who yet believe that a democracy mainly in the hands of artisans is a much more dangerous thing, and who have fears with regard to Victoria, Queensland, and New South Wales which no longer oppress them with regard to the United States. Although in the United States, as Mr. Bryce has pointed out,[1] the rich bear less than their due share of taxation, the wage-earning class, he tells us, is no more active in political work than are other classes, returns few workmen to Congress or to the State legislatures, and only greatly exerts itself for the purpose of preventing the introduction of cheap foreign labour, and of supporting local industries by protective tariffs. In Canada also

[1] Chap. lxxxi. First Edition, vol. iii., p. 70.

this is partially true. In the Australian colonies, although the wage-earning class shows far more political activity, and is far more powerful, it does not attempt largely to return artisans to Parliament, and is content to help to carry on the government through statesmen and politicians chosen for merit or for attention to their work, without respect to class.

Classes.

In all the colonies, both in those where the workmen are all-powerful and in those where the capitalists rule, there is no such war of rich and poor as is seen in the United Kingdom and Western Europe generally, and no such jealousy between workmen and employers. In the Australasian colonies, in which the workmen are politically the strongest class, there is not, however, so great a fusion of classes as is seen in the back country of Canada and of the United States; and the line between classes, as regards social intercourse, is somewhat more sharply drawn than in the newer parts of British America or of the United States. If our self-made colonial population—in Australasia at all events—show a certain impatience of youthful immigrants of the higher social class, that feeling is natural and not unreasonable; and if they are given to vaunting their own prosperity and running down all that comes from the old world, they have much in their success to excuse them for so doing. The supposed roughness and violence of young Australia is a matter which I have already dealt with in the chapters on Victoria and New South Wales. The facts have been grossly exaggerated by hasty writers, and it may confidently be asserted that the Australian "larrikins" are, in the possession of evil qualities and in their mode of showing them, behind both the roughs of the old country and the "hoodlums" of the United States.

Social condition of colonial workmen.

That there should be little danger in the political predominance of colonial workmen is natural when the circumstances are borne in mind. As regards the settlers and the sons of settlers in the more distant colonies—those of Australia and South Africa—they come largely of a picked race, and represent the most enterprising and energetic of their class. Colonial workmen generally are well-to-do; many of them own property; they live in good houses; often hold land; are commonly members of religious congregations; their wives are able to employ young girls to do much of their household work, and have leisure for intellectual improvement. In many of the factories of Victoria and New South Wales we find not only the excellent bands of musicians which some English factories can show, but debating societies admirably managed, concerts of good music given by the men in evening dress, and the practice of taking the family to the seaside for a holiday trip each year. While the athleticism of England has been, up to the recent revival of football, mainly in the upper and middle class, in the colonies the workmen supply the football, the cricket, and the cycling clubs with their chief strength. They take walking tours and outings for sketching and for boating as freely as do the rich. So great is the general prosperity that regular domestic service is dying out, and is being replaced by occasional help from young people or from immigrants before they get good places. It is impossible in the wealthier colonies to tell one class from another by its dress. No doubt many of the working people, like many of the trading and other classes, care nothing for serious pursuits, and are wasteful and improvident. But on the whole they are good citizens, and their rule presents no danger. So great has been the prosperity of the

colonies in recent years that full employment and high wages have led to large investments by workmen, which have become a conservative counterpoise to extreme opinions, and have checked any general movement of the working classes against the present relations of capital and labour. There have been strikes in particular cases for higher pay, but the disturbances have been confined to isolated branches of trade and have never become general, and the parliaments of labour have stopped far more strikes than they have countenanced. Nearly every dispute is referred to boards of arbitrators, and their decisions are accepted by both parties.

Opinions of colonial workmen.

When I speak of the dominance of labour in the Australian colonies I mean its potential dominance, and its power in those questions upon which working-class opinion is united, and do not wish to suggest that there is much interference by artisans in the whole field of politics. Colonial workmen have of recent years discussed among themselves, for the most part, rather special issues affecting special measures than put forward any general policy accepted by the whole body of working men. So little movement has there been against property, in spite of the steps taken to ensure that wealth should contribute a large share towards the expenses of the State, that property alone, as a rule, is allowed in colonies to vote at municipal elections, and the workmen show little dislike for the principle which exists in many colonies that property should confer in local elections a "plural" vote. So powerful are the urban freeholding interests of the working people that city property bears but little State taxation—in Victoria none. The most prosperous of the colonial workmen are freeholders in towns or suburbs, shareholders in limited liability companies owning

factories and mines, and in fact capitalists and proprietors, with the same feeling against nationalisation of the land as is found among the landowners of the United States. While the colonial legislation of the Australian Liberal party has been steadily opposed to the principle of mere sale of land to the highest bidder, it has allotted land, without respect to quality, in fixed areas and at fixed rates, on a freehold tenure, to *bonâ fide* settlers, and the workmen who own their houses in or near the towns make common cause with the free selectors, or, to use the Canadian phrase, the "homesteaders," in the country districts. Although the most extreme land reformers of Europe either care nothing for free transfer of land or dislike it, the whole of the colonies have adopted and maintained, with every sign of popular assent, an easy system of the transfer of real estate, and support it as steadily as they do payment of members, universal State education, manhood or virtual manhood suffrage, and the other planks of the old colonial Liberal programme now mostly carried into law.

General characteristics of colonial Democracy.

In the colonies we find now a general pride in the admission that the tone of society is democratic, and the word is once more losing the associations which gathered round it when democracy was looked upon as meaning mob rule, and again coming to be used for the power of the whole people, and for a form of government which calls this out. The Australians and Canadians, and, in spite of the presence of a large native population of dark skin, the South-African English, show themselves, at all events in the older centres of population, under democratic institutions, a religious, moral, educated, and intelligent people, considerably above the European average, and a people who, whether they style them-

selves Conservatives or Liberals, are firm believers in democratic principles, and strong opponents of class rule. They admit very willingly that virtual dominance of the working class which exists in some of the colonies, because the working class is the most numerous; but they find it an influence consistent with respect for the rights of minorities, and are aware that the workmen in those colonies do not act as workmen in colonial politics, but as ordinary citizens of the State. An interesting proof of the fact that there is no middle-class hostility against workmen, even in the colonies which are the most controlled, potentially at least, by a working-class majority, was afforded by the recent subscriptions from all classes in Australia towards the dock labourers' strike in London. The members of the trades-unions of Victoria only led the way, and all ranks followed, including employers of labour, and at least one Governor.

There is a general belief in the South-Sea colonies, and a widespread belief in Canada, that the majority will be right in the long-run, and all are full of hopefulness and cheerfulness as to the national future. Our colonies are, indeed, in one sense not new countries. They possess an old civilisation, in most cases our own with the upper class left out, and therefore similar to the form which ours will probably one day assume when the upper classes have been overwhelmed on the one side by new wealth and on the other side by increasingly powerful Labour. Not only, however, is British aristocracy absent in Australia, but also that political power of wealth which exists in Great Britain and in the United States; and so steady and gradual has been the political absorption of the richer people in Australia into the ranks of the democracy, that the political predominance

of riches may be said to have gone-under without a struggle. The fact that the Australian railways are in State hands has in itself done much to check the rise in Australia of that supremacy of railway kings which is harmful to American interests. The advantage given in the mother-country by wealth, in the race to obtain certain coveted positions, is altogether non-existent in the great self-governing colonies; but, while money has in them little or no political power, there is, as we shall see, no socialism in the European sense, and little dislike of the capitalist class. On the whole, however, the colonies form as absolute a democracy, although under constitutional monarchy, as the American or the Swiss commonwealths under republican institutions. The equality of the citizens is not so much paraded in the self-governing colonies as in the United States, but is quite as real. The mere fact that a peerage does not exist, and that hereditary titles are almost unknown, is little; but there is in the colonies no sustained rank, and any predominance in individuals that exists is purely personal, and is seldom continued to their posterity. Wealth in the colonies seems to be soon dispersed, but in Canada it is no disadvantage to the offspring of prominent colonial statesmen who contemplate a political career to be their fathers' sons. When I say that wealth has little or no political power in our colonies—far less than in Europe, inconceivably less than in the United States—I may possibly be told that in South Africa there is one conspicuous exception, for one English gentleman of great reputed wealth does exercise considerable political influence in South Africa. But his case forms no real exception, for it is his business ability and his political ability which have given him his station. In Canada, too, where the Canadian Pacific

railroad has considerable political influence, that influence is not directed by a single man. Mr. Van Horne, an American by birth, who has become Canadian in his ideas, and who belongs so completely to the American continent that he has never, I believe, been seen in Europe, has attained by his energy to much power; he is not, however, a politician, and should be referred to rather as a man of business capacity than as a man of wealth.

Another difference between our chief colonies and the United States must also be pointed out. There is in the self-governing colonies of Australia and Canada no dark-skinned element comparable in importance to the negro element in the United States, at present excluded by combination from real political power. Nor is there in Australasia any large white foreign element with a lower standard of comfort such as exists in the vast immigrant population of the United States. In the colonies, as in the American Union, State schools, either free or with fees very small, taking into consideration the means of the working classes, fuse the immigrants with the majority composed of the amalgamated races of the United Kingdom. Even the German population, which is the most numerous and the most prosperous of the alien races, is not so considerable proportionately anywhere in the British Empire as it is in Chicago and many parts of the United States. As the equality of conditions is more complete, and the influence of wealth less, in most of our self-governing colonies than is the case in the Union, so we find that the colonists have been bolder than the Americans in their legislative experiments. The Australians, too, have had in this respect the advantage of coming suddenly into a full-grown political life. The Italian

naval authorities have been able to do more with their money than have those of any other country, from the fact that, starting late, they have had the advantage of adopting the newest ideas without check or hindrance. In politics the Australians had a similar advantage, except in the one point of local government, in which Canada on the whole stands first, having in this respect, as in her federal constitution, profited the most largely by American example. While, however, our colonists of Australasia are bold in their experiments, and free from all conservative fear of change, yet they are thoroughly English, and as impatient of the doctrine of natural rights as is the Editor of the *Quarterly Review*.

Anglo-Saxon as contrasted with Latin Democracy.

It is necessary to insist much upon the English character of the colonial democracy of Greater Britain. Nothing can be more complete than the manner in which history has vindicated the accuracy of many of Tocqueville's observations upon democracy, and the correctness of many of his views. At the same time the most curious contradictions are to be observed in his writings, though each part is true in itself if we confine our attention to a portion of the field. The fact is that Latin democracy and Anglo-Saxon democracy give rise to very different modes of thought, and produce very different results. In one famous passage Tocqueville pointed out with extraordinary force the tendency of democracy to favour absolute government, and his passage was prophetic with regard to the rise of the Second Empire in France. But he himself was well aware that no such empire could be founded in a democratic community mainly composed of the English race. Tocqueville has in another place confessed that the temperament of the

French nation is so peculiar that we cannot argue about France from the base of study of the tendencies of mankind at large. That inapplicability of general reasoning which he admitted in this passage is also true, though in a less degree, as between Great Britain and her daughter-countries. It is impossible unrestrictedly to argue from English example about the colonies, or from colonial example about the United Kingdom. Thus it is said to be one of the bad tendencies of democracy, to be set with others against many blessings, that there exists in the most advanced communities a jealousy of distinction of every kind. That popular jealousy is far less strong among the democracies of the Anglo-Saxon race than it is in Latin countries. While the American and Australian democracy may be fond of flattery and impatient of control, it is nevertheless far more amenable to the restraints of law, to the guidance of the leading men, and to the moral obligations of justice and Christian principle than is the case with the town democracy of other races, and such evil tendencies as it may possess are held in check by much respect for the past and by a true love of freedom.

Insufficient attention has as yet been given by political observers to the characteristics of the colonial democracy and to the importance of colonial example, and, writing in 1885, the late Sir Henry Maine almost ignored them.[1] That learned writer, in discussing the nature of democracy, drew plentifully upon his stores of knowledge as to the old world and the United States, without seeming to remember the existence of Canada, or New Zealand, Victoria, New South Wales, Queensland, or South Australia, except when he mentioned the

[1] *Popular Government*, by Sir H. S. Maine. John Murray.

bearing of the action of colonial governors as to dissolutions of Parliament on the rights of Governments at home. The only inhabitants of the colonies with whom Sir Henry Maine concerned himself were the Australian "blackfellows." He assumed, too, that under democratic government members would to an increasing degree receive positive mandates from their constituents, although colonial example would have shown him that colonial representatives are left more free in this respect than are members of Parliament in Great Britain.

Weak points of popular government.

Many of the political evils which are put down by impatient and superficial observers to republican government, but which are also to be found in the British colonies, under institutions at all events nominally monarchical, are, as a fact, evils which have of late years rapidly increased in England, and are increasing, although less fast, in all the free countries of the world. The bids made for votes, at the expense of the true interest of the country, or at the expense of international justice, are perhaps as offensive in one country as in another. We have to set this evil—which accompanies immense publicity, the enfranchisement of all classes, the cheapness of newspapers, and the diffusion of superficial information without a very real sense of responsibility—against the blessings which in England, as in the United States and as in the colonies, flow from the same institutions, of which political conduct of the kind I have mentioned forms "the seamy side." No doubt from some points of view modern monarchical government of the German type, resting upon public opinion as much as the democratic governments of Great and Greater Britain themselves rest upon popular support, has much to say for itself; but looking at it from a distance we are apt to see the good

side of such institutions and to neglect the bad. Perhaps the weakest point of democratic assemblies is to be found in the conduct of foreign affairs, for in the case of war they show an amount of energy which makes up for their tendency to occasionally "hang the wrong man." I cannot but think that if English politicians would, in foreign affairs, ask more than they do for confidence and silence their request would be granted. The conduct of foreign affairs by the Senate of the United States, although it has been extremely unpleasant to ourselves, has not been disadvantageous to the interests of the American Union. It must be admitted that it has been from time to time inconsistent with the highest considerations of international courtesy and justice. As regards colonial legislatures, we for the most part hear in this country only of the least laudable of their proceedings, and when an occasional "scene" transcends the bounds of decency it is at once telegraphed to all our newspapers as sensational news, whereas, perhaps, the humdrum proceedings of that same legislature in passing good laws and well governing the colony have been unnoticed for months or even years. On the other hand, a popular autocracy is perhaps more inclined to make war or to threaten war, with the chance of having to make it, for an insufficient reason and in an unjust cause than any democracy, and such are the gigantic evils of war that the slightest tendency in this direction is a drawback which more than equals the defects which may attend the democratic institutions of Greater Britain.

Improvement.

As democracy is existent or inevitable in most countries inhabited by our race, it is cheering to be able to point out that instead of its evils and its vices becoming greater as years go by, they have proved

to be a lessening quantity. Victoria presents, on the whole, an admirable spectacle, as do many of the other colonies; and if the Parliament of New South Wales is given to occasional outbreaks of a painful nature there is every reason to believe that the public opinion of the colony will gradually succeed in repressing the excesses of which it loudly complains. It has been seen, moreover, that while the evil of violent language and untrue aspersions is supposed to be the reason which prevents the best people in democracies from taking part in public life, in New South Wales the period of violence has been chosen by men of a class who formerly did not take part in colonial affairs for their entrance into Parliament. While it must be admitted that in New South Wales and in the United States we often hear it said that the best men are not in politics, there is some exaggeration about this statement. Of course in countries where vast fortunes are to be made, and to be made so fast as in these new lands, many of the ablest men have no time for politics, and are devoted to money making in some form as their pursuit; and in America the small leisured class turns with natural dislike from the still existing corruption of political affairs. On the whole, however, the Australians and, though in a less degree, the Americans have reason to be satisfied with the calibre of their leading politicians, and when it is said that the race of American statesmen has dwindled it should, I think, rather be contended that it has much changed, and that, while Washington and the men who succeeded to his power were country gentlemen with country gentlemen's tastes and habits, they were not superior in the real qualities of government to the rail-splitter Lincoln. The public men of at least the younger among the British democracies across the seas have

Public men.

above all a high average, and the type is not a bad one. They are courteous and accessible, and not more servile to the democracy than the public men of Europe are servile either to democratic or to other masters. A good deal of nonsense has been talked and written upon these subjects, and, because some brilliant writers or considerable men of science of the English race in the new worlds have been found to hold themselves aloof from politics, conclusions have been drawn which are no more warranted than would be similar conclusions drawn in England from the opinions of Carlyle. After all, the public men of Europe are not as a rule the rivals in accomplishments of Sir Philip Sidney, and, to take another standard of comparison, if the commanding figure of Prince Bismarck is omitted, it might be contended that the public men of our leading colonies are at least on a level with the public men of the German Empire, and superior, as matters stand, to the public men of Russia.

High standard of colonial life.

In the colonies as in the United States the great majority of the people believe in the wisdom and the goodness of majority rule, and they are probably the best judges in their own case. The whole of the colonial governments, from the best to the least good, give the advantages of civilised government in a high form. The law is almost universally respected and obeyed. The average comfort and security of the people are at a singularly high level. There is order and there is justice, and the people are happy. There is complete toleration of opinion, and the weak and the little have been raised in the social scale, as compared with those of Europe, without any wrong being inflicted upon the rich, and the many have been benefited without driving out the few. While some even of the so-called

Great Powers of the old world are suffering from many of the worst evils that can oppress peoples, the young countries of Greater Britain are those of all mankind in which the order of society seems to be the most secure and the condition of the people the best. These facts are not sufficiently recognised in the mother-country. A lecture was delivered at Toynbee Hall last November by a distinguished publisher, a man remarkable for his knowledge of men and things; but the only reference in it to the British Empire outside of England, and to the wider public to which the works published by him must be supposed to be addressed, was contained in the following words: —"... then it was shipped to the colonies. Failed books like failed men, criminal books like criminal men were sent off to the colonies." Such a speech does more harm in Australia than half-a-dozen meetings of the Imperial Federation League, with the Lord Mayor in the chair, can be expected to do good. Here is a cultivated Englishman, a man who may be thought to be in advance of the great mass of his countrymen in his knowledge of the English-speaking countries, who seems to think that convicts are transported by us to colonies, and that our daughter-countries are peopled by our failures. The ne'er-do-weels who were sent out from England to colonies, rather perhaps to get them out of the way of their friends at home than with a real idea of improving their own position, are indeed to be pitied in finding themselves sent to countries where the average energy and courage and ability are greater than is the case at home. In all the leading colonies the British people enjoy a higher average of comfort than in the mother-country. The out-door life and the good wages have called forth

the better qualities of the race; and, if the speech that I have quoted seems to show a certain contempt for those who inhabit the daughter-lands, we must not shut our eyes to the fact that the feeling may sometimes be returned.

Great size of the Australian cities.

The colonies differ from one another in a most important point. The Australian colonies are countries having a larger proportion of their population in the capital cities than is the case anywhere else in the whole world. Canada, on the other hand, in this respect resembles the United States, where the cities, though large, are more on the European scale. In *Greater Britain* I ascribed the swelling of the cities of Australia, beyond American and Canadian or old-world relative proportions, to the fact that the squatter system of pastoral tenancies had kept the people from the land; and this political fact is, of course, connected with the geographical and climatic consideration that Australian land, without irrigation, is not generally well suited to agricultural settlement. The Australians often discuss this City-question among themselves, and are of opinion that the tendency to crowd into capitals is general, and will exert its force throughout the world. However this may be, I am concerned here chiefly with the fact and its Australian results. On the whole, it must be admitted that, while the drift of an observer's mind is almost certain to be against the desirability of the creation of capital cities containing a third of the population of the state, in Australia the good results from the overwhelming size of Melbourne and other capitals exceed the bad. It is the growth of capitals and not of all cities that is remarkable in Australia. In America and in Canada and New Zealand there are no great capitals; no cities which politically take their place. New York

is a huge port, but there is no concentration in New York of the whole life of the American people. Montreal is not more Canada than New York is the United States; but Melbourne is nearly half Victoria in political power, and Sydney nearly half of New South Wales. The total town population of Australia is not greater in proportion to the rural population than the town population of Great Britain, but towns of the second order are very few. In each of our chief Australian colonies there is one centre, and not a number of commercial rivals as in Great Britain. Melbourne and Sydney are far larger in proportion to their states than is London to the United Kingdom; and there are in Australia no Glasgows, no Manchesters, and no Liverpools.

Change in conditions of town life.

The Australians contend, as I have tried to show in discussing the question separately from the Melbourne and the Sydney point of view, that all modern civilisation tends towards the creation in each state of one centre at which all business will be transacted, and to which will come all those who search for recreation, for cheap living upon realised gains, for the best schooling for their children, for everything except the mere raising of produce from the soil. While provisions once were dearest in the larger towns, provisions are there cheapest now, because the political and social centre is also the railroad centre, to which all commodities flow. Since statistics have shown that the rural districts keep pace with the towns, and that the great capitals are only gaining ground at the expense of their smaller rivals among the cities, it has become clear that, in the Australian colonies, the capitals are not drawing people from production, but only concentrating for purposes of business and social life those who are not directly producing with their hands. Sydney and Adelaide

have respectively about 35 per cent of the population of New South Wales and South Australia; and Melbourne, if we include its suburbs, a still greater percentage of the population of Victoria. Geelong, Ballarat, and Castlemaine are standing still so far as population goes, although rich and flourishing from the point of view of the industries of each place. The manufactures, too, are coming to the capitals, and shopping tends more and more to concentrate itself in the one centre. The cheapness of railway fares upon the State lines, of course, conduces towards this end, and it is found more agreeable for the customer to come to the capital to deal with all his tradesmen than to make his purchases in the neighbourhood of his residence. The effects of this concentration in capitals upon national character are considerable. In the mother-country we are apt to think that the crowded and insanitary homes of the working people in our cities are a necessary drawback to town life; but in Australia the working people of the capitals have excellent houses and gardens in the suburbs, and are better off than the dwellers in the country from most points of view. On the other hand, the population of the colony, generally speaking, gains, from the concentration in the capitals, in education, in power of recreation, and in many of the matters which make life most pleasant. The effect must be a quickening of the national pulse, and is already, in fact, visible in the brightness and high intelligence of the Australian people.

Effect on the Democracy.

Culture.

It may be asked whether the colonies have as yet produced that literary or artistic development which we expect from populations so happy and so intelligent as those which I have described. I have already spoken of the necessary absence as yet in the

colonies of a leisured class. In the eastern portion of the United States, which, although exposed, as are the colonies, to the literary competition of the United Kingdom, possesses a proportionately larger leisured class than do the newer Canada or Australia or the Western States, there is a more widespread literary cultivation than in any of the old countries of the world. Great results have already been achieved by people of the United States in the realms of science, although these cannot be attributed to the leisured class, and American science is more practical than ours and runs more into invention, because the rewards of invention are in America greater and more rapid. Even pure science has its students, however, in the Eastern States, as poetry is not wanting in Canada and Australia in spite of the powerful influence and competition of contemporary English literature. I have already named colony by colony the most conspicuous examples of a success in literature which is rather ignored at home than lacking in the colonies.

Architecture.

Colonial architecture, although not good, compares favourably with that of the dwellings of the British middle class. At the same time our colonists are in this respect behind the colonists of foreign races established in their midst. The French domestic architecture of Lower Canada and the Dutch domestic architecture of South Africa are picturesque, and free from that element of meanness or vulgarity which too often characterises British architecture in all parts of the world. The fine old Dutch homesteads of the Cape, with their indispensable verandahs, are perfect specimens of simple architecture—as perfect as are the houses of the best Flemish towns, with the additional advantage of being placed amid beautiful surroundings and shaded

by magnificent old trees. The French architecture of Quebec is superior, too, to that of Canada in general; but in Australia the opulence and comfort of the colonial Britons have helped them to create a school of architecture which is beautifying the cities day by day.

Journalism.

It must be admitted, however, that colonial democracy and the race for wealth, combined with the free importation of the literature of the mother-country and of the art of France, have caused the best writing of the colonies to be found in the pages of their newspapers, and as regards art have prolonged the duration of its infancy. I have already spoken of the wonderful development of the Australian and of the Canadian press, but in this respect, at all events, South Africa is not behind. The leaders in the two daily papers of Cape Town are distinctly above the average of the newspaper literature of Europe; and in South Africa, as in Australia, the weekly editions of the leading papers are marvels of literary production, and widely read. The number of colonial papers is as remarkable as their ability and their circulation, and the Transvaal is a British colony in this respect. In the single young town of Johannesburg, within twelve months of its foundation under Dutch rule, there were six English newspapers; and even in Pretoria, where the British colonial element is smaller, there are several excellent English journals.

Resemblance of the colonies to the United States of Tocqueville's time.

It would, I am convinced, be a mistake to suppose that the partial absence of a literature, other than newspaper literature, in our colonies is in any degree the result of democratic institutions. M. de Tocqueville pointed out that in the United States in his day there was little art or literature, and that many Europeans who had been struck by this fact had

thought it a result of democracy, whereas they had confused what was democratic with what was only American. Time has shown Tocqueville to be right, and America has been making steady progress in science and literature at least, though she has not progressed as yet with equal rapidity, if we exclude the American studios of Paris, in the field of Art. Writers who record for us, with regard to our own colonies, opinions similar to those which fell under Tocqueville's censure are likely to prove wrong. Other observations, indeed, of Tocqueville's upon the same subject also apply as well to the colonies of to-day as to the America of his time. For example, he shows how the Americans, finding among the English, whose tongue they spoke, distinguished men of science and writers of eminence, were enabled to enjoy the treasures of the intellect without having to labour to amass them, and how the American people of his day were intellectually a portion of the English, and were merely in fact the English who happened to be out West. Tocqueville with great eloquence pointed out how democracy is likely in the long-run to favour science and literature, by enormously increasing the numbers of those who have the taste for intellectual enjoyment, as compared with those who have the ability to indulge it in aristocratic societies. At the same time he showed how in democratic communities with their active life there would be less tendency towards meditation, and how, therefore, the literary work of democratic communities would probably possess a more practical turn than that of aristocracies. It has often been remarked with what foresight—a foresight due at least as much to his habit of patient study as to natural ability—Tocqueville prophesied the future of the communities which he had seen at their daily toil,

and it is remarkable to trace the degree to which his observations on the America of his time fit the Australia and the Canada of our own.

Literature.

In a literary sense the colonies may, indeed, be said to stand now in pretty much the same position in which the United States stood in the time of Tocqueville, and America made a little later a great literary advance. Though it may still be said of the American people that their reading is not over choice, and that they are largely fed upon telegrams and sensational stories, nevertheless the country has produced a powerful literary class and some literary work of the highest merit. In the colonies there is almost as much literary dependence upon England now as there was formerly in the United States; but there is every reason to hope that the universal diffusion of reading power among the people, and the influence of free libraries, public discussion societies, and other means of rousing intellectual interests, will lead to the same good results throughout all Greater Britain which have been witnessed in the United States. While in the richer among the old countries of Europe there is a larger literary class in proportion than can exist in a new country, I am disposed to doubt whether the population generally are more literary in their studies than in new countries. It is often said that the people of the colonies are superficial in their tastes, that they like a smattering of literature of an easy type, and a smattering of science, but do not read deeply; but I doubt myself whether a careful examination of the statistics of English Free Libraries would show the existence of a better state of things among ourselves. There are, naturally and necessarily, more people with leisure, and more people of the highest cultivation, in

proportion to the numbers of the population here than can be the case in the younger countries, and that is all. Olive Schreiner among novelists and for the Cape, Henry Kendall among poets and for Australia, not to speak of statisticians, and of the political essayists of Canada, form the first of a future race of colonial writers; while Marcus Clarke and Brunton Stephens of the British-born colonists may be counted as colonial as the colonists themselves, and equally precursors of the colonial literature of the future. Although Adam Lindsay Gordon killed himself, and Marcus Clarke died in poverty, and Kendall had little better fate, it may, I think, be safely predicted that the day will come when colonial literature will hold its own with the literature of the mother-country, and letters form an acknowledged and sufficient colonial career. The colonists are no more likely to be content with inferior work in literature and art than they are in other matters. In their newspaper press they expect and obtain, as I have shown, the best. Their universities are remarkable; the organisation of secondary instruction admirable; their railway material upon the State lines the most excellent perhaps in the whole world; and although literature and art cannot be called into existence by administrative ability, because they are things of the soul and not merely things of skill, it is impossible to believe that, with their sunlight, their intelligence, their education, their cheerfulness, and their manliness and robustness of mind, the colonies will not fulfil the promise that is given by such a work of genius as *The Story of an African Farm.*

Colonial politics.

I have mentioned the fact that the workmen are stronger in Australia than any other class, but have also pointed out that they do not often stand for the Assem-

blies. Although, on the other hand, the constituencies at large are favourable to and friendly towards the artisans, some few of the old school of squatters still remain who sneer about "his imperial and royal majesty the colonial working man," but generally speaking they admit, even where they consider him a despot, that he is on the whole a beneficent despot in his political ways. In those colonies in which there is a dislike on the part of a minority, for the men in power, and a feeling that there is too low a tone in political life, as, for example, in New South Wales, the attack is rather upon what we should call the lower middle class than upon the artisans. The colonies of the United Kingdom differ indeed greatly upon this point of the standard of public life. In some of the self-governing colonies there is as high a standard of public duty as exists at home or in the rural districts of New England, while of some few others this certainly cannot be said to be the case. As the best have payment of members, and the least good till lately have not had it, and in no colony are there more than one or two workmen-members, the existence of a low parliamentary standard cannot well be ascribed to the dominance of the artisan class. In Victoria there is, I believe, one member of the Assembly who is a working man, still earning his living or a part of it at his trade; and there is one member in a similar position in the colony of Queensland. There are in Victoria perhaps half a dozen who have earned their living with their hands and are still superintending the work of artisans as small masters, and there are about as many more who have left their trades for other employments. But, on the whole, the composition of colonial Parliaments does not greatly differ from the composition of Parliaments in the old world. The working classes, while far more

powerful in Australia than in Great Britain, have not much more direct representation, although, in nearly all the colonies, members of the Assemblies are paid, and in all of them candidates are relieved of the necessary expenses of elections. The trade unions have in fact been engaged in Australia as they have in the United Kingdom in minding their own business. They have interfered as Unions only in questions directly affecting labour, such as wages, hours of toil, the work of women and children, factory inspection to secure the health of workers, and, I must add, Protection. As a body they have naturally shown themselves favourable (as they are favourable in the United Kingdom) to the principle of the payment of members, which in the colonies they have been instrumental in carrying into law against the general opposition of the so-called Upper Houses; but they have done it upon the principle that labour should be paid, rather than with much wish to receive direct advantage by the payment of their own men.

Position of members.

Colonial members of Parliament are not so much in the position of delegates as are members of Congress in the United States, and they remain in public life for a longer period than is the case with the Congress men of America. There is in the self-governing colonies much more opportunity for men to obtain distinction through parliamentary service than is the case in the United States. Colonial Ministries are exclusively parliamentary, and this fact is perhaps the chief of those which may account for the higher standing enjoyed in most of the colonies by members of Assembly as compared with the Congress men of America. There are, too, much more defined personal groups in colonial politics than in those of the United States—men are more, and "the machine" less. There is no American

politician dominant in Federal affairs in the way in which Sir John Macdonald is personally dominant in Canada and Sir Henry Parkes in New South Wales. The position in South Australia of Mr. Playford, in Victoria of Mr. Service, Mr. Gillies, and Mr. Deakin, in Queensland of Sir Thomas M'Ilwraith and Sir Samuel Griffith, in New Zealand of Sir Harry Atkinson, Sir Robert Stout, and Mr. Ballance, and at the Cape of Mr. Hofmeyr, as well as that of the Canadian and New South Wales Prime Ministers, is of a non-American type, and resembles the place that has been held in Italy in recent years by men like Minghetti, Sella, Bonghi, Crispi, Cairoli, and Depretis, rather than anything in United States affairs.

Electoral and parliamentary peculiarities.

It has been seen that the political peculiarities of our colonies concern chiefly the points in which it may reasonably be expected that we in England shall soon follow their example. The secret ballot was once an Australian peculiarity, and the closure a peculiarity of South Australia, but both have been followed very closely by ourselves. Payment of members, sometimes of one only and sometimes of both Houses, all but universal in our self-governing colonies, is so widely spread throughout the constitutional world that we in the United Kingdom are ourselves becoming peculiar among nations in not adopting it, and in this matter, too, we shall probably follow Canadian and Australian and South African example. The most remarkable peculiarity which attends payment of members lies in the adoption by the Cape of the principle that members of either House who live more than fifteen miles from the seat of Parliament are paid fifteen shillings a day in addition to the guinea paid to those resident within that distance, who are popularly called "Cape Cockneys." The tendency in South Africa

is to raise the pay of members, because since the Transvaal has become rich it has been liberal to its Volksraad, one member of which declared in his place that, looking to the fact that he had to swim a river to come to Parliament, his constituency did not "expect him to get drowned in his old age for thirty shillings a day."

Payment of colonial representatives in France.

It may be noted in this respect that not only are the senators and deputies elected by French colonies, to sit in the French Parliament, paid as such out of French national funds, but that the same men are also paid by their own colonies, at very varying rates, as representatives of the colonies on the *Conseil supérieur des Colonies*, a fact which will be found explained in much detail in Dislere's *Traité de Législation coloniale*, a book which has no parallel in English literature.

Suffrage.

The wide extension of the suffrage in the self-governing colonies is unaccompanied by any features which distinguish it from the ordinary democratic constitutions of the modern world. With the exception of the New Zealand case, colonial majorities have not as yet appeared to attach much importance to the principle of "one man one vote." In Canada and many other colonies all elections are held on the same day, a provision which makes the one-man-one-vote restriction less important than it is at home, but in Sydney the protectionists complain that the rich merchants have many votes, and in Victoria the Liberal party are pledged to the abolition of double votes. In Canada, however, under the Dominion Franchise Act, sons living with their fathers are enfranchised, as joint tenants are with us, where the father's property is sufficient, if divided by the number of proposed voters, to confer the franchise upon each. The latest attempt to deal

fully with representation is that made in New Zealand in 1889, which is remarkable as confirming the principle, often laid down by Mr. Gladstone, that the sparsely-peopled rural districts deserve special attention in fixing or adjusting the divisions of the electorate. A New Zealand Act of 1887, which had established the permanent commission for the adjustment of representation, to which I have alluded in my remarks upon New Zealand, had fixed the number of members, and had provided "that a nominal addition of 18 per centum shall be made to the number of the population of" special districts, generally the least peopled, in allotting members. The new Act fixed 28 per cent in place of 18 as the proportion to be added, "in computing for the purpose of this Act the population of the colony," "to the population not contained in any city, borough, or town district which contains a population of over 2000." The New Zealand Acts of 1887 and 1889 show that the colony is not too proud to follow the example of the mother-country in some points, for the instructions to the commissioners are based upon those which were prepared, at the Local Government Board, at the time of the Redistribution Bill, for Sir John Lambert, Sir Francis Sandford, and the other gentlemen who admirably performed the duties laid upon them. The one-man-one-vote provision of the New Zealand law is contained in a short clause which simply provides that "no elector shall at any election of members of the House of Representatives vote in respect of more than one electorate," while the next clause allows a question upon the subject to be put, and a third clause imposes a penalty of £50 for any offence under the Act—words which cover voting in more than one district. No British colonies have shown

much favour for cumulative, limited, personal, or proportional representation. New Zealand rejected such plans when proposed by the Prime Minister (although, as we shall see, the cumulative vote exists in New Zealand in the election of Education Boards), and in the other colonies they are seldom named. In New Zealand the cities of Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch, and Dunedin, have three members each; but the voters vote for three, and there is no plan for preferential voting.

Minority representation.

The bulky work upon minority representation which is published in France names several British colonies as having some form of the system, but the information of the authors is not brought up to date. They state, for example, that in South Australia the representation of minorities has existed since a time earlier than the date of my own birth; and as a matter of fact it was tried there in 1840, but the experiment was not repeated. In Malta it has only very recently been abolished, and in the Cape it still exists. The cumulative vote for the Upper House at the Cape was approved by Lord Grey in 1850, and brought into force in 1853; and was applied also to the election of members of the Assembly for the city of Cape Town. Kimberley returns four members (as Cape Town returns four members) to the Assembly by the Act of 1882, but cumulative voting has not been introduced in the Kimberley case. Although minority representation has so long existed in the Cape, it has no special popularity there, and very possibly may fail in the future to be maintained.

Upper Houses.

Colonial Upper Houses, whether nominated by the Crown, as in New South Wales, the Dominion of Canada, New Zealand, Queensland, Newfoundland, and Quebec, or elected, as in Victoria, South Australia, Tasmania,

the Cape, and Prince Edward Island, are weak. Western Australia, which will probably enter upon responsible government in 1891 with a nominated Upper House, will receive an elective Upper House at the end of six years or when its population reaches 60,000, as the option left to the colony will undoubtedly be exercised. Some of the Canadian Provinces — such as Ontario, the chief of them—have, as has been seen, but a single Chamber, while some possess Upper Houses, constructed on all possible systems—election, nomination for life, and nomination for a term of years. In New South Wales the Upper House is threatened by the Prime Minister, Sir Henry Parkes, although he finds it prudent to explain that what he has said of it was only "an ejaculation." In Cape Colony, in spite of the dignity conferred upon the Upper House by the provision that its deliberations are presided over by the Chief Justice of the colony, and in spite also of the fact that the Ministers can speak in the Upper House even if members of the Lower, the Legislative Council is not of much account, and few politicians of importance seek election to it. In the Molteno Ministry and the succeeding administration, which lasted between them from 1872 to 1881, only one Minister in each was a member of the Legislative Council, all the others being members of the House of Assembly. In the Scanlen Ministry, when it was first formed, there was again one member of the Upper House, and on his retirement in the last days of the Government he was succeeded by a member of the Assembly. In the existing Administration at the Cape there is likewise one member who sits in the Legislative Council. In the Dominion of Canada the weakness of the Senate is illustrated by the fact that out of the fifteen

members of the present Canadian Cabinet only two represent the Government in the Senate. Nomination by the Crown, which means nomination by the Government of the day, tends of course, as Dr. Bourinot has shown, when one party has been long in office, to fill the Senate with men not acceptable to the whole people, and the representative character of that body greatly suffers. In Victoria the colonists have not yet got over their satisfaction at replacing their nominated Upper House by an elective body, and they assert that the new Council is infinitely less harmful than the old; but the new body is not strong, and it is difficult to discover what useful purpose it serves.

Manitoba put an end to its Upper House by "an Act to diminish the expenses of the Legislature," passed "by and with the consent of the Legislative Council" which the Act abolished. The tendency in the colonies which still possess nominated Upper Houses is to follow the example of Victoria and change them for councils subject to election, but in some cases there is a belief that elected Councils may assume that, also deriving their authority from the people, they are the equal of the Assemblies, and not so much bound to give way to the other Chamber as is the case with the House of Lords or with nominated bodies. South Australia has found, as has been seen, the means to prevent the deadlocks which would occur if elective Legislative Councils were generally to take a lofty view of their constitutional rights. The late Attorney-General of South Australia spoke once, somewhat proudly, at a meeting of the Federal Council of Australasia, of "the facilities which exist (in our province) for making the second branch of the legislature amenable to the popular will"; and there can be little doubt

that, when a federal Parliament comes to be constituted for Australia, South Australia will propose the application of its penal dissolution clause to the new Senate or Upper House. Colonial statesmen and parties are not agreed as to the rights of colonial Upper Houses, the Liberals generally asserting, and the Conservatives denying, as in France, the right of the Lower House to the exclusive control of the public funds. The Liberals hold, as Sir Henry Parkes has put it, and as Sir Graham Berry used to maintain in Victoria until the Victorian Upper House gave way, that the parliamentary institutions of the mother-country have descended to the colonies, and that, in accordance with the principles which guide the action of Lords and Commons respectively, the Councils have no right to interfere with the Assemblies as regards money Bills. Where there exist, as in some cases, Constitution Acts which contain clauses apparently empowering the Councils to amend money Bills, the Liberals seem to suggest that they should be interpreted by imperial practice and precedent. Disputes between the Houses, however, generally end, like disputes in the mother-country, by the Upper House giving way, with more or less ill grace, without any theoretical settlement being reached of the constitutional questions involved.

The Referendum.

In some points our colonies are not leading the way, and we must turn to Switzerland to see where lies the probable future of democracy. The colonies as a rule have Upper Houses, with which they quarrel, but which they do not destroy; and in none of them does there exist a sign as yet of the adoption of the Referendum. In Switzerland we learn that the future of democratic government will probably take the direction of the creation of small single Chambers, before which the

Ministries and the constituencies will possess equal power of initiating legislation, and which will amend the Bills, after which they will be referred to popular vote in a plebiscite of "Yes or No? Shall the Bills as amended pass?" In spite of the rapidly increasing use of the Referendum, not only in Switzerland but also in the United States, and of the growing popularity of the idea in France, no one of our colonies has as yet made trial of either the Referendum or the Initiative. I do not of course forget the imitation in Canadian railway and liquor legislation of the principle of popular poll in districts known to us in connection with English local government. The term Referendum is conveniently applied to the consultation of the people of the entire State. Under the present constitution of Switzerland, as has been well shown by the late Sir Francis Adams,[1] the Referendum is a Conservative force, and has the influence which a powerful Upper House might conceivably exercise if it were cautiously inclined to resist change and impervious both to unpopularity and to the dictates of temper. No doubt since the general adoption of the Referendum the Swiss voter has become to some extent indifferent as to the choice of legislators; but this indifference rather tends to continue the old men in their positions than to lower the quality of the supply, and from a Conservative point of view the institution of the Referendum in new countries would seem to be a wiser provision than the creation of weak Upper Houses. Switzerland, indeed, being a federal State, can enjoy the luxury of an Upper House like that of the United States, which has a real basis for its existence in the Cantonal or State

[1] *The Swiss Confederation*, by Sir Francis O. Adams, K.C.M.G., C.B., and C. D. Cunningham. Macmillan and Co., 1889.

system; but Canada, which might have formed an Upper House upon the model of the American Senate, rejected it for a weak nominated body. It is possible that one reason why Canada failed to follow American example was because the Canadian Conservatives foresaw that while they would govern the federation they might have to face a Liberal Senate; but it is perhaps to be regretted, in the interest both of Canada and of political science, that the Dominion should have failed to make trial either of the Referendum or of an elective Senate representing Provinces. The Referendum and Initiative, with single Chambers, would appear well suited to the circumstances of the Australian states, if they are to remain virtually separate from one another upon the present system; but if federation is brought about it is to be hoped that any Upper House which may be created for the federation may follow the American rather than the Canadian precedent.

"Socialism" or "State-socialism."

The Conservative and resisting forces of strong Upper Houses, difficult, indeed, to create except upon the federal and provincial system, seem, however, to be little needed by our colonies, for there is in them no such sign as is to be seen in the mother-country of the growth of extreme views hostile to the institution of property and obnoxious to the richer classes. Revolutionary Socialism, as contrasted with State-socialism, is far stronger in Europe than in our colonies; and if it be true that the Australian colonies, and in a less degree Canada and portions of South Africa, present us with a picture of what England will become, we shall find reason to suppose that the changes of the next few years will be much less rapid and much less sweeping than many hope and most believe. It is in Great Britain of all the countries of the world that Revolutionary

Socialistic views appear to be the most generally entertained among thoughtful people at the present time. The practical programmes put forward by moderate European Socialists are, indeed, mostly law in the Australian colonies, but the larger proposals which lie behind appear to have less chance of being entertained there than they have in the old world. The programme of the Young Democrats of the democratic republic of Switzerland contains a large number of items most of which are already the subject of legislation in Australia: the railways to be in the hands of the State, stringent labour legislation to be adopted, the separation of Church and State, and so forth. But while Swiss Social Democrats put last in their programme the item which looms largest—the nationalisation of commerce and industry, and equality of the profits of labour—they doubtless give to it the greater portion of their thought. Now in Australia such ideas have little weight. Revolutionary or democratic Socialism, in short, in Australia, in Canada, and in the United States is not popular with workmen, who largely own their houses and possess land and shares; but, on the other hand, State-socialism advances rapidly in Australia. While in Canada, as in the United States, the great body of small agricultural proprietors seem disinclined to try many of the experiments of State-socialism, in Australia the householding town democracy has no such fears. The Australian colonists feel that their governments are governments of the whole people, and that the people should make full use of the capacity of government to do all that can be done.

Laisser faire.

Mr. Goschen has described Australia as a paradise of *laisser faire*, but he must have been singularly misinformed. Railways are everywhere in the hands of

the State, which does not treat them as mere investments, but uses its power over them, to the full, for the comfort of the inhabitants. No one in the colonies now struggles against the State ownership of railroads, and, to those in England who think the Australians in the wrong upon this point, they answer that the reasons which we give in our books for Government carrying on post-office work apply equally to railways. They tell us that we are in the habit of arguing that if the postal service were left to private enterprise the smaller places would be without a post, or would be charged more heavily for it than the large and wealthy cities. They quote us as saying that in the towns, in which the service pays, there would, under private enterprise, be competition, with the result of duplication of servants, of offices, and of plant, involving waste to the community; and they insist that this and our other arguments about posts are true, but are equally applicable to railways. It is very generally believed in our South-Sea colonies that the future of democratic states will more and more point to the conducting of public enterprises by Government, Parliament not attempting to interfere in the details of the management, but supporting Government in selecting experts to serve as commissioners, on the principle now adopted in the railway commissions of the Australasian colonies. Just as the meetings in England of borough surveyors and of medical officers of health bring about constant improvement in sanitary machinery, so, the Australians think, conferences of the experts employed in the management of public enterprises will lead to continual improvement in the management, without that waste which is inevitable under a competitive system. Education is generally free or virtually free; labour is more controlled

than it is at home. The State interferes in agriculture, by means of bounties, and in many matters in which the advocates of *laisser faire* would be the first to deprecate its action; and public works are set on foot for the benefit of the unemployed. In some colonies the Government owns the waterworks of the great towns, and in almost all it contributes liberally towards charities and hospitals. But, while State-socialism prospers in the colonies, there remains the amazing fact —startling to all Englishmen, whether they are under the influence of the attractions of modern Socialism or whether they fear it as the terror of their dreams—that there is no Socialism, other than State-socialism, worth mentioning in the Queen's dominions outside Great Britain.

Drift of colonial opinion with regard to Socialism.

The leaders of opinion in the colonies are more inclined towards certain sides of Socialism than are their followers. While the colonial democracy are not at all inclined to move in the direction of Revolutionary Socialism, Sir Samuel Griffith of Queensland, Sir Robert Stout of New Zealand, and some others among the leading colonial statesmen, have by speech or writing suggested large alterations in the existing order of society. Sir Samuel Griffith has contributed articles on the distribution of wealth to the *Centennial Magazine* which are a little vague, but are suggestive of a speculative desire for sweeping change; and I have already mentioned the tendency towards land nationalisation of Sir Robert Stout and others. Among the most extreme or advanced, however, of the working people of the colonies there are few who desire that land should be universally held by the community or labour organised by it for collective profit. There is no general desire apparent to transfer to the community land, mines, or

factories, although a universal belief in the wisdom of the community managing railways. The change which has occurred in England from the old Radicalism, whose last conspicuous representative among us was Professor Fawcett, and which had for its main principle the freedom of the individual and the restriction of State action, to the Radicalism of our day, which has strong Socialistic leanings, has not been seen in the colonies. There the old Radicalism has all along been represented by the colonial Conservative party. The dominant Radicalism of the colonies stands firmly in a middle position, desiring to see the State play a large part,—as large perhaps relatively as it plays in Germany, but not inclining towards democratic Socialistic ideas in the ordinary sense of the phrase. There is in colonies like Victoria no capitalist rule, and even the Protection of Victoria comes rather from the workmen than, as in some protectionist countries, mainly from the employers; but there is little desire to replace Capital by some different engine of production. In the colonies as in the mother-country the politicians and the electorate work by rule of thumb, and are impatient of general theories; but, while the actual progress achieved in the direction of State-socialism in recent years has been great both in the mother-country and in the colonies, but greater in the latter, as might be expected from the openness of the field, in the realm of speculation Great Britain is more advanced than her daughter-countries, and seems more ready to inaugurate a new era for society. While the trade unions of Australia have brought about that universal eight-hour day which the Unions of England have not been strong enough to secure, the Australian unions fail to show that general feeling in favour of the nationalisation of the land which

finds expression at all representative meetings of English workmen. The workmen of Australia when they express collective opinions upon public affairs appear to attach more importance to the extension of Protection to local industries, to the representation of labour among the unpaid magistracy, to the employment of workmen as inspectors of factories, to the prevention of the importation of criminals, paupers, Asiatics, and labourers under contract, than they do to the Socialistic or semi-Socialistic schemes of Social Democracy; but they support their Governments in undertaking duties which in the old world and in America are left to individuals.

Nationalisation of the land.

The exception, so far as it is one, to my statement as to the non-existence in our self-governing colonies of general speculative ideas of an advanced description concerns the nationalisation of the land, a change which, as I have pointed out in the Australasian part of the first volume, has advocates in the South-Sea colonies, although they are nowhere a majority. The colonial Parliaments have never shown much desire to make the State a landlord, even when invited to do so, as in at least one case, by a colonial Government. A Land Bill brought in by Mr. Ballance in New Zealand, when he was a member of the Stout-Vogel Administration, attempted to carry into law a portion of the land nationalisation views held by Sir Robert Stout and himself, and, while it gave power to the State to resume land at 10 per cent above the valuation, it also laid down the policy of leasing as against sale. A Bill for the gradual conversion of New Zealand freeholders into leaseholders under the Crown was also, I believe, suggested by Sir George Grey. A considerable portion of these proposals failed to become law, and those which were carried have since been modified by Parliament. Mr. Ballance, in his speech in bringing

in his Land Bill, praised the plan of perpetual leases, and prophesied that it would soon become the prevailing system, and afterwards in the administration of the law the present leader of the New Zealand opposition tried to enforce the adoption of his policy of discouraging the sale of land. But the Act was almost immediately on its passing altered by the New Zealand Parliament, and lands which had been "opened" for perpetual leasing were declared open for sale for cash, and holders of perpetual leases allowed to acquire freeholds. Then the Stout Government went out of office, and Sir Harry Atkinson's Government passed through Parliament in 1888 an Act embodying the old policy of sale.

Existing land systems.

The land systems of British North America, which have been described, so far as there is need to mention them, are modelled, as has been seen, upon the American freehold homestead plan. In the Cape there is a curious land system which is of Dutch origin—the greater portion of the land being held of the Crown on a quit-rent tenure, and a good deal more held as leasehold under an Act of 1864, while few of the large estates are held upon a freehold tenure. In 1887, however, a new law was introduced which expressed the latest views of the Cape Parliament, and under this a public auction system, with payment by the purchaser of one-fifth of the price within the year, and mortgage of four-fifths at 4 per cent in favour of the Government, is the plan preferred. At the same time the State is in Cape Colony a large landowner, and the quitrents form a considerable item in the public revenue, and if Government land is left derelict for five years the Government may resume possession. This land system of the Cape is peculiar in our colonies, has not been imitated, and is based on Dutch views of Roman law; and in our other

South African colony of Natal there is a wholly different system. The old Dutch farmers who had entered Natal before it became a British colony were allowed farms, some of 6000, some of 2000 acres, at an annual rate of a little over half a farthing an acre, redeemable at 15 years' purchase. But, from 1848, a homestead system was adopted in favour of the immigrants, which was expanded when Natal became a separate colony. The plan of a redeemable rent was applied to the immigrants under a scheme of 1866, by which a rent of 1d. per acre per annum was fixed, which was redeemable, after eight years' occupation, at 5s. an acre. Since 1880 Natal Crown lands have been sold in freehold in lots of not over 2000 acres at a price payable in ten (now twenty) annual instalments without interest, or at a different rate where the purchaser wishes to buy right out at once and receive a clear title. In the Australasian colonies, when lands were let out to pastoral tenants at low rents, it was distinctly only as a temporary arrangement, with the view of the lands being at any time withdrawn for sale; and in all the colonies the land most suited for agricultural settlement passed gradually to free selectors of the working class. All the colonies except the Cape, and for a time New Zealand, have shown alacrity in getting rid of the freehold of their land for cash, though all of them have tried their hand at legislation intended to secure a preference to the poor man, intending to settle on the land, over the rich man, who is made to wait and buy up freeholds.

Opinions as regards the future.

If in each of the colonies a small body of men, with distinguished leaders, have advocated nationalisation of the land, in none of them—not even in New Zealand—have their views found general favour, probably for the

reason that too large a proportion of the population are interested, as landowners, in leaving matters as they are. It has been lately stated in England that the legislature of New South Wales, by an Act of 1889, gave to the State power to expropriate owners on paying the full market value plus 10 per cent, without the necessity for special legislation in each case. Even this would have been a very different thing from proclaiming a general State ownership of land; but in any case the statement was exaggerated, and can in fact only have referred to a Bill dealing with one metropolitan case, and enabling the Government to assume some land in front of the new Sydney Post Office, taking more land than they actually needed (for streets), which it was proposed to sell to help to repay the cost of the improvement. The principle, as was shown in the New South Wales debate, was one which had been asserted by the Imperial Parliament at least thirty years ago in the case of a corporation. Hayter's admirable Year-book gives an excellent account of the development in the Australian colonies of the existing land system, and all that I need say is that the system meets with general support, although Dr. Quick, in his history of land tenure in the colony of Victoria, quoted above, has pointed out with great force what might have been the better results of retaining the Australian public lands in the hands of the State. I have described in the chapter on Victoria the failure of Mr. Gresham and Mr. Syme, supported as they were by the authority of Mr. Higinbotham, to convert the Australian population to the same views as are put forward by Dr. Quick, and in these more general remarks I may add that Mr. Syme, best known as the founder of Australian Protection, might easily, had chance so willed, have made in the world the same name that

has been made in later days by Mr. Henry George, Mr. Syme having put forward in most eloquent and powerful language the same principles at a much earlier date. Mr. Gresham neglected his business for the land nationalisation controversy, was compelled to support his family by manual toil, and was eventually drowned in one of the arms of Port Phillip. Mr. Higinbotham became Chief Justice; and Mr. Syme naturally turned from the land policy in which he failed to carry the people with him to that Protection policy in which he was completely successful. Some of the Australian trades, speaking through their Unions, have expressed, indeed, of late an opinion in favour of Mr. George's views. They have called upon the State to impose a tax which, progressing by degrees, shall at last take for the community the full annual unimproved rental value of all lands—that profit which arises from the natural advantages and from the demand of an increasing population to get the benefit of them. The mass of the Australian public are unwilling to admit that they have legislated on the wrong principle; land legislation in the parent colony is still timid in the extreme, and even the boldest of Australian land reformers prefer as a rule to work through the adoption of progressive death duties, for the purpose of reducing large estates, rather than to adopt more sweeping measures.

Contradictory opinions on financial advantage of State ownership of colonial lands.

I am glad to find that so competent an observer as Dr. Dale [1] takes the same view that I do as to the unwisdom of the past Australian policy, and also as to the impossibility now of adopting an effective change of system. At the same time a different view as to the financial effect of keeping colonial lands in the hands of

[1] *Impressions of Australia*, by R. W. Dale, LL.D. Hodder and Stoughton, 1889.

the State is taken by some high authorities. Mr. Sutherland in an article in the *Melbourne Review*[1] for 1885 has worked out the figures (which in the case of Victoria, with her admirable system of statistics, are easily accessible) that bear upon the question of the nationalisation of the land, and his calculations go to show that from the mere standpoint of pecuniary interest it would have been a matter of indifference in Victoria whether the State had kept the land in its own hands or sold it to individuals. The writer argues that if that has been the result in the case of a colony whose progress has been so marvellous as that of Victoria, and has been accompanied by gold discoveries which caused a rapid and constant increase of population, due to the influx of immigrants, in the average case a young nation would lose by entering upon a policy of nationalisation. The appearance of the article led to a controversy between the Melbourne *Argus* and the Melbourne *Age*, in which Mr. Syme's organ joined issue on the facts and conclusions of the writer of the article. Mr. Sutherland in stating the value of property had allowed 20 per cent over the assessments, and the *Age* asserted that the sum was too small, as owners were in the habit of understating the value of their holdings to a greater extent than the allowance made. On the other hand, it might be argued that the rent to be paid, where the State held the land in its own hands, under periodical assessments to be made by public officers, would be as likely to be under the true value as present assessments are, and that the rentals to be received by Government should be diminished in the calculations for this reason. The author of the *Review* article, however, did not contend that Victorian figures show the undesirability

[1] *Melbourne Review*, Vol. X. p. 176.

of the policy of State ownership of land, but only that the pecuniary results of the two systems would come pretty much to the same thing.

It is seen, then, that the Ministers holding views similar to those of Mr. Syme or of Mr. George, who have filled high office in the colonies, have not been able to give expression in legislation to their views. Little has been accomplished by laws to carry out their opinions, and it clearly would be more difficult for the colonies to retrace their course than it would have been to have retained the lands in State possession from the time of the earliest settlement. The popularity of "the Torrens Act," with regard to land transfer, is, as I have shown, in itself an evidence of the rejection of extreme land views. The simplification of the transfer of land has in town districts encouraged land speculation, while in rural districts it has greatly facilitated the settlement of freeholders upon the soil, but everywhere its adoption tells heavily against that of land nationalisation theories.

Taxation.

While general ideas with regard to the land are unpopular with the Australian majority there is no timidity in the South-Sea colonies with regard to taxation upon land — unpopular in Canada and South Africa. I have already named the land-tax of Victoria and the graduated or progressive succession duties of nearly all the Australasian colonies, of which the succession duties in New Zealand and some other colonies were adopted for the double purpose of raising money and of breaking up large estates, while the Victorian land-tax was mainly instituted for the latter purpose. It has been contended that although the Victorian tax has classes of exemption so constructed as to fine the large owner for the benefit of the agricultural settler, it must have failed in its in-

tention, inasmuch as, had it succeeded, the amount due would have shown a rapid decline, whereas the tax yields an almost fixed amount. The tax, however, has led to a certain adoption of the excellent practice of dividing properties, early in the life of the possessor, amongst his sons. Mr. Bryce has said[1] that no "legislation that is compatible with the rights of property as now understood" can "do much to restrict" the increasingly rapid growth of fortunes in the United States; but an expansion of those graduated or progressive death duties now almost universal in our Australian colonies would certainly have in the long-run that effect, and yet would be, to judge from Australian example, compatible with the rights of property even as now understood by us at home. In new countries the selling value of land rises so steadily by natural increment that it soon counterbalances a certain depression caused by the imposition of taxation of this kind, and capital brings in huge returns.

Progressive taxation.

Although large landowners and great capitalists as a class naturally dislike graduated taxation, it cannot be said that the institution of property as such is weakened by it, or money or rich people driven from the colonies. The extreme limit which as yet has been reached by such taxation is the 13 per cent upon certain large properties in New Zealand; but this amount is borne so quietly that it is certain that a far higher rate could be sustained. The tendency of democracy in taxation lies this way. The Australians have chiefly chosen, as I think wisely, the death duties for their experiments. The Swiss have selected income-tax, and in Vaud, one of the most enlightened Cantons, there has been instituted a "progressive" heavy income-tax in "categories," which

[1] First Edition, vol. iii. p. 667.

was advocated as intended to throw an increased share of public charges on the rich, and to diminish the burdens of the poor. A progressive income-tax also exists in some states of the American Union. Little sign has yet been seen of such taxation in the British colonies outside of Australasia, while in British Columbia a system of Provincial taxation has lately been introduced which combines the democratic system of the exemption from property-tax of small incomes (under the "Taxes on Property Act, 1888") with the antiquated expedient of a poll-tax, laid on all male residents of eighteen, and paid by employers for their workmen.

Introduced in the colony of Victoria by a Minister who, though not originally a Conservative, had become known as a Conservative before he carried it, the graduated succession duty, varying from 1 per cent on small properties to 10 per cent on large (widows, children, and grandchildren being subject to a reduced scale only) has worked well, bringing in a large amount of money without greater unpopularity than attends taxes of every kind, and it has been imitated in almost all the South-Sea colonies. A fear is felt in England that such taxation, now initiated by Mr. Goschen to the extent of 1 per cent, may tend to cause evasions of the law; but taxation upon large fortunes is not easily evaded, because in the case of the largest the public notoriety that attends them, and the considerable number of persons who possess full knowledge of them, make it difficult to defeat the intentions of the legislature. The legal evasion caused by the division of property in lifetime is beneficial to the interests of the State, and helps forward one of the intentions of the authors of such taxation—that of dividing fortunes of unwieldy size into several fortunes

of more manageable dimensions. There can be little doubt that the breaking up of very large estates is, on the whole, an advantage to the community, provided it be not accompanied by a discouragement of the provident instinct; and New Zealand example shows that if heavy taxation is confined to the largest fortunes there is no discouragement of providence attendant on it.

Freedom of bequest.

We are so accustomed in England to absolute freedom of bequest that we are apt to ignore the fact that, in all the many countries to which the Napoleonic code applies, property owners are forbidden to leave the whole of their money as they please. It might with more truth be contended that rich men would be driven from France to England by the existence of such a law than that the Victorian tax of 10 per cent on large estates, or the New Zealand duty of 13 per cent, has any effect in checking the accumulation of property in the colonies. Sir Rawson Rawson and Mr. Westgarth, the highest authorities upon the point, have both told us that the most striking feature in the Australian colonies, as compared with the rest of the world outside of the United States, is the unprecedented pace of growth in property.

Progressive taxation in France.

It is a somewhat curious fact that the principle of graduated taxation, which has spread rapidly in Australia, in the United States, and in Switzerland during the last twenty years, was adopted in parts of France under the Second Empire when it had become almost unknown elsewhere. The *impôt progressif* had existed in France for seven years after its first introduction in 1793, and had been imitated in the house-tax of the United States for several years, beginning in 1798, but had everywhere become extinct during the long peace. In Paris and in some other cities of

France, by the permission of the State given during the reign of Napoleon III, the house-tax, or rather rent-tax, is now once more "progressive." There is a total exemption of the lowest rents, and then six scales, rents over £40 paying vastly more in proportion than those of from £16 to £24. The Australian graduated or progressive taxes are likely to be extended, but as long as enormous sums of money are levied by means of customs duties in those colonies, there is not so much temptation to raise them to the highest levels possible without causing evasion, as there will be when the South-Sea colonies either adopt free trade or learn to manufacture and produce, as will be increasingly the case, the articles that they need, and combine in federation, with free interchange of goods among themselves. The resolutions of a labour congress in favour of a single tax on land cannot have much weight so long as the same men give their votes for the advocates of Protection.

Colonial experiments.

The experiments of the colonies in finance, like their political experiments, have a special interest for ourselves, because, unlike the political experiments of Switzerland, or the social experiments of Germany, they are tried among a people of our own race, and because, too, just as we have already in many matters followed Australian example, so there is reason to suppose that we are likely to follow it in others in the future. It is at least possible, for example, that, as the future of the English Liberal party may lie in the direction of that European Socialism which I have called Revolutionary or Democratic, the future of the English Conservative party, in the increasing strength of Socialist opinions, may lie wholly away from the doctrines of their former opponents of the Man-

chester school, and in the direction of State-socialism of the Australian type. At the same time we still give more attention in our newspapers, our reviews, and our books, to Continental than to colonial legislation. So complete is our ignorance with regard to colonial experiments that it is equalled only by the want of knowledge in the colonies about one another. As regards the federated colonies of Australasia the institution of the Federal Council has done something to familiarise a few statesmen with the legislation of other colonies; but generally speaking, Australian politicians know little of what has been done outside of their own state, and nothing about Canada or South Africa, while Canadian statesmen are in a condition of blank ignorance about Australia. The visit to Australia of a leading Canadian politician, sent out by his Government, and the tours which are being made by the envoys of the Imperial Federation League, may do something to cause a better knowledge in the colonies of the general principles of colonial legislation; and as regards the mother-country, the admirable volumes of the Colonial Institute are doing much to remove the reproach under which we suffer. One of our highest authorities in England upon colonial topics lately announced the adoption in Queensland of the principle of the payment of members as though it were a new thing there, when as a fact the Bill passed in 1889 merely changed the payment of two guineas a day, while the House was sitting, into a payment of a fixed salary of £300 a year. In the chapters upon labour, upon education, and upon the liquor laws, I shall have to mention other colonial experiments (made, one would almost think, upon our behalf) in addition to those which I have already attempted to

describe, and I will conclude this general chapter by briefly indicating a few other topics upon which it is necessary to note colonial example.

Position of women.

There has been little change in Canada and Australia in the position of women since I wrote on the matter in 1868, and the views stated in *Greater Britain* are applicable to the situation, as it seems to me, with little if any change. Superior as are the Australian colonies to the United States, in some points which touch the condition of their people—similar as is Canada to the United States—in the one matter of the place of women the colonies stand behind the states of the American Union, and in something like an equal position with the mother-country. The respect for women, though great, is less great in the colonies than in the United States; the rights conferred upon them by the law are on the whole less considerable. As regards that political franchise concerning which there is doubt among themselves and in the minds of some of their best friends, they nowhere possess it, and in the colonies the question stands in about the same position as it occupies in the mother-country. Sir John Macdonald proposed in Canada to give the franchise to unmarried women, but, in spite of his great power and of the dominance of his party, he failed to carry his proposal, and woman's suffrage remains in Canada a mere personal opinion of the Conservative Prime Minister of the Dominion, as it is of the Conservative Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. The Stout-Vogel Government in New Zealand entrusted to Mr. Ballance, the present leader of the Opposition, a woman-franchise Bill, which was strongly favoured by Sir Julius Vogel; but that Bill was dropped, and in no colony has any greater actual advance been made towards woman suffrage than is the

case in the mother-country, although in South Australia, Queensland, and Victoria some think the adoption of woman's suffrage close at hand, and in New South Wales the Prime Minister is as strongly favourable to the extension as are the First Ministers of Canada and of the United Kingdom. In the colonies generally, though by no means universally, women ratepayers possess the municipal and the school-board franchise, as in the mother-country, but, as in the United States, they take far less part in politics than is now the case in England.

Marriage and divorce.

As regards legislation which bears on domestic conditions, the colonies show themselves favourable to marriage with a deceased wife's sister, and, at the suggestion of Sir Alfred Stephen, New South Wales proposed to place women upon equal terms with men in the law of divorce, although the measure, which also in other respects enlarges facilities for divorce, has hitherto been vetoed by the Government at home. Victoria has now passed a somewhat similar measure.

The Colonial Office veto.

The disallowal of Sir Alfred Stephen's Bill is, of course, lawful, because the Colonial Office can technically justify the veto or suspension of any measure; but it appears to me to have been unconstitutional. The object of the veto, and the whole intention in reserving Bills for the consideration of the Imperial Government, have been frequently explained by constitutional writers. Governors when they forward Bills that they have reserved give their reasons for reserving them. Now the grounds for reserving Bills and for their ultimate disallowance, as stated by the constitutional authorities, are the possibility of their conflicting with Imperial interests, or their being beyond the legislative powers of dependencies. There is no higher authority upon the subject than Dr.

Bourinot, and he, quoting the settled opinion of great authorities, declares that "only when the obligations of the Empire to a foreign power are affected or an Imperial statute is infringed, in matters on which the Canadian Parliament has not full jurisdiction, is the supreme authority of England likely to be exercised." Another weighty Canadian authority, Mr. Blake, put the claim of the colonies still higher, for he declared that the mother-country can interfere "only in instances in which, owing to the existence of substantial Imperial as distinguished from Canadian interests, it is considered that full freedom of action is not vested in the Canadian people." It certainly seems to me that these principles are as applicable to New South Wales as they are to Canada, and that the right course for the Secretary of State, if he did not like Sir Alfred Stephen's Bill, was to make the reply which was made by one of his predecessors when the colonies began to adopt Protection, namely, that, however much the Government might regret the proposed legislation, they did not feel justified in opposing the wishes of the people.

Sir Alfred Stephen, and other independent Australian statesmen.

Sir Alfred Stephen has performed in his old age many legislative services for his colony, and in Victoria Mr. Service, as he grows old, is also becoming known as a safe and cautious proposer of improved legislation, carrying out, for example, in Victorian law principles, admirably laid down for us in a Bill drawn by Sir James Stephen, which the Parliament of the United Kingdom cannot find time to pass. The colonial experiments in the field of labour may, however, possess a more immediate interest for readers than topics connected with the science of jurisprudence.

CHAPTER II

LABOUR, PROVIDENT SOCIETIES, AND THE POOR

Power of the Unions in the colonies.

THE position of the trade unions in the colonies is of much interest to us in Great Britain, inasmuch as they are partly branches of British unions, and wholly modelled upon the English system. The Australian unions have, however, reached a power as yet unattained by those at home, through the exercise of which they have been successful in fixing the length of the working day, and in a lesser but still considerable degree able to settle the price of labour. The bugbear of the colonial workman is cheap English, Indian, or foreign labour, and the terror of being dragged down from the high position in the scale of comfort which he now occupies to the lower level of the French or Belgian or German labourer. In Australasia he fights for a life of comfort and well-earned partial leisure against a life of mere existence. In trade matters as in politics the workman's power in Australia is exercised, upon the whole, with discretion and restraint. He is able to paralyse the commerce of the continent, and he has not done so; and where instances may be given —as, for example, in the boycotting of steamship companies which employ Lascars or Chinese—of something like abuse of power, it has not been altogether without excuse.

The trade unions of Australia are bound together in a compact federation, and are in the habit of supporting strikes outside the particular colony of the subscribers. When the coal-miners of New South Wales struck two years ago for an increase of wages they received considerable contributions from the trades of Melbourne. When the "lumpers" struck against the interference of the English mail steamers in the intercolonial shipping trade the lumpers in Victoria, South Australia, and New South Wales went almost simultaneously on strike. It was therefore no new principle which was asserted when the Melbourne Trades supported the "dockers'" strike of 1889 in London, but what was remarkable in this case was the extent to which the general public of Australia backed up the Trades.

Hours of labour in Australia.

In the Australasian colonies the eight-hour day prevails, and is all but universal, as is in the towns of South Africa the nine-hour day as far as European labour is concerned, while Canada is in this respect perhaps slightly behind even the United States—a country itself on the whole behind our Australian and South African colonies as regards hours of labour. The eight-hour day of Australia is not only all but complete, but has the full approbation of the whole community; and when the great procession of Demonstration Day—the Lord Mayor's Show of the Australian colonies—annually in each colony records the triumph of the workmen, and the banners and trophies of the trades pass through the streets surrounded by thousands of well-clad, well-nourished men, there are few Australians who do not rejoice at the evidence afforded of the strength and prosperity of the colonial workmen. Eight-hour Bills have lately been proposed in several

colonies. In South Australia one was carried on its second reading in October 1889, as I have said, by a majority of one vote, but made only slow progress in Committee before the end of the Session. In Queensland a similar Bill was introduced by Sir Samuel Griffith, and was defeated in the Upper House by twelve votes to two after it had passed through the Assembly, but was thrown out chiefly upon the ground that it was not needed.

Effect of the eight-hour day in Australia.

In the Australian colonies it is customary to insert in many public Bills dealing with works to be carried out by Government a provision that the hours of labour shall not exceed eight. In Victoria the Government employs a great number of men in public works, such as railways, and their hours are fixed by Act of Parliament; and in some private Bills, such, for example, as Tramway Bills, clauses fixing the day's work at eight hours have been inserted in the Assembly. The eight-hour day is so universal in Australia that these clauses are not really needed, as the workmen had forced the complete carrying out of the principle before the custom of inserting them arose. The effect of the eight-hour day, according to general admission, has been found as satisfactory throughout Australasia as in Victoria. So far as Australian example can bear upon the English labour problem it appears to be favourable to the attempt to gradually introduce the eight-hour day in the contracts of the State and of municipalities, and even to give to it the force of a general law in the case of those trades to which it would be most easily applied. It has been pointed out by the writer[1] who has given the greatest attention to the discussion of the subject that the economic objections which are now brought

[1] *Wealth and Progress*, by George Gunton. Macmillan and Co., 1888.

against the regulation of adult labour by law are the same as those which were directed against the factory legislation of this country when first proposed, and that English Economists who wrote before 1850 opposed the English Factory Acts, while all who have written since 1855 have supported them.

In Australia great importance is attached by the public to what are called "the enlarged social opportunities" of the working classes conferred by the short hours, and the same feeling is beginning to have a powerful influence in Canada. The Royal Commission on the Relations of Labour and Capital which has lately sat in that country, and which I named in my chapter upon the Dominion, in a "First Report," signed by five members including the chairman, recommends that all Government contracts should stipulate that the daily hours of labour under them should not exceed nine; and in the "Second Report," signed by the remaining eight members, "it is urged that the Government aid the movement for shorter hours by stipulating in every contract for work entered into with it that the contractor shall not employ his hands for a longer period than nine hours per day." Thus the Commission, which was one of high authority, was unanimous in recommending a nine-hour day in all Government contracts, and it was foreseen that the example of Government would be followed by all municipalities. Now the parliamentary influence of the operatives in Canada is less than is the case in Australia. There is one miner in the Nova Scotia Assembly who is, however, returned mainly as a "Nova Scotia First" man and as an advocate of separation from the Upper Provinces on account of the protectionist policy of the Dominion. There is one miner in the British Columbia Assembly; and in the

In Canada.

Ontario House one member who was returned as a labour reformer, and who is, I believe, a working mason, though he has been also a captain of volunteer militia: the latter member represents the important constituency of Lincoln (which contains the Canadian Niagara), and was returned by a narrow majority on a large vote. But, while the workmen are even weaker in the various Legislative Assemblies of the Provinces and in the House of Commons of the Dominion than they are in the House of Commons of the United Kingdom or in the Parliaments of Australasia, and less influential, they yet appear likely to shortly secure that model statutory working day as regards Government contracts which they have not yet obtained at home.

Results. Arbitration.

In Australia the effect of the eight-hour and in the Cape of the nine-hour day is socially Conservative, that is to say, the comfort conferred by it upon the working classes prevents agitation for revolutionary change. The tact and wisdom displayed by the Trades Council of Melbourne have been immense, and the Employers' Union of Melbourne has been able repeatedly, in circumstances of considerable danger, to meet its representatives and settle matters by arbitration, with the effect of preventing strikes. In Canada the arbitration provisions rest not on custom but upon law. In Lower Canada the drift of opinion is towards the French system of compulsory arbitration, upon the application of one party to the dispute, with a judgment by a Council which has the force of law. In Ontario there is a Trades Arbitration Act which has been on the Statute-book for some years, but it has never been made use of, as one section provides that the Boards under the Act shall not interfere with the rate of wages or price of

labour, this section, in the opinion of the Commissioners who signed the Second Report, rendering it useless. The Ontario Act proceeds upon the Victorian system of the formation of Boards of Arbitration, partly elected by employers and partly by men, under chairmen unconnected with trade, who have power to call witnesses.

American opinion on the position of labour in Australia.

The American Government lately sent a Commissioner to Australasia to report upon the condition of labour in our colonies, and it is interesting to note the fact, which shows that others are more alive than we are to the value of Australian experiments, that would indeed be more useful to ourselves than to America. The United States Commissioner points out to his Government that, while the great majority of the trades in Australia work forty-eight hours a week, the bricklayers and masons of Victoria work only forty-five, and that the carpenters are likely to secure a reduction of hours to that number. He shows that the two great English societies of the Amalgamated Engineers and the Carpenters and Joiners have branches in Australia and allow benefits to their members, but that most of the Australian unions are not benefit societies, and are founded purely for the protection and security of trade interests.

Wages.

The rate of wages is, of course, high in the colonies generally, and specially high in Australasia. It has been computed that Melbourne employers have to pay 100 per cent more wages for 20 per cent less time than is the case in England; but nevertheless the price of many articles produced only averages, according to British Government returns, about 20 per cent higher than in England. It is difficult to see how, unless colonial labour is more effective than British labour, goods should be produced in the colonies at only 20 per

cent in excess of British prices, although the skilled workmen get nearly double the wages for a shorter day that the same class of men obtain in Scotland or in England. In South Africa there is no unskilled white labour, but the wages of the artisans are on the Australian scale. The wages of labour in the South African colonies have, however, been raised of late by the rush to the Transvaal gold-fields. In Canada wages are somewhat lower than in the South African and Australasian colonies. American rates are higher than those which exist in Canada or in our other colonies,[1] but the cost of living is much less in the colonies than in the United States, and a careful examination of the figures goes to show that there is an inflation of all prices in America, which makes the real wages much less than the nominal. In Australia this is not the case. Some articles indeed are dear throughout the colonies, and house rent is high, though for good accommodation; meat is cheap, as well as some other forms of food; and the cost of living cannot be said, on the whole, to be much greater than in England.

Cost of living.

Those who desire to pursue the subject of the cost of living in the colonies will find much information in the circulars now issued by the Emigrants' Information Office in London. The only marked exception, other than that of the United States, to the rule that in the districts to which British emigrants resort the rate of wages is, generally speaking, about double that of the United Kingdom, for shorter hours, and the purchasing power of money only slightly inferior, is afforded by the condition of the Transvaal gold-fields, which are rightly classed for this purpose with the British colonies, though situate on the territory of a foreign state. With regard

[1] Chisholm's *Handbook of Commercial Geography.* Longmans, 1889.

to the Transvaal exception, it should be borne in mind that there are no large centres of population in the interior of South Africa except the capitals of the diamond-fields and of the gold-fields—Kimberley and Johannesburg: while there is not only dark-skinned unskilled labour throughout South Africa, but also a certain amount of dark-skinned skilled labour—the Dutch-speaking Malays at the Cape, and the East Indians, who spread westward from Natal. Kimberley and Johannesburg are abnormal in their condition, being the only large, fast-growing cities, the growth of which is not helped by their being railroad centres, and Johannesburg is not even served by a railway system. Building is going on at Johannesburg with lightning speed, but as everything has to be brought in by wagon, and as each wagon is drawn by from a dozen to eighteen oxen, the cost of all articles is great. It is the place of the whole world where skilled artisans at this moment can make the highest wages, and meat is cheap; but all luxuries stand at an enormous price, and if the artisan drinks or smokes, or prefers a dear good lodging to a less dear bad one, it is difficult for him to save. The result of the rush to Johannesburg has been to cause a certain demand for skilled artisans in Natal, and for a time to raise the rate of wages there, the nominal rate of wages in Johannesburg being vastly higher, but the cost of comfortable living far greater, than in Natal. The normal condition of the colonial working man as regards the cost of living is represented by the settled parts of the Australian continent, where rent is a little higher, and clothes are 20 per cent dearer, than in England, but food considerably cheaper. There are in Melbourne a great number of "Sixpenny Restaurants," giving to the

working man what we should call a good middle-class meal for that price.

House rent. Skilled artisans in Australia commonly pay from 12s. to 14s. a week for house rent, obtaining for this a small house to themselves. Besides the saving upon some kinds of food, there is a saving as compared with England upon fuel in consequence of the warmer climate. Many artisans are willing to pay 16s. to 18s. a week for rent, while some pay as much as 20s. The men who have been a long time in the colony have generally saved enough money to buy an allotment, for which they commonly pay £100. On this they build a cottage for some £300, through the assistance of a building society, and become the owners of their house in from eight to twelve years, at the end of which they find themselves in possession of property which is often worth from £100 to £150 more than it was when they began their payments. Many artisans, in from ten to twelve years from the time of their marriage and settling down as householders, are possessors of a freehold house and garden of from five to seven hundred pounds value, and there are whole suburbs of Melbourne which are inhabited by these working-men proprietors. Their cottages are neat, and the interiors show a great deal of taste, while the state of the gardens bears evidence of horticultural skill. It may be said that half the people of Melbourne live in houses of their own, and that more than half the working people of that city are proprietors of house and land. It need hardly be pointed out that when men have in this way for ten or twelve years schooled themselves in thrift, and find themselves, though still in the prime of life, relieved of the necessity of paying rent, the process of accumulation of capital by working men must be rapid, and the drift of opinion

among the Australian artisans in favour of out-and-out proprietorship in the soil is explained. The universal feeling is that it is better to pay two or three shillings a week more in youth than need be paid for rent, in order that the question placarded upon the walls by the building societies—"Why pay rent?"—may be solved long before a man is forty.

Board.

Considering what a high rent those who cater to the wants of the colonial workman have to pay, the extraordinary development of the cheap restaurants that I have named is in itself a remarkable testimony to the lowness of the average price of food. There is one restaurant at Melbourne which does no trade whatever except in 6d. meals, and at this some twenty male servants are employed. The proprietor seems to have made his fortune, for he has three sons who have passed through the university and have been brought up as medical men and have travelled in Europe before settling down. There are in Melbourne a dozen such restaurants on this scale, and innumerable small ones. So good a meal cannot be obtained in England for the same price as in Victoria, although the landlord's rent is higher in the colonies, and although he has to pay double as much to his servants as he would pay at home, besides incurring extra cost for gas and coal for cooking. The unmarried artisan in Sydney and in Melbourne often boards in families, obtaining board and lodging at 15s. a week. The youthful artisan who receives 48s. a week and pays 15s. for board and lodging with his margin of 33s. can easily save a pound or more per week, and in some six years will find himself possessed of savings which, with the interest on his small investments, will amount to some £350, upon which to start married life. This great

preponderance of average earnings over average expenditure is, of course, the main cause of the development of material wealth in the colonies.

Rents in Canada.

In British North America the material condition of the working classes is nothing like so good as in Australia, although it has considerably improved since confederation. Wages have risen; hours of labour have been reduced; and the necessaries of life are on the whole, with the exception of rents, lower than they were before. The cost of dwelling-houses has, however, increased in the larger cities, as has been seen, to such an extent as to somewhat counterbalance the other advantages. At Toronto the rents average more than a quarter of the income. In Montreal rents are even higher, while in Quebec, where wages as a rule are lower, the proportion taken for the rent is on the average but a fifth. At St. John, New Brunswick, we have the same state of things as in Quebec, while the condition of Halifax more closely resembles that prevalent in the cities of Ontario. House rent throughout the towns of the Dominion appears to be increasing more rapidly than wages. In Toronto there has been a rise of from 30 to 40 per cent in house rent in the workmen's districts in the last ten years. The condition of the workmen's dwellings of Toronto and Montreal is inferior as regards building to that which is found in the cities of Australia, although the hot climate of Australia leads, unless great care is taken, to an equal amount of infantile mortality, likely now to be checked in Melbourne by the improved administration introduced by a Victorian Act of 1889. In the mining districts of Canada the land in the neighbourhood of the mines commonly belongs to the mine owners, and it is the practice of the companies to build log shanties for their men. These are run up

for between £40 and £80, and the rents vary from £3 : 10s to £10 a year. In the great commercial centres of Ontario complaints are heard of the undue rise of rents owing to urban and suburban property being in the hands of large landowners, and legislation with regard to unearned increment, or for fixing judicial rents, has been suggested. But the pressure of rent upon wages will have to become more widely felt in the Dominion before public interest is fixed upon the matter.

Permanence of high wages in the colonies.

Dr. Dale has argued in his book upon Australia that, although the colonial working man has shorter hours, better wages, and cheaper food than his British fellow-subjects, and in some of the colonies enjoys also the advantages for his children of a perfect system of free schools, and of a glorious climate, it will be difficult for him to prevent wages from gradually sinking to the European level. There is, however, no sign as yet of such reduction. Protection appears to compensate the Australian and Canadian manufacturer for the higher wages that he pays, and if it does so at the expense of the colonial consumer, the difference in the cost of the articles produced does not seem to exceed 20 to 25 per cent, or to be found ruinous by the community. Dr. Dale is of opinion that if Australia is ever to become a rival of Europe in manufactures her people must be willing to live upon European wages; but there is no sign of any such desire to beat Great Britain and Belgium in their best markets, and the protectionist workmen of Australia generally limit their ideas on the export of manufactures to the Australian colonies. The other scheme for the future life of Australia, which would be afforded by the Australian artisans becoming directors of the cheap labour of the Chinese or of the dark-skinned

races, appears, from what has been seen in Queensland, to have been definitely rejected by the opinion of the workmen themselves.

Co-operation

Just as there is in the colonies little or no Revolutionary Socialism of the European type, so also there is as yet little co-operative manufacture—far less than in the mother-country or in the United States. There are, as has been seen, co-operative gold-mines and sugar-mills in Queensland, and there are co-operative stores in Montreal, Toronto, and Melbourne: in Melbourne and Toronto upon the Rochdale plan; while the Montreal stores are, I fancy, only similar to the Civil Service stores of London. After all that has been written by Mr. Mill, Mr. Fawcett and others as to the development of co-operation, and after the remarkable success that the principle has already met with in some parts of Great Britain, it is curious to find that the reports of co-operators from Canada, from Australia, and from South Africa are all alike discouraging. While the British Minister at Washington has forwarded to our Government a memorandum with regard to American co-operation to the effect that American opinion declares that "only a slow-thinking, penny-counting, frugal, and painstaking people could bring co-operation to a success," and that "the average American has thought it beneath him to consider the details of dimes;" in the colonies the success of co-operation is altogether behind even that which it has met with in the United States. The consul at Philadelphia has told us that "profit-sharing" does not deeply interest the American working man; that "superior individual qualifications, personal ambition, and recognised inordinate desire for immense wealth . . . stand in the way of extended co-operation;" and that co-

LONDON LIBRARY

operation in the United States is "far distant as an established institution." In the colonies it seems more distant still, for it has hardly been brought yet to the birth. From Australia the co-operators report that "the working class are well paid, and don't yet value the small addition to their income which a co-operative expenditure creates. They could more easily raise funds for self-employment than their class at home, but they are more political and trade union, in which their time, energy, and savings are spent." Another report declares "that every one here came out with the intention of doing something for himself, having less thought of aiding others than co-operators generally have at home. . . . The workers earn double the wages here that they would at home, and yet only work eight hours a day. The result is that they spend more in all kinds of enjoyment. . . . They are rather too well off to value the small sums (as they think them) which the co-operative store brings." It will be seen that the future of labour in Australia does not seem to lie this way. At the same time a platonic declaration in favour of co-operation was carried at the last intercolonial trade union congress, which also declared its support for the Single Tax advocated by Mr. George, though in practice the members when at their homes mostly give their votes to the protectionists.

Factory inspection and sweating.

If in all that bears upon co-operation the colonies are behindhand, the reverse is the case with regard to factory legislation; and it may be said generally that the colonies possess legislation equal or superior to our own as regards factory inspection, with the addition in some cases of a provision against "sweating," in which we are likely to follow their example. The Victorian sweating clauses provide that every occupier of a factory

or workroom who has work done for him outside shall keep a correct record of the work and of the people who do it, and their addresses, for the information of the inspectors, and it is the opinion of some of the most skilled inspectors in the mother-country that such a provision would be useful here. The chief clause was drawn by Mr. Deakin, but it was greatly weakened by words put into a following clause, while the Bill was before the Legislative Council, in which the influence of the employers was exerted to prevent publication of the information, and to give them the virtual option of refusing it. The Victorian chief-inspector, in his report published in 1889, states that there is little sweating in the colony among women and children, as the demand for their labour is in excess of the supply, and no woman would work longer hours and for less pay in one place than she need in another. At the same time he admits that when his inspectors have to investigate anonymous complaints about women being employed more than forty-eight hours a week, nothing can be found out. "The statement is denied by the employer," and although the girls are asked to state their grievances, "they preserve a stolid silence, or appear to endorse what their employer says. . . . The girls have a great objection to go into Court. To take them there against their will would be to have unwilling witnesses. However, if all the complaints made are correct, they will only amount to a few hours' overwork in occasional weeks, for which the hands are . . . paid."

Truck. There is in several of our colonies legislation founded on the English Truck Acts, but as a general rule, except, as we have seen, in Newfoundland, the condition of the white-skinned workman is such as to preclude all risk of

abuse connected with the payment of wages in goods. In South Africa, however, Kafirs are employed who used to be almost entirely paid in kind, and the truck legislation of Cape Colony is nominally or really intended to protect the Kafirs employed in the diamond-mines, who are not only housed by their employers, but practically imprisoned by them to prevent diamond stealing. The diamond industry of the Cape has created a special crime—that of illicit diamond buying—and a special class of wealthy criminals the "I. D. Bs"; and to prevent the theft of stones by the natives, who are tempted by large bribes to secrete them, the workmen are hired for several months, during which they are kept in close confinement in barracks attached to the mines, never being allowed to pass the limits during the period of their engagement. The "compounds" contain stores to supply the coloured workman's wants, but the Labourers' Wages Act now prohibits the payment of wages in goods, partly perhaps for the protection of the traders against the mining companies.

Chinese.

The point affecting labour upon which colonial workmen in Australasia and in part of the Canadian Dominion feel most strongly, and upon which they are the most thoroughly agreed, concerns the competition of the Chinese. As far back as 1854 Sir Charles Hotham, the second Governor of Victoria, after a tour round the gold-fields, reported to the home Government that he thought the introduction of the Chinese race into Australia undesirable. To the colonies the Chinese question appears to present itself in a very different aspect from that in which it is viewed by us at home, and it is difficult to induce the men of the colonial lower-middle or working class, dependent upon labour or trade for maintenance, to take what we should

call a broad international view of Chinese immigration. That the Chinamen shall be excluded from white colonies means only in the minds of the working colonists that they intend to protect their own position. "Canada for the Canadian," "Australia for the Australian," are the prevailing cries; and colonial labour, knit together in its powerful federations, desires to limit competition, and above all to wholly shut out the competition of the cheapest of competitors—the Chinese. The Chinaman is pre-eminently a dexterous hand, industrious and persevering, of few wants and small aspirations; an excellent workman, but with a low standard of comfort. The colonial artisan, disliking the competition of the European labourer, with a standard of comfort less elevated than his own, finds himself threatened with the competition of a workman with the lowest standard of comfort in the whole world; able to live, it would seem, upon that which to a colonial eye is nothing. The colonial workman, with his high pay and his short hours, and his time to sit in the shade or play games in the summer, or to read or go to theatres in the winter, and his tendency to pursue all kinds of sport, with his education and his independence, and his sense of power, has come to regard all these privileges as his right, and he intends to keep, if he can, the position that he has won. He is no more selfish than are the generality of mankind, and if he gives great subscriptions to maintain strikes where he thinks the strikers are in the right, it is not altogether or always in the expectation of a return, as is shown by the contributions from Australian workmen to the dockers' strike, in a case where no return seemed possible. But the colonial workman does not look with favour upon the dark-skinned labourer, and the Chinaman, of whom he has seen something,

he distinctly hates. While the Australian cultivates broad liberal sentiments within the bounds of Australasia, and the Canadian within those of the Dominion, they are inclined, and not unnaturally, to set a barrier at their frontiers against outside people and their works.

Their occupations.

The Chinese are a small population in our white colonies because of the great difficulties which have been thrown in the way of their incoming, but they would be numerous if allowed freely to flock in. It is estimated that there are some fifty thousand Chinese in Australia, but in early days there were almost as many in the single colony of Victoria. In British Columbia they are, as has been seen, numerous in proportion to the sparse population of that Province, and in British Columbia, as in South Africa, the colonial workman has taken up that position of director of cheap labour which in the Australian colonies he is unwilling to assume. The white miners of British Columbia direct the labour of the Chinamen more than they work themselves, and in the coal-mines each miner has with him a Chinese labourer. In the capital of Natal, also, it is no uncommon thing to find a bricklayer attended at his work by three or four Indian coolies. There has been a certain change in the colonial position of the Chinese in recent years. At first they came in rather as gold miners than as workmen, but lately they have swarmed into the cities and become the competitors of the white man in every trade, but especially as carpenters. In western America, both in the United States and on the Canadian side of the border, the Chinamen do laundry-work, cooking, waiting at eating-houses, and a certain amount of private service. In Australia they are cooks and market-gardeners, but are inclined, where not forcibly

prevented, to underbid their neighbours and to make their way into all town trades. In British Columbia there are, as will be seen in the next chapter, some factories which are worked by Chinese labour.

Nature of Australian and Canadian feeling against them.

There has been some attempt in Australia as on the American continent to raise a hue and cry against the Chinese upon the ground that they are dirty and immoral; but Sir Henry Parkes has taken up a more defensible position, and has declared that "they are a superior set of people," belonging "to a nation of an old and deep-rooted civilisation. We know the beautiful results of many of their handicrafts: we know how wonderful are their powers of imagination, their endurance, and their patient labour. It is for these qualities I do not want them to come here. The influx of a few million of Chinese here would entirely change the character of this young Australian commonwealth. It is, then, because I believe the Chinese to be a powerful race, capable of taking a great hold upon the country, and because I wish to preserve the type of my own nation in these fair countries, that I am and always have been opposed to the influx of Chinese." Under the stress of such sentiments the Chinese have been shut out from some colonies, and a poll-tax has been put upon this single race in others. South Australia is still not altogether unwilling that they should enter her tropical northern territory, of which they practically hold as their own a considerable section. There are in Sydney and elsewhere in Australia a few Chinese merchants of the highest character, employing excellent Chinese clerks and storemen, and enjoying the general respect of the community; but these men are not threatened. It is the Chinese workman, and especially the workman who competes with white-skinned artisans,

whose presence will not long be tolerated in the colonies. It is easy for us in London to preach to the colonial workmen upon this question and to tell them that it is unchristian for them to declare that they will keep for themselves a country in which they are as yet far from numerous, and will prevent the starving and the destitute of alien races from obtaining a footing there. But, on the other hand, workmen who can point to their comfortable houses, their comparatively refined wives, their well-nurtured, well-clad children, to the culture and to the morality of their comrades, and to the probability of Australia successfully maintaining in the future a civilisation of this high type, have much to say for themselves in opposing the introduction of those whose presence in large numbers would reduce their material condition to the level of that of the unemployed of the worst parts of London. The Christianity that they understand is an assertion of the claim of the masses to rise in the scale of humanity, and as they are a drop in the ocean compared with the numbers of the Chinese, they assert their inability to raise the Chinese scale of comfort, and decline to allow theirs to sink to that of China. The colonial workman considers that he has as much right to defend his country from the peaceful invasion of the Chinese as he would have if they came with weapons in their hands to destroy his property and his home. Of course the consumer suffers. Of course from the point of view of the political economy of our youth, the Australian or the Canadian consumer has a right to obtain Chinese-made furniture at a third of the price (for in cabinetmaking the Chinese are supremely cheap) that he has to pay to the colonial workman. But the whole drift of opinion in our colonies is against unrestricted competition, and there is virtually

no colonial resistance upon this subject to the views of the working man.

Treaties.

The Blue-book of July 1888 relating to "Chinese immigration into the Australasian colonies" begins with a note from the Chinese Minister at the Court of St. James calling attention to the Colonial Acts directed against the Chinese people. The Chinese contention, that the special laws directed against Chinamen are inconsistent with our treaties, was dignified and true. A Treaty between China and the United States was for a moment looked upon by our Government as a happy settlement of a difficult question, but that Treaty has since been indefinitely adjourned by the Chinese. An Australian intercolonial conference has declared the Chinese "an alien race," "incapable of assimilation in the body politic, strangers to our civilisation, out of sympathy with our aspirations, and unfitted for our free institutions." It is impossible not to sympathise with this feeling, but, on the other hand, exclusion presents great difficulties, one of which is that there are enormous numbers of Chinamen who are British subjects, and that exclusion means excluding people merely because they are dressed in a particular way or have faces of a particular type. On the other hand, if the Chinese of Hong-Kong are allowed to come in, they will sell their passes to Chinese aliens, and detection of such a trade is difficult. Thus the "Chinamen" to be excluded are not necessarily Chinese, but may have been British subjects by descent for many generations, as is the case with some of those settled in the Straits. The Government of New Zealand has exceeded all others in the high-handed character of its action against the Chinese. It reprinted without change and put in force in 1888 a proclamation by Sir Arthur Gordon, dated

1881, under the Public Health Act, declaring all places where there is a Chinese population, infected with the smallpox, and imposing quarantine upon all persons coming from them, or having received any person coming from them. The appendix to the Blue-book which contains the Colonial Acts (including those of Canada and of British Columbia) against the Chinese is indeed unpleasant reading; but Lord Salisbury found it necessary to be silent after Sir Henry Parkes had said, "Neither for Her Majesty's ships of war, nor for Her Majesty's representative on the spot, nor for Her Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies, do we intend to turn aside from our purpose." It is curious to contrast the language of our colonies now with regard to Chinamen with the treatment that was meted out to the unfortunate Chinese a few years ago when they ventured to urge that there were reasons which made it difficult to allow that which they have since virtually allowed, namely, the general right of travel by Europeans in the interior of China. It is impossible not to feel that we have two different voices in which we lecture those whom we choose to think the inferior races. In the meantime, the safest way of meeting the difficulties I have described would seem to lie in general legislation against pauper immigration.

Convict immigration.

The fact of colonial anti-Chinese Acts being in defiance of British treaty engagements will not of necessity greatly shock their authors. Colonial legislators are not likely to be more tender towards treaties than towards the ordinary law of England. In 1845, and again in 1849, the inhabitants of Melbourne prevented by force the landing of British convicts, and much more violent language was used of that resistance

by the English press than has recently been applied to the equally illegal prevention of the landing of Chinese. But there is now a general feeling that the anti-convict agitators were in the right. In the second of the two years named the legislature of New South Wales passed a law which imposed on all persons who might have been transported to or convicted in any British colony in the southern hemisphere, and who might arrive in New South Wales, the necessity of notifying to the magistrates all changes of residence on their part, and if summoned by a Justice of the Peace, of accounting for their means of support, in each case under a penalty of two years' imprisonment with hard labour. The Act was disallowed. The Australasian League, which was started at Melbourne in 1851, was intended, among other objects, to support with money those who might suffer through being prominent in the cause of "anti-transportation," and this league went so far as to unfurl an Australian flag with the white stars of the Southern Cross upon a blue ground, although it had indeed, occasionally, a Union Jack in the corner. It is quite possible that the anti-Chinese excitement, unless we feel ourselves able to fully meet it, may revive a separatist movement which the anti-transportation feeling first encouraged. The movements against convicts and against Chinese have been marked by an equal disregard of the letter of the law. Victoria passed in 1852 a "Convicts' Prevention Act," which prevented ex-convicts who had received the Queen's pardon, or who were absolutely free, having completed their sentences, or who held tickets of leave which gave them a legal right to go where they chose in Australia, from landing in Victoria, although by the law of England they were able to do so, and which heavily fined the

captains of ships introducing them. The Queen's assent was at first refused to the Bill, but it was acted upon all the same, and ultimately the colonists had their way.

Colonial action against undesirable immigrants.

Colonial Governments are never backward in illegally preventing the landing of persons whose presence is distasteful to the community; and just as they have in several cases illegally kept out ex-convicts, and as they have kept out Irish approvers without the slightest shadow of a law, so they have sometimes prevented the Chinese from landing before the Governments were armed with powers enabling them lawfully so to do. Sir Henry Parkes, in the Assembly of New South Wales, when charged with having broken the law, replied, "I care nothing about your cobweb of technical law; I am obeying a law far superior to any law which issued these permits, namely, the law of the preservation of society in New South Wales"—a strong declaration for a Prime Minister. Lord Knutsford telegraphed to the New South Wales Government on this occasion to ask under what law the landing of the Chinese had been prevented, and the reply was that there existed no law authorising the prevention. The Supreme Court of the colony declared the action of the Ministers illegal, so an Indemnity Bill was passed, Lord Carrington strongly backing up his Cabinet. The Prime Minister of Victoria, Mr. Gillies, was not so violent as his brother Minister of New South Wales, but he informed Lord Salisbury through the Governor that while "the Chinese Minister appeals to treaty obligations, Mr. Gillies is not aware of the exact nature and extent of these obligations;" and went on to argue that it was impossible that the home Government, which made treaties without the colonies having any direct voice in them, could have bound the colonies by treaties allowing a Chinese immigration of

indefinite extent. As with convicts so with regard to the Chinese: the treaties, like the laws of the United Kingdom, will be broken down by the strength of colonial feeling.

Examples of strength of colonial feeling on Chinese immigration.

In most of the colonies the anti-Chinese legislation applies only to the Chinese race, and cases have occurred where steamers have reached colonial ports with Japanese crews and Chinese cooks and stewards, and sometimes Chinese quartermasters, and the Japanese have been able to take their run ashore while the Chinese were penned up on board. Some years ago there was, as I have stated, a seamen's strike in the Australian colonies, directed against the employment of Chinese by the steamship lines. The Australian Steam Navigation Company argued with the representatives of white labour that, as the Company was extending its trade into tropical climates, it must at least have Asiatic labour in the engine-rooms; and the men ultimately accepted an agreement that the Chinese should only be employed in subordinate and accessory positions, such as those of stokers, while the total number employed in the Company's fleet was to be reduced from 180 to 130 in three months. The Australian Steam Navigation Company has recently sold the boats with regard to which the strike occurred to a new firm—the Australasia United Steam Navigation Company, which undertakes still more tropical trade, and which seems likely also to have difficulties at the port of Sydney. The seamen's unions of Victoria and New South Wales have compelled the ships trading to China and back to forego trade between intercolonial ports when they are manned by Chinese crews, and they have attacked the Peninsular and Oriental Company for the employment of Lascars; and the employment of Lascars by the British India

Company has been partly stopped by the boycotting of their ships.

Chinese in tropical colonies.

It is curious to contrast the strength of the Australian and American feeling with the favourable opinion entertained of the Chinese in tropical colonies, such as the Straits and the territories of the British North Borneo Company. From the latter it is officially reported that the Chinese make "excellent citizens, always at work;" and in the case of Singapore the Chinese residents have subscribed largely to the fund for the purchase of quick-firing guns for the defence of this most flourishing of British ports, one Chinese merchant alone subscribing 500 guineas, while many gave £100 apiece. In the Malay Peninsula and in Borneo, as well as in the Dutch Indies, the Chinese form the backbone of the State. It is a happy thing that in some parts of the Empire we should be on good terms with the Chinese, for it is difficult for us to seek their alliance on the Asiatic continent while our colonists violate our treaties with the Chinese Government.

Australian opinion not connected with Protection.

In Australia, however, the feeling against Chinese immigration is overwhelming in all classes. Even reasonable and moderate people, such as an Australian financier who lived for many years in London, say that "all treaties must give way" to the consideration that if admitted the Chinese will "possess and denationalise Australasia," and this although the writer whose words I quote was himself in favour of the importation of dark-skinned labourers to work in the Australian tropics.[1] The anti-Chinese feeling is often spoken of at home as connected with the colonial doctrine of Protection; but Sir Henry Parkes, whose words I have

[1] *Half a Century of Australasian Progress*, by William Westgarth. Sampson Low and Co., 1889.

quoted, is a free trader, and Mr. M'Millan, the leader of the free traders of the free-trade colony, in his recent address to the electors of East Sydney used these significant words: "We have decided, although rather perhaps in a precipitate manner, that our virgin soil shall not be contaminated by hordes of an alien and unmixable race."

Effect upon the Chinese Government.

Australians are tempted by the difficulties of their local labour problem to forget the need in which the Empire may one day stand of the Chinese alliance in eastern Asia, and we in the old country, who see, perhaps more clearly than they can be expected to perceive, that the future mastery of the world lies between the British, the Russian, and the Chinese races, may be pardoned for attaching more importance than do colonists to good relations between Great Britain and the Chinese Empire. China, which fought France not long ago upon a point of honour, and which obtained in our time from Russia, without fighting, a province which Russia had long administered, is a power well able to hold her own; and if we bear in mind the incredible numbers of her population, and the ability of her rulers, we can feel little doubt that the value of her alliance with ourselves in the future must increase each day. An alliance in Asia between China and Great Britain would form a true league of peace.

Anti-foreign legislation.

A recent American Act of Congress, making it unlawful for persons not either citizens of the United States or having declared their intention of becoming such, or for foreign corporations, to hold or own in the Territories real estate acquired after the date of the Act, except such as might be acquired by inheritance or in the ordinary course of the collection of older debts, is legislation supported by one of the same reasons as

are applicable to the American and Australian legislation against the Chinese, and it is, perhaps, defensible, and especially defensible under republican institutions.

Legislation against an influx of cheap labour would be more easily defensible as a principle than it is, if it were generalised, and not directed against the men of a single race only, but turned against all forms of that competition which is typified to the democracy by the figure of the Chinaman. I see no reason to protest against the desire of the Americans and of the Australian and Canadian colonists to exclude the poorest forms of foreign labour, provided that it be done by general laws. There being only 100,000 Chinese in the United States, out of a population which was considerably over fifty millions in 1880, the cheap labour question can hardly be said to have been, as yet, presented there by the Chinaman in a very formidable shape, except locally on the Pacific Slope. In our colonies the Chinese population, though larger in proportion than in the United States, is so small that the danger guarded against by legislation was also a danger of the future. In the United States, the most severe competition which white labour has to face is the competition of the home-born negro, more prolific than the European races in America, but not, of course, helped as are the American whites by immigration. Just as some in Australia have in their imagination foreseen the predominance in that continent of the Chinese, unless their arrival be prevented, so as regards the American continent some have prophesied the predominance of the negro.

English and native races.

It is a curious fact that the English race have more generally destroyed the native races with which they have come in contact in their young settlements than

has been the case with other colonising peoples, but have destroyed the natives only afterwards to enter into a conflict with other dark or yellow races, whose efficiency as labourers seems equal to their own. While the destruction of the native races by the British race in countries where the English can labour out of doors is generally complete, it is the fact that other European races who have set to work to destroy the natives in similar countries have not succeeded, and that the English people have often destroyed them when trying hard to keep them in existence. The founders of Pennsylvania made every effort to deal fairly with the natives, but the Red Indian race will soon be extinct throughout the United States, and the Indians of Canada will probably disappear except in the form of the French-speaking Indians who are of mixed race. In Australia, although Victoria and some of the other colonies made great efforts to treat the natives kindly, the race once inhabiting this enormous continent will shortly disappear. The Maories of New Zealand are also a small and a dwindling people; but in some parts not only of America, but even of temperate America, such as the Mexican plateau, the Indian race has beaten the Spanish, and whole counties are peopled by persons bearing high-sounding Spanish names, and Roman Catholic in religion, who to the eye are mostly pure Indians in blood. In British North America and in Australasia, which we have swept of their former native owners, we now dread the competition of the Chinese; but in South Africa—where the destruction of the Hottentots and Bushmen of the Cape cleared large tracts of their native population, but where the descent of the Kafirs from the north has in some parts replaced them by an even greater number of dark-skinned people—coloured immigrants of another

kind are pouring in from across the seas as labourers and even artisans.

Anti-Indian agitation in South Africa.

There has been among the Dutch of South Africa in recent years an agitation against cheap imported labour in some degree similar to that in Australia and Canada against the immigration of Chinese. At the same time there is a wide distinction between the agitations, and the warmest opponents of East Indian immigration to South-Eastern Africa have been those who have demanded that, while the introduction of Indians should cease, the Kafirs of the country should be tempted or compelled to do their work. The Indian coolies of South Africa are employed in every kind of labour. They work on the plantations and in the fields; earn high wages in domestic service; are hawkers, fish-curers, and small shopkeepers, and their savings are great—the Indians returning to Hindostan by a single ship in 1884 having taken with them no less a sum than £15,000. The Bombay traders, under the name of "Arabs," have spread through the Transvaal and Free State, and when the late Sir John Brand visited Harrismith at the beginning of 1888 a presentment was made to him to the effect that the Volksraad had failed to protect the State from the introduction of Asiatics, that it was against the interest of the European community to admit them, and that the Government should find means of removing the growing evil and destroying "the baneful influence" of the Asiatics. The petition concluded by a reference to the anti-Chinese agitation of Australia—a curious example of the smallness, in these days, of the world.

Indigent foreigners.

Colonial labour seeks protection by legislative means not only against the cheap labour of the dark-skinned or of the yellow man, but also against white paupers,

and against the artificial supply of labour by State-aided white immigration. Most of the countries of the world, indeed, have laws against the admission of destitute aliens, and the United Kingdom is in practice almost the only exception. Several of our colonies have, as we have seen, made laws against the introduction of what are styled in New Zealand "Imbecile Passengers," and of these laws the Tasmanian and New Zealand Acts are good examples. There is no such law in New South Wales, but in South Australia, and in some other colonies where persons have been landed who soon became a burden upon the Government in the asylums for the destitute, the Government have re-shipped them at the expense of the colony to the place whence they came. Victoria has a clause in a general statute of 1865 which was closely followed in the drafting of the New Zealand law. The New Zealand "Imbecile Passengers Act" consolidates and amends previous legislation upon the subject, under similar titles, dating as far back as 1873. It enables the customs authorities of New Zealand to force the owners of ships bringing persons likely "to become a charge upon the public or upon any public or charitable institution" to execute bonds in the sum of £100 for each such passenger, under which they have to repay all expenses incurred for his support or maintenance by any public or charitable institution of New Zealand within five years of his landing. This legislation has been closely followed in Tasmania with the addition of the important words "from any cause unable to support himself." In Canada the Governor-General has power, as has been seen, to prevent by proclamation the landing of destitute immigrants.

The colonial workmen are opposed not only to

the reception of the destitute from abroad, but even to assisted immigration of persons willing and able to work. There was for a time almost as much agitation against the employment in New South Wales of Sir Edward Walter's commissionaires as against that of Chinamen. This was an extreme assertion of colonial views, but that colonial workmen should refuse to contribute towards assisting immigration to their colony is fairly reasonable, as it is difficult to reply to the argument that if the colony is in want of workmen it is fair that workmen should be allowed to come in, but not fair that those already in the colonies should be compelled to contribute by taxation to the bringing out of people to compete with them. The workmen argue that as long as English emigration is not assisted, colonial wages are not likely to decline below what they think a reasonable limit; but that if assisted emigration is encouraged, inferior workmen will come out, and bring down wages to the European level. I said in my chapter on New South Wales that immigration operations had been suspended by Victoria and New South Wales, and would never be resumed. That is so with regard to immigration operations generally; but it is the case that, without talking about it, Sir Henry Parkes has allowed assisted passages to be given to the wives and children of settlers already in the colony of New South Wales at cheap rates, and that the colony is quietly spending money for this purpose—the object in view being, however, rather to keep in the country settlers who are already there than to bring in new families.

Assisted immigration.

It must be urged upon the colonial workman's side that, where assisted emigrants have been sent out on a large scale, there has frequently been a good deal of

The unemployed.

temporary want of employment in the colony, and the unemployed have come upon the State for their support. Some of the men sent out to Australia have obtained good employment as shearers, and paid as they are a pound for every hundred sheep, and being able, after a short apprenticeship, to shear from seventy to a hundred in the day, have earned high wages for a short time. After two or three months they find themselves with considerable savings, and are then in demand for harvesting, and afterwards get odd jobs at fruit-picking, and so are employed throughout the summer from October up to March; but, bringing out with them improvident habits, they often rapidly spend their large savings in the towns, and by the dead of winter, in July, are starving in the cities. The result is that there is a good deal of want of sympathy in Melbourne and Sydney with the colonial "unemployed." On the other hand, great respect is felt for the Trades Hall Councils, which almost invariably show wisdom and moderation, and act under a sense of responsibility and with a marked spirit of justice. The colonial Governments have often provided work at half wages, that is, at 4s. a day, for the unemployed; but the experiment has hardly been successful, and the men, even at this wage—very low according to colonial rates—have proved a bad bargain to the State.

State immigration. Colonisation schemes.

There are indeed vast difficulties to be met with at both ends of the journey as regards State emigration from England on a large scale. The workmen in England resent emigration proposals which they think put forward by the plutocracy to cover the refusal of just demands, and object to pay taxes which would be chiefly for the benefit of the colonies and of the men who go; and, on the other hand, the colonists show still

stronger disinclination to receive State immigrants than that shown by their English comrades to sending them. So strong has lately been the opposition to State-aided emigration on a large scale that schemes for colonisation by families, such as those which I have mentioned in my Canadian chapters, have taken the place of ordinary emigration projects. The colonies generally have been consulted upon such schemes, and their recent answers, on the whole, have not been favourable. Newfoundland and some of the Crown Colonies, such as Natal and Western Australia, alone seemed willing to entertain the matter, and the self-governing colonies met the proposals with a general refusal. But Sir Napier Broome, who answered for Western Australia, had in contemplation a very large expenditure, involving the advance in the first instance of from half a million to a million sterling. The only chance at the present moment for the success of such a scheme would seem to lie either in the co-operation of the Canadian Pacific railroad company or in that of the company just formed for Bechuanaland; but as regards Australia and Cape Colony colonial objections are too marked to allow the matter to be entertained, and the field offered by Natal and by Newfoundland is limited in extent. A word of caution is perhaps needed with regard to the attempt to force emigration into special lines. The colonisation of Bechuanaland by English agricultural families may be feasible, but to pour immigrants into Canada is often but an indirect means of helping them into the United States.

As regards all persons not able to earn their living upon land, it is worse than useless to direct them in considerable numbers to some one spot. Young countries cannot absorb an indefinite number of newcomers, and

Australia, the Canadian Dominion, and South Africa already take a larger number of such immigrants in proportion to their population than is the case with the United States, even if we exclude from view, as comparatively old countries, the states of the Atlantic seaboard. It is difficult to combine the two objects of promoting emigration from Great Britain for the sake of England, and of using it for the purpose of strengthening the tie between the United Kingdom and her colonies. If the matter is looked at from the point of view of the emigrant, the Transvaal and the temperate parts of South America, not to speak of the western country of the United States—all under foreign flags—offer tempting fields. If it is looked at from the Imperial point of view, Australia is rather alienated than drawn towards us by large emigration schemes, and the North West of Canada is more successfully brought under cultivation by those who reach it after long farming experience in Ontario, than by those taken there straight from England. In any case it is certain that the schemes long talked about at home for the deportation to the colonies on a large scale of East-enders from London, and of the British unemployed, must be put aside as impracticable in face of colonial opinion. The Parliament of the United Kingdom has voted no direct assistance (except in the special case of the Scotch crofters) to British emigration since help to emigrants to Western Australia was stopped by Mr. Lowe, when Chancellor of the Exchequer, with the approval of Mr. Stansfeld and the Local Government Board, although against the opinion of the Colonial Office, and such assistance is not likely to be revived. The Irish Government have promoted the grant of money from the Church surplus for emigration from the congested districts of the west of

Ireland, which has been in the nature of that "colonisation" now recommended for general adoption; but a larger scheme was rejected by the Canadian Dominion on the ground that it would be politically inconvenient and undesirable for the Dominion Government to connect itself with a scheme of the kind. The Canadian view is that only a private company can ever press settlers for repayment of moneys advanced, inasmuch as the settlers would naturally use political influence to be relieved from paying, if asked for payment by a government.

Friendly societies.

While the self-governing colonies are inclined, generally speaking, to discourage immigration, and while those of Australia are strengthened in their resistance by the occasional existence in their cities of bodies of persons professing to be unemployed, the colonies have not found themselves face to face with the permanent existence of a large class of poor. Providence of an organised kind is as remarkable in them as in the mother-country. While the Briton does not make as a rule those sacrifices for the benefit of all those about him which are made by the poorly-paid Hindoo, who, in a country of low wages in which a poor law is unknown, invariably provides for his old people and keeps them in greater comfort than he keeps himself, Englishmen and colonists alike are remarkable for the extent to which they have carried the system of provident societies. Nearly every friendly society that exists in England has branches in Canada and Australia. The Oddfellows, taking the colonies through, are perhaps numerically and financially the strongest of these bodies; the Foresters of various societies coming close behind. In Victoria the Manchester Unity of Oddfellows has 16,000 members; in New South Wales

13,000; and in South Australia 12,000. It is to Victoria that we must go to find the highest development of friendly societies. There are in that colony some 800 courts, with some 70,000 members, and an income of a quarter of a million. The number of members in these societies exceeds the total number of handicraftsmen in the colony, and includes nearly all the manufacturing hands, as well as a considerable number of small shopkeepers. In the other colonies also the friendly societies are strong, and in most of them legislative control has now been brought to bear to secure an effective audit; while building societies are, throughout the colonies, much stronger in proportion than they are in England.

In South Africa.

In the South African colonies friendly societies flourish in a remarkable manner, considering the smallness of the population and the peculiarities of the position of labour in the country; but South Africa is the part of our dominions in which, on the whole, there is to be found the smallest amount of poverty. As a curious example of the comfort of the population I may mention the rarity in South Africa of copper coinage—the threepenny piece, known colloquially as a "ticky," playing the part of the British penny. In the regulations of the Cape and of the Natal railways it is explained that fractional parts of 3d. are charged 3d.; and the absence of the class of poor in South Africa is connected with the prevalence of the friendly society system. The Oddfellows, the Foresters, and the Druids, as well as Hibernian friendly societies, thrive as greatly in South Africa as in Canada or Australasia itself. In Cape Town, which is by no means a large city, there are (including the suburbs) six Foresters' Courts, five Oddfellows' Lodges, four Free Gardeners' Lodges, three Lodges

of Druids, and sixteen other courts of friendly societies, or thirty-four courts in all. In the small towns of Natal the Oddfellows, Foresters, and Freemasons are remarkably strong. In Maritzburg there are under 4000 adult males, including the garrison and the officials; but a single Oddfellows' Lodge in that town has over one hundred members. In Durban, the commercial port of Natal, there are only 2500 white men above eighteen years of age, but there is an Oddfellows' Lodge of 170 members, and a Foresters' Court of 325. While friendly societies are strong, there is little trade unionism in South Africa. In the South African European population there is no poor class, and the white artisans form an aristocracy of labour directing the cheap labour of the natives. In Australia and in Canada there are a great number of Courts of Rechabites and of other temperance societies; but these are weaker in South Africa, where "temperance" principles apparently do not flourish. Masonry has been strong in Upper Canada and in Australia from the first, and flourishes in the colonies even more in proportion to the population than in Great Britain, and in South Africa freemasonry is prosperous both among the English and the Dutch.

Savings banks.

The most remarkable difference, between the colonies and the mother-country as regards providence, concerns savings bank deposits, which are in the colonies on a far larger scale. In considerable portions of Australasia, for example, there are as many depositors as there are heads of families—two hundred thousand in Victoria, with some four millions sterling of deposits; and the life insurances of Australasia assure at this moment a sum of something like forty-five millions.

The English friendly societies which have branches

Racial difficulties.

throughout the colonies and the United States object, as I have said, to exhibitions of pride of race. But the exclusion of coloured men can be managed without being laid down as a principle, and it must not be supposed that because the colonial courts remain in connection with the Order they are freely open to the reception of the aborigines or of the Chinese. The right of all honourable men to become Foresters or Freemasons, without reference to colour, is a doctrine easy to lay down in Great Britain, but is not a principle the observance of which is easily obtained in the colonies.

Government friendly societies.

It is interesting to note as a new development of State administration that in New Zealand the colonial Government conducts with spirit a Department for Life Insurance. The Post Office Insurance Department of the mother-country is a failure, having a business less than one-hundredth part as great as that of each of several private companies; whereas the New Zealand Government Life Insurance Department has met with an extraordinary success, largely accounted for by the fact that it advertises freely. The prospectus, like many of the other documents of the New Zealand department, is adorned by a quotation from the *Economist*, pointing out the advantages of "the greatest of undeveloped economic forces, the principle of insurance backed by the State guarantee, that is, of insurance which really insures." The New Zealand Government office has been in existence for twenty years, and is more flourishing by far than any of the private companies doing business in New Zealand; in fact, the Government office carries on operations which are almost equal to those of the whole of the companies put together, and does a business which is increasing faster than the business of the companies increases. So great is the

success of the department that if the New Zealand Government would consent to receive English business, which at present it refuses on account of certain technical difficulties, there can, I think, be no doubt that it would win a large amount of favour here. The collapse of some English insurance offices was the original cause of the introduction of the Bill which founded the New Zealand office, and it has not been hampered by restrictions upon the maximum amount of individual policies, such as have checked the extension of Mr. Gladstone's system in the mother-country. The New Zealand Government now believe that their example is likely to be imitated at home, and that steps will be shortly taken to create a living and active insurance department under Government management, embracing the three kingdoms, while they refer to their own legislation as offering one among many examples of the legislature of a young country setting to the mother-country an example in securing improved social conditions for its inhabitants. One result of the popularity of the New Zealand office is that, while there are only twenty-six life policies per thousand of the population in the United Kingdom and in Canada, there are eighty policies per thousand of the population in New Zealand—the highest number anywhere in the world. The State makes itself responsible for fulfilment of all contracts made by the department, and offers therefore an unimpeachable security to the policyholders.

Temperance section.

There is in the department a temperance section, and total abstainers have the option of being placed in a class by themselves, where "the profits which are found to be due to their special mortality" will be appropriated among them, instead of being shared by the policyholders generally. If the practice of total abstinence is

conducive to longevity they reap the advantage, as is pointed out to them by the Government, both of participating in the special profits and of demonstrating to the world the truth of their views with regard to the healthiness of total abstinence. The Government has issued tables in colours showing the probabilities of profit from total abstinence, and point out that total abstainers should not insure in any office which does not give them the benefit of their abstinence by placing them in a section apart. The New Zealand department publishes leaflets and tracts by the ton, under all kinds of attractive headings, such as "He is going to be married!" The Government prints also a "Post Magazine and Insurance Monitor," which has a large circulation. Although the department has been in existence since about 1870 its scope has several times been extended by legislation, and it has only been brought into full working order upon the existing system by the laws of 1884 and 1886.

General State insurance.

Although the New Zealand system has met with such complete success, not much has yet been heard in the colonies of proposals for compulsory State insurance, and but little attention has been excited in them by accounts of the last development of State-socialism in Germany in the insurance law of 1889. An able writer against Socialism has styled it "a kind of inoculation with a milder type of the disease, in order to procure immunity from a more malignant." Now in colonies where there is no Revolutionary Socialism and no permanent class of poor the necessary leverage for obtaining the adoption of such laws would seem wanting. In the great self-governing colonies, it may be said, there is no permanent poverty except such as springs directly or indirectly from drink, or, in the case of women and

children, from desertion. In New Zealand, however, where for some years there was a good deal of distress, there are bodies in existence not unlike our own Boards of Guardians.

The poor in New Zealand.

The most important colonial legislation upon the subject of the poor is that of New Zealand, contained in the Hospitals and Charitable Institutions Act of 1885, with the amending Acts. It has been pointed out[1] that the New Zealand Government, pestered almost out of existence by "the unemployed," promoted a Bill the main object of which was in fact to throw off the State and on to the localities the difficulties connected with the subject. The New Zealand law involves something like a poor rate, and something like relieving officers; but direct subsidies are still given by Government, after the colonial system, to hospitals and charities. The colony is divided by the Act into Hospital Districts, and for each district an elective Board is provided, to be chosen by the councils of the boroughs and counties within the district. To the Boards are given "the exclusive superintendence and control," with few exceptions, of hospitals, almshouses, and orphanages, other than those specially incorporated under the Act, and also the distribution of charitable aid. The funds consist of endowments, voluntary contributions and bequests, grants from local authorities, and subsidies from the consolidated fund—the latter paying ten shillings for every pound of donations or contributions from local authorities, whether voluntary or raised by rate, up to October 1890, and after that date such sums as the Colonial Treasurer shall think necessary, where he is not satisfied that the Board has sufficient without his

[1] *New Zealand of To-day*, by John Bradshaw. Sampson Low and Co., 1888.

help. The amount of the contributions of the local authorities rests upon the decision of the Board, but must be spread over the district according to rateable value; and the local authorities can appeal to the Colonial Secretary. The Board is allowed to build poorhouses (although they are not called by that name), and may also give out-relief to the indigent (although the word "pauper" is carefully avoided), and possesses also power to close any institution not required. Each Board took over the officers, medical men, nurses, and attendants of the institutions placed under its charge; but those institutions which petitioned for incorporation, if they showed a list of not fewer than a hundred persons willing to contribute yearly sums of not less than five shillings, having paid one year's subscription in advance, or willing to give donations in one sum of not less than £10, might (provided that the total of their contributions came to not less than £100 a year) receive incorporation. After the foundation of the system institutions supported in the same way might still be incorporated if no counter-petition by an equal number of persons were received; but each Board is allowed to object to incorporations in its district, and on objection a resident magistrate holds an inquiry. Provision was also made for the representation upon the governing bodies of the incorporated charities of local authorities who might contribute towards the funds. Powers were taken for obtaining contributions from near relations for the maintenance of persons aided. It will be seen that the New Zealand system bears a strong resemblance to our poor law, except that it does not confer anything like a right to relief, and the other self-governing colonies are free even from the New Zealand rate for charitable purposes. At the same time

the line which might be drawn between New Zealand and some of the others involves distinction without much difference, because taxation exists throughout Australia in aid of charitable institutions, although the money comes, upon the Australian continent, from the consolidated fund and not from rates.

In New South Wales.

In New South Wales the Government has five charities exclusively under its own management in the form of a hospital and four asylums for adult poor, in addition to lunatic asylums and reformatories. As regards other charitable institutions, the Government of New South Wales subsidises private trusts, and, asking few questions, gives money to committees as its almoners. As a general rule it grants to charities a sum equal to that raised by private contributions; but it has sometimes been forced to step in at critical moments to make good deficiencies, as, for example, in the case of the Benevolent Asylum and the Asylum for Destitute Children. To some of these institutions the Government has at times also sent indigent persons to be maintained, and has paid for them a price such as to leave a margin of profit to the management. The Asylum for Destitute Children has lately ceased to be a recipient of Government bounty, since the adoption by Government of the boarding-out system, under the supervision of the State Children's Relief Board, a committee of ladies and gentlemen nominated by Government and entirely financed from Government funds. Most of the hospitals of New South Wales are now supported on the "mixed system," that is, partly by voluntary contributions and partly by State aid. But the Roman Catholics maintain a denominational hospital in Sydney, which is wholly supported by voluntary contributions, or by the payments of "paying patients," although in practice open to patients of all

denominations, and this, not being technically "public," receives no Government grant. A Government inspector of public charities exercises a certain control over the management and expenditure of the various charitable committees, and makes an annual report. The Government of New South Wales spends out of public moneys from £100,000 to £150,000 a year on charity, of which £40,000 a year represents the grant on the mixed principle, on the basis of pound for pound; and in addition to the annual ordinary expenditure upon charities we have to remember the extraordinary expenditure from time to time upon relief works for the unemployed. There is a good deal of dissatisfaction in New South Wales at great numbers of persons altogether escaping their fair share of the burden of the cost of charity, and also at wasteful expenditure in the management of some of the charitable institutions, and Royal Commissions have been appointed from time to time to inquire into such matters. It is not unlikely that New South Wales may one day imitate the New Zealand legislation. But there is a horror in the colonies, which is unknown in the United States, of the words "pauperism," "poorhouse," "workhouse," or "pauper," and when a speaker, not long out from England, casually referred at a Sydney public meeting to the "Benevolent Asylums" as "poorhouses," one who followed him said that the use of such a term was an insult to the community, and thanked God that there was not a poorhouse in Australia. Unfortunately for him there are in Western Australia two "poorhouses" actually so called. There is in the colonies a good deal of fear of words: the honest term "wages" is too often replaced by "salary"; and a maid-of-all-work does not object to do all the menial drudgery of a house provided she is termed "companion,"

or "nursery-governess," or "lady-help," instead of "housemaid" or "general servant." That "paupers" should become "recipients of charity" or "inmates of the asylum" is only in keeping with the colonial habit that calls almost every shop a "store," and almost every servant an "employé."

In Victoria. In Victoria, as in New South Wales, the State supports the lunatic asylums and industrial and reformatory schools, and contributes towards hospitals, giving, however, in the latter case, not merely pound per pound, as in most other colonies, but two pounds for each sovereign; and the Victorian contribution towards charities amounts to £230,000 a year. Victoria is especially proud of her treatment of neglected children, and transfers them, upon a system which I have mentioned in the Australian chapters, from the gaols, through State institutions, to families, until those who begin life in gaol are found earning their livelihood as industrious apprentices. One peculiarity of Victoria is that in some cases deserted mothers of good character are paid for taking care of their own children; but this is only done in some thirty cases at a time, and with much caution. New South Wales, Queensland, and South Australia run Victoria close in their legislation with regard to children. State care of neglected children in Victoria has been a considerable success, and the "Department for Neglected Children" is one of the most popular of colonial institutions. By the neglected children's Acts of December 1887 the legislation of Victoria was placed in advance of that of the United Kingdom upon the question, and, while it is impossible to deal here with the details of this legislation, it may be safely recommended to the imitation of the mother-country. If I have seemed to ridicule the Aus-

tralian custom of replacing disagreeable words by those less suitable which convey a pleasanter shade of meaning, I may add that none will be found to complain of the recent replacing in South Australia of the term "Destitute children" by the term "State children," and in Victoria of the term "Neglected children" by the term "State wards." The annual report of the Secretary of the Victorian department, published in 1888, contains an admirable defence of the boarding-out system against the very able strictures of the Rector of Islip; and it must be taken as admitted throughout Australia and Canada that the boarding-out system is in the colonies a complete success.

In other Australian colonies.

In South Australia an even larger proportional amount is expended upon State charities than in Victoria and New South Wales, and generally speaking, it may be said that the same principle which applies to Government aid to charities in the colonies which I have named is general throughout Australia.

In the Dominion of Canada.

I have named in my principal chapter upon Canada the outdoor relief given by the managers of the House of Industry and Refuge at Montreal. By the Municipal Code of Quebec it is provided that every local Council may contribute to the maintenance of poor persons unable to earn their livelihood, and may establish and maintain poorhouses for the relief of the destitute, and give domiciliary relief or aid charitable institutions in the neighbourhood. In Ontario also the municipalities look after the indigent poor. At Toronto, where there is much distress towards the end of the severe winters, the corporation makes grants to charitable organisations such as the House of Providence, the House of Industry, the Boys' Home, and the Orphans' Home. There is also in Toronto a City Relieving Officer, who makes inquiry

into all applications, which amount to thirty a day in February, and hands them over to a committee elected by the combined Charities, that is, the Charities receiving grants from the municipality. At Hamilton the corporation also grants relief to widows and children and old men, and provides work for able-bodied applicants in winter. At London the corporation has a Relief Inspector, and as many as 140 families have been relieved in a single winter month. In Nova Scotia also the municipalities support charitable asylums, and Halifax has one which holds 300 inmates. The maintenance of paupers from outside the city limits is borne by the whole Province, and there is here no system of outdoor relief.

In South Africa and Crown Colonies.

At the Cape and in Natal there is no white pauper class, and although there is a vote for paupers under the medical head in estimates, from which are aided the public hospitals and the district surgeons, this mainly concerns the dark-skinned races. In many of the Crown Colonies, and especially in those of the West Indies, there is found in existence a system closely resembling that of England; parochial almshouses, managed by parochial Boards, being provided for the poor, who, however, consist generally in these cases of persons of black skin.

Protection.

Having described the position of colonial labour, and the steps taken by it to protect itself against the competition of the cheap races, and of indigent immigrants from Europe, I now turn to the consideration of the means by which it has sought to protect itself against the importation of cheap goods from other countries.

CHAPTER III

PROTECTION OF NATIVE INDUSTRIES

Colonial Protection in 1868.

Greater Britain contained a chapter upon the subject of Protection which led to so much discussion that I was forced in later editions to add a footnote to the effect that, while it had at first been rightly understood as a mere statement by an English Free Trader of the views held by colonial protectionists, it had subsequently been misread to be a defence of protectionist views. The fact is that it is not easy for a Free Trader to give a perfectly fair statement of the facts bearing upon colonial Protection without being himself thought to be an apostate; for it is necessary in the first place, and above all, to point out that many of the statements made by British and by New South Wales Free Traders with regard to the consequences of colonial Protection will not stand the test of examination. In *Greater Britain* I pointed out that colonial Protection was not only strong but growing, and that it had in Victoria and Canada the support of many extremely able and intelligent men who were perfectly convinced protectionists, while throughout the colonies there was a rapidly increasing minority in its favour. Since that time the whole of the great self-governing colonies, except New South Wales and the Cape, have become protectionist, while the Cape has heavy duties upon

most goods, put on, however, mainly for revenue purposes, but now beginning to give rise to a growth of protectionist opinion; and in New South Wales the Free Traders hold their own only by a bare majority. I also showed that many colonial protectionists were willing to admit the truth of most of the Free Trade arguments. It is not denied that the effect of Protection is to increase the cost of goods to the consumer. It is admitted that Free Trade would tend to the more rapid peopling of the country. I argued that the Protection of the English across the seas was no national delusion, but a system deliberately recommended as one, on the whole, conducive to the prosperity of each young country, in spite of pocket losses which came home to all.

Effect of subsequent experience.

The light which has been thrown upon the problem in the last two-and-twenty years shows that wages have been kept up, and even raised in the protectionist colonies, above the point at which they stood in 1868, but that there has been a similar increase in neighbouring colonies under a system of Free Trade. The hours of labour are the same, the rate of wages of artisans substantially the same, and the cost of living about the same, in the adjoining colonies of Victoria and New South Wales, under different fiscal systems. The foreign goods that are consumed compete on a fairly equal footing with goods manufactured in the colonies, the import duties of Victoria (amounting until very lately on the average to from 17 or 20 to 25 per cent on the articles taxed) giving a slight advantage to the colonial manufacturer, but not greatly affecting prices of cheap goods, in which the local manufacturer would be able now to hold his own without Protection, though he will not admit this. Prices

are, however, affected in Victoria by over-production, and the colony possesses so small an internal market that the recent application of a more rigid system of Protection at her frontiers will tend to increase the risk of this over-production, with consequent fluctuation of prices. Victoria, under a protectionist system, has developed an export trade about equal to that, in the same classes of goods, of the adjoining Free Trade coal-possessing colony. Canada, too, is beginning to export her manufactured goods, and to compete with Austria in the supply of furniture to distant markets, such as those of Turkey. As French-Canadian labour is good and cheap, and timber of all kinds to be had at an extraordinarily low price, she might have done so without Protection. Victoria greatly increased her duties on many classes of goods at the end of the session of 1889; but there has not as yet, of course, been time to judge of the results upon her trade or upon wages. My remarks must, therefore, be understood as applying to the state of things developed under the tariff existing previously to the end of the last session of the Victorian Parliament.

Victoria under Protection.

It is a curious fact that Protection has so eaten into the national temperament of Victoria that the writers in that colony who take the Free Trade side, and who believe themselves to be Free Traders, employ arguments of the most purely protectionist type, which they try to turn against the other party. When M. Challemel-Lacour told Lord Granville that he was a Free Trader, Lord Granville replied, as is well known, that he was aware of it, but could not find the difference between a French Free Trader and an English protectionist; and we may say the same of some Victorian Free Traders—as, for example, Mr. Service—so far as

their arguments are concerned. The position of the Victorian Free Traders was clearly explained in the election of 1889 by Mr. Murray Smith when he stated that Protection is so deeply rooted in Victoria that not only must any contest over the tariff be hopeless for those who like himself are Free Traders, but that the vested interests which have been created by Protection are now so important that, even if they had the power to sweep away Protection, it would be dangerous to exercise it suddenly. The Victorian protectionists have found the same practical difficulties in their way as have the protectionists of France: the raw material of one trade is the manufactured article of another. Foreign stuffs are imported on a large scale and made into clothing in Victoria; the duty upon woollen goods not having been sufficient to promote a rapid growth of the woollen industry in Victoria, but the duty upon clothing being sufficient to protect the local clothing manufactories. When it was proposed to increase the duties upon woollen goods the operatives of the clothing factories attacked the proposal in the same way in which the protected users of English yarns in France attack proposals to increase the protection on yarns and dyes in favour of the French spinners and makers of dye. At the same time, the Victorian duties have since been raised. The protectionist tariff of Victoria has undoubtedly added to the depression of the gold-mining industry in the colony, by greatly increasing the cost of the machinery of which it stands in need.

Growth of local manufactures.

It cannot, on the other hand, I think, be denied that the effect of the Victorian protective system has been to enable the colony to gradually supply its wants with a better class of Victorian goods. Only a few years ago, while the local manufacturers made all the

kitchen and cottage furniture, the furniture of the wealthy was imported. Now the local manufacturers are beginning to hold their own in a better class of goods, in all cases where the goods are of a kind for which there can be obtained a reasonably large colonial sale. Victoria appears to be doing an increasing trade with South Australia, and in the latter colony the protectionist agitation is not an agitation against the cheap labour of Europe, but an agitation for Protection against protectionist Victoria. It is an exaggeration to say, as the Victorian protectionists do say, that in the last twenty years Victoria has become the manufacturing colony of Australia. That is so for some limited classes of goods, but for some limited classes only, and she still imports vastly more manufactures than she exports, while the Free Trade colony, assisted by her cheap coal, has also a large show of local factories. Victoria makes no linen, weaves no silk, spins no cotton, and manufactures but a small portion of her woollen fabrics, though the proportion will increase under the higher duties now adopted. The colony is, however, too small, the market too limited, for Victoria to be able to compete with Lancashire in cottons or with Yorkshire in woollens and worsteds—districts in which the trade can afford to see machinery grow obsolete in ten years, and cheerfully replace it with the improvements that are necessary to keep pace with the manufactures of Belgium and of France. What Victoria does under her protective system is to import woollen stuffs and linens and make them into shirts and suits, Protection affecting rather the nature than the volume of the trade.

Kinds of goods manufactured.

Victoria, then, under her protectionist system, makes, as has been shown, most of the common goods she needs, and exports such goods to the other Australian colonies.

The goods of high luxury, articles which cannot be produced in small quantities except at exorbitant cost, are not as a rule manufactured in the colony; but such articles as cheap wearing apparel (including not only clothes in the ordinary sense, but shirts, boots, and shoes), soap and candles, common machinery, and metal goods, are now sold wholesale in the colony at rates very slightly higher than those which obtain in England itself. Of course a locomotive or a large engine for a big ship cannot be turned out as yet in protectionist Victoria to compete with those of Glasgow or of Belgium any more than is the case in Free Trade New South Wales; but what may be called "people's" goods (as contrasted with luxuries) and necessaries, are now manufactured on such a scale and at such rates that the trades concerned in their production would not suffer by the complete removal of Protection. The manufacturers, I repeat, do not admit this, and have lately obtained an increase of some of the low duties, but the fact is as I state it. Victorian manufacturers would suffer very greatly by complete intercolonial Protection, and hence we see the curious spectacle of some Victorian Protectionists becoming Free Traders without knowing it, while some of the Free Traders of the neighbouring colonies are with equal rapidity turning to the protectionist side. Many of those who are interested in manufactures in Victoria, and who formerly found their interest in Protection, now find their interest in intercolonial Free Trade, while Free Trade and Protection in Europe and other distant places matter equally little to them. At the same time, those who are interested in manufactures in the other colonies are fighting might and main, not for that intercolonial Free Trade combined with Protection against

the world which is the ideal of the philosophic Victorian protectionists, but for Protection against Victoria combined with indifference towards the rest of the world. It would, however, be a mistake to suppose that intercolonial Free Trade, with Protection against the rest of the world, is, even in Victoria, the dominant opinion. The intercolonial Trade Union Congress of 1889 declared against it, and the Deakin-Gillies Ministry was forced, at the end of the session of 1889, to abandon its position and to assent, as I have said, to the imposition of increased duties.

Bearing of colonial Protection upon Australasian Federation and upon Imperial Federation.

I have already discussed in the Australian chapters the bearing of Australasian Protection upon the question of the creation of an Australian or Australasian Parliament, and on confederation or union. In my chapter upon the future relations between the various parts of the whole Empire, and especially between the mother-country and the colonies, I shall have to consider the light thrown upon the question of Imperial Federation by the discovery of the undoubted fact that the colonies and dependencies of the Empire lean, by a vast majority, to a distinctively protective policy. It is curious to notice how sudden has been the change upon this point. As late as 1882 an able writer, by no means inclined by political opinions to take Free Trade views for granted,[1] argued that it would be possible to establish a closer connection throughout the British Empire upon a basis of Free Trade, and that the advocates of a Fair Trade Empire would find themselves mistaken if they relied on the illusion that the colonies would be willing to join an Imperial Zollverein provided it were surrounded by a wall of higher duties to

[1] *State Aid and State Interference*, by George Baden-Powell. Chapman and Hall.

outsiders. The writer thought it would be possible to found a Free Trade Empire upon the proposition that low tariffs were the most conducive to prosperity, and he named Victoria, along with Hong-Kong and New South Wales, as leaning to the Free Trade side. Victoria was protectionist even at the time at which he wrote, but there was a very strong Free Trade party at that moment in the colony—a party which is now so dead that the holding of Free Trade convictions by a statesman is looked upon as an amiable eccentricity, which need not in the least prevent his receiving protectionist votes, it being understood that no attempt is likely to be made to revive the question. At the time when the work in question appeared the author was able to declare that only two out of forty colonies maintained tariffs that could be described as high or hostile, a statement which, if 25 per cent duties, put on for protectionist purposes, are fairly to be called "high and hostile," has become untrue. He thought that the Australian colonies were "asking why it is that New Zealand and New South Wales are outrunning Victoria." But since he wrote New Zealand has rivalled even Victoria in the exaggeration of her duties, and New South Wales appears to be upon the point of adhesion to the protectionist side.

Fallacies involved in comparisons between Victoria and New South Wales.

The writer from whom I quote assured his readers that the colonies of New South Wales and Victoria, running a race side by side, afforded a perfect example of the evils of Protection, for New South Wales had outstripped Victoria in the race. But this comparison, which has since been repeated, is wholly fallacious, owing to the existence in New South Wales of cheap coal and the non-existence in Victoria up to the present time of any substantial output of coal of any kind, and on

account also of the overwhelming superiority of New South Wales in size. The late Mr. Westgarth indeed has contended that her smaller area is an actual advantage to Victoria over New South Wales, and that this and the colder climate are the reasons of her temporary success; but I cannot say that his argument carries conviction to my mind. An able colonist, Mr. Pulsford of the Sydney Chamber of Commerce, sets Victorian gold, drawn from a small area, against the New South Wales excess of wool production over that of Victoria, which she owes to her greater size; but this view, too, is somewhat fanciful, for it takes no account of the coal of New South Wales. That the local opinion is not to the effect that the experiment has been conclusive as between the two systems is evidenced by the fact that while in 1882 the Irish Prime Minister of Victoria, in a short-lived Government, had hinted at the possibility of the colony reverting to Free Trade, the two parties in Victoria now vie with one another in Protection, and the protectionists of New South Wales have grown from a small minority into a party all but victorious at the poll.

Population figures

Victoria and New South Wales are now of the same population. When Victoria entered upon her protectionist path she had a vastly larger population than New South Wales, and the fact that New South Wales has caught her up and is now beating her in population is pointed to by Free Traders as pretty conclusive evidence of the truth of their position. It should, in connection with this point, be remembered that Victoria has a very limited soil for a young country; that New South Wales has a vastly larger amount of unoccupied land; and that the fact of Victorians passing over with their capital and their labour into New South Wales

is not in itself a sufficient argument against the protective system of Victoria. Moreover, the mere possession of abundant coal ought to give manufacturing supremacy to the larger colony, a supremacy which she has hardly as yet established. The figures which show the ages of the population have somewhat more importance. There can be no doubt that a considerable number of the people of the best working age have left Victoria for the other colonies, and on the whole this must be considered as at least showing that Victorian Protection has not so vastly improved the position of the working classes, nor New South Wales Free Trade so greatly harmed it, as to prevent what was in itself a natural movement of population into the countries with land requiring people.

Revenue.

The fact that New South Wales has caught up and passed Victoria in revenue is again not a conclusive argument, as Victoria has had to bear an extraordinary falling off in gold production, while there has been no similar natural decline attending the results of labour in New South Wales, and coal-mining in the latter colony is increasing fast.

Other figures.

New South Wales has, however, caught up and passed Victoria in general trade and in shipping. The advocates of Protection and Free Trade in the two colonies have fought during the last two years over the statistics relating to the number of hands employed in manufacture; they have succeeded in showing that the statistics have been so arranged as to swell the figures, and that not much light is to be drawn from them. Whether she retains a comparatively Free Trade system, or whether she, as seems probable, adopts Protection, New South Wales must creep gradually to the front, and the steadiness of her advance cannot form a powerful argument in this controversy.

General view of the comparison between the colonies.

The comparisons which have been drawn between Victoria and New South Wales by the Free Traders and the Protectionists during the last sixteen years, when impartially considered, prove that neither Protection nor Free Trade has much affected the neck-and-neck race which the colonies have hitherto been running, and in which, for the reasons I have given, New South Wales under either system must prevail. It is in fact impossible to show that either colony has greatly suffered from the fiscal policy which it has adopted. Victoria has a better average quality of land, but New South Wales possesses a tract, equal in area to Victoria, of land as valuable as that of Victoria. Victoria has enjoyed in the past the advantage of her gold production; but New South Wales has had her coal-mines, the value of which, in one way or another, has hardly been much less. Both colonies have passed through waves of depression. Seven years ago, when Victoria was in the trough of the wave and New South Wales was on the crest, it seemed as though the Free Trade predictions would be justified, and the colonial Free Traders thought that "the laws of political economy" had been triumphant; but after a short time the conditions became equal, and then again New South Wales went through an era of depression.

On the whole, it must be admitted that the colonies still stand upon about an equal footing of prosperity. If we compare the bank deposits, including those of savings banks, and add to them the deposits in building societies, it will be found that Victoria has a slight advantage; but with regard to these and other figures all that can be asserted is that a protective system is by no means so disturbing an element in national finance and national prosperity as was imagined, before the colonies

had tried their experiments, to be the case. The Victorian figures also go to show that the gross bulk of trade is not much interfered with by protective duties such as those adopted in the past by the colony of Victoria and in the present by South Australia and New Zealand, although it may be by those of Canada, and might be by duties such as those recently imposed upon some articles in Victoria. Twenty per cent duties rather divert imports from one channel into another, and derange items, than affect the sum total, which practically remains unchanged. Victoria, in spite of her Protection, and owing in part to the wealth of her population, stands singularly high in the list of countries importing goods from the United Kingdom. In a five years' period which I have taken for comparison Victoria imported about £90,000,000 worth of goods, and exported £80,000,000 worth—taking the sums at which the goods were valued when they left Victorian ports. In the same five years New South Wales imported £105,000,000 worth, and exported £87,000,000 worth, but during this period borrowed more largely than Victoria, and her public expenditure amounted to much more than her revenue. The Victorian trade returns have been swelled by the Riverina trade from New South Wales passing through Victoria to the port of Melbourne, so that New South Wales trade is really larger, and Victorian trade, from one point of view, less, than figures would lead one to suppose. The effect of Protection is seen in the imports of spirits and beer, which are larger in the case of New South Wales than in that of Victoria, because more distilling and brewing takes place in Victoria than in New South Wales. The same is seen in boots and shoes, where New South Wales

imports five times as large a value as does Victoria, because shoe manufacturing has grown up under Protection. New South Wales imports flour and biscuit, while the absence of good cheap coal in Victoria forces Victoria to import her coal from New South Wales.

Small value of the figures.

The colonial protectionists and Free Traders fight over the figures of colonial trade with a keenness which is somewhat ludicrous. They are led into struggling for a slight apparent advantage in some particular set of figures, without regard to the fact that the figures themselves cannot be sufficiently accurately compiled to make tenable so fine an argument as that which is based upon their slight variations. I have seen the most elaborate disquisitions as to the profits of trade in each of the colonies turning upon hair's-breadth differences, and neglecting the fact that no figures of trade ever came within 20 per cent of the truth—a fact which at once vitiates almost every conclusion which can be drawn from them. Any one who has had to do with trade figures as a professional statistician, or as a negotiator of commercial treaties, is aware that considerable sources of error, and, as a consequence, enormous discrepancies, exist, and that it is impossible to trace one and the same operation of trade, carried on through a port of export and a port of import, by any resemblance in the statistics of the two countries concerned. Then again, besides false or erroneous declarations of value, there are differences of classification between country and country which fatally vitiate all trade statistics. If we take figures that are plain, and as to which the differences are so great that it is safe to found an argument upon them, it is clear that Victoria imports less of certain classes of goods, and manufactures them herself, while New South Wales imports them.

While, however, the comparison between Victoria and New South Wales does not greatly help us, it must not be supposed that, even if it seems by the figures to matter little which fiscal policy such prosperous young countries adopt, there is no danger in a system of Protection. The difficulty which has been found in replacing local by Australian Protection, the marked tendency towards higher duties in all the colonies, point towards increased retaliation on the part of all; and there is reason to fear that constant exasperation may be the result, with disastrous consequences to the growth of an Australian nation.

The position in New South Wales.

We have already seen that Protection is not needed for the purpose of enabling manufactures to grow up on the Australian continent, and that they are springing into existence in considerable numbers between Sydney and the coal-mines. At the same time there can be no doubt about the growth of protectionist feeling in New South Wales, or about the rise of that principle in popular favour with the constituencies. Powerful causes which at one time operated in the direction of bringing about the change were the increase of city population and consequent difficulty in procuring employment in Sydney and its suburbs, and the competition in the markets of New South Wales of the goods produced by the protected manufactures of the sister colonies. There has also been in New South Wales a considerable development of general Australian feeling in favour of maintaining a high local rate of wages, combined with the fear that, unless a protective policy be adopted, the Australian workman will be forced down into the condition of the labouring classes of Europe. The desire to knit the colonies together on the basis of a federal union, and to establish a nation suf-

ficiently strong to maintain itself against the world, and the impossibility of so doing, in face of the feeling of the other colonies, without shutting the ports of the new country against the manufactured products of India and of Europe, have also tended in the same direction. It should be remarked, however, that, though the colonial advocates of Protection desire to shut out British goods, they at the same time expect that the British market will continue to be open for the reception of the wool and other products of New South Wales, while they assume that a rapidly-increasing population in Australia itself will guard against the possibility of over-production on the part of the locally protected manufactories.

Arguments for Protection.

The increasingly powerful protectionist party of New South Wales point out that she imports more agricultural produce than she exports, and is dependent upon the farmers of the other colonies for her food, while many men walk the streets of Sydney wanting work, and there is fertile land in the colony waiting for the plough. These facts, which in my mind point towards the adoption of a better land system, are made use of only for the purpose of promoting a recourse to high duties. Another point of the protectionist speakers bears upon what they think the illogical position in which the colony finds itself by preventing the immigration of Chinese, while it allows, or as they put it encourages, the importation of Chinese manufactures. In reply to the Free Traders, who argue that it is best for the colony, having an extraordinary advantage in the growth of the finest wool, to send its wool to England and receive it back in the form of manufactured clothing, the protectionists point out that wool-getting employs but little labour. They argue that it enriches the few while the many are left unhelped, and declare that it profits nothing if

the imported clothing be cheap provided the working colonists have no money with which to buy it. It would be a mistake to suppose that protectionist feeling in New South Wales is confined to the artisans and the manufacturers. They no doubt once formed the backbone of the protectionist party, as the wool-growing squatters and the importing merchants of Sydney form the backbone of the Free Trade party; but the rapid growth of the protectionists in the last few years has been caused by their receiving very general support among all classes. Some of the Sydney workmen are now Free Traders, but, on the other hand, there has been a considerable growth of protectionist agitation in the rural districts, and especially in the Riverina, which desires to retaliate upon Victoria. The comparison which has been drawn between Victoria and New South Wales, and much relied upon, as we have seen, by Free Traders in foreign countries, is not popular in New South Wales; and, so far as the comparison is brought into the discussion, it is generally by the protectionists, who point to the fact that Victoria, with little over one-fourth the area of New South Wales, bears an equal population and possesses a well-filled treasury, while New South Wales with her vast territories has experienced frequent deficits under a policy of Free Trade. The local protectionists sum up the question by declaring that the experience of the colony under Free Trade shows that Protection is necessary for the development of her resources and the employment of her people; and both the imperial federationists and the Australian federationists help forward the movement, often without wishing it, because there is a general belief throughout the colony that either system of federation is impossible so long as New South Wales stands aloof from the

general fiscal policy of Australasia, which is also that of the vast majority of the units of which the Empire is made up.

Roman Catholics and Protection

There has been an attempt lately in New South Wales on the part of the Free Traders to connect the Protectionists with the Roman Catholics, and to damage the doctrine of Protection in that colony by associating it with a religion unpopular with men of other creeds. In an article in the *Centennial Magazine* of Sydney for September 1889 by Mr. Wise, the late Attorney-General of New South Wales, it was declared that the suggestion "that Catholicism, being a religion which rested on the surrender of the individual, was more likely to incline towards a policy of Protection—which is the negation of individual freedom in industrial matters—than a policy of Free Trade," was one "eminently suitable for philosophical discussion." It should be remarked, however, that in Victoria the Roman Catholic party were formerly Free Traders. On the other hand, the protectionists of New South Wales attack the Free Traders for being subsidised by the rich importers; but this is an argument which may be turned both ways, for protectionist manufacturers also subscribe freely in New South Wales, as in the Dominion of Canada and the United States, towards the party funds of the side from which they expect to gain Protection. Now that Victoria has recently adopted a far higher tariff upon many articles than had previously prevailed within that colony, there is a temptation to New South Wales, while retaining her Free Trade principles, to do a large smuggling trade across the land frontier and the Murray, which it would require high expenditure to guard; but no one can desire that the irritation in Victoria which would result from such a policy should be superadded to

Subsidies to party funds.

Smuggling.

that which has already been excited by the question of the Murray waters. The intention on the part of Victoria to continue to take water for irrigation purposes from the Murray, although that river is in the territory of New South Wales, would, under such circumstances as those at which I have hinted, become dangerous in the highest degree to Australian peace, as the exasperation on the part of Victoria which would be produced by border smuggling would cause pretensions to be put forward upon the Murray question, and language to be used, which might lead to civil war.

A difficulty in the way of the protectionists of New South Wales has hitherto been their failure to secure a representation in the daily press proportional to the number of their voters, for both the *Sydney Morning Herald* and the *Daily Telegraph* are Free Trade organs; and the protectionist *Bulletin*, which is not satisfied with the services of the protectionist evening paper, complains that Mr. M^c^Millan is always presented to the people "wearing a halo round his saintly political head," while Mr. Dibbs "is depicted with horns and a barbed tail."

The New Zealand view.

One of the most thoughtful of the colonies, and the most inclined to strike out opinions for herself, possibly on account of her climate and her detached geographical position, is New Zealand, and New Zealand is one of the latest converts to distinct Protection by high duties. It is interesting to note the opinion of New Zealand writers upon the Protection question. There is a general leaning in New Zealand to the belief that moderate Protection, during the years in which it was tried in that colony, chiefly by chance—the duties having been mainly put on for revenue purposes—led to the growth of manufactures which would not otherwise have

sprung up. These are now of advantage to the colony, and are able to hold their own, though, in New Zealand as in Victoria, the latter fact is denied by the manufacturers interested. Mr. Gisborne[1] has given the facts of a case in which a duty was charged in New Zealand on an imported article, with the effect of encouraging local manufacture and founding an established native industry. The result has been that the whole colony is now supplied with an article of local produce at a cheaper rate than that at which it can be imported, so that this article could now be placed in the free list of the tariff without any effect on trade. Sir Harry Atkinson, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, is quoted by the late Mr. Westgarth, himself a strong Free Trader, in his book of 1889, as having stated that the New Zealand paper manufacturers, who were unable to hold their own without Protection, have, after a short period of protective duties, become able to manufacture paper enough for the islands, and to sell at the same rate at which paper can be brought from Australia or from Europe. Still, in New Zealand, as in Victoria, the tendency is towards higher duties.

The Queensland view.

The adoption of Protection in a marked form by Queensland—after a short trial of duties averaging $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent in a tariff standing half-way between the Free Trade of New South Wales and the moderate Protection at that time prevailing in New Zealand, South Australia, Tasmania, and Western Australia, and since replaced in New Zealand and South Australia by duties more upon the Victorian scale—is of considerable interest and importance. Queensland is still mainly a country exporting raw material. She is a gold-mining and a

[1] *The Colony of New Zealand*, by William Gisborne. London, Petherick and Co., 1888.

stock-raising country, and has hitherto exported the produce of her mines and pastoral regions, and of the sugar plantations of her coast. She has had little occasion to give attention to the fostering of manufactures, and nearly her whole population has been absorbed in the production of what we call raw material for exportation. It is indeed a remarkable evidence of the strength of protectionist feeling in the colonies that such a country should have deliberately adopted first moderate and then stronger Protection, and that both parties in Queensland should now apparently agree, like both parties in Victoria, in support of the protectionist principle. The view now popular with both sides in Queensland is that formerly put forward by Sir James Martin in New South Wales, when he said that the magnificent territories of Australia, teeming with the elements of every kind of wealth, mineral, pastoral, and agricultural, were intended by Nature for other purposes than a sheep walk like an Asiatic steppe; that all honest occupations were equally desirable and equally ennobling; that the skilled artisans who had come into the colony were entitled to the development of their trades, and should not be driven, of necessity, to settle upon patches of land which they were ill trained to cultivate, and the fruits of which might at any time be reduced in price below the cost of their production by free imports from foreign countries. It is in my opinion unlikely that, with the increase of population, and the demand of the workmen in the towns for new avenues of employment, Queensland will revert to a policy of Free Trade. At the same time Protection is far from popular in the Northern Territory of Queensland, and somewhat increases the chances of separation.

There can be little doubt about the general popularity

The Canadian view.

of the protective system in the Dominion of Canada, and Sir John Macdonald's long possession of power has been facilitated by his adoption of the so-called National Policy, and not disturbed by the existence of a serious Free Trade opposition. Those who would change the system would substitute for it commercial union with the United States or throughout the British Empire; but only an insignificant minority profess Free Trade views or support their proposals by Free Trade arguments. Canada still imports a large amount of manufactured goods, and is not a large exporter of her own manufactures, being, of course, mainly an agricultural, pastoral, and timber country. But the adoption of the National Policy has affected the import of manufactures, and has caused Canadian manufacturers to win the greater portion of the Canadian market, while there is a general belief, probably untrue, that average prices have not risen. The Canadian argument, which does not carry conviction, is that, when times were bad in the United States, the American manufacturers made what is called a "slaughter-market" of Canada, and poured their goods into the country. The low prices which ruled on these occasions did not continue, and the occasional influx of goods prevented all growth of Canadian manufactures, but when trade was good in the neighbouring larger community prices immediately went up in Canada. As for the attempt to show by figures that under Protection prices have not increased in Canada, the fact that such an argument can be put forth without clear contradiction may be taken as showing that there has in fact been no very great rise in prices. The growth in wealth of the Dominion, by every test that can be applied, has been rapid since Confederation, but more rapid since the adoption of the protectionist

policy than it was before that moment. At the same time there is, as I have shown in the British North American part of my first volume, much dissatisfaction in Canada with the existing state of things, caused by the narrowness of the market that Canada offers to the Canadian manufacturer, and by the difficulty which he still finds in competing in most goods with his rivals in European or Eastern markets.

Although the Canadian, like the American and Australian protective duties, are supposed to be directed against the pauper labour of the old world, it is a curious fact that in one portion of the Dominion, namely British Columbia, protected manufactures (as, for example, that of boots and shoes) and other industries (such as that of fish-canning) are carried on by the use of Chinese labour in the factories. The white workmen who are employed in packing and in transport, and who direct the labour of the Chinese, are, in British Columbia, many of them favourable to the use of Chinese labour, and some of the inhabitants of the Province desire to see the tax levied by the Dominion upon Chinese immigration removed. It is probable that the use of Chinese labour in British Columbia will sooner or later be put down, and in the meantime the present system is curiously at variance with the arguments used in Canada to bolster-up Protection.

Commercial union.

The system which, as I have shown, has a certain popularity in Canada as a proposed remedy for the economic disadvantages under which she labours, by the application of a high protective system in the case of a young country with a small home market, is commercial union with some other country or group of countries. The Canadian Government have pronounced against commercial union with the United States, which

is the remedy proposed by a section of the Opposition, but the Government have suggested the opening up of new markets in France and Spain, and in Australia and the West Indies. Some Canadians are inclined to imagine that a tariff union of the Empire is possible, but the protectionists, who are the majority, of course desire Protection for Canada against what they style the pauper labour of India and of the mother-country. Some Canadian Free Traders, like Mr. Goldwin Smith, have committed themselves strongly to the principle of commercial union with the United States; but the whole of their argument against the existing state of things in Canada points to complete Free Trade instead of discrimination in favour of the United States and against the mother-country. Free Trade would possess this advantage, that it is a system which Canada might adopt for herself without asking the leave of any one, whereas the other proposals find enormous difficulties in their way. When maps are pointed to by the advocates of commercial union with the United States, and the question is asked if it can be wise for two countries with such a border to set up a high tariff wall between them, Free Traders would be inclined to answer that it would be wise to knock down the wall that is built upon the Canadian side, but not of necessity wise to knock it down only for the purpose of building up another wall along the maritime frontiers of Canada.

When the commercial union party declare that it is a crime to shut out Canada from participation in the growth of the commerce of the continent, the argument goes to show that it is a still greater crime to shut out Canada from participation in the commerce of the world. If Canada were to abolish her custom houses she

would be her own mistress, which could not be the case under a commercial union with a country of overwhelming size and strength; for such a power must proceed to regulate the Canadian tariff in interests which might not be the interests of Canada. The frontier between the Dominion and the United States is such that it may be safely asserted that by no expenditure could smuggling be effectively prevented if Canada were to remove her duties, and that the American tariff would be broken down. The destruction of the protectionist policy of the United States would be of no permanent advantage to the outside world, and a temporary gain to certain industries in Great Britain and in Belgium would be succeeded by a lasting loss. Looking at the matter from a purely Canadian point of view, however, I cannot but think that the circumstances of Canada point to the wisdom of absolute Free Trade, and that not only would her resources be more rapidly developed under such a system, but that greater prosperity would be more equally diffused throughout her population. At the same time such opinions are altogether unpopular in the colony, and there is, in fact, no sign of their making way.

Support gained for Protection by the unpopularity of direct taxation.

It is supposed that Free Trade is made impossible of adoption as a policy for Canada because of the Canadian dislike for direct taxation, but it is somewhat curious that this should be the case. Many of the Australasian colonies, with a system at least as democratic as prevails in Canada, show little dislike of direct taxation, and it must be remembered that in the case of Canada a large revenue might be raised from customs by duties on intoxicating liquors and tobacco to supplement direct taxation. Canada would gain by the adoption of a policy of complete Free Trade.

Effect of Protection upon wages.

One of the ablest of modern political essayists[1] has argued out the question of the effect of Protection upon wages; but he has unfortunately discussed the subject as though it were one upon which light could be thrown only by the example and experience of Great Britain and of the United States, and, like too many writers, has ignored the evidence afforded by the history of our colonies. He has shown, as I have also myself contended, that wages in the United States, though nominally much higher than in the United Kingdom, are scarcely higher, except, I should say, at Chicago and in California, when the purchasing power is taken into account. But wages in our Southern colonies — throughout Australasia and in South Africa—are double as high as in England, for shorter hours; and purchasing power is, on the whole, equal, except with regard to rent, while as regards rent the difference is chiefly caused by men with a higher standard of comfort insisting upon vastly superior accommodation. If I cannot side with those colonial authorities who believe that Protection is a source of the enhancement of wages, I am at least forced to admit that it does not decrease them even from the point of view of purchasing power. Sir Lyon Playfair asserts also that "labour disturbances or strikes" are "much less frequent and acute" in England "than in the United States with its policy of Protection." But labour disturbances and strikes are not more frequent or severe in the protectionist colonies than in Great Britain, and a colony in which they have been serious has been the Free Trade colony of New South Wales. Sir Lyon Playfair indeed mentions Australia, but only for the purpose of repeating the argument which I have

[1] *Subjects of Social Welfare*, by the Right Hon. Sir Lyon Playfair. Cassell and Co., 1889.

named above, drawn from the fallacious comparison between Victoria and New South Wales; and his statement of the comparison involves a partial error, for he asserts, without reserve, that wages are higher in "Free Trade New South Wales" than in the "protectionist colony" of Victoria—the fact being that on the average they are for most classes of labour about the same, and only higher, as I have said, for some forms of unskilled labour. Sir Lyon Playfair also attempts to prove that "Protection leads slowly, but surely, to socialism, and tends even to communism"; and he points out that it is not to State-socialism that, in this phrase, he intends to object, but to Revolutionary Socialism. He thinks that the protectionist "is very near being a communist, differing very little from the man who denies the right of property altogether." Now colonial example, so far from giving support to this contention, goes to show that Protection in Canada and in Victoria, where it has been long tried, has a decidedly conservative effect, and no country in the whole world has less leaning towards Revolutionary Socialism or towards communism than has our protectionist colony of Victoria.

CHAPTER IV

EDUCATION

In the chapter on Labour and the poor we have seen in what way the colonial State deals with neglected or destitute children as State wards, and have now to consider how it treats the children of those who avoid direct dependence upon the community for maintenance.

British North America.

The special and peculiar case of Newfoundland has been dealt with in the first chapter of the first part of this work, inasmuch as Newfoundland alone among our self-governing colonies has a strictly denominational system of education, without "public schools" in the colonial sense, the Boards governing the schools being nominated by the respective sects, and entrusted by the State with the appropriation of the grants.

The Dominion.

In the whole of the rest of British North America, although the Provinces group themselves into two divisions, one of which is far more denominational than the other, there is no approach to the Newfoundland plan. The common or public school system of the Dominion, except in New Brunswick, is in a greater or a less degree compulsory, and (except in Quebec only) is free; and throughout the Dominion money is found by the State, and generally, but not invariably, supplemented by local rates, and dispensed through public bodies either to public schools only, or

in some Provinces to "separate" or "dissentient" schools as well as to the public schools. In Quebec there are school fees, but they are low, and cannot be called for from "indigent persons"; and throughout the Dominion the total expenditure upon education is enormous, and the number of children upon the school rolls immense. In the newer parts of the Dominion, especially in Manitoba and in the North-West Territories, something like one-eighteenth of the total area of the soil has been set apart as an educational endowment, and the sums realised by the sale of the blocks of land are invested in Government securities for the support of education. The reason for the existence of a "separate or dissentient" system in Ontario and Quebec is that at the time of confederation guarantees were given to the Provincial minorities for the continuance of their separate schools; and the British North America Act provides that, while the legislature of a Province has the exclusive right to make laws on the subject of education, it is nevertheless unable to prejudicially affect any denominational school systems in existence before confederation. As regards the "dissentient" schools of Manitoba there is an appeal to the Governor-General in Council from any acts of the Provincial authority affecting any legal rights or privileges of the religious minority, and the Parliament of Canada is armed with powers to enforce the execution of the law, but has not so far been called upon to take action under these provisions.

Ontario.

In Ontario the phrase "public schools" includes the public schools proper and the Roman Catholic separate schools. Trustees, elected by the ratepayers, appoint the teachers, levy rates, and administer the public funds allotted for elementary education, while "dissentient

trustees" are elected in districts where the minority object to the management of the schools by the ordinary trustees, these minorities being in Ontario Roman Catholic. The Ontario system is remarkable for the fact that it allows children between the ages of five and twenty-one to attend school free of charge—a liberality unexampled anywhere in the colonial world, although New Brunswick runs Ontario close in this respect. Ontario is also distinguished by choosing the whole of its inspectorate from among teachers, who are promoted to be inspectors as the reward of an educational career; and the Ontario authorities declare, as is shown both in the official handbook and in a useful English work,[1] that their system is in this respect infinitely superior to our own. The Ontario men maintain that the patronage system which prevails in England for the choice of inspectors has been most mischievous in its influence upon elementary schools, and that men with no fitness for the work, who have been "pitchforked into their places," "have sown misery in their districts," the work of education being consequently retarded. The religious difficulty is, of course, mainly met in Ontario by the provision of the separate Roman Catholic schools; but as regards the non-Catholic public schools, which are officially styled "unsectarian," every school (and much the same rule applies to the higher schools aided by the Province) must be opened with the Lord's Prayer, and closed with the reading, without note or comment, of authorised portions of the Bible, and a recital of the Lord's Prayer or of a prayer which has been sanctioned by the Education Department. There is a conscience clause with regard to attendance on these

Extraordinary liberality of system.

[1] *The Schools of Greater Britain*, by John Russell. William Collins, Sons, and Co.

readings. The clergy of all denominations, or persons appointed by them as their representatives, have the right to give religious instruction to the pupils of their own Church in each schoolhouse at least once a week after closing hours. The corporations of school trustees are small, and, in a rural district, only one trustee goes out of office each year. They have to raise by rate as much as is received from the Provincial Government. Classical schools are aided by the Province, and also receive help from municipal grants and from rates. A large number of the high schools are under elective local bodies and are free. The University of Toronto, which is the Provincial university of Ontario, and which is unsectarian and has under it a university college which admits women, is mainly kept up by the State or from endowments originally given by the State; and there exists also in Ontario provision for technical education, schools of science and of art, and a College of Agriculture, all largely helped by the Provincial Government. Mechanics' institutes are subsidised by Government at the rate of two dollars for every dollar locally raised. There are a considerable number of denominational colleges, called universities, which are not under Provincial control.

Quebec.

In the Province of Quebec there is a system which in theory is similar to that of Ontario, except that it is not free. It is based, like that of Ontario, upon the election of school trustees by the ratepayers, with power to provide schools, and with the right on the part of the minority, if dissatisfied, to elect minority trustees, the principal school trustees collecting the rates, but handing over a proportional share of them to the "dissentient trustees" for their separate schools. In practice the schools which are maintained by the school

trustees throughout Quebec Province are strictly Roman Catholic schools, and the dissentient schools are Protestant. As in Ontario, the State and the localities both contribute towards the support of the elementary schools and of the grammar schools and high schools. Children between five and sixteen have a right to attend school on payment of the low fees exacted, and from seven to fourteen are made to attend. The school inspectors, as in Ontario, are chosen from among teachers. Although the grammar schools of Quebec, like the elementary schools, are not free, there are a large number of scholarships by which the picked children from the public elementary schools receive free education, and there is also an arrangement by which the Protestant children of Montreal can climb up, by merit, until they obtain free university education. The fees in Quebec are not only low, but as a rule are paid for only two children from one family, and are invariably remitted, upon recommendation by known persons, on the plea of poverty. In the cities a more elaborate system has been devised for dividing the rate between the Protestants and the Roman Catholics than obtains in the country districts. In the case of the city school-tax of Montreal—which is levied only upon owners, tenants not being obliged to pay any portion of it unless they have specially contracted to do so—there are separate lists of Roman Catholic and of Protestant owners of real estate. There is also a third list containing corporate and company owners, and persons who are neither Roman Catholic nor Protestant, or who are of unknown religion, as well as a catalogue of properties jointly owned by persons of different creeds. There is also a provision that Jews should be allowed to carry their property from the third list to the Roman Catholic

or to the Protestant list at choice. The rates from the first two lists go to the Roman Catholic and to the Protestant commissioners respectively, and those from the third list are divided between them in proportion to the numbers of Roman Catholics and of Protestants in the city.

Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island each possess a free, compulsory, unsectarian public school system, the trustees in Nova Scotia being elected at a yearly meeting of the ratepayers in small districts, and the meeting deciding the amount to be raised by the rates to supplement grants from the county and the Province. The Nova Scotian teachers are directed to inculcate a respect for religion and the principles of Christian morality, and the Roman Catholics dislike the system. There is in Nova Scotia (as in many portions of the colonies) a strong objection to the principle of payment by results, and this system does not exist within that Province. In Prince Edward Island the age of compulsion is from eight to thirteen, and in Nova Scotia from seven to twelve. Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island.

In New Brunswick, although there is no compulsion —its absence being peculiar, inasmuch as all the other Provinces of the Dominion have compulsion in some form—the system is free from the age of five to twenty—an expansion of the principle of free schools almost as wide, it will be seen, as that prevailing in Ontario itself. The New Brunswickers are proud of their system and of the enormous sums of money which they spend upon education; but, as in Nova Scotia, there is a good deal of grumbling on the part of the Roman Catholic inhabitants about the "unsectarian" nature of the public schools, and the absence of provision for separate denominational schools. The teachers are New Brunswick.

empowered, but not required, to open school by Bible reading and prayer if permitted by the trustees, and there is a conscience clause with regard to attendance at this time. As in many other Provinces, the inspectors are chosen from among the teachers. The Province is being urged to introduce a separate school system for the benefit of the Roman Catholics. It possesses a Provincial university endowed by the State.

Manitoba.

Manitoba has that separate school system which exists in "the two Canadas," and the Manitoba system generally possesses a considerable resemblance to that of Ontario; but the age during which children have the right to free education extends only from five to sixteen years instead of from five to twenty-one, the "school age" being five to fifteen. The Lieutenant-Governor in Council appoints a Board of Education consisting of a Protestant section of twelve members and a Roman Catholic section of nine members, of which the Roman Catholic section officially makes use of the French language. In the early days of the Province the Roman Catholic schools, chiefly then used by the French half-breeds, exceeded in number the Protestant schools used by the Scotch settlers, but since the recent large immigration from Ontario and Europe has taken place, the Protestant population has greatly grown. Schools are founded in the most sparsely peopled districts, for anywhere where ten children of school age can be found within a three-mile radius five heads of families can obtain the formation of a school district, and receive a grant from the Province as well as a grant from the municipality, and also local rating powers, the Province laying down the principle that the great cost of education in sparsely settled districts ought not to prevent the erection of schools. The Provincial grant is divided

between the Catholic and the Protestant sections of the Board of Education, the Protestants now receiving about four-fifths. There is a Provincial examining university to which denominational colleges of the Church of England, the Presbyterians, and the Roman Catholics are affiliated, and which is aided by the State.

British Columbia.

In British Columbia there is a large Provincial grant in aid of education; but in this Province the legislature finds the money which in other Provinces comes from local rates. The system is compulsory, free (in the Nova Scotian age of seven to twelve), and unsectarian, and is administered by small boards of trustees in each district, who are chosen by "the people"—a phrase which in British Columbia includes the women. Religious teaching in the public schools is virtually prohibited in this Province; the Lord's Prayer being sometimes read, but this only by special permission of the trustees.

North-West Territories.

In the North-West Territories, as in British Columbia, the schools are free; but denominational schools are helped by the State, and, as a matter of fact, the unsectarian schools are not numerous, and the elementary schools are mostly Protestant or Roman Catholic denominational schools.

Canadian universities.

In addition to Toronto University, already referred to, mention should be made of the McGill College, the well-known undenominational University of Montreal; and of Laval, the Roman Catholic University of Quebec.

Australasia.

In Australasia there are as many systems as there are colonies, but it will be best to mention in the first place those of Victoria, New Zealand, and Queensland, which possess a certain resemblance to one another. In all three education is free. In all three it is in theory compulsory, although in Queensland the law is not

enforced in practice; and in all three it is either strictly secular or virtually secular. Generally speaking, throughout Australia the State builds the schools, pays the teachers, and exercises a general management and control over the schools through a central department; but a certain concession is made to the principle of local government by the election in Victoria and in parts of Queensland by the residents, and selection elsewhere in Australia of Boards of Advice, called School Boards in New South Wales. As a rule their powers extend only to small matters, and they are unable to appoint or dismiss teachers. In Australia, in short, education is more distinctly left in the hands of the State than it is in British North America, except so far as British Columbia and the North-West Territories do not follow the usual Canadian plan. While, however, the School Boards of New South Wales and Boards of Advice of the other Australian colonies have little power, in New Zealand, where elective school committees themselves elect an Education Board for a large district, this Board appoints and dismisses teachers, and administers the considerable State grants, which are supplemented from the rent of lands granted by the State and by gifts, but not by rates. The Ministers of Education of the Australasian colonies have as a rule no power over universities, and in all the South-Sea colonies except New Zealand are virtually limited to the care of elementary education, though in New Zealand the middle class schools are within the Minister's control.

New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia.

The Victorians are strongly attached to their free system, and hold that in the great cost of education in young countries the small sum produced by the fee, with an enormous amount of worry and friction, is not

worth consideration, and is obtained only by means which are objectionable from the educational point of view; and they think the pauperising effects of remission of fees to those unable to pay are distinctly noticeable in the neighbouring colony of New South Wales. Dr. Pearson, a former Fellow of Oriel, the able Education Minister of Victoria, has lately travelled through South Australia and New South Wales, and drawn up a report which forms a comparison of the system of the three colonies. He is a thoroughly competent authority, and seems to be well content with the position of his own colony, except in the matter of too strict an adherence to the principle of seniority in the promotion of the teachers. At the same time he appears to side with the teachers themselves in doubting the advantage of payment by results, which exists in Victoria, and to a trifling extent in South Australia, but does not exist at all in New South Wales, which shares the usual Canadian view upon this point. Dr. Pearson finds that the children under eight in portions of New South Wales are ahead of the Victorian children of that age, but that above the age of eight the children in New South Wales, although pushed on more rapidly and taught more subjects, are less thoroughly taught and possess less accurate knowledge than in Victoria and South Australia. But New South Wales has taught great numbers of its children Latin, French, and mathematics, and these subjects are better taught and taught to more children in New South Wales than in the other colonies; while singing and drawing are best taught in Victoria, as a part of the free system. The public school children of Victoria are supposed to learn to read easy music at sight before leaving school, and if only a small proportion of them are able to keep it

up in after life a good deal has been done for the education of the popular taste. That the attempt to teach music, without fee, should be so widely made is an interesting sign of the willingness of a democratic country to encourage general culture.

Resemblances and differences of Australasian systems.

Victoria, New Zealand, and Queensland, as we have seen, resemble each other in system pretty closely, and differ considerably from New South Wales, while the remaining Australian colonies may be said to occupy a middle position. In South Australia, Tasmania, and Western Australia education is generally compulsory and unsectarian or secular, Western Australia alone aiding denominational schools in the shape of fifteen Roman Catholic schools and one connected with the Church of England. The school age is most extended in Victoria, where it is from six to fifteen or sixteen years. Victoria, New South Wales, and New Zealand possess the greatest number of scholars in proportion to population, and New Zealand the highest average attendance; while New South Wales spends the most money upon education, New Zealand and Victoria standing next. Victoria stands far before the other colonies in the proportion of children able to read and write; and New Zealand and Victoria stand first in the elementary education of their entire people. In all the Australasian colonies the State finds from taxes or grants of land either the whole or by far the greater portion of the cost of elementary education, which is one reason why the School Boards have by law so little power. Centralisation is not unpopular in Australasia.

Free schools.

While the Australian colonies generally adopt the principle of compulsory education they are about equally divided with regard to free education. In New South Wales, South Australia, and Tasmania fees are

charged, to those who are unwilling to obtain remission upon the ground of poverty, amounting to 4d. a week in South Australia for children under eight, and 6d. for children over eight. In New South Wales the charge is 3d. a week for each child up to four of one family, and for any number beyond four the total amount is not to exceed 1s. The fees go into the consolidated fund. In the mother-colony school-fees produce about sixty thousand pounds a year, out of a total cost which still exceeds six hundred thousand a year. Children of school age are allowed to travel free to and from the public schools of Tasmania and of New South Wales; and in New South Wales and South Australia itinerant teachers are appointed in districts where it is not possible to collect a sufficient number of children to form a permanent school. In a country where almost every family pays 6d. a week for a newspaper it is no hardship to provide 3d. or 6d. a week for the schooling of each child, and no doubt an enhanced value is given to education in the minds of some parents by the direct contribution of some small amount towards its cost; but, on the other hand, the difficulties of collection and the dangers of remission are so great that, when the sum involved is so small as is discovered by New South Wales experience, it is almost obviously undesirable to exact fees. At all events colonial example is strongly upon the side of the Victorians as against New South Wales in this respect. Education may be said to be free throughout almost the whole of British North America, and to more than half the population of Australasia.

Sacrifices made for education in the colonies.

Speaking generally it may be said that Victoria is not surpassed by any country in the world in the efficiency of its system of public elementary schools, although Ontario, New Brunswick, and several of the

other Provinces of the Dominion stand on the same level, while South Australia is not far behind. Our colonies compare favourably with the most advanced States of the American Union, and altogether surpass the mother-country in the sacrifices they have made for education, those sacrifices being perhaps greatest in parts of Canada and in New Zealand and New South Wales, although in the last-named colony there was at one time perhaps some waste. New Zealand is somewhat decreasing her public expenditure from taxes upon education, but has endowed her schools with land upon the scale of the education grants of the new States of the American Union. Victoria is now making provision for the endowment of her school system with lands. The colonies have, however, invented little in the educational field, and what they have done has been to pick out the best parts of the systems of the mother-country and of the various States of the Union, and make an excellent amalgam for themselves.

Compulsion.

Just as elementary instruction is compulsory through almost the length and breadth of British North America, so is it through almost the length and breadth of Australasia, though there are considerable differences in the degree in which compulsory attendance is enforced in practice. In South Australia, as in Queensland, compulsion is more a theory than a fact.

The religious difficulty.

The Australasian colonies, with the exception of Western Australia, avoid all concessions to the denominational system. Western Australia may be said to possess a system not unlike that of the mother-country, and there is in this country of the future compulsory attendance at schools either "public" (and these secular or virtually secular) or denominational but State aided. In the whole of the remainder of Australasia only public

schools are helped, and these are either secular, or, as in Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and British Columbia, unsectarian and not supplemented by the provision of State-aided denominational schools.

There is no attempt in Australasia to imitate, with a view to the conciliation of Roman Catholics hostile to the public schools, the system prevailing in Ontario and Manitoba. In New South Wales the teachers have to give lessons, which must be "non-sectarian," out of the Irish National Series of Scripture Lessons, and the clergy of the Roman Catholic Church and a portion of the Church of England clergy maintain a hopeless agitation against the system. The law in New South Wales, in New Zealand, in Tasmania, and in Queensland allows any clergyman of the school district to attend the school, at such suitable hour as may be arranged, to give Scripture lessons to the children of his own denomination, but, in practice, few of them attend. Here and there some will do so twice a week for a time, and a teacher is told off to keep order for them; but after a year or two, for one reason or another, the practice drops. In South Australia it is within the power of the parents to demand the reading of the Scriptures, but the reading is seldom asked for. In New Zealand a Bill to compel Bible reading in the schools was rejected by a large majority at the time when Sir Robert Stout was Prime Minister and Minister of Education.

In Victoria, where the system is secular and where no religious teaching is allowed in school hours, unless that vague religion which is to be drawn from Nelson's Series of Royal Readers can be said to constitute religious teaching, the clergy are at liberty to use the buildings for teaching their own flocks; but here

In Victoria.

also they do not avail themselves of the opportunity, and confine themselves to a somewhat sterile agitation. Some of the creeds work for the reading of the Bible without comment, others ask for the books of the Irish National Series, while the Roman Catholics and a portion of the clergy of the Church of England refuse to accept any system but one of denominational schools.

An association, chiefly consisting of ministers of religion, which was formed for the purpose of providing religious instruction in the State schools of Victoria, ceased to exist after a life of two years' duration; but there is still "The Bible and State Schools League," of which Bishop Moorhouse was one of the founders. There seems before this League as little prospect of success as lies before the Roman Catholic Church and those few clergy of the Church of England who are working for State aid to denominational schools, for the Education Act appears to have a marvellously strong hold upon the affections of the Victorian people, who vote steadily against candidates who are suspected of a desire to upset it. Pastorals are issued by the Roman Catholic Church against those who send their children to "godless schools"; but the difficulty caused by sparse population in the rural districts prevents the Roman Catholic community from supplying accommodation in separate schools for their own children, and as a matter of fact the Roman Catholics largely resort to the public schools. At the same time in New South Wales and in Victoria the Roman Catholic Church provides school accommodation for more than one-tenth of the total population of school age. Aid to small denominational schools in the thinly peopled districts would mean a large expenditure

by the State, and there is little chance of the Victorian voters agreeing to such a system. From time to time the Roman Catholic Church refuses Confirmation to children attending the State schools, and pressure has been put on the parents in order to procure withdrawal; but, nevertheless, the practice of sending Roman Catholic children to the public schools continues.

Roman Catholics in Australia.

No one can fail to admire the earnestness and consistency which the Roman Catholic Church has shown upon this question and the sacrifices which a community, comparatively speaking poor in the colonies and in the United States and in Great Britain, has made for Roman Catholic education; but these considerations must not make us shut our eyes to the fact that in none of the English-speaking countries do the Roman Catholics make that amount of way upon the question to which their numbers and political influence would seem to entitle them. The average view taken by the Australian voters, who refuse to help the denominational system, is that it is the duty of the State to see that the children are educated in needful branches of secular instruction, while they think that the Churches exist mainly for the purpose of providing religious instruction. The success of the Sunday School system is pointed to as a proof of the wisdom of the voluntary system, and the voters say: "We do our part; do yours, or leave it alone, as you think best."

Higher instruction.

Victoria has not yet extended its public system to secondary education, except by giving many scholarships as the reward of merit to the best pupils of the primary schools, but wholly supports elementary education and helps a university and colleges. In New South Wales the State not only gives a good deal of superior teaching in its elementary schools, but, like the Canadian Province

of Ontario, also assists secondary education, and supports its university in addition to helping the colleges in connection with it. In all the towns of New South Wales there are schools called superior public schools, which compete with private high schools. In New Zealand the State has been mainly instrumental in providing secondary education, but the cost is great, and the public provision is being gradually withdrawn in the interests of economy, and replaced by local help. In New South Wales, and in those other colonies in which the State largely helps in the work of secondary education, fees are charged in the secondary schools to the great majority of those who attend them, and these schools are practically self-supporting. The working classes in the colonies as a rule seem to prefer the scholarship system to the undertaking of secondary education by the State. Most of the boys when they are fourteen are wanted by their families to work, and even the provision of free education for longer years will not tempt fathers to keep their children from the trades or callings that they wish them to pursue. The scholarship system allows the picked children of the working class to take advantage of free higher education, and it is only for the picked children that a demand for such training exists. It is therefore probable that secondary education will continue in all the colonies to be carried out mainly by private enterprise, or by colleges founded by the various Churches, or by schools which, if nominally public and aided by the State, will nevertheless charge fees sufficient to defray the greater portion of the cost. The character of secondary education in the colonies is improving every year, and, on the whole, is satisfactory—giving an excellent liberal training, superior to that of the average school in England.

New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, and New Zealand all have universities aided by the State, and largely supplied with professors tempted out from England by good salaries. Tasmania is now engaged on the organisation of a similar system. Generally speaking it may be said of these universities that their pass standard is higher than a pass degree of Oxford or of Cambridge, and as high as that of London; but their honour work is less good than that of the old English universities. In their arrangement the colonial universities approximate more closely to Scotch universities than they do to English, and there is a considerable similarity between Melbourne University and the universities of Edinburgh and of Glasgow. All the Australian universities now admit women, whose success has been great in proportion to their numbers, and all of them receive large benefactions. Sydney University has obtained nearly £200,000 from a single donor, and possesses considerably over £300,000 of invested property, besides enjoying one of the largest annual public grants made to any university by any State in the whole world. Melbourne University has a grant only less considerable than that of Sydney, and great private gifts have been made to the Church of England and the Presbyterian colleges affiliated to the university. The New Zealand university is an examining body without fixed abode, and the teaching in New Zealand is conducted by the colleges in the chief towns. In addition to these universities and colleges there are scholarships tenable at Edinburgh and London, offered by the University of Adelaide and the South Australian and Tasmanian Governments, besides the scholarships tenable at the older English universities which have been already mentioned.

Australasian Universities.

New South Wales was the first of the Australian

Technical education.

colonies to make much provision for technical instruction, and its Technical College is a considerable institution. The Working Men's College of Melbourne is due to private benefactors, and has a large number of students, whose work is of a high level, while the Schools of Mines at Ballarat and Sandhurst and the Technical College in Geelong are also flourishing. Land has been set apart in Victoria as an endowment for agricultural colleges, and schools of design have been established throughout the country, as has been seen. South Australia has a flourishing Agricultural College already in existence, with a large experimental farm attached to it, while New Zealand possesses one in the middle or south island. The mechanics' institutes and Athenæums, which are to be found from one end of Australasia to the other, and which in most of the Australasian colonies are assisted by the State, as they are in Ontario, must be mentioned in connection with education; and free libraries, which are established in some of the smallest villages, are also far more generally diffused in the colonies than they are at home. The cadet system and teaching of military drill in connection with education is not general throughout the colonies, but is pushed far in Victoria.

Newspaper education.

I have already spoken of the colonial weekly newspapers, and noted their extraordinary bulkiness and solidity, but it is almost necessary to name them in connection with popular education in the colonies; for their encyclopedic information, if carefully studied, as it is studied in the bush, constitutes a considerable amount of practical teaching. The heavy toil of the up-country stations leaves little time on weekdays for reading or for keeping up in any way the excellent primary education which has been given in the colonial schools; but

Sunday is, as a general rule, carefully observed as a day of rest, and largely spent in reading the weekly productions of the colonial press; and the horticultural, agricultural, musical, artistic, literary, and popular scientific information given in these huge journals is of a formidable kind.

Australian educational peculiarities.

In some of the colonies, as, for example, in South Australia, special provision has been made by law for the punishment of those who "upbraid" any teacher in the presence or hearing of his pupils. In other colonies, as, for example, in Victoria, the Queen's birthday and the Prince of Wales's birthday have been set aside as public school holidays throughout the colony. In all the colonies there is more mixture of classes in the public schools than is seen in England; and in some of them, or rather in parts of some of them, there is an absolute mixture of classes in the schools, with results that are excellent for all. "Mixed schools" of boys and girls are not so common in the colonies as in the United States; but they exist, and in Queensland are somewhat numerous. In some of the colonies private schools are inspected by the State, and in these cases the State scholarships giving free higher education are sometimes open to pupils coming from the inspected non-public (that is, from the Roman Catholic) schools. In New Zealand the principle of the cumulative vote is applied in the election of the Education Boards, which are, as has been shown, more important in that colony, from the large size of their districts, than in any other colony of the Australasian group.

Future of colonial education.

While then the prevailing system of public education in Australasia, and in those parts of Canada which are not affected by the provision for "dissentient" schools

made at the time of confederation, is compulsory and secular or unsectarian, it seems popular among the majority of colonial communities, and threatened with no dangers other than those which arise from the Roman Catholic difficulty, at which we have already glanced. I call the colonial religious difficulty Roman Catholic, because the members of the Church of England are divided, and the Protestant bodies in general fairly contented with matters as they stand. From time to time some of the Church of England colonial bishops have denounced secular education, but they have not been followed by the laity, and their charges have been ridiculed by the press under the name of "Protestant Bulls"; and it must be admitted that, while the grievance of the High Churchmen is the same as that of the Roman Catholics, the only leverage which can ever avail to shake the colonial secular or unsectarian school system is that of the Roman Catholic vote. The Roman Catholics and a portion of the High Church clergy undoubtedly feel the being rated for secular or virtually secular schools a thing offensive to their conscience, and will use any political power which they may possess to upset the system. I have said that the opposition is making but little way in Australasia and in those Provinces of Canada where there is not already a system partly denominational; and I ought to add that the crime statistics of those colonies which possess a nearly universal secular system of primary education give no colour to the view that such a system has a deteriorating effect upon those subjected to it.

Permanence of the public school system.

It is necessary before concluding an examination of the present position of education in the great self-governing colonies to briefly discuss the probability of its permanence. Fierce attacks have been made in

Victoria, where there has been more feeling aroused in the matter than elsewhere, upon Dr. Pearson, himself a decided Churchman, for the supposed excision of the very name of God from works used in schools. Bishop Moorhouse's successor in the see of Melbourne has promoted petitions urging the restoration to the school-books of passages relating to Christianity which have been excised from them, and Dr. Pearson has reprinted speeches made by him in the Assembly in defence of his official action. Dr. Pearson explains that he was not in the colony when the Education Act forbidding Bible teaching became law, and that he had not entered colonial political life when Nelson's Series was substituted for the Irish Series of school-books, or when, at a later day, passages relating to Christianity were struck out of the Nelson Readers. He also shows that in 1887 a motion was carried directing him to report whether any of the books used in the State schools contained religious dogma, contrary to the provisions of the Act providing that secular education only should be given in the schools. But Dr. Pearson admits that he thinks that the expurgation of the Nelson Series which took place before his time was unadvisable, and in this view he will be supported by opinion in the mother-country. It certainly seems fanatical to attempt to expunge all references to a religious system of which such deep traces are to be found throughout our literature; and the folly of attempting to do so is seen by the fact, forcibly shown by Dr. Dale, that many of the passages struck out are, if carefully considered, far less objectionable to atheistic parents than the language of the National Anthem, which is sung in the Victorian schools. Dr. Pearson successfully repels the charge of "secularism run mad" in obliterating the name of God

from the school-books, but he does not attempt to show the wisdom of the course which had been adopted by his predecessors. He admits that had he been able to do so he would have "applied to the House to restore some of these expurgated passages, the excision of which has given so much offence," and which include lines in Burns and Longfellow, and in Tennyson's "May Queen" —the passages in Longfellow being, I believe, the same as those the excision of which has raised a similar controversy in some States of the American Union.

Proposals of the opponents of the secular system.

Dr. Pearson is able at present to gain an easy victory over his opponents, because they are not agreed among themselves. He is in a position to show that while the Roman Catholics form the backbone of the opposition to the public school system in Victoria, they denounce as strongly the New South Wales system of unsectarian Bible teaching (which some of those who temporarily act with them wish to introduce into Victoria) as they do the Victorian secular system. But Bishop Moorhouse in his day and other later Church of England leaders in Victoria have from time to time proposed not only that unsectarian religious teaching should be introduced into the State schools, but also that a grant should be given to the Roman Catholics in aid of denominational education. Bishop Moorhouse was prepared to give a pledge that the Church of England, or as it is called by Victorian politicians the Anglican Church, in Victoria would never ask for any separate grant for itself, even though the Roman Catholic Church were subsidised, provided unsectarian teaching in the schools were allowed. The Presbyterians are very strong in Victoria—stronger perhaps than in any colony except New Zealand—and some of the leaders of the Presbyterian Church support some of the English High Churchmen

in proposing a grant to denominational schools. On the other hand, the proposal to grant separate sums of money to the Roman Catholic Church for purely denominational education is unpopular with all those who value the secular results of the present system, and in resisting it colonial ministers are able to point to the fact that the majority of the Roman Catholic laity in practice acquiesce in the secular system. Dr. Pearson asserts that only 20,000 out of more than 50,000 Roman Catholic children in Victoria attend Roman Catholic schools, and he says that this number of 20,000 is subject to deductions. He calculates that among the 20,000 are included the children of rich Roman Catholics, who attend denominational schools in the same way in which the children of rich Protestants attend private schools often denominational, and that it includes many children who regularly attend State schools, but are withdrawn for some months before their first Communion (in order that Confirmation may not be refused to them) and placed for a time in Roman Catholic schools. Dr. Pearson calculates that, when allowance is made for these classes, the public schools of Victoria may be said to educate two-thirds of the children of the Roman Catholic community. The reply.

The Victorian politicians maintain that Victorian patriotism is promoted by the destruction of the old feelings of religious and of racial animosity, by the children all growing up together, sitting on the same bench, learning the same lessons, and playing in the same playground, Protestant and Roman Catholic looking upon one another as fellow-countrymen instead of as enemies or natural opponents. They assert that religious hatred is dying out in Victoria, and does not exist at all among those who have been educated at the

public schools. It is a remarkable fact upon Dr. Pearson's side that one-fourth of the public teachers in Victoria "are Roman Catholics, who are not deterred by their religion from teaching in our schools, who rise to be inspectors and to hold the highest places in the Department, and many of whom I know to be most cordially attached to the system."

We may well doubt whether the Roman Catholics, even though assisted by the authorities of the Church of England and, it may be, of the Presbyterian Church, will make way upon this question, and feel certain that they will not do so unless by the political influence of the Roman Catholic vote at moments of an equal division of parties. The feeling, too, in Victoria upon the side of the public school system is so strong, the conviction of the majority of the voters that the Sunday school system is a complete success as regards the religious instruction of the young so nearly unanimous, that attempts to use the Roman Catholic vote for the purpose of upsetting the public school system are apt to cause a coalition of parties against denominational grants, and to depress for a long time the fortunes of the party suspected of a leaning towards them. The Roman Catholic Church is stronger in portions of the United States than she is in Queensland or Victoria, and yet her strength has not prevailed to obtain a revision of the school system of the States of the American Union in accord with her demands. If ever the agitation against the complete exclusion of religion from the public schools should in the colonies possessing a secular system rise to a height which makes some form of concession necessary, it seems possible that that concession will take the shape of a small recognition of the religious principle in forms which would be more offensive to Roman Catholic

opinion than even a strictly secular system, but would detach the Presbyterians and many of the Churchmen from the ranks of those who at the present moment are inclined to lend assistance to the demand for denominational grants.

The Cape.

Widely different is the problem of public education in South Africa from that presented by Australasia and British North America. The Cape system of education for the whites was virtually established by Sir John Herschel, the Astronomer-Royal, and supplemented by a system dealing with the natives which bears the name of Sir George Grey. The Roman Catholics did not receive help under Sir John Herschel's system, because they rejected that amount of State control which in some colonies they have since put up with; but, on the whole, the plan laid down formed a liberal and comprehensive system. There are now in the Cape public schools for whites largely helped by Government grants, but the State assists nearly all elementary schools of every kind as well as secondary schools, and the university—an examining body. There are free pupils, who are known as "Queen's scholars," at the South African College; and such scholarships are given to picked boys, and there are free scholarships in the elementary schools. Grants are made by the Cape to boarding schools, in order to deal with the sparse population of the rural districts—a system which is unusual in the colonies, but not entirely unknown outside the Cape, as there is something like it in South Australia. There are in Natal grants, as has been mentioned in the South African part of this work, for children present at inspection who have been under instruction at their homes. At the Cape there are farm schools, to which grants are given where they are established six miles from any

public school and bring together not fewer than five children to be taught. It is found that the Dutch colonists teach their children Dutch at home, but willingly send them to school to learn English, although a small number of parents who send their children to the schools express the desire that they should be taught in Dutch and should not learn English. As regards the public elementary schools, the local managers (who are the Municipal Boards or the District Councils, or persons appointed by them, or, where they refuse to act, managers elected by householders willing to guarantee the expenses) have power to provide for religious teaching subject to a conscience clause. The managers in the Cape have far larger powers than the Australian Boards of Advice, for they decide the question as to the teaching of Dutch, fix school fees, and nominate teachers. The vast majority of the schools of the Cape are two different classes of schools dealing with dark-skinned inhabitants, and primary education may be said to be more widely spread among the native population of the Cape of Good Hope than among the dark-skinned majority in colonies where there is a numerous black or yellow population, except indeed in one or two of the West-India islands and Hong-Kong. There are in the Cape scholarships similar to those of South Australia and Tasmania, of Trinidad and Barbados, to enable young colonists to take degrees at European universities. There are several excellent institutions for higher education which are aided by the State, of which the South African College at Cape Town is undenominational, and the Stellenbosch College Dutch; while of two diocesan colleges in connection with the Church of England one maintains a ladies' college of considerable size.

Natal. In Natal there is a double system, the colony keep-

ing up public schools in spite of the existence of State-aided denominational schools, and the state of things in Natal, as in Western Australia, is somewhat similar to that which prevails in England. The Natal State grant is very high, being more than £5 a head on every scholar; but less is done for native education and for Hindoo education by Natal than is done for Kafir education by the Cape.

Crown Colonies.

The Crown Colonies, other than Western Australia and Natal, which have been mentioned, yield examples of every kind of system—from those of Hong-Kong and Barbados, which provide almost as freely for the education of the black or yellow population as do the self-governing colonies for that of their white inhabitants, down to those which resemble that of India in the paucity of the numbers of pupils attending school in proportion to the total population. It is impossible, and if it were possible it would be useless, to describe in detail the various plans adopted for education in Crown Colonies. In Heligoland we have a compulsory system, under which all the children attend a free, mixed, German and English school. In St. Helena also there is a compulsory system, while the schools consist partly of Government schools and partly of schools (more numerous) merely assisted by the State. In Malta there is a Government system of free schools; but the schools are denominational, and, in fact, strictly Roman Catholic. In Hong-Kong there is a Government secular system, but the colony also aids denominational schools. In the majority of the Crown Colonies, but a majority which does not contain the most important, the system is one of denominational schools aided by the State, as, for example, in British Honduras, British Guiana, The Gambia, Lagos, and Sierra Leone; and the Gold Coast

finds its education chiefly in aided denominational schools. In Ceylon there are Government unsectarian schools which are free for vernacular education, while fees are taken for English teaching; but there are also a larger number of State-aided schools, mostly denominational. In the Straits Settlements there is a similar system, as well as in Mauritius.

Trinidad.

Of the West Indies, Trinidad has had the most interesting educational history, fully described by a great writer with leanings towards the secular system at one time in force in that island under circumstances which made its adoption a matter of peculiar difficulty.[1] In Trinidad the majority of the population are Roman Catholic, and in addition to a large Roman Catholic black population there is a considerable element of Roman Catholic Spanish and French whites, yet a secular system was introduced by a rash Governor, with the natural result that the Roman Catholic clergy, assisted, I believe, by the clergy of the Church of England, took away a large proportion of the children from the schools. The system had to be withdrawn, and one of State aid to schools of all descriptions substituted. There is in Trinidad a secular State college which might be termed a university, and to which is affiliated the College of the Immaculate Conception, a strictly denominational Roman Catholic institution; and Trinidad is also remarkable among small colonies for holding examinations for scholarships at the London University, as well as giving scholarships of her own to be held at the older universities of England.

Other West India

In Jamaica and the Leeward Islands education is increasing among the negroes with remarkable rapidity.

[1] *At Last*, by Charles Kingsley. Macmillan and Co., new edition, 1889.

Turk's Island has adopted a free and unsectarian system, while in the Leeward Islands of Antigua, St. Kitts, and Nevis the system is denominational with State aid; but the fees which are exacted in nearly all the islands are a hindrance to education among the negroes. In Grenada there is a double system of Government and of aided schools; in Bermuda a compulsory system, but without free schools; in Bahamas a free unsectarian system, partly compulsory, as well as aid to other schools; while Barbados heads the list among the West Indian colonies in the proportion of school attendance to population, and maintains Government scholarships to be held at Oxford or Cambridge, as well as makes grants to the winners of scholarships at London University. and Atlantic islands.

Except to a student of educational systems, or as a branch of the inquiry into the future of the negro, the position of education in the Crown Colonies is of less immediate interest than that of education in the self-governing colonies; and while we have perhaps little to be proud of in the extent of education revealed by the figures relating to India and the Crown Colonies, we may turn with pleasure to the educational statistics of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The citizens of the United States, in spite of their strong and general opinion against admitting to equality the negro race, have made far better provision for negro education in their Southern states than is the case with us in even the most advanced of our West Indian colonies. On the other hand, the care which has been shown with regard to the primary education of the people by the inhabitants of New Brunswick and Ontario, of Australia and New Zealand, and, it may be said, of our self-governing colonies generally, testifies to the determina- General conclusions.

tion of the colonists to insure the instruction of the future rulers of the State. Nor have the colonies been less successful than the States of the American Union in securing the education of their youth, while the fact that they have not recently been called upon to deal with so large an immigration of the poor and untaught of Europe has enabled them to show in their criminal statistics even better results from widespread education than can be found in the statistics of the United States.

CHAPTER V

RELIGION

Those powerful religious influences, which our survey of the education question has shown us to be at work within the colonies, are worthy of separate investigation.

Variety of the religious organisation of the colonies.

Of the self-governing colonies some have grown up without an established Church; others possessed one at an early period of their history, but have abolished the system of State aid; while in Lower Canada, as has been seen, there has existed since the French possession a virtual parochial establishment of the Roman Catholic Church, and in the Cape, from its earliest days, a predominance of the Dutch Reformed Church.

Dominion of Canada.

By the census of 1881 the Roman Catholic Church stood at the head of the religious denominations of the Dominion of Canada, but its adherents do not form an actual majority of the population, the members of other religious bodies being to the Roman Catholics throughout the Dominion at that time as more than four to three—a proportion which has probably undergone alteration by the increase of Protestantism through immigration. In the newly peopled districts the Presbyterians are the strongest denomination, the Church of England standing next, closely followed by the Methodists and the Roman Catholics; but taking the Dominion as a whole, the Methodists stand second, the Presby-

terians third, and the Church of England fourth, the Methodists in British North America being a united body. Hostility between the Church of England and the Roman Catholic Church is far stronger in the Canadian Dominion than in Newfoundland or in the Southern colonies. In the Roman Catholic Province of Quebec, as we have seen, the Protestant minority have, on the whole, lived on good terms with the Roman Catholic majority, but in Ontario feeling runs high and leads to acts of violence. The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Toronto, Dr. Walsh, was attacked on his "welcome to his diocese" in the latter part of 1889. His carriage windows were broken by stones, and he appeared in his cathedral with his arm in a sling. Throughout Manitoba, and in the Maritime Provinces, as well as in Ontario, the relations of Protestants and Roman Catholics have been strained since the passing of the Jesuit Bill.

Protestant Union.

Next to the predominance of Roman Catholicism in a portion of the Dominion the most interesting feature connected with the religious life of British North America is the effort which is being made to form a united Protestant body. The differences which separate members of the Church of England, Presbyterians, and members of the Methodist Church of Canada are probably too serious to be bridged over; but the names of the delegates who have taken part in recent conferences on Canadian Church Union show that what is aimed at there has a more practical side than have the schemes which in the mother-country have been mooted in the Lambeth Proposals for bringing about the unity of Christendom. In Canada, and especially in the Province of Ontario and the city of Montreal, Protestants have a bond of union which is unfortunately far more

powerful than any feeling of brotherhood, namely, their opposition to and dislike of the Church of Rome. Although the very word "Protestant" is obnoxious to great numbers of English Churchmen, the movement towards united Protestantism was started, as has been seen, by the Anglican United Synod of Montreal; and the Methodist Conference and the Presbyterian General Assembly appointed committees to confer with the Church of England delegates, who included several bishops. The only result of the Conferences hitherto has been the adoption of resolutions to meet again.

The united Methodist Church of British North America.

The union of the four bodies of Methodists in the Dominion under one Conference took place in 1883, the contracting bodies being the Methodist Church of Canada, the Episcopal Methodists, the Primitive Methodists, and the Bible Christians. The unification of Methodism in Canada (and Methodist "Canada" includes Newfoundland) has been highly successful in its results, and it must be conceded that Methodism flourishes in British North America more conspicuously than does the system of the Church of England. Throughout the Dominion the Methodist Church forms not only a religious but also a social centre for its people, and, although the Methodists do not act as a united body in either Provincial or Dominion politics, any more than do the Roman Catholics themselves, they provide ready-made organisations on occasions when candidates are fortunate enough to secure their support. In Canada, as in Australasia, the Methodists and Presbyterians have in fact the numbers that they claim on paper, whereas the Roman Catholics and the Church of England receive the nominal allegiance of large numbers of persons who neither attend a church nor give money towards Church purposes of any kind. The Methodists by the census of 1881 had 743,000

adherents in the Dominion, as against 676,000 Presbyterians and 575,000 members of the Church of England. Out of their 743,000 adherents the Methodists, however, officially claim only 47,000 "full and accredited Church members," the conditions of full membership being narrow and rigid. There are in existence other, but non-official figures, which set the number of "members" in Canada vastly higher, and even the "Wesleyan Methodist Kalendar" claims 213,000 "members" for the Methodist Church of Canada, as against 78,000 Wesleyans in Australasia; but the word "members" is in this case not so strictly limited as in the other statistics from which I have quoted. The movement towards coalition between the various Methodist Churches, which has met with this extraordinary success in Canada, first in welding those Churches into one, and then in immensely increasing the membership of the united body, is now spreading to South Africa, where the Wesleyans are strong.

The united Presbyterian Church of British North America.

The Presbyterian Church is governed by the General Assembly of Canada (but Presbyterian "Canada," like Methodist Canada, includes Newfoundland), and is also a highly prosperous community. In Nova Scotia the Presbyterian is by far the most powerful Protestant Church, and in every trade centre of the whole Dominion the most prominent commercial names are of Scottish origin, and belong to members of the Presbyterian Church. Presbyterianism in the colonies is, as a rule, united, and in Canada union dates from 1875, when the main body of the Kirk joined forces with the other Presbyterian bodies, as, it may be hoped, will one day also be the case in Scotland in the event of Disestablishment. There is, however, also a small "Presbyterian Church of Canada" "in connection with the Church of Scotland."

The Church of England has more difficulty in speaking in Canada with a single voice than have the other religious bodies; for, less under discipline than the Roman Catholic Church, it differs also from the Presbyterian Church and from the confederated Methodists in having no representative body for the whole of British North America, or even for the Dominion. The Provincial Synod of the Church of England in Canada includes only the five eastern Provinces, although it is probable that the Church will shortly be united throughout British North America under one ecclesiastical jurisdiction. A scheme has been put forward for the erection of each civil Province into an ecclesiastical province, presided over by an archbishop; but, considering that the Church of England outside the United Kingdom has not hitherto been given to the foundation of archbishoprics, it seems difficult to treat seriously the proposal of the Toronto Committee for the simultaneous creation of seven archbishoprics (followed, I suppose, by others, as new Provinces spring up) for the benefit of six hundred thousand people. The union of the Church throughout the Dominion would be of advantage to it, but the Church of England will not gain ground by the mere assumption of high-sounding ceremonial titles which have no appropriateness in a new country, although the Roman Catholic Church has indeed five archbishoprics in Australasia. The Church in Canada displays great activity in the large centres of population, but it does not seem to be making headway in the rural districts.

The Church of England in Canada.

The reports of the Canadian bishops of the Church of England show a certain despondency as to the future. For instance, the Bishop of Ontario writes that "the members of the Church are only a small

minority of the population, and are relatively poor. The wealth of the cities is in the hands of sectarians; and the Unions recently formed, both between the various Presbyterian bodies and the Methodists, have brought the Church of England face to face with two powerful antagonistic organisations." That which at once attracts notice in connection with Church work in Canada, as indeed throughout the Church of England outside the United Kingdom, is the great number of dioceses and of bishops, and the poverty of the young churches. "The Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America" (to give its official designation to the Church which is in communion with the Church of England) is growing rapidly in strength. Mr. Bryce is unfair to this Church when he assigns to it but 432,000 members, while he credits the principal Baptist body with 2,732,000, for his figures are supposed to be founded upon the assertions of those who rule the Churches, and the American "Episcopal Church" declares that it has half a million of communicants, one and a quarter million of baptized members, and great wealth. The heads of the seventy-four "colonial" dioceses of the Church of England (or sixty-three excluding the missionary bishops) tell, as a rule, a different story. Some of the sees have incomes of only £190 or £150, and have but a very small number of communicants or baptized members within their limits. The signatures of the bishops in Canada strike one with astonishment, and point to an assumption of geographical control which, one would think, would be best abandoned. "E., Algoma," "M. S., Huron," "W. C., Mackenzie River," "J., Moosonee," and "A. J. R., Qu'appelle," are not only odd signatures, but perhaps in some small degree ridiculous under the circumstances of the case. The dominant tone of the

English Church in Canada is Evangelical, for the Church in Ontario is naturally somewhat anti-Catholic, from finding itself at close quarters with the Roman Church, and is much associated with the Orange Lodges. The Episcopalian Synods have lately passed strong Protestant resolutions on the Jesuits' Estates Bill, and the proposed amalgamation of the Church with the Presbyterian and Methodist bodies, although visionary, is evidence of Evangelical predominance in the Synods.

The Reformed Episcopal Church.

A body known as the Reformed Episcopal Church began life in Canada some twelve years ago; but, although it possesses congregations in Montreal, Toronto, Ottawa, Hamilton, and other places, it is not growing at the present time, and has to deal with schism in its own ranks. A portion of this Church is affiliated to a similar Church in the United States. On the whole, the Reformed Episcopal Church is an Evangelical body, which discards vestments and even the surplice; and it was started as a protest against the early growth, as it was supposed, of ritualism in the Church of England. But in Canada, where the Church of England is such a body as has been described, there hardly seems room for the continued existence of the Reformed Episcopal Church.

The Baptists.

The only other denomination which finds large support in British North America is the Baptist, strong in the United States, which claims in the Dominion the adhesion of 296,000 people. In the Province of New Brunswick the Baptists stand next to the Roman Catholics in strength, and have almost twice as many members as either the Church of England or the Presbyterians, who stand respectively third and fourth—the Methodists being only fifth in this Province. The Baptists are, however, not a united body; and the

Baptists of New Brunswick are divided between the Baptists who are Calvinists and the Free Baptists; but in educational matters they act together. The Congregationalists possess, throughout the Dominion as elsewhere, some of the most distinguished and popular of city preachers.

The Independents.

Australia.

In the early days of New South Wales the Church of England claimed the position of a State Church in that colony, which at that time virtually included all known Australia; but I doubt whether there was a legal ground for such a claim, and it certainly never was allowed to pass without protest by the representatives of the other religious bodies. At the same time in all Crown Colonies in early days the Church occupied a privileged position, though, as a general rule, by favour of the Government rather than by law; and in most she received endowments or annual contributions from State funds. As Australian settlement increased, and church building on a large scale began, the practice arose of giving State contributions to the building funds of the bodies which were recognised as the four principal colonial Churches—the Church of England, the Roman Catholic Church, and the Presbyterian and Wesleyan bodies; and grants were also given in New South Wales towards the salary of the clergymen of the four denominations. The principle upon which sums were taken in the Estimates for religious purposes was similar to that which prevails at the present time in the Australian colonies with regard to contributions towards hospitals and other charitable objects, namely, the provision of a sum to supplement provision by the inhabitants of the district. The Baptists, the Congregationalists, and the smaller bodies were left out of the arrangement, but the burden on the young State was nevertheless considerable,

and the ecclesiastical items in colonial budgets grew at a pace which seemed to threaten indefinite expansion. An agitation sprang up throughout the settlements which was conducted on similar lines to that now carried on by the Liberation Society in the mother-country; and in one after another the time came when it was thought wise to sever the connection between the religions and the State. The change throughout what once was New South Wales, and now forms the present colony with Queensland and Victoria, was connected only with a partial disendowment. In some cases Church endowments were transferred to educational purposes, but in many the Churches received the lands that they had held, often by State gift, in fee-simple, with power to sell them or to deal with them as they chose, and some of these land grants which were in suburban neighbourhoods speedily became most valuable. The Churches sold a portion and leased a portion of their land; and the purchase money and the rents have become a permanent endowment. There is now little trace of a connection remaining between any of the Churches and the State in the Australian or generally in the self-governing colonies. In one or two colonies there is a provision that all Church bodies may secure reservations of land as sites for churches in the survey of new districts. The grants payable to the clergy at the time of Disestablishment were, as a rule, continued for the life of the recipients, and some ten thousand a year is still paid in New South Wales to the survivors of the old Church of England, Roman Catholic, Presbyterian, and Wesleyan clergy.

Effects of the abolition of State aid.

The increase of subscriptions for Church purposes, even in proportion to the increase of wealth, has been remarkable in Australia since the cessation of con-

current endowment, and it cannot be said that there has been a falling off in the vigour of Church work, while the Methodist and Presbyterian Churches have taken a fresh lease of life under the new system. Religious activity is now great in the colonies — far greater than it was twenty years ago — equal to the activity in the United States, and, on the whole, superior to the activity in England. Sunday Schools, Young Men's Christian Associations, and Missions flourish; and if the Church of England is less strong proportionally, in numbers and in wealth, than she is at home, it is probable that the difference is accounted for by the circumstances of young countries, and by the fact that the immigrant settlers belonged chiefly to the other Churches, rather than by the withdrawal of State aid. The influence of Christianity is, on the whole, greater in the colonies than it is at home, and there is less ill feeling towards one another among the religious bodies than in Great Britain, while church-going or chapel attendance in the towns is more general, though theology as a study is less pursued. No one in Australia dares to express a wish to revert to the State aid system. Mr. Bryce has said of the United States that a main cause in preventing the State organisation of religion is the American limited conception of the functions and duties of the State; but in Australia we find exactly the same phase of thought upon the unwisdom of Church establishments, although in no other part of the world does there prevail so high a conception of the true position of the State.

There is also to be remarked a more general disinclination on the part of the laity to allow ecclesiastical organisations to interfere in politics than exists at home, and parties in Australia frequently attack their opponents on

the ground of a supposed use of ecclesiastical influence in their favour, for the purpose of discrediting and damaging them through this charge. At the same time the clergy of all denominations in the colonies, as in the United States, seem anxious to keep aloof from party strife; and public opinion, while it assigns to them a large share of social influence, holds them in this matter to a course which is recommended to them by the mixed characters of their flocks. It is true now in all the English daughter-countries, as it was in the time of Tocqueville, that the ministers of the gospel "eschew party with the anxiety attendant upon personal interest." As a rule in the colonies there is no disqualification imposed on ministers of religion to prevent their sitting in either House of Parliament, although in many there was at one time such a disqualification, which was repealed when State aid was withdrawn. A most distinguished Presbyterian minister in New South Wales sat in the Upper House, and after the repeal of the disqualification, which in that colony concerned only the Assembly, he was elected to represent Sydney in the Lower House, and was a member for many years. Other ministers of religion have occasionally sat in colonial Houses in more recent times, but generally after having ceased to be actively connected with the ministry of their Church. In Victoria there has been a case of a former minister of religion becoming a minister of the Crown. Nothing can be higher than the respect in which the ministers of all creeds are held throughout the colonies—a change as regards Australia from the days when the clergyman was known by the phrase of the blacks as "dat-fellow-white-man-bin-wear-'m-shirt-outside-'m-trouser," an allusion, as a Queensland writer tells us, to the surplice.

The Church of England in Australia.

The position of the Church of England in the Australian colonies from time to time has varied according to the ability and wisdom of her rulers, and the late Bishop of Melbourne and present Bishop of Manchester —Dr. Moorhouse—had an influence, within and without his Church, which greatly improved the place of the Church of England in Victoria—a colony in which the Presbyterians, as in Ontario and in New Zealand, are rich and numerous, and in which the Wesleyans have also had from the first great social influence. Dr. Moorhouse was remarkable as a colonial preacher, but he was also the most popular of Australian lecturers, and his addresses on weekday afternoons, on the problems of the day, were crowded by business men. I have given in my chapter on Victoria the credit of Australian irrigation schemes to Mr. Deakin; but Mr. Deakin himself has said that as regards these Dr. Moorhouse paved the way; and indeed the bishop has left his mark on the present aspect of many considerable colonial questions, and his name will not be forgotten in Australia, where he made himself as remarkable by his able tactics as by his powerful speech.

High Church movement.

There is in Australia not much tendency towards religious speculation, and the Church of England is not so much divided by antagonistic schools of thought—Anglican "Catholic," High Church, Broad Church, or Evangelical—as she is at home. Australian ritualism is rather connected with the Australian love of sight-seeing and of the sensational than with doctrine; and good music and beautiful vestments attract congregations, as congregations are attracted by fine preaching, and by preaching upon popular subjects. The same congregations will flock, attracted by different reasons, to churches of diverse types, and those colonists who are unused

to a particular form of worship are rather drawn to it by its novelty than repelled, as in England, by the difficulty of reconciling it to their traditions. The High Church clergy in Australia complain of general want of support, and of some discouragement from their bishops. They maintain that they are working towards a revival of primitive faith, calculated to bring about increased fervour in individuals and renewed vigour in the life of the Church. They admit that the Protestantism of New South Wales is robust, and antagonistic to their movement; but they contend that in Queensland the High Church element is progressive and prominent among that portion of the inhabitants who have come from England.

In Victoria and New South Wales the majority of the clergy are Low Church, and most of the bishops have been Low Church bishops. The nomination of bishops is in the colonies usually in the hands of the older members of the Synods, who have as a rule strong Protestant leanings, and who are inclined to entrust the selection of a bishop for a vacant see to men of their own party in England. While, however, the Bishops of Sydney and Melbourne are generally Evangelical, the other Australian sees, and especially those of Queensland, are often now occupied by bishops who are more or less in sympathy with either the High Church or the Broad Church parties. The present occupants of the sees of Adelaide, Tasmania, Bathurst, North Queensland, Brisbane, and Grafton cannot be numbered among the Evangelicals; and the same is the case with the coadjutor-Bishop of Rockhampton. In New South Wales, as in Ontario, the Church is much associated with the Orange Lodges, and the Orange element in the Church is large and combative. There is considerable

religious resemblance between New South Wales and the Protestant parts of Canada. In South Australia and in Queensland the High Church clergy are stronger in proportion than they are in the more populous colonies. There is a great deal of ability among the Australian High Churchmen, and a good deal of scholarship. A considerable proportion of the Anglican clergy in the Australian colonies have, however, belonged to other Churches before ordination, and these men as a rule have little sympathy with the historic standpoint of the High Anglican. The High Church movement in Victoria is slightly gaining ground as far as can be judged by modern alterations in the services, but the change is slow. In spite of all difficulties in its way, the Church of England is on the whole the first religious organisation in Australasia. The weak point is shown by the statistics of attendance upon the principal service of a selected Sunday. In colonies where, as usual, the Church of England shows by far the largest nominal army of adherents, the Roman Catholics, Presbyterians, and Wesleyans sometimes exhibit a greater attendance at divine worship, which points to the fact that the Church returns are swelled by the inclusion of a good many persons who are in fact somewhat indifferent to her ministrations.

Organisation of the Church of England in Australasia.

The Church is controlled in each colony by Diocesan Synods, containing lay representatives elected by the Church members from the various parishes, and the standing committee of the Synod, as a rule, containing a lay majority. The various Synods are united in a Grand Synod of Australasia. The rigidity of the organisation of the Church is a disadvantage to her in Australia. Some of the clergy have wished to "exchange pulpits" with leading Presbyterian and Methodist ministers, but on the question being referred home by

the bishops, an adverse opinion has been expressed which is not supported by local feeling. It was thought in Victoria, I know not with what reason, that Bishop Moorhouse leaned towards permitting the exchange; at all events he would not take upon himself to condemn it, and the English decision, although inevitable, was unpopular. In New Zealand the Church of England Bishop of Nelson, who has lately become Primate of New Zealand, not long since was present with his clergy at the laying of a foundation stone of a Wesleyan chapel, and although his action met with general approval in the Australasian colonies, it has been severely condemned in certain quarters at home. Some colonial Churchmen, as, for example, the Bishop of Ballarat, have pointed out that the colonial Churches are rather separate trees than branches of the Church of England. There is, according to his view, no binding legal connection between the Church of England and the Church of England in each colony; and the Bishop of Ballarat and the ex-Bishop of Sydney have both advocated the federation of the Churches in one great Anglican communion. I think, however, that Dr. Barry does not wish the federated Church to impose English ideas in the matter of Church government and of ritual upon the colonies, but rather to leave them Home Rule in all such matters.

Question of precedence.

A good deal of trouble has been caused to colonial Governors by questions of precedence, and whenever any bishop of the Church of England is allowed to assume special privileges at a levee, as happens from time to time, complaints are speedily heard. At the Centennial Banquet at Sydney Cardinal Moran very naturally refused to allow a precedence which some had proposed to grant to Dr. Barry, the Church of England bishop who held at the time the see

of Sydney, which is sometimes said, although incorrectly I believe, to carry with it a Primacy as regards the Church of England in Australia. According to the Irish precedents, and to one English precedent, Cardinal Moran was in the right. Since Disestablishment it has been held that cardinals should take rank at Dublin immediately after princes of the blood, and although in England the case is different, on account of the existence of an Established Church, in a recent Royal Commission, of which the present Governor of New South Wales was himself a member, the Crown gave to a cardinal a precedence over an English marquis and an English suffragan bishop.

The Roman Catholic Church.

Despite a marked Australian tendency towards the assertion of the liberty of individual thought, the Roman Catholic Church does not lose ground. There is in Australia less disposition in families to adhere to the family religion than is the case at home; and, while men of pure Scotch descent are generally Presbyterians, those of English descent seem to move more freely from one Church to another. At the same time, and in spite of the often noticed want of veneration among Australians, the Roman Catholic Church, though weakened, as in all English-speaking countries, by a certain unpopularity of the Irish who form the larger portion of its flocks, nevertheless attracts to itself a considerable amount of independent support. There is great difference of opinion in Australasia, as in the United States, on the subject of the numbers of the Roman Catholic population. Cardinal Moran some years ago spoke of the Roman Catholics in Australasia as numbering 700,000 —a number which at that time would have placed them nearly on an equality with the Church of England; but colonial statistics make them the second religious body

in Australasia, with about 700,000 people at the present time, and considerably inferior to the Anglicans in numbers, as the latter are now credited with something like 1,300,000 people in Australasia. In nearly all the Australian colonies, but not in New Zealand, where the Presbyterians stand second, the Roman Catholics are a good second to the Church of England by every test which can be applied.

The Roman Catholic Church has not been so happy in its selection of an Australian cardinal as in its choice in England of Cardinal Manning and in the United States of Archbishop Gibbons for the scarlet Hat; for Cardinal Moran is wanting in the broad popular sympathies which distinguish the present leaders of the Roman Catholic Church in the American Commonwealth and in England. Dr. Moran will be remembered in England as having been the Government candidate for the Archbishopric of Dublin, at the time when Dr. Walsh (known to hold pronounced Nationalist opinions) was selected by the Pope. In Australia, as in the United States, the Roman Catholics spend much money upon their churches, and St. Patrick's Cathedral at Melbourne, although unfinished, is one of the finest buildings in the Empire. But buildings and organisation are not everything, and not only do the Roman Catholic authorities in Australia wage war upon what they style secret societies, as they do in Europe, but Cardinal Archbishop Moran has, according to a private circular which has been made public by the ex-Attorney-General of New South Wales, Mr. Wise, pushed the prohibition further than it has been carried in England, by depriving of the services of the Church those who join the Oddfellows, Foresters, Good Templars, Rechabites, "and all kindred societies." It is difficult indeed

to draw a line as regards "secrecy" which shall exclude the Good Templars or the Manchester Unity of Oddfellows from approval, and include the various Hibernian Lodges as worthy of recognition. Such a circular must be unwise in a society like that of New South Wales, and can only be read as displaying the intention to force the Roman Catholics out of the daily life of the colonial State and into close organisation as a separate community. Such a course must lessen the chance of the Roman Catholic Church holding its own against the democratic organisation of the Wesleyans, and is in marked contrast to the policy of the Roman hierarchy in the United States.

Presbyterianism.

The Presbyterians and the Methodists in Australasia do not form completely united Churches, and in spite of a partial or federal union in 1885 there is among the Presbyterians no body which contains an overwhelming proportion of Australasian Presbyterians, as the Wesleyan Society contains an overwhelming proportion of Australasian Methodists. Putting together all forms of Presbyterianism, the Presbyterians stand third among the religious communities of Australasia, and are not far from holding the first place in wealth and in church attendance. They are, however, much stronger in New Zealand and in Victoria than in New South Wales, where the returns of church attendance show them to be strangely weak. The Presbyterian Churches in the colonies, as in Scotland, are given to the sport of heresy-hunting, and some four years ago there was a prosecution for heresy in Victoria, by the Presbyterian General Assembly, of the pastor of the leading Scottish Church, who was driven out, and has since founded a separate Church on broad Christian lines, in which he has the assistance of a priest who has lately left the Roman Catholic communion.

Wesleyanism in Australasia is not far behind Presbyterianism in position, even if the Presbyterians should be treated as one body. The Wesleyans officially claim in Australasia (without the smaller islands) nearly 50,000 "full and accredited Church members," and over 300,000 attendants on public worship—a number even greater than they possess in the Canadian Dominion, crediting them with the whole of the numbers given for the Methodist Church of Canada there united. Non-official figures, as in the case of Canada, are far higher, but the Wesleyan Kalendar gives 78,000 Wesleyan "members" in Australasia as against the 213,000 "members" which, as we saw, it assigns to the Methodist Church of Canada. The number of adherents as given in the statistics of colonies which take a religious census is always higher for all churches than that of attendants at the services; but the Australian Wesleyans have provided an amount of church accommodation altogether in excess of the attendance at worship. It is certain that the itinerant organisation of the Wesleyan Church is suitable to the colonies, and a cause of the flourishing position of the Methodists of Greater Britain. There is a Wesleyan Conference for South Australia; one for New Zealand; one for New South Wales with Queensland; and one for Victoria with Tasmania, all under the General Conference of the Australasian Wesleyan Methodist Church, but there is a separatist agitation among the Wesleyans of New Zealand. The Victorian Wesleyans have been recently taking some part in politics on account of their general desire for the introduction of the Bible in the schools. Wesleyan Methodism.

The Primitive Methodists and the Bible Christians are strong in the Australasian colonies, and the United Methodist Free Churches have also many members: the Other Methodists.

smaller Wesleyan Churches (or, as the Wesleyans style them, "the Sister Churches") having between one-third and one-fourth as many members in Australasia as the Wesleyan Society. The Primitive Methodists are the most numerous of the smaller Methodist bodies throughout the Australasian colonies; but in Western Australia all Methodism is weak, there being only 2000 Methodists, according to the last census, including the Wesleyans. The Bible Christians are strong in Victoria and South Australia, while the United Methodist Free Church is also strong in Victoria.

Congregationalists and Baptists.

The Independents in Victoria have a powerful preacher in Dr. Bevan, who is, however, not alone in the Victorian Congregational churches in ability and preaching power. In New South Wales also the Independents have a considerable social and intellectual place. The Baptists are as numerous as the Congregationalists in Australasia, and if we take all the great self-governing colonies, the Baptists exceed the Independents in number; but neither the Congregationalists nor the Baptist Churches can compare with the Methodists or the Presbyterians in strength. If, however, a union should one day be brought about between the colonial Congregationalist and Baptist Churches, the new body would stand almost on an equality with the united Methodist or united Presbyterian colonial Churches.

Smaller bodies.

The smaller religious bodies are numerous in the Australasian colonies, but the comparatively trifling numbers of their members make it unnecessary to say much of them. Figures do not support the view that the absence of an Established Church tends to the multiplication of sects, for a larger proportion of the population in the colonies generally, and in each colony taken separately, belong to four or six religious bodies

than is the case in England. In those colonies in which a religious census has been taken, difficulty has been found in inducing the people accurately to describe their religious opinions. A great number of persons have adopted descriptions which place them in categories by themselves. For instance, in Victoria one person claims to belong to the sect of the Waldenses, one returns himself as a Huguenot, one as a member of the Church of Sweden, one as a member of the Reformed Church of Switzerland, one as a Sankeyite, one as a Borrowite, one as a Millerite, one as a Walkerite, one as a member of the Brotherhood of the New Life, one as a Theosophist, one as a Man of God, one as a Believer in parts of the Bible, one as a Friend of Justice and Liberty, one as a Supporter of Free Religion, one as a "Silent Admirer," one as a Humanitarian, one as a Positivist, one as an Immaterialist, one as an Iconoclast, one as a Fatalist, one as a Heretic, one as a Sceptic, one as a Worshipper of Nature, one as a Believer in Free Trade, one as a Follower of Bishop Colenso, while many thousands decline from conscientious scruples to state their religious opinions. Such descriptions, however, are matters of individual feeling, and do not point to a multiplication of sects, properly so called; and it may be confidently asserted that sects possessing separate places of worship, or separate religious organisations, are less numerous in Australia than at home.

Salvation Army.

The Salvation Army is strong throughout Australia, and its barracks, and banners, and morning bands, with drums and trumpets, and street corner preaching, are noticeable features in every considerable town; but the originators and the officers have come from England. When the first of the Salvation leaders came out, new to colonial life, they began a crusade against public-

houses, and collected crowds before the bars. This action clashed with the municipal regulations of the Australian towns, and a struggle followed in which the Town Councils asserted their authority, and compelled the Salvation Army to desist from practices which were disorderly. The organisation is, however, powerful, and parades in Sydney and in Melbourne from ten to twenty thousand people upon the racing holidays, when the Salvationists encourage their friends to show their absence from the racecourses by attendance in other portions of the towns. The Salvation Army, who are particularly strong in New Zealand, carry on in Australasia a great number of good works. Their prison-gate brigade and their efforts to reclaim "the lost" are not only praiseworthy, but effective, and seem likely to be more permanent than they have been in some of the countries to which the organisation has been taken from England.

Australasian Protestantism.

The same tendency on the part of Protestants to unite against the Roman Catholics which we found to exist in the Canadian Dominion is discernible in Australasia. The opposition of the Roman Catholics to the school system of the colonies is the ground of this movement in Australia, as opposition to the dominance of the Roman Catholic Church in the Province of Quebec is the Canadian cause. We have seen, in the chapter on Victoria, how marked a tendency there is in Australia towards political coalitions against the Roman Catholics, and the religious tendency in the same direction is as clear. In Australasia, as in Canada, the Protestant Irish and the Orange societies form the backbone of the fiercer portion of the movement; and the existence of corresponding societies upon the other side, under various Hibernian names, strengthens the tendency

towards that separation between the Roman Catholics and the remainder of the community which leads to a recognition of common Protestantism among the majority. It is probable that in Australia this is a transient feeling, for the new Australian population now growing up is imbued with a tolerant spirit, and the tendency of Australian feeling towards absolute freedom of individual thought, in religious as in other matters, is inconsistent with aggressive Protestantism. On the other hand, the difficulties in the way of Protestant alliance are less great in colonies than they are at home. Many persons hold sittings both in church and chapel, and attend services of the Church of England and of the Independent, Wesleyan, or Presbyterian bodies in different parts of the same day. The Church of England clergy and the Wesleyan and Presbyterian ministers commonly attend one another's social meetings, and take part in mixed services in non-ecclesiastical buildings more often than is the case in England. The Anglicans and Presbyterians in Victoria build joint churches in thinly peopled up-country districts, as Baptists and Congregationalists sometimes do at home. The cause of Protestant union is also aided in the colonies by the Evangelical leanings of the authorities of the colonial branches of the Church. While in the United States the body which answers to the Church of England is of High Church tendencies, at least so far as is implied by the adoption of an attractive ritual, throughout the English-speaking communities of the self-governing colonies the Church is mainly Evangelical, especially in New South Wales, where it has a distinctly Puritan tone. When Bishop Moorhouse refused to pray for rain, on the ground that Victoria had not taken sufficient interest in water conservation to

enable him to do so with a clear conscience, the outcry from the Church in the neighbouring colony of New South Wales was great; and when, on another occasion, he informed his hearers that he smoked tobacco and enjoyed it, he brought down a storm of denunciation on his head. Dr. Barry, the late Bishop of Sydney, found himself somewhat out of his element in New South Wales, for, in spite of his eloquence, his want of the qualities of popular oratory, and his scholarly liberality of thought, were difficulties in his way in the Church of the mother-colony. The erection of a marble representation of the Crucifixion in St. Andrew's Cathedral at Sydney brought a Low Church storm about his ears, and when the bishop was appealed to by indignation meetings, and protested that he saw nothing harmful to the Church in the representation, the matter was carried to the Synod, and the panel was removed. Although Dr. Barry had, on the whole, a less marked general influence in Australia than had Dr. Moorhouse, when he left New South Wales all the Protestant creeds were represented by their chiefs at the farewell banquet held in Sydney, and the heads of all these Churches made speeches on the occasion. The bishop in his reply advised the federation of the Protestant Churches, without, however, using those words, which provoke objection from High Churchmen; but his observations as to the necessity of drawing close the bonds that exist among the Christian bodies were understood by his hearers in this sense, and as excluding Roman Catholicism from view.

Sunday observance in the colonies.

On the whole, Sunday is observed more strictly in the colonies than in England (although there are great local differences between various towns), and in parts of the colonies as strictly as in North Britain. In the

Dominion Province of Ontario there is severe local legislation against Sunday excursions. The shops as a rule in Australian towns are shut as closely as in Scotland, and work is as absolutely suspended. Public-houses are closed in nearly all the colonies on Sunday; but, though the Australian streets are as quiet on Sunday as the Canadian, there is in Australia little Sunday gloom. A great many people who have attended church or chapel in the morning take Sunday outings; the parks are crowded, and in fine weather the outskirts of the towns. But few concerts or public entertainments (except of sacred music) take place on Sunday. No Sunday newspapers are published in Victoria, and when a company was started in Melbourne not long ago for the publication of a newspaper to be called the "Sunday Times," it is said that a private intimation was given to the promoters by the Government that the publication would be illegal and that they would be prosecuted. In some of the other colonies Sunday newspapers are published without hindrance. The secularists have in several colonies taken steps to test the legality of selling tickets or taking money for entertainments on Sundays. The proprietors of places licensed as theatres or for public performances are afraid to allow Sunday entertainments, for fear that their licenses may be cancelled, and attempts to evade the law have failed. On the whole, Sunday is less strictly kept in Sydney than in Melbourne, Adelaide, Hobart, and the chief towns of New Zealand, in spite of the efforts of the *Sydney Morning Herald*. The museums and picture galleries, it must be remembered, are open on Sunday afternoons in Sydney, though not in Melbourne, where, however, the Zoological Gardens are always thronged on Sunday afternoons. As a rule,

throughout the colonies there is no Sunday traffic on the main lines of railway, but a large pleasure traffic in the afternoon upon the suburban lines.

Colonial tendencies in religious thought.

It is not possible, I think, to seriously maintain that there is much general difference between the colonies and the mother-country in the matter of religious thought. In Canada non-Catholics are kept together and are strengthened in their Protestant orthodoxy by the existence of a powerful Roman Catholic Church, dominant in one portion of the country. In Australia the cheerfulness of the national temperament is the cause of the existence of more "Universalism," in the American sense, and less Calvinism than in the older countries. Not many real Australians are willing to dwell upon the gloomier aspects of religious thought, and although church attendance and church membership are widely spread, and religion has in Australia a powerful bearing upon human conduct, definite religious convictions sit more lightly upon the people than they do in the old world. Professed Unitarianism is not strong, though, as in England, it is influential out of proportion to its numbers; and while dogmatic Atheism exists, as at home, among a portion of the artisans and of the professional men, it is perhaps less strong in Australia than in the mother-country. Of free thought in its various forms there has been some growth during the same fifteen or twenty years that have witnessed an increase of church subscriptions and church attendance; but, as a rule, free-thinking colonists continue their membership and their attendance at orthodox churches, even where their beliefs are honeycombed with doubt, rather than disconnect themselves from the congregations. Australian free thought is not aggressive in its

character. Free-thought lecturers occasionally draw enormous audiences, but the unbelievers of the working class stay at home as a rule on Sunday mornings and evenings, and do not trouble themselves to join societies to spread their views. The leading Australian newspapers, except the *Sydney Morning Herald*, refer to religious matters from an outside point of view. The Conservative journals adopt a kind of dignified reticence in dealing with religious matters, through which a certain hostility to current creeds may be discerned; while the workmen's papers make no pretence of concealment of unorthodox views. At the same time, in Melbourne the *Daily Telegraph*, I believe, belongs to what is called a religious syndicate, has a clergyman for editor, denounces horse-racing, and decries the theatre; and the paper has made some headway under its new management. Generally speaking it may, I think, be said that there is among British colonists no such respect for authority or tradition as is to be found in the British colonies among persons of foreign race. The French-Canadian Roman Catholics, the Mennonites of Manitoba, the Doppers of South Africa, are clerical conservatives such as cannot be matched among the English race; but Christian feeling has an immense and even an increasing influence on colonial legislation.

South Africa

Religious life in South Africa is of a very different kind from that in the other colonies, and neither the Wesleyans, the Church of England, the Roman Catholics, the Independents, nor the Baptists can be said to count there in the same sense in which they have to be reckoned with at home, in Australia, in Canada, or in the United States. The Dutch Reformed Church is the only religious body which has great influence on the life and history of Cape Colony, and its services are con-

ducted, and its sermons delivered, mainly in a foreign tongue. The Colenso controversy in Natal did not go far beneath the surface of colonial life, notwithstanding the attention it attracted at home. England, of course, has exported her sects to Cape Colony and Natal, but the Church socially and politically predominant throughout South Africa is the Boer National Church—the Dutch Reformed Church with its offshoots.

The latest official return of religious denominations in Cape Colony puts the Wesleyans first, and the Church of England second, as to the number of ministers and of congregations; but the Dutch Church, which is placed third in these respects, is altogether below its right position, owing to the manner in which the statistics are compiled. Then, after a long interval, come the Congregationalists and the Roman Catholics, and then the Presbyterians—so far as they are separate from the Dutch—and, in the seventh place, the Baptists. The returns are misleading, because they include missionary establishments of the Wesleyans and of the Church of England, and the ministers of small native churches, and native congregations in the interior, which are purely nominal. If we compare baptisms, which are a more serious test, the Dutch Church has nearly twice as many as the Church of England. The counting of mission establishments, which are of various degrees of efficiency, makes all calculations as to religious bodies in South Africa untrustworthy or misleading. A recent return of the Cape Government estimates the number of communicants of the Dutch Reformed Church at over 60,000, of the Wesleyans at 27,000, and of the Church of England at 15,000, while the Congregationalists stand next with 9000.

Religious life of the Boers.

We have seen in the chapters on South Africa how religion enters into the life of the Boer inhabitants, and forms to a greater extent part of their daily existence than is the case with other communities except in Russia and the United States. A speech by President Kruger at the opening of the Transvaal Volksraad is more full of Biblical quotations and allusions than is a modern English sermon; and the Boers in ordinary conversation introduce references to the special Providence which watches over their nation, as a peculiar people, in the same way in which the English Puritans or Scotch Covenanters used to do in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The most influential individuals in rural South Africa are the ministers of the Dutch Reformed Church, who live in towns, while the farmers travel long distances to these centres for the Sunday services. "Sunday houses" are erected in the neighbourhood of the churches, which are occupied by the farmers and their families from Saturday evening to late on Sunday night; and, where farmers live at such immense distances from towns that a weekly journey by waggon thither is impossible, they never miss the quarterly sacramental feast, when the churches are surrounded by the camps of those who have no Sunday houses. Churches and ministers are few, but the attendance is large and the ministers are well paid.

The Doppers.

The Dutch Reformed Church, like the orthodox Church of Russia, has outside it a body of "old believers." The "Re-reformed" or "Dopper" Church, which is extraordinarily strong in the Transvaal, is a Church which holds the old Dutch doctrine, and objects to the modern changes introduced into the Dutch Reformed Church. President Kruger is the most distinguished member of the old-fashioned persuasion.

Scotch ministers.

The Dutch Reformed Church is in communion with the Presbyterian Churches of Scotland, and accepts Scotch ministers without further ordination. It is a curious and interesting fact that many of the most distinguished ministers of the Dutch Reformed Church of South Africa are of Scotch extraction, and the Rev. Andrew Murray, one of the professors at Stellenbosch College, and others of these gentlemen enjoy the highest possible reputation throughout the colonies. Although the Scotchmen trained in Holland who have lately come into the Dutch Reformed Church as ministers are not yet the dominant element among the *predikants*, the Dutch ministers as a rule are men of culture. Such men as Mr. Stegmann, for example, are friendly to the British, and their influence has been constantly exerted on the side of peace between the races. The Dutch Church, however, is separated from the British Churches by its very different view upon the native question, and it has sometimes happened that Scotch Presbyterian ministers, trained in the same school, have come out by the same ship—the one to act as minister for a Dutch congregation, the other to serve as a Scotch missionary, and thus to teach, upon the most difficult question in South African affairs, doctrines diametrically opposed to one another. The most successful missionary institution in South Africa belongs to the Free Church of Scotland, which preaches the doctrine of the equality of races, abhorrent to the teaching and practice of the Boers.

Disestablishment.

The Cape of Good Hope, like New South Wales, formerly possessed a system of concurrent endowment of the principal Churches, but one which in the Cape was of earlier growth (owing to the strength of the Dutch Reformed religion, and the comparative weakness of the Church of England) than in New South Wales,

where it was introduced only after the principle of aid to one Church alone had broken down. Disestablishment in the Cape of Good Hope took place in 1875, by the passing of what is known as the Voluntary Act, which, like the New South Wales Act, reserved existing interests, and in the Cape many thousands a year still continue to be paid as pensions under the expiring system. The absence in the Cape, as has been seen in the last chapter, of the struggle between the Roman Catholics and the majority, over unsectarian as contrasted with denominational education, has prevented that intrusion of religious difficulties into political life which exists in the Maritime Provinces of the Dominion, in Ontario and Manitoba, as well as throughout Australasia. The fact that Sir Gordon Sprigg is an English Nonconformist, Sir Thomas Upington a Roman Catholic, Mr. Merriman a member of the Church of England, and Mr. Hofmeyr a member of the Dutch Reformed Church, has no political importance; and South Africa is not troubled by the religious controversies which vex the Australians and the people of British North America.

The Church of England in South Africa.

Religious life in South Africa cannot be dismissed from view without a further reference to the Colenso controversy, although Dr. Colenso's name will be remembered in Natal rather in connection with his political attitude on the native question than with the theological opinions associated with his name in England. Bishop Colenso died in 1883, and since his death the vacancy in the see of Natal has not been filled. The Church Council of the Church of England in Natal petitioned the Queen to appoint a bishop to fill the vacancy. The reply was that steps would be taken for the consecration of a bishop if the Archbishop of Canter-

bury should apply for one. The petitioners were, however, afterwards recommended to join the Church of the Province of South Africa, which the Church Council declined to do, urging that that course would mean the abandonment of the Church of England in Natal, and they proceeded to nominate a bishop. The Primate continuing to refuse to apply for a Queen's mandate for consecration, it was announced by Government in the imperial House of Commons that the Queen would not be advised to appoint, by letters patent, a successor to Bishop Colenso. The Church Council of the Church of England in Natal reply that they do not ask for the appointment of a bishop by letters patent, but that all they want is a Royal mandate for the consecration of their nominee as a bishop of the Church of England, with the view of his exercising episcopal functions in Natal. They protest against the Archbishop's advice that they should submit to the Church of the Province of South Africa, which, he urges, is in full spiritual communion with the Church of England, and point out that that Church has been declared to be separate and independent, while they assert that its bishop, claiming to have authority in Natal, is not a bishop of the Church of England, and was consecrated without legal authority emanating from the Queen. They protest, as a colonial Church on behalf of colonial Churches, against being placed under the personal and therefore varying control of the Primate for the time being; and they urge that, while all religious bodies are supposed to enjoy full toleration under British law, and liberty to maintain very different forms of worship and of Church rites, the Church of England is denied self-government. The Church Council of the Church of England in Natal, with Sir Theophilus Shepstone at

their head, distinctly repudiate the imputation that they are a sect of Colensoites having special sympathy with the doctrines of that prelate. The services at their cathedral at Maritzburg bear out this contention. The sermons are orthodox, and the ritual moderate High Church; while some bishops of the Church of the Province of South Africa have, I believe, been known to wear mitres in their churches, and be surrounded by black choristers in scarlet cassocks, and Kafir deacons in coloured stoles. Owing to the quarrel, the Church of England in Natal remains an Episcopal Church deprived of the means of having its buildings consecrated and its children confirmed. The unfortunate disputes at Grahamstown, during which the Dean locked the Bishop of the diocese out of his cathedral, display the scandals to which the position sometimes leads. The only present importance of the dispute, from a general colonial point of view, is that it suggests a strength possessed by the Wesleyan body throughout Greater Britain which is not shared by the Church of England. If the Church of England is to hold her own in the colonies she will be forced to give Home Rule to her branches, as the Methodist churches have Home Rule, or she will be exposed either, on the one hand, to secession or, on the other hand, to depressing and numbing weakness; and if the Church is to continue to flourish in Australasia and in the Canadian Dominion, the sooner principles are laid down which have been denied in the case of the Church of England in Natal the better.

Wesleyans.

The Wesleyan Methodist Church is active throughout South Africa, and has a local self-governing Conference, but its work is mainly missionary. In the Cape of Good Hope district the Wesleyans possess "Dutch"

churches, but it must not be gathered from this fact that they have a following among the Boers. The Methodist churches in which Dutch is spoken are kept up for the benefit of the Hottentots. In Cape Town the Wesleyan Church is prosperous.

The Roman Catholics.

The Church of Rome is less strong in South Africa than it is elsewhere in Greater Britain, though equally active; and less strong, probably, because the Irish population, which everywhere supplies the majority of its adherents, is weaker in South Africa than in Australasia or in the Dominion. The Jesuits are energetic in the matter of education, and have a seminary for missionaries and an excellent school for boys at Grahamstown, modelled upon Stonyhurst, and presided over by a distinguished ecclesiastic who was formerly superior of the order in England.

The Salvation Army.

The Salvation Army is as busy in South Africa, proportionately speaking, as in New Zealand, or in Melbourne or in Sydney. Its headquarters are at Port Elizabeth, and its methods successful with the Hottentots, although it is said that the Dutch ministers view its proceedings with dismay.

Sunday observance.

Owing to Dutch influence, Sunday observance is rigid throughout South Africa, except in the matter of the sale of drink. It is the custom not to serve late dinner at hotels on Sunday, and even at some of the English clubs this rule prevails, although public-houses are not closed as they are in the rest of Greater Britain. The Transvaal Volksraad continues to add to its Statute-book severe ordinances upon the observance of the Lord's Day; and while there is suburban railway traffic at Cape Town, in the interior Sunday is kept by travellers in the dry season, as the transport drivers are given to regard the day, although in the rains they have

to set aside their scruples on account of the danger of being stopped by floods.

India. We have already seen, in the chapter on British India, the small amount of direct impression that has been as yet produced by Christian teaching in the peninsula of Hindostan. The Roman Catholic Church has made some way among the natives in Southern India; and the American Protestant missionaries, as well as the missionaries of the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society, those of the London Missionary Society, and many other agencies, show a considerable number of teachers and of churches, but only small congregations. The work of the Church of England in India is twofold. She is the Church of the majority of the white inhabitants and of the great bulk of the army, and she is also a missionary body, being aided by the State in the first but not in the second of those capacities. State aid to the Church in India rests upon a somewhat different footing from that which it formerly occupied in the colonies where State aid has ceased, or now in those few where concurrent endowment of all creeds prevails. Every city in India where there is a white population of considerable size contains a British garrison, and in these the Church is mainly a military church and the congregations consist chiefly of men in uniform, who are also well represented in the Roman Catholic, the Presbyterian, and the Wesleyan congregations. As regards the missionary side in India of all the Christian creeds, the accounts of it given in their records are discouraging so far as direct influence or convert-making is concerned. To indirect influence produced by Christian teaching and example, allusion has been made in the earlier portions of this volume. The Hindoos have

lately founded Hindoo Tract Societies for the propagation of Hindooism and for anti-Christian agitation; and the Wesleyan Methodists, who seem to have been specially marked out for opposition—probably because of the extent to which they push Bible teaching—complain of the decrease of attendance at their girls' schools, some of which have been emptied through the efforts of the agents of the Hindoo Tract Societies. The regular churches also complain, however, in bitter terms, of the interference of the Salvation Army. On the whole, the various Church of England and Protestant missionary bodies report advance, but advance which is very slow; and they possess more native converts in the single island of Madagascar than in the whole peninsula of India, vast as is its population.

Crown Colonies.

In most of the Crown Colonies disestablishment of the Church of England, or withdrawal of State aid in the case of those in which concurrent endowment prevailed, has been brought about since 1868. Generally speaking the Christian Churches in them are all in a flourishing condition; the Baptists, Wesleyans, Presbyterians, and Churches founded by the London Missionary Society, but now placed under various Congregational Unions, reporting, however, on the whole, an advance more rapid than that described by the Church of England. In the West Indies the Baptists are strong among the negroes, and indeed it might be asserted that the Baptists are an American rather than a colonial Church—powerful in the United States and in the West Indies, and among the negroes everywhere, rather than in Australasia, where, as has been seen, the Presbyterians and Wesleyans leave them in the rear. The negro majority in the West-India Islands is chiefly Baptist or Wesleyan, and upon the West-African coast it

is principally Wesleyan. While in Jamaica and most of the other West-India islands all Churches have ceased to be aided by the State, in Barbados concurrent endowment still exists—the Church of England receiving a large endowment from the revenue, and the Wesleyans, Moravians, and Roman Catholics much smaller sums. The Church of England is established in Barbados, the bishop and clergy being paid from public moneys, while the concurrent endowment to the other creeds is by way of grant of lump sums to their governing bodies; but in the remainder of the diocese, which includes the whole of the Windward Islands, the Church has been disestablished and disendowed—all State aid to other Churches in the shape of concurrent endowment having, also, been suspended or withdrawn.

Trinidad.

In many of the Crown Colonies, as, for example, in Malta and in Trinidad, the Roman Catholic population altogether outnumbers the Protestant. In Trinidad there are two and a half times as many Roman Catholics as members of the Church of England, and the small Protestant bodies account only for an infinitesimal proportion of the population. In this colony the Churches formerly aided by a concurrent endowment are now being partially disendowed as vacancies occur among those of their clergy who have been in receipt of allowances from the State; and it has happened that the Church of England Bishop has ceased to be directly paid by the State, while the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Port of Spain continues to receive a thousand a year from Government for his life. Canon Kingsley, when writing on the religious condition of Trinidad, argued that it was natural that the Roman Catholic Church, owing to the nature of her services, should obtain the greatest hold upon the negroes; but this is not the experi-

Other West-India islands.

ence of Barbados, where the Church of England is strong, or of the Southern States of the American Union, where the negroes are Methodists or Baptists, or indeed, it may be said, of negro countries generally. The test of figures shows that it is difficult to maintain that there is any great difference in religious tendencies between negroes and white colonists, Methodism being, on the whole, with both apparently the most flourishing and advancing Church. In the West-India Islands the Church of England has gained ground less rapidly than have the Wesleyan, Baptist, and smaller Protestant denominations, because she has suffered from having been the Church of the planters and the whites. The emancipated negro was likely to join Churches which would be partly under his control, and he has done so. The negroes give largely, in proportion to their wages, to church objects, in spite of the heavy pressure upon them of payment for the schools; and there is reason to think that the Methodists, Baptists, and Moravians have done more for the improvement of the West Indian negro population than has any other agency.

Mauritius.

Besides Malta and Trinidad, which have been named, there are other colonies in which the Roman Catholic element is large, as, for example, the Mauritius, in which the Christian Churches are still aided by the State upon the system of concurrent endowment, the Church of England bishop and the Roman Catholic archbishop each receiving 7200 rupees of salary. In spite of common payment by the State, the Mauritian religious bodies fall out with the Government and with each other. The Roman Catholic archbishop has complained publicly to the representative of a newspaper about the treatment of his Church, pointing to the fact that the vast majority of the Christians among the population of

Mauritius belong to the Roman Catholic Church, and that "the few converts made" by those whom he classes together as "the Protestants" "are blacks, who, I have no hesitation in saying, are practically bought, and are really left without any religion at all." The archbishop quarrelled with the Governor, who was an Irish Roman Catholic, because, as he said, the Governor "attempted to interfere with the appointment of priests, and wished only French clergy to be engaged," whereas the archbishop somewhat preferred Irishmen. According to the census of 1881 there were in Mauritius 108,000 Roman Catholics, and 8000 other Christians; but the Church of England and the Presbyterian Church receive payment from the State at more than eight times the rate per head of their adherents which obtains in the case of the Roman Catholics.

Disestablishment.

It cannot be doubted that the policy of the disestablishment of the Church of England in the few colonies where it remains established, and of the cessation of State aid in those few where concurrent endowment continues, will prevail, and that an end will soon be put to that mixture of systems which in matters of religion as in matters of education exists in countries under Colonial Office control. Since 1868 the opinion of the Office, in the direction of the withdrawal of State assistance, has been clearly shown, and in no case has any step been taken that leads the other way, while in all the colonies where State aid has ceased religion prospers.

Pacific island and other missions.

It is impossible to deal here, otherwise than by mere mention, with the work which missionaries of the English race, American and British, are doing in the Pacific and in other portions of the globe, in countries under British authority or protection as well as in the

open field. Their labours are greater, and the results which they have achieved larger, on the whole, than those which have been given or attained by teachers of all the other races put together. The various societies of the Church of England, the Wesleyan Methodist, the Baptist, the "London" or Congregational missionary societies, and many others, and the American bodies, have for serious rivals only the French Roman Catholics and the French Evangelicals. The vast subscriptions received by the British societies, the armies of missionaries which the British and American societies send forth, leave to the French Roman Catholics, who stand next, but little chance of competing with them upon an equal footing; and if in Southern India and in parts of China the French missionaries have been able to hold their own, it is rather because their system lends itself to success among certain of the Asiatic peoples than because of a greater average energy or self-denial in the missionaries sent out. It would be difficult to overrate the influence which has been exerted on behalf of British enterprise in the Pacific and in Africa by the missionary bodies. Men like Mr. Chalmers of New Guinea are not only religious teachers, but conquerors who win new worlds to British influence.

Conclusion.

We must conclude, then, that the teaching of the colonies goes to show the success of the principle (now adopted almost throughout our Empire outside Great Britain) that the State shall not patronise one form of religion, and shall hold itself aloof from all. No bad consequences can be shown to have followed on the disestablishment that has taken place in some colonies, or, in others, upon the absence of religious Establishments from the first; and the results of the withdrawal of State aid are not to be discerned in any marked

departure in the colonies from the English standard, while we have noticed a stricter observance of the Lord's Day, and the greater power of the Sunday Schools. The influence of Sunday Schools is far more widely spread, taking the colonies through, than it is in England. The number of religious edifices and the number of the clergy of various denominations, in proportion to the white population, is greater throughout the colonies than in England; while if church attendance, under the difficulties occasioned by sparse population in vast districts, is less remarkable in extent than is the provision made for it, it is, on the whole, as large in proportion as it is at home. Neither is any decline observable in recent years, but, on the contrary, there has occurred in most of the colonies the same marked revival of religious activity which has been recently witnessed in the mother-country.

CHAPTER VI

LIQUOR LAWS

So many persons are deeply interested in that sharply restrictive legislation with regard to the sale of intoxicating drinks which is almost peculiar to lands of English speech that no apology need be offered for treating it in a separate chapter, although peculiarities in the liquor legislation of various colonies have already been briefly named in passing. While students of politics are aware of the tendency that exists to follow in the mother-country experiments which have been tried by our colonies in political and social legislation, the general public are inclined to look upon the colonies as, above all, countries which, along with the United States, are testing for us the value of Local Prohibition as regards the sale of drink.

Canada. Foremost among the colonies which have engaged in temperance legislation stands the Dominion, which has dealt with it both as a whole and by Provincial Acts. In Canada the matter is constitutionally as well as socially important. Grave legal questions have arisen in the attempt of the Courts and Parliament of the Dominion, and of the Privy Council at home, to decide the rights of the Provincial legislatures to pass measures which indirectly affect that taxation in aid of the Dominion revenue which is exclusively within the

control of the Federal Government. Similar difficulties were faced before a Dominion Act upon the Liquor question was pronounced unconstitutional. The limitations within which the Provincial legislatures of the Dominion may enact measures that affect taxation confine their powers to such as bear upon the raising of revenue for local purposes. Laws restricting the sale of intoxicants diminish Dominion revenue, and are therefore of doubtful legality. On the other hand, by its Act of 1883 the Dominion attempted to deal with matters which had been relegated to the Provinces. Difficult constitutional questions have also arisen in the administration of the Canada Temperance Act, 1878, known as the Scott Act.

Local Option under the Scott Act.

The Scott Act is a Dominion Local Option law—giving power to close drink shops, by a bare majority of votes, without compensation—the working of which has been watched with intense interest by the Local Option party throughout the British world. After a Prohibitionist campaign, the provisions of the Act were put in force county by county, until the whole of Prince Edward's Island, the majority of the municipalities in Ontario, large sections of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, parts of Quebec, and two counties of Manitoba, had made the sale of intoxicating beverages illegal. In the Province of British Columbia the Act was not brought into operation. The Act provided for a reversal of the local popular judgment in the event of a change in public opinion, and in some parts of the country large majorities were found to exist against Prohibition after it had been for some time in operation. In many cases the operation of the Act has been suspended and drink shops reopened. The feeling in Canada was at one time so strong against the prohibi-

tory legislation that there was in 1888 a considerable agitation in favour of the removal of the Act from the Statute-book. On the other hand, the Methodist Conference, which is, as has been seen, very powerful in Canada, and which has on this question the support of many other religious bodies, is in favour of National Prohibition, and is disposed to accept no Local Option law as the ultimate form of legislation upon the subject. Canadian Methodist feeling goes so far as to strongly recommend the disuse of fermented wine for sacramental purposes, and Canada is sharply divided into two parties upon the Liquor question. In 1888 and 1889 a great number of Ontario counties voted upon the local suspension of the Scott Act, and in most of these "repeal" was carried, although in many of the same counties there had previously been large majorities in favour of the adoption of the Act. A return upon the subject which has been presented to the imperial House of Commons gives a full list of the votes taken under the Canada Temperance Act since its passing. In 1878 the decision was in three cases for the adoption, and in none against,—in 1879 in nine cases for, and in only one against; that one in Quebec,—in 1880 in four cases for, and in one against; that one also in Quebec, —in 1881 in ten cases for, and in four against,—in 1882 in three cases for, and in one against,—in 1883 in only one case, for adoption,—in 1884 in seventeen cases for, and in five against,—in 1885 in twenty-one cases for, and in seven against,—in 1886 two to two. In 1887 there was one decision against repeal, and in 1888 (and, by Canadian figures, 1889) an overwhelming majority in favour of repeal. Some districts, however, have tried three years of Prohibition under the Scott Act, then three years of licensing, and have now returned to Pro-

hibition. Reports have been obtained from certain of the Provincial Governments with regard to the working of the Act. In Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island the Lieutenant-Governors reported that in most cases the Act, although adopted by vote of the electors, had never been thoroughly enforced. It is the case that the machinery for the enforcement of the Scott Act is most imperfect, and this allows the party in favour of Prohibition to declare, with some force, that the failure of the Act has been owing to its loose construction, which has led to an amount of evasion calculated to make it unequal and unpopular.

Other Canadian laws upon intoxicating liquors

In Ontario, apart from the Scott Act, the maximum number of licenses that can be granted in any district has long been regulated according to population. By Provincial Acts of 1887 and 1888 the number of licenses may be reduced to a minimum of one in any district, and no new license may be granted against the wish of the majority of the electors. Sale of drink is forbidden on Saturday evenings and on Sundays. There is a provision in the Ontario law that whenever any person comes to his death, by suicide or otherwise, during intoxication, the seller of the liquor that caused the intoxication is liable to an action for damages. This clause is copied from the laws of several States of the American Union, where it is very general, and is known as the "Civil Damages Clause." In Ontario, and also in Quebec, the law provides that the relatives of intemperate persons may notify the sellers of liquor not to sell it to such persons, and if they sell it after such notice they are liable to a suit for damages by the person who gave the notice. Toronto is governed in liquor matters by the old Ontario Act, which dates back before the Scott Act, and by which the municipal

councils fix the number of licenses (being unable, however, to grant more than four for the first thousand of the population, and one for every four hundred beyond), and have also power to raise high license fees. Under this Act the Town Council of Toronto have much reduced the number of licenses, and that without compensation.

Quebec. In Quebec the local liquor laws are somewhat similar to those of England, except that liquor cannot be sold after eight P.M. to soldiers, sailors, apprentices, or servants, and that, as in almost all colonies, there is universal Sunday closing. In addition to the Scott Act there exists in Nova Scotia a License Act and Provincial prohibitory law, under which municipal councils can refuse to grant any licenses where the majority of the ratepayers are opposed to granting them. Liquor cannot be sold in Nova Scotia in gold districts or within a mile of any mine. Neither can it be sold to Indians or to minors, and there is general Sunday closing. As in Ontario, when any person comes to his death through intoxication his legal representatives may recover damages against the person furnishing the liquor. In New Brunswick power is given to the county councils by the Province to make rules for the regulation of the sale of liquor. The sale of liquor to apprentices, servants, or persons under sixteen years of age, without the consent of the master, parent, or guardian, is forbidden; while in Quebec it is forbidden altogether to persons under sixteen years of age. There is also universal Sunday closing in New Brunswick. In Prince Edward Island the sale of liquor to Indians and to minors is forbidden: there is general Sunday closing, and the same law on the sale of liquor to intemperate persons after notice as exists in Ontario and Quebec.

Nova Scotia.

New Brunswick.

Prince Edward Island.

Manitoba.

In Manitoba power is given to the city corporation of Winnipeg to make by-laws regulating the issue of licenses within the city, and it is provided that the number of hotel licenses shall be limited to one for every three hundred inhabitants. There is also a prohibition in Manitoba of the sale of liquor to intemperate persons after notice, besides the provision which exists in some Australian colonies for an inquiry by a Justice of the Peace at the request of the relatives (with the addition in Manitoba of the connections or the clergyman) of any person who is unable to control himself in the use of liquor, or is squandering his means or neglecting his business, or likely to injure himself or others. In the event of the Justice finding this to be the case he has to take steps to notify in writing all licensed liquor-sellers of the fact; and the liquor-sellers have to post up the notice in a conspicuous place, and to refrain from selling or giving liquor to the person interdicted. Where it appears to the Justice that the interdiction is insufficient to effect the reform of the person interdicted, he may commit him to gaol for a period of not less than thirty and not more than sixty days; but the person interdicted may appeal to the Provincial Queen's Bench. There is absolute Sunday closing in Manitoba.

British Columbia and the High License system.

In British Columbia, where the Scott Act does not seem popular with the electorate, municipalities may make by-laws with regard to the issue of tavern licenses. In Vancouver City a large fee is charged for licenses, which brings in a considerable revenue to the municipality. British Columbia, in short, possesses what is known in the United States as the High License system, between which and Prohibition—State or local—opinion in the United States is now divided. As has been well shown by Mr. Edwardes, in his report

to the Foreign Office on the various American State systems, the weak point in prohibitory laws has been found in the difficulty of preventing evasion and in the deadly character of the adulterated liquor sold under an illegal system. While the advocates of Prohibition are able to show that in the States or districts where it has been applied it has destroyed the temptation afforded by open bars, has reduced drunkenness, and the offences which may be attributed to the use of liquor, as well as the waste of money upon drink, on the other hand, evasion is almost everywhere considerable, although Kansas is said to form an exception to the rule. The scale has been turned in favour of the High License system in British Columbia, as in a good many districts of the American Union, by the fact that, while the institution commends itself to moderate temperance reformers by reducing the number of drinking saloons, and by destroying the more disreputable places where intoxicating liquors are sold, and throwing the trade into the hands of a good class of dealers, it at the same time brings in a large municipal revenue by a form of taxation from which no one seems to suffer, and which in fact no one feels. At some places there is combined with the High License system a provision for the finding of a large sum under surety by the licensee as a guarantee for not infringing the various provisions of the local laws as to sale of intoxicating drink to minors, to drunkards, and on Sundays, as to adulteration, and so forth. At the same time the High License system is obnoxious to some of the rigid Prohibition party, who would almost prefer to it a system of free trade.

The Territories.

In the North-West Territories the sale, manufacture, or possession of intoxicants, is prohibited except

with the special written permission of the Lieutenant-Governor, who is invested with absolute discretion in the matter, and can prevent the importation of alcoholic drink; and the policy of the Dominion Government has been to entirely prevent all liquor traffic in the Territories. The late Lieutenant-Governor of the Territories is now Minister of the Interior for the Dominion, and in some speeches and addresses lately pronounced against the system of Prohibition after nine years' experience in its administration. Prohibition in the North-West Territories was originally intended to prevent the sale of drink to Indians, but is now found vexatious by the large white population. The present Lieutenant-Governor agrees with his predecessor, and has reported that the enforcement of the Prohibitory Law becomes more and more difficult year by year. Liquor, he says, is "run" into the country at every point and in every form. He pleads for lager beer, and thinks that the sale of light beer would do more than Prohibition to check spirit drinking. In the adjoining American territories comprised in the new States of North Dakota, and South Dakota, total prohibition of the liquor traffic was recently placed in the Constitution by majorities, so narrow in the case of North Dakota as to lead to the existence of a widespread doubt whether Prohibition had been carried. In Montana, Prohibition was rejected by the popular vote, or, as Transatlantic usage puts it, Montana "went wet" while the two Dakotas "went dry." The experience under Prohibition of the State of Kansas has been very different from that of the North-West Territories, and in that rising community Prohibition is popular with the people.

Other peculiarities of Dominion liquor legislation are

Minor peculiarities.

to be found in the minor provisions of the Scott Act itself; for example, power is given to returning officers and their deputies to seize from all persons within half a mile of the polling stations, when a poll upon the Act is being taken, firearms, bludgeons, or other weapons. All persons convicted of a battery within two miles of any place where such poll is being held are to be deemed guilty of an aggravated assault; and there are provisions for preventing either non-residents coming into polling districts when carrying arms or residents coming armed within one mile of a place where a poll is being taken. The sale of intoxicating liquors on polling day is prevented.

The Liquor License Act, 1883.

In 1883 a Licensing Act for the Dominion was passed to make the licensing law uniform. It was provided (with certain exceptions) that the total number of licenses to be granted should not exceed one for each 250 of the first thousand of the population, and one for each 500 above the first thousand; but there were local powers reserved for municipal regulation of the number of licenses. There was a provision that no license should be granted in municipal districts where three-fifths of the voters declared in favour of Prohibition. There was complete prohibition of sale of drink on Saturday evenings and on Sundays, except to boarders at table during meals between the hours of one and three and five and seven on Sunday. Sale of drink to persons under sixteen was forbidden. The Act made provision for inquiry into the charge that any person by excessive drinking of liquor wastes or lessens his or her estate, or greatly injures his or her health, or endangers or interrupts the peace and happiness of his or her family; and two Justices were to have power to forbid any licensed person to sell, for one year, liquor to the drunkard.

There was also a provision under which the husband or wife, or father, mother, curator, tutor, or employers of any person under twenty-one, or the manager of any charitable institution in which any "person so addicted" might reside, would have been able to cause a notice to be given to any licensed person not to sell liquor to such interdicted person. But there was a saving clause as regards earlier legislation, and, especially, nothing in the Act was to be construed to affect or impair any of the provisions of the Scott Act, so that many of the provisions mentioned above would in any case have remained in force. This Act of 1883, however, was in January 1885 declared unconstitutional by a judgment of the Supreme Court, on the ground that most of its provisions fell within the jurisdiction of the Provincial legislatures, and the disallowance of the Act was upheld by the Privy Council on appeal in November 1885. The Act is still of interest as an expression of the prevailing opinion in Canada, and as virtually a draft code made up from the local laws now actually existing in the Provinces.

Not only have Dominion Liquor Laws sometimes been declared unconstitutional, but also Provincial Liquor Acts, or parts of them. In some cases the method adopted has been held to exceed Provincial powers, but in others has been held to be good in law. The point raised in many cases was that the Provinces were interfering in trade; but it has been held that the licensing laws relate to police or municipal or local matters, and are therefore within Provincial powers. The Canadian liquor legislation has been the subject of judicial decisions at home, and the Privy Council in its judgment upon the constitutionality of the Liquor Act of Ontario decided that

Provinces were able to delegate the powers specially given them by the constitution of the Dominion, to authorities created by themselves, such as license commissioners for municipal areas. The Local Option law of Canada as a whole has also been referred to the Courts, and it has been held that that law was within the competency of the Dominion Parliament, so we find in Canada two temperance systems—the one Provincial and the other Federal—both of which are legal, though certain laws of each description have been pronounced invalid.

Prohibition.

With regard to the Canadian legislation generally, it is maintained by the supporters of Prohibition that the Scott Act is unpopular in districts where it has not been really enforced, and that, where drunkenness has under it been suppressed, the Act has been maintained at recent polls; and it is true that in spite of the partial failure of the Scott Act to secure support there is a marked movement in Ontario in the direction of Dominion or Provincial as against district Prohibition. The majority of the Canadian Liberal party are prohibitionists. The consumption of liquor in Canada is the smallest per head in any English-speaking country in the world; but it is said that there has been an increase in the consumption of spirits in Ontario in recent years, although this is denied, and the statistics are misleading inasmuch as spirits entered for consumption in one Province are often carried to another. So great has been the evasion of the Scott Act that it has been even said that some of the most active prohibitionists have worked locally for its repeal, holding that their views were better carried out under the former licensing system than under nominal Prohibition; and it is a curious fact that, while the "Liquor party" and the

publicans were everywhere powerless to prevent the adoption of the Act, "repeal" has been carried in many districts by large popular majorities.

New Zealand.

The most interesting of the colonies after the Canadian Dominion as regards licensing legislation is New Zealand, where there is a comprehensive Act of 1881, which has since that time been amended. There is a steady decrease in the consumption of strong drink in New Zealand in spite of the increase of the population, and New Zealand now spends on drink less per head than does the United Kingdom, and less than do the principal colonies of the Australian continent. Not only is the white population becoming sober, but the Maories are mostly teetotallers, and a majority of the younger Maories are active members of the Church of England Temperance Association. The New Zealand Act creates licensing committees elected annually by the ratepayers for this special purpose, persons interested in the manufacture or sale of liquor, or in licensed premises, being disqualified from acting upon the committees; and there is a provision that if any member of a licensing committee absents himself from two consecutive quarterly licensing meetings his office becomes vacant. Vacancies are filled by the nomination of persons who hold office until the next election. In districts in which at least half the inhabitants are Maories, Native Licensing Districts are created, and in these districts assessors are elected by the inhabitants qualified to vote for Maori representatives in Parliament, and the sale or gift of intoxicating liquor to persons of the native race is forbidden. No new licenses since the passing of the Act in 1881 can be granted until the ratepayers have determined, on a poll, by a bare majority, whether the number of licenses may

be increased. Drunkenness, even entirely unaccompanied by disorder, is made a punishable offence where the drunkard is found on licensed premises, on a highway, or in any "public place, whether a building or not." There is complete Sunday closing in New Zealand, as in most of the colonies, but in New Zealand the prohibition of Sunday sale is subject to a *bonâ fide* traveller clause. The supply of drink to persons apparently under the age of sixteen years is forbidden, and in New Zealand it is an offence on the part of the publican to allow drink to be given on his premises to such a person.

In New Zealand, as in most of the Provinces of the Dominion of Canada, and in Tasmania and South Australia, where any person by excessive drinking "misspends, wastes, or lessens his or her estate, or greatly injures his or her health, or endangers or interrupts the peace or happiness of his or her family," such person can be put under notice, and all licensed persons forbidden to sell drink to him or her. In New Zealand, when a drunkard has been put under notice by the Justices, any person with a knowledge of the Prohibition giving drink to or procuring it for the prohibited person is also punishable. There are in New Zealand inspectors of licensed premises appointed by the Governor, whose duty it is to enforce the carrying out of the Act, and to prevent evasion. The burden of proof is thrown upon all persons found upon licensed premises when they are searched by the inspector in a case where liquor is sold contrary to law, and the persons on the premises are deemed guilty of an offence under the Act "until the contrary is proved." Power is given to the Governor to make regulations for the efficient administration of the Act, and these when gazetted have the force of law.

So far the New Zealand law is strong, and calculated to be more effective than the less detailed provisions of most of the Canadian Acts; but the 229th Clause is said in practice to be found by the temperance party to contain a principle fatal to their power. It enacts that nothing in the statute shall apply to clubs, except the provisions of this clause itself. The clause enables clubs existing at the time of the passing of the Act to apply to the Colonial Secretary for a charter, and directs the Colonial Secretary—if satisfied that the club in question is really a voluntary association of persons combined for promoting social intercourse and comfort, and providing its own liquors, and not established for purposes of gain—to issue the charter subject to a payment of £5 by the club. Moreover, when any number of persons not fewer than ten propose to establish a new club, they have to forward to the Colonial Secretary an application for a provisional charter, and the Colonial Secretary is at liberty to issue such a charter for one year, and at the end of one year is obliged to give a permanent charter if the ordinary conditions are fulfilled.

Queensland.

The next most comprehensive Act is that of Queensland, which establishes a system of Local Option; two-thirds of the ratepayers on a poll having power to close all houses, or a bare majority to reduce the number of licenses, or to put a stop to the issue of fresh licenses. One-sixth of the ratepayers are sufficient to obtain a poll, and they state in their notice the point upon which the poll is to be held; but the provisions for Prohibition and for reduction of licenses by a specified number have not been popular in Queensland, and the polls have been chiefly upon the third point, namely, the stopping of new licenses. It will be

seen that the Local Option portion of the Queensland Act is stronger than that of the New Zealand Act, because a local majority has in Queensland direct power to impose complete Prohibition. But it must be remembered that in New Zealand the licensing bodies are themselves elective, and elected for the special purpose, so that the popular control in New Zealand is as a fact complete, although temperance reformers would prefer a direct popular vote upon the question in all cases, in place of the election of a council. There is in Queensland, as usual, complete Sunday closing, but with a *bonâ fide* traveller clause. There is also the usual colonial prohibition of the supply of liquor to aboriginal natives—in Queensland the provision is extended to Polynesians and to half-castes—and of the supply to boys and girls.

Other Australian licensing laws.

The liquor laws of the remainder of Australia are of a less drastic nature than those of Canada, of New Zealand, or of Queensland. While in Victoria there is Local Option as to the number of licenses, with compensation, and in New South Wales and South Australia a mild form of Local Option as to new licenses or the increase of licenses, involving in the mother-colony a local expression of opinion and in South Australia a memorial by two-thirds of the ratepayers, in none of these colonies are the temperance party in the least satisfied with the state of things which now exists. At the same time in all of them that present condition gives them more power than they have in England.

Victoria.

After the Acts of New Zealand and of Queensland, that of Victoria has, among Australasian laws, until lately been the strongest in a temperance sense. Fierce fights have taken place under its Local Option clause in various portions of the colony, and in

one instance an exciting contest between the publicans and the temperance folk resulted in the closing of twenty-three public-houses in one district at one time. In all, between one and two hundred public-houses have as yet been closed in Victoria under the Local Option clause. Inasmuch as in Victoria, Local Option concerns not total cessation of the sale of drink, but only the reduction of the number of public-houses to a statutory minimum, a commission deciding which public-houses shall be closed and what compensation shall be given, the blow falls upon the houses which have the most indifferent character. The Victorian Act has been already tinkered several times, and is not likely to last long in its present form. The figures which have been taken in Victoria for the ordinary statutory number are drawn from Canadian Acts; one to each 250 of the first thousand inhabitants, and then one to each subsequent 500.

Compensation.

Victoria is, I believe, the only part of the British Empire in which the principle of compensation has been applied. This forms a precedent which will no doubt be quoted in England, inasmuch as in Victoria the licenses were granted for the good of the community, and not for the good of the holders—the English principle, upon which the United Kingdom Alliance have based their opposition to compensation in the legislation of the mother-country.

South Australia.

In South Australia recent proposals have been made to Parliament for considerable changes in the existing law, under which the principle of Local Option is represented by the efficacy of memorials from two-thirds of the ratepayers against new licenses. The Corporation of Adelaide petitioned against the Bill of 1889, and it was dropped. The outgoing Prime Minister,

Mr. Playford, had been pledged to bring in a Bill for complete Local Option, but with compensation. The existing clauses relating to memorials against new licenses provide that no new licenses shall be granted where two-thirds of the ratepayers of the immediate neighbourhood petition against the grant, and that where a license has been refused on account of the receipt of such a memorial, future licenses shall not be issued except upon a memorial by a bare majority to that effect. There is in South Australia, as in many colonies, a complete prohibition of the supply of liquor to aborigines, as well as a prohibition of the supply of liquor to minors under fifteen; and, as in New Zealand, the publican is punishable if he allows any one to give liquor to such children. The clause already mentioned in several colonial Acts as to persons, by the habitual or excessive use of liquor, wasting their means, injuring or being likely to injure health, or endangering or interrupting the peace or happiness of their families, exists, as has been seen, in South Australia, and extends, as in the greater part of Canada, to all persons who may knowingly, "during the currency" of an order against a drunkard, supply the person with liquor. In South Australia the publican is also punishable if he allows a person under notice to loiter about his premises, even although he does not supply him. As in New Zealand, so too in South Australia there are special inspectors to obtain the enforcement of the Act.

Tasmania.

In Tasmania temperance legislation took place in 1889, and introduced Local Option, which had previously been refused. The Bill as presented to Parliament contained a clause which went less far than the South Australian Act, and did not much extend the previous Tasmanian legislation, under which the licens-

ing Bench were to entertain memorials from the locality, although they were not bound to follow them. The Lower House, however, changed this into a provision that memorials from two-thirds of the ratepayers in the neighbourhood objecting to the granting of new licenses were fatal to the granting of such licenses; and that where the petition from the locality was directed against the renewal of an old license the magistrates might require proof on oath of the allegations of the memorial, and might then grant or refuse the certificate according to their opinion whether the allegations had or had not been sufficiently established. But the "neighbourhood" is narrowly defined, and consists in the cities of Hobart and Launceston of the space within a radius of 200 yards, and in other towns within 500 yards, and elsewhere within a mile. The Local Option clause has, however, less importance under the new Tasmanian law than it possesses in South Australia; because the licensing Bench itself under the new law is partly elective, although not wholly elective as in New Zealand. The nominated element of Justices has a slight majority on each Board, but the number of elected members is so large that a strong temperance feeling in any district may lead to the stoppage of licenses. The Upper House increased the stringency of the Bill and gave a bare majority of ratepayers, in place of a two-thirds majority, the right of veto of new licenses. The temperance party were, however, dissatisfied with the Bill, and petitioned the Governor for the refusal of the Royal assent.

As in New Zealand, no person interested in the manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquors is in Tasmania to be elected a member of a licensing Bench. A clause was also inserted in the Bill rendering liable to punish-

ment persons found upon licensed premises after hours, and it was supposed in the colony that this clause was a new departure, in punishing the publican's customer instead of the publican alone; but it will be seen from what has been said above that there exists for it at least one precedent. The clause relating to drunkards being placed under notice has existed for some time in Tasmania; but, in the form in which it now stands, it rests on the evidence on oath of any two persons, instead of, as in most colonies, a declaration by a member of the family. The drunkard himself is liable to penalty as well as those who procure drink for him. Generally speaking, it may be said that all the recent Australian Acts show that their proposers are well acquainted with modern legislation upon the subject in other colonies, for each of the Acts takes whole clauses from the Acts of other colonies without change; and it is to be wished that the fulness of knowledge possessed by colonial temperance reformers concerning the temperance legislation of all parts of Greater Britain extended to politicians generally and led to somewhat more uniformity of legislation in English-speaking countries.

New South Wales.

The licensing law of New South Wales is moderate as compared with that of Canada, New Zealand, or Queensland, and timid even as contrasted with that of the neighbouring colony of Victoria. But, although little stringent for a colonial liquor law, it is severe as compared with those which still exist in the United Kingdom. The New South Wales Acts discourage bars for the sale of liquor apart from hotels providing board and lodging and stable accommodation; and gin palaces and drinking music halls are unknown, although, as in most of the colonies, there are shops specially licensed for the sale of colonial wines. There is a Local Option

poll, but it is not final as regards licenses, and is in fact little more than an expression of opinion. While there is Sunday closing in New South Wales with a *bonâ fide* traveller clause, this clause is narrow in its provisions, and a New South Wales "traveller" is—or rather should be, if the law were not evaded—a traveller indeed. The same provision, which is general in the colonies, with regard to the serving of minors apparently under fifteen or sixteen years of age, exists in New South Wales. There has been a recent inquiry by a Royal Commission, and at the time when the commissioners were appointed it was supposed that there had been an increase in the consumption of intoxicating liquors, and the commissioners were directed to inquire into the causes of the supposed increase; but they found, as a fact, that there had been a decrease in the consumption; and I must once more warn my readers against believing all that has been written upon the subject of consumption per head of intoxicating liquors, inasmuch as there exist no statistics more misleading. The Commission pointed to the possibility of the adoption of the New Zealand law for the punishment of mere drunkenness apart from disorderly conduct; but no other very stringent measures were recommended in the report. On the other hand, a majority of the members returned to the colonial Parliament at the last election were pledged to vote for an extension of Local Option, and a large proportion of them declared against compensation. The Good Templars supported the protectionist candidates in the country districts, and returned them; but in Sydney some of the protectionists refused to take the required pledge against compensation, and the Good Templars voted for the free traders and defeated the protectionists.

Western Australia.

In Western Australia, with the exception of Sunday closing, the liquor law is somewhat similar to that of England, but there is a high fee on publicans' licenses. The supply of liquor to aboriginal natives by any person is prohibited in Western Australia except as between master and servant. There is the usual drunkards' clause, allowing Justices to prohibit all persons from supplying liquor to notorious drunkards; and in Western Australia the notorious drunkard himself, if found loitering about a public-house, may be locked up for a week with or without hard labour.

Habits of the people.

In the chief colonies of Australasia, as in the United Kingdom, there is a steady decrease of drunkenness, and a general aversion to the use of stimulants on the part of the self-respecting portion of the younger population. Tea is even more widely consumed than is the case at home, and coffee palaces and temperance hotels are commoner than they are with us. The early settlers in Australia took out with them drinking habits, but the Australian climate has done its work in diminishing in the race the craving for the use of stimulants, and the power of the Churches has helped in the reform. In the digging days the practice of offering drink to strangers sprang up in Australia, and became general, and at one time offence was given by refusal to drink. The practice of "shouting," that is, of "standing treat," has now all but died out in the more settled portions of the country. There seems reason to think that the Australian of the future will be a sober man, and the greatest of all the differences between the old colonists and the young Australians lies in the drinking habits of the former and the repulsion to drink very general among the latter. A good deal of drunkenness is seen in Australia from time to time among a limited class—the

men employed up-country, who visit the capitals only at rare intervals, and who are apt to spend a portion of the large savings out of their high wages by "going on the spree," as it is called. The system known as "knocking down a cheque" has been fully explained by Mr. Finch-Hatton,[1] but it would be a mistake to suppose that these occasional outbreaks indicate a large consumption of drink, for such is not the case, and the very men whose drunkenness is from time to time paraded in the streets are themselves sober as a rule.

Temperance.

Those who have watched the career of Australian youths, and who are able to compare it with the career of an equal number of persons of the same classes in the mother-country, feel assured that there is less ruin in Australia caused by drink than in the United Kingdom, and there is, indeed, less doubt about the fact than about the reasons for it. Some are inclined to ascribe the decline in drinking habits almost exclusively to the climate, since experience has shown that in the great heats hot tea affords a far better means of quenching thirst than do spirits, wine, or beer. Others are inclined to set down the change mainly to the greater influence in the colonies of the Wesleyan and such bodies, who make temperance a part of their religion. The result in either case is plain; the young Australians are either teetotallers or moderate in their use of alcohol. As the ranks of the electors day by day are swelled by an increasing proportion of native-born Australians, the Local Option principle even to the extent of national Prohibition gains ground. There is a general belief among the younger colonists that there are many people who, if consulted in their reasonable

[1] *Advance Australia!* by the Hon. Harold Finch-Hatton. Allen and Co., 1885.

moments, do not want to drink intoxicating liquor, and who yet consume it to excess if temptation is thrown in their way. Public-houses—or "hotels," as in Australia they all are called, and are in fact—are closed on Sundays throughout the colonies, and the result of colonial experience is to teach that Sunday closing has diminished drunkenness. In Victoria a crucial experiment was tried: the public-houses were closed on Sundays in the early days of Melbourne; then opened for two hours upon Sundays; and now wholly closed once more; and Victoria supports Sunday closing. The *bonâ fide* traveller clause is, however, though probably necessary, no doubt made use of for the evasion of the law. As the whole of the New Zealand law is evaded by the general establishment of clubs, so the early closing and Sunday closing clauses of the ordinary Australian Acts are resisted by the same means, but not to a very large extent.

South Africa.

The extreme temperance legislation of Canada, the strong legislation of New Zealand and of Queensland, the more moderate Local Option laws of South Australia and Tasmania, and the Local Option with compensation of Victoria, seem to establish the rule, in the greater portion of the white-inhabited colonies, of consultation of the popular voice with regard to licenses. But the exception formed in Australia by Western Australia is strengthened by the South African colonies. The Cape and Natal stand even below New South Wales and Western Australia in the scale of stringency of temperance legislation. At the Cape the principle of Local Option is not recognised, except as regards new licenses. We find there the mild provision that new licenses are not to be granted unless a petition in favour of the application is signed by one-third of

the inhabitants of the district, and that they must be refused if a majority of the voters sign a memorial against them. The laws of the Cape of Good Hope respecting the sale of intoxicating liquor were mostly consolidated in 1883, by an Act which was amended in 1885 and 1887. The Cape followed the ordinary colonial view, with regard to the selling of drink on Sunday, in prohibiting that sale, though certain hotels are specially licensed to serve *bonâ fide* travellers on Sunday. Licensing is left to mixed bodies consisting partly of magistrates and partly of elected members. The elective members are not elected for the purpose, but consist of the mayors or chairmen of municipalities and of members of the Divisional Council. As regards the sale of drink to natives the law is theoretically stringent. The Governor may define areas in which no licenses can be granted and no liquor sold except with the permission of the Governor. No such areas, however, were in existence in 1888; that is to say, while the law is strong, this portion of it is not put in force. In 1887 it was announced by the Prime Minister that, in consequence of representations made by magistrates in native territory to the effect that unless the whole colony were proclaimed the restrictions were productive of more evil than good, the Government had advised the Governor to cancel all existing proclamations. There was a debate and a division in Parliament upon the question, and the temperance party asserted that their opponents desired to exterminate the Kafir race as well as to encourage the trade in Cape brandy; but the temperance party in the Cape seemed to give up the case of the white population, and put forward that of the black people only. The liquor interest in South Africa is strong, for the brandy consumed by the natives,

commonly called "Cape smoke," is manufactured by the ordinary colonial farmers. The friends of the aborigines argue that the farmers desire free trade in brandy, both in the interests of their own profits and because, being Boers, they desire to destroy the natives; but the farmers are too strong for them.

Natal.

While the framers of Cape licensing laws have sometimes begun by stating in the preamble that "the vice of drunkenness prevails to a great extent," the Natal laws generally begin by setting forth "the increase of drunkenness among persons of the native race," and whites are not within the purview of Natal prohibitions. There are strong laws in Natal against the sale of liquor to natives, the brandy interest being less powerful in that colony than in the Cape. As regards licenses, the Natal Boards are not even partially elected, like those of the older South African colony. There is in existence in Natal a clause permitting the incarceration of persons for mere drunkenness. Although the brandy interest is not strong in Natal there is a good deal of rum manufactured from the sugar cane upon the coast; and, in spite of the laws prohibiting the supply of drink to natives, there is some evasion of the prohibition.

Habits of the population.

The mining population at Kimberley and elsewhere keeps up a large number of small bars, there called canteens, such as would not be tolerated in Australia; and there is certainly room for temperance legislation in South Africa other than that directed against drinking by the Kafirs. The temperance party at the Cape, as has been seen, accuse the Dutch farmers of desiring to exterminate the Kafirs by means of drink; but it is a remarkable fact that in the Orange Free State the Dutch are following the inhabitants of Natal in trying to prevent the sale to natives, rather than the example

of the Cape in permitting it without practical restriction.

The vineyards of South Africa, which used to produce good wine, and which might largely supply European markets in the present day, have been turned into brandy farms, without, however, having succeeded in manufacturing a grape brandy which can compete with French Cognac.

Memorials have been presented to the Colonial Office from Churches, from the Bishop of London, and from great numbers of temperance bodies, protesting against the granting of licenses by the Cape Government for the sale of intoxicating drinks in the Transkei; but the Cape Government in their reply stated that, while they were willing to give the Secretary of State information, they did not "for a moment acknowledge the right of irresponsible bodies, such as the Aborigines' Protection Society, to interrogate the colonial Ministry, who are responsible for measures undertaken by them within their constitutional rights." There can be no doubt that public interference from home is useless, although the Church of England, the Wesleyan Church, and the Presbyterians of Scotland may be able to do much by acting upon the Churches in South Africa with which they are in communion. At the same time the influence of the Churches has already availed to modify the Cape proclamations as to the Transkei, and the sale of spirits to natives is now forbidden except where permits are obtained from local officers.

Crown Colonies.

In Crown Colonies generally there is the same variety of legislation with regard to intoxicating liquors that prevails in other matters. In many Crown Colonies, as, for example, Barbados, the Leeward Islands, and St. Vincent, there is general Sunday closing. In

Bahamas there is Local Option, though hotels in districts where the ordinary sale of intoxicating drink is stopped are allowed to sell it to their guests. In some Crown Colonies, as, for example, Mauritius and St. Vincent, the sale of intoxicants to minors under fifteen is forbidden, while in Bahamas, Malta, and others the age is fixed at sixteen. In Cyprus there are no restrictions. The sale of strong liquor to the dark-skinned population is carried on in West Africa to a large extent, and revenue is derived from it. In Bechuanaland the sale of spirits and wine to natives is forbidden, though beer is specially allowed; in Zululand, as in Natal, Kafir beer is alone permitted, while in Basutoland the prohibition is general in its terms. In Fiji the sale of drink to natives and half-castes is forbidden, and natives and half-castes are punished if they make use of intoxicants or even have them in their possession. As regards Protectorates and spheres of influence, Great Britain and the United States attempted at the African Conference at Berlin to check the liquor trade on the West Coast of Africa, but, through the opposition of Germany and France, the proposed clause in the protocols was dropped. At the same time our own West African colonies, like the Cape of Good Hope, are, as has been seen, offenders in this matter. I have not named the colony of Ceylon in this connection, or written as yet of the case of India, because the temperance party complain that in those countries the State is promoting the sale of spirits, for revenue purposes—a question which is a different one from those which we have been discussing. To this matter I will turn after putting forward a few general considerations on colonial liquor legislation.

While English and Scotch colonists are generally

friendly to Local Option, and are gradually extending its operation, and while in some colonies the settlers of Irish race are disposed to concur in their views, in others there is opposition from a section of the Irish, who, in Australia, are closely connected with the liquor trade, and in all the colonies the German settlers are opposed to modern liquor legislation. The dislike of the Germans to local interference with their beer-drinking habits is so strong that it is thought that they may not improbably quit districts which put down the sale of beer for others in which it is permitted. In some districts of Iowa they have prevented the enforcement of the prohibitory law, but in other parts of the United States there are great numbers of Germans inhabiting districts which are under Prohibition. As regards the other races, the clergy of all denominations —who take in the colonies, as has been seen, but a slight part in political questions, and indeed hardly any except upon the education question and the one which forms the subject of this chapter—are strong supporters of temperance legislation, and use their power to the full in the direction of Local Option.

Colonial liquor legislation.

Another point which is worthy of some notice is that while the power of local Prohibition is being freely given, and while the party in favour of general Prohibition is growing stronger every day, in most of the colonies the prohibitive legislation makes special and exceptional provision for the extension of the colonial wine trade. It will indeed be curious to see whether that wine-growing which has a future in Ontario, and the possibilities of great extension before it throughout the Australasian colonies, will modify the prohibitionist sentiment, or whether wine-producing countries exporting spirituous liquors to all parts of the world can

Wine-growing and Prohibition.

become or remain prohibitionist as regards home consumption. Formerly South Australia was the wine-producing colony, but now Victoria stands first and New South Wales second, while the other colonies are also producing wine; and if in that which was once pre-eminently the wine-growing colony—the Cape—public feeling is opposed to temperance legislation, this cannot be said to be the case in the Australasian colonies, and in the wine-growing parts of Ontario.

Supposed failure of Local Option.

It has too easily been thought of late in England that the Local Option legislation of the colonies has been proved a failure. No doubt in some parts of Canada it is less popular than it was. The present Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Territories in the Report which I mentioned has told the Dominion Government that the sympathy of many of the settlers is against the Government upon the question of Prohibition. No doubt the Scott Act has gone out of use in districts where it had previously been put in force, and no doubt, also, in many parts of Canada and of Australasia there is evasion of the law, while everywhere it is difficult to stop an illicit liquor traffic in sparsely settled countries; but in Australasia, at least, there is no sign of a desire to repeal the Local Option Acts—on the contrary, the whole political movement sets the other way, and such Acts are yearly being strengthened, or introduced into colonies where they had not previously been in existence. The legislatures of New Zealand and of several Australian colonies have, too, taken steps which are likely to be effective in preventing evasion of the law. Local Option is also spreading in the United States, and total Prohibition by means of general State laws polls a large minority of votes. While, however, American and Canadian example may as yet be doubtful,

Australasian example and opinion cannot be quoted upon the side of resistance to Local Option views.

The Liquor question in Ceylon and India is different from that which has been discussed above. There is no prohibition of sale of drink to the dark-skinned population; but various licensing systems are in force, which are opposed by the temperance party as being calculated to stimulate the sale of drink to natives, for revenue purposes. Not only, in short, is nothing done to stop the sale of drink, but it is alleged that Government does its best to increase it, or is at least tempted in that direction by the systems which it has continued or set on foot. The House of Commons has, after full debate, condemned the liquor policy of the Indian Government as leading to the establishment of the liquor trade, in defiance of native opinion and against the protest of the inhabitants, in places where it did not formerly exist, and, by giving facilities for drink, causing a steadily increased consumption, with consequent evil results to the population. There can be no doubt that almost all recognised organs of native opinion support the view taken by the majority of the House of Commons, and Indian religious opinion has been called into play to support the action of the temperance reformers. The Indian systems of excise raise for Government a large revenue upon the local sale of foreign liquors and upon the manufacture of country liquors; and this revenue is one which is growing fast; while the example set formerly by the East India Company, and now by our Government, is being imitated in native states by princes who, under British advice, are glad by this means to increase their revenue even against the religious feeling of their people. India and Ceylon.

The statements which have been made by the temper-

ance reformers have been sharply denied by many representatives of the Indian Government, but the denials hardly meet the points which have here been briefly stated. At the same time it is not true that, taking India through, there has been a recent adoption of an evil system, for even in the time of the Company revenue was raised by a liquor-farming system; and the Government argue that the increased consumption of liquor, where there is an increase, is owing to improvement in wages and increase of industrial employment. It is doubtful, according to writers who support in this matter the Government view, whether a general increase in the consumption of strong drink has in fact taken place, because while a great deal more liquor becomes the subject of duty than was formerly the case, it is supposed that there is less smuggling and illicit distillation. Mr. Cust has stated that "the great increase of the Excise in recent years really represents much less liquor sold, and an infinitely better regulated consumption than the smaller Revenue of former years. . . . The great increase in the Revenue, which is unquestionable, does not mark the extension of drinking habits, but is the result of a great and general increase of the rate of tax, which it would have been entirely impossible to realise but for the great improvement in the preventive measures." The Government assert that in raising the liquor taxes they have intended to check consumption, but the Indian National Congress has, by a unanimous vote, condemned the existing system; the House of Commons has condemned it; and the Government of India will be forced to devise a liquor system less contrary to the drift of modern opinion than any of those which have, it may be admitted, long existed within the territories which they govern. While, however, it would be easy to

sacrifice the Indian revenue from liquor, it is difficult to see how, without enacting absolute prohibition (such as exists in the North-West Territories of Canada) of the importation, manufacture, and possession of drink, illicit distillation could be prevented in such a country as India.

Restriction everywhere gaining ground.

India forms no exception to the general principle that restriction of the sale of intoxicating liquors finds more and more favour every day throughout Greater Britain.

PART VII

FUTURE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE MOTHER-COUNTRY AND THE REMAINDER OF THE EMPIRE

PART VII

FUTURE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE MOTHER-COUNTRY AND THE REMAINDER OF THE EMPIRE

Present position of the Imperial Federation proposals.

On the 15th November last, at a meeting at the Mansion-House to receive Mr. Parkin, who has recently spoken for the Imperial Federation League in all parts of Canada, as well as in Australia and New Zealand, Lord Rosebery and other speakers adopted a more moderate programme than that which has been sometimes put forward in the name of the League. Lord Rosebery, indeed, receded from at least one suggestion formerly made by himself. He explained a "fatal" objection to his own scheme for introducing colonial representatives to the House of Lords, as well as the "double objection" to the idea of introducing such representatives into the House of Commons—an idea, however, which he, in common with Mr. Forster, the parent of the League, had been consistent in condemning. He showed that the extension of the Privy Council by the inclusion of the Agents-General, as proposed by Lord Grey, was a matter of extreme difficulty, and that the project of a Zollverein, or customs union, was by no means a practical proposal towards the consolidation of the Empire. On the other hand, Lord Rosebery (followed upon the point by Lord Carnarvon) maintained that we already possess a form

of Imperial Federation inaugurated by the Colonial Conference of 1887. One of the chief speakers, declaring that the Conference had made recommendations upon matters which concerned the common good of the Empire, exclaimed, amid the cheers of the members of the League, that "if that was not Imperial Federation," he did "not know what is." At a later period in the meeting a resolution was carried to the effect that a series of such gatherings as the Conference of 1887 would tend to the consolidation of the Empire, and that it was undesirable that a long interval should elapse before another conference was summoned; and Lord Carnarvon, in seconding the resolution, declared in the name of the League that "all that they claimed and desired was that the question" [that of Imperial Federation] "which was excluded at the last Conference—formally and deliberately, and no doubt wisely, excluded—should not be excluded in the future." The resolution was supported by Mr. Parkin, the orator of the League, fresh from the triumphs of his eloquence in Canada and Victoria, and from his total failure in New South Wales; but not one word did Mr. Parkin say of that which those who went to hear him most expected—the willingness of the Australian colonies to act upon the principles formerly suggested by Mr. Forster and other officers of the League, or even to support the moderate platform of Lords Rosebery and Carnarvon.

The moderate programme.

In face of the limited programme now put forward by the authorised exponents of the views of the Imperial Federation League, it is useless to discuss at length the projects which have been sketched by ingenious persons for the reconstruction of the Empire. The League now asks only for a series of conferences at which the subject of Imperial Federation is, though not

proclaimed as the chief matter of discussion, not to be actually tabooed. The conferences cannot be frequent if colonial Prime Ministers are to attend, or even colonists of the second political rank. Moreover, Sir John Downer and Sir Samuel Griffith did not improve their position in their colonies by their visit to England in 1887; and it will be difficult indeed to persuade the statesmen of Queensland and New South Wales and South Australia to attend at all in London. Again, the exclusion of the subject of Imperial Federation from the debates of 1887 was made at that time an actual condition by New South Wales and some other colonies; and it is by no means certain that those colonies would be represented, even by their Agents-General, if it were not again excluded. As matters stand it is almost certain that Queensland, for one, would not attend a conference called upon the Carnarvon base, and it is possible that she would decline to attend a conference of any kind. It may, however, be conceded that a fuller form of Australian federation must soon come, and that the Dominion of Canada, Newfoundland, the United States of Australasia (to use the Victorian and South Australian name), or British States of Australia (to use Sir Henry Parkes's name), the Cape, and New Zealand, if she were still outside the Australian federation—that is, all the self-governing colonies possessing responsible institutions—might, after Australian confederation, be willing to attend.

Conferences.

How far the credit for the Conference of 1887 belongs rightly to the Imperial Federation League, and how far to Mr. Stanhope, it is difficult to say. The suggestion came from the former, but Mr. Stanhope himself and the Cabinet seem to be entitled to praise for the manner in which they overcame the difficulties

presented by the question. As I have often attacked a portion of Mr. Stanhope's proposals upon the army, I am the more willing to declare that his circular calling the first Conference was admirably conceived, and that he deserves the highest approbation for having seen in advance exactly what could and what could not be done. When sufficient time has passed to make it possible again to obtain the presence in London of colonial statesmen of position not inferior to that of the representatives at the Conference of 1887, no doubt a further conference might be called, especially if Australian federation had become complete in the meantime—a conference which might lead to useful common legislation, and even possibly, though that is far more doubtful, to such a discussion upon the general future relations of the Empire as might clear the air.

Future conferences.

The first and most difficult subject which must be treated at all such conferences is that of defence, which I reserve for separate discussion in the next chapter, merely pointing out that the difficulties of the question will be lessened after Australian federation, inasmuch as there would be little trouble in dealing with the group, compared to that of facing the separate Parliaments of Queensland and New South Wales. Besides defence, however, there are no doubt many matters in which a closer union of the component parts of the Empire is not only desirable, but possible of attainment; such, for example, as posts, telegraphs and cables, steamship subsidies, patents, currency, weights and measures, census and statistics, extradition, naturalisation, judgments, criminal law, commercial and maritime law, law of status, courts of appeal, loans, and many others. Although this list of subjects avoids the

most difficult, namely, common revenue, common control of foreign affairs, decision as to peace and war, and the conduct of wars, still it includes some of high importance. In posts and telegraphs, already discussed at the last Conference, but most imperfectly, the Empire is behind many other portions of the world. The fact that English agencies should be in the habit of sending to the Continent letters and newspapers intended for their clients in the greater portion of the British Empire, in order that they may be posted there at cheaper rates, and the fact that the cheaper postage from some foreign countries to India leads to circulars intended for parts of Greater Britain being printed, as well as posted, abroad, are not creditable to us. German letters to almost all portions of the British Empire outside the United Kingdom cost about one-half the sums which have to be paid upon English letters to the same places. These are matters which ought to be settled by agreement in London between the mother-country, India, and the colonies.

The subsidies of steamship lines, and several other subjects that I have named, are also essentially matters for agreement; but it is doubtful whether we in England are yet in the frame of mind for conceding to the colonies and to India their due share in controlling the policy of the Empire even upon secondary questions. It seems hardly noticed at home that we are not in the habit of admitting the colonies to freely legislate even upon all matters which concern their own home affairs. We may take for an example the divorce Bills which have been recently passed in several colonies, and the first of which was vetoed because inconsistent with home ideas, although the legalisation of marriage with the deceased wife's

sister has after a struggle been permitted in Canada and Australia. In this and many other matters too, while the legislation has been at last allowed, it has been consented to in a grudging spirit; and I believe that the wife of a most distinguished late Agent-General, legally married though she was according to the colonial law, was not long since treated in England as though her marriage had been an English one and consequently illegal. On the other hand, the Minister of a foreign Court who was here at the same time, and whose wife was his own niece, which was legal according to the laws of his country, found no difficulty in securing the reception of his wife at Court. In other words, that is still recognised in the case of foreign countries which is refused to our colonists in matters which are supposed to be entirely of domestic concern. Colonial judgments, too, are still treated in the United Kingdom as though they were foreign judgments.

Loans and financial federation.

One of the most difficult of the subjects which I have named in my list is that of loans, and I cannot but think that the fact that the mother-country (which has the fewest public assets to show for her heavy debt) has the best credit, in itself points towards a general financial federation of the debts of the whole Empire. This matter has been sometimes raised in connection with the subject of defence, because the savings which could be made for the colonies, by means of a consolidated debt resting upon the credit of the whole Empire, might be used for defence purposes. No means so sure could be found of popularising in the colonies the connection with the mother-country as that of giving them the direct advantage of cheaper money; and although our own credit stands immensely high at the present moment, it rests upon a less sure basis as regards the

future than does that of many of the colonies to which we still deny the right of obtaining trust fund investments. Even the most heavily indebted of all the colonies has been shown to possess a substantially sound financial position, as well as magnificent prospects for the future. No doubt the giving of control to the whole Empire over the borrowing of a colony is difficult, but I cannot believe that it transcends the resources of our statesmanship. Mr. Gresswell has discussed this matter with ability, and has powerfully put forward the advantages of financial union, which is further recommended to us by the fact that the colonial debts are mainly in British hands, and are more and more becoming one of the chief resources of the investors of the mother-country.

A customs union.

Although the President of the Imperial Federation League now puts aside not only projects for close political union, but even those for the creation of a customs union or Zollverein, many of his supporters by no means reject the possibility of a customs union. It is, however, necessary to point out that most of the colonists who agitate for what they call a commercial union or customs union mean something very different from what we call by the same names. When our merchants ask for it they express their wish to secure a better market for our goods by getting rid of colonial tariffs, and for this end some of them are willing to adopt protective measures against the outside world; but the colonists repudiate the idea of relying largely upon direct taxation to make up a deficiency in their customs revenue. What the Canadians ask for is that we should concede advantages to colonial goods over the goods of foreign countries, and many of them distinctly explain that they would not admit British manufactured articles

into Canada without duties. They propose, however, to subject them to duties somewhat less heavy than those which would be levied upon foreign goods. Two schemes have been put forward, which are in fact the same, one for an additional duty throughout the British Empire upon all foreign goods—the money to be spent upon imperial defence; the other for a reduction of duties upon British and colonial goods in colonial ports, accompanied by differential treatment of foreign as contrasted with colonial goods in home ports. Both these proposals involve Protection in England in a greater or less degree, and as they have been repudiated by Lord Rosebery, the President of the League, they possess little importance for the moment except that it must be understood that they lie behind the Canadian suggestions for a conference upon imperial union. There was a debate in 1889 in Canada upon commercial intercourse between the mother-country and the colonies. It was introduced by the Canadian advocates of Imperial Federation, and their proposals met with considerable public favour, although there was a disposition on the part of the leading men to avoid committing themselves to a somewhat indefinite movement.

Mr. Hofmeyr.

Mr. Hofmeyr's scheme put forward in connection with the Conference of 1887, for "promoting a closer union between the various parts of the British Empire by means of an imperial tariff of customs," was less important on account of its intrinsic practicability than on account of its author's position in South Africa, where, as has been seen, he is the politician of the greatest power, the leader of the Dutch party, and the maker and unmaker of Cape Ministries. Mr. Hofmeyr's scheme, which may be brought up at a future conference by the Canadian delegates, is to promote an imperial tariff of

customs, to be levied independently of the duties payable under existing tariffs on all goods entering the Empire from abroad; and the revenue derived from the new tariff is to be devoted to general defence. As Mr. Hofmeyr is the leader of the Afrikander party, to which has been imputed a desire for separation from the British Empire, it is important to notice his words: "I have taken this matter in hand with two objects: to promote the union of the Empire, and at the same time to obtain revenue for the purposes of general defence." Mr. Hofmeyr declared that by his scheme he wished to counteract what he called "territorialism," or the tendency of local interests to bring about the disintegration of the Empire. He instanced the West Indies, where the planters find themselves unable to sell their sugar profitably in British markets, and consequently look to the United States, but fail to make arrangements with the Americans on account of imperial treaties. A feeling naturally arises in favour of annexation to the American Union, as the attachment of the West Indies to the Empire becomes opposed to the self-interest of a portion of the inhabitants. This state of things Mr. Hofmeyr thinks would be remedied by differential treatment. So, too, in the case of Canada, Mr. Hofmeyr points out that if she asks for partial or complete commercial union with the United States we can concede it or refuse it, but that the dissatisfaction which would be aroused by refusal, and the dependence upon the United States which would result from the concession, would be equally dangerous to the unity of the Empire.

With regard to defence Mr. Hofmeyr showed that subsidies by the colonies to the mother-country for naval defence may be said by objectors, as in Queens-

land, to constitute taxation without representation or "Tribute," but that the colonies might consent to indirect taxes of such a kind as admitted their right to greater fiscal privileges within the Empire than are accorded to foreigners. Mr. Hofmeyr proposed a 2 per cent all round duty, raising a revenue of between seven and eight millions sterling to be devoted to naval defence. In answer to opposition, founded upon free-trade principles, Mr. Hofmeyr argued that his proposed duty is no worse than differential duties, kept up, not for the sake of promoting trade between colony and colony, but between a colony and a foreign State—the Orange Republic. Grain imported into the Cape from Australia pays duty, while that imported from the Free State, a foreign country, pays no tax whatever. The former reciprocity treaty between Canada and the United States was another instance of the same kind. Mr. Hofmeyr meets the very serious objection that his proposal would be an infraction of the most-favoured-nation clauses of our treaties by suggesting that in future treaties we should draw such a most-favoured-nation clause as would allow us to give special privileges to our colonies. Some of the French colonies are forced by the mother-country to give special privileges to French trade, and French most-favoured-nation clauses are held not to be violated by the provision. Mr. Hofmeyr tried to meet the free-trade arguments as to taxing the food of the British working man, and as to taxing the raw materials of British manufactures, by suggesting that at the present moment the taxpayer of the United Kingdom has to maintain almost single-handed the army and navy of the Empire, while under the Hofmeyr plan the burden would be divided.

Mr. Hofmeyr's position, power, and character render

his scheme interesting, as it shows the leader of the Afrikander party, of all prominent colonial statesmen, one of the most zealous on behalf of the Imperial idea; but it gains practical importance by the fact that it receives countenance from Canada, and will probably be put forward by Canada at some later date. Any form of Imperial Federation proposed by Canada will be Imperial Federation upon a protectionist base, the popularity of which in the mother-country will be problematical to say the least. Moreover, it will, as has been shown earlier in the present work, not admit the goods of the mother-country and of India freely to the colonial markets, because it is of the mother-country and of India that protected manufacturers are the most afraid.

The Canadian view of a Zollverein.

The crux of Imperial Federation lies in this tariff question. The British Empire for customs purposes consists of a great number of foreign and almost hostile countries, and it is as difficult to conceive the whole of the colonies becoming free-trade communities as to expect the mother-country to become protectionist under such temptation as the Canadians could hold out to her. We have not yet been able to reduce to harmony, or to found upon a base of principle, the tariffs even of those Crown Colonies in which we are all-powerful, and there seems indeed but little hope of the adoption of a common system for the Empire as a whole. In declaring that a Zollverein is by no means a practical proposal towards the consolidation of the Empire, Lord Rosebery no doubt thinks that any commercial union tempting the mother-country into the paths of Protection is impossible, just because colonial protectionists are more anxious to keep out the goods of Great Britain and of India than those of any other portion of the world; but he

Difficulties of a common tariff.

perhaps also feels that, were it possible of attainment, such a Zollverein would be opposed to our best hopes for the future of the world. Instead of doing our utmost to break down the barriers between peoples, we should be setting up new ones which would help to parcel the globe into three or four great systems of the future, shut off from, and hostile to, one another.

Decisions of Conferences.

The Conference of 1887 was merely consultative, and, distinguished and powerful as were its members, its decisions were not binding until they had been ratified and adopted by the Parliaments of the various colonies which were affected by the arrangements made. Sir Samuel Griffith took a leading part in the Conference,

Queensland.

and he was Prime Minister of Queensland; but it will be remembered that the Queensland Parliament rejected the Defence Bill and turned out the Ministry. This seems an additional reason, besides others which have

Local federation.

been given, why the extension of the federal system throughout the various groups of which the Empire is composed should precede the series of frequent conferences looked for by Lord Rosebery and Lord Carnarvon. It matters perhaps but little, from this point of view, whether Newfoundland should join or should continue to refuse to join the Canadian Dominion, or whether New Zealand should permanently stand aloof from Australia; because the more detached are New Zealand and Newfoundland from the colonies in their neighbourhood, the more certain are they to lean steadily upon the imperial connection. But the case is different with the colonies of the Australian mainland, and little indeed can be done in the direction of consolidation until New South Wales has joined, under one system or another, the colonies which send representatives to the Federal Council of Australasia. It took Switzerland 557 years

to grow from a league of perpetual alliance into a confederation, and progress in such matters cannot be rapid; and it is difficult to say that Lord Salisbury's letter of July 1889, declining to summon a meeting of representatives, from various parts of the Empire, to consider the possibility of establishing a closer union, was at the time unwise, although its form was open to misconception. The previous declarations of Mr. Smith and Mr. Stanhope in favour of Imperial Federation, and the paragraph pointing to it in the Queen's Speech of September 1886, are to some degree in conflict with the later declarations of Lord Salisbury.

The Rosebery-Salisbury correspondence.

While the Conservative Cabinet have toned down their opinions in favour of Imperial Federation, the Imperial Federation League itself, although it has never changed its official programme, has, as we have seen, also shown a tendency towards some modification of its views. Nothing can be more catholic than the tone which has always been exhibited by its official organ, a paper which has been conducted with an impartiality which might with advantage be extended in political discussions. *Imperial Federation* has, however (while it has always given fair play to all sides), sharply criticised the writings of those who have asked disagreeable questions bearing upon the possibility of the adoption of a close union, such as the question how the Federation would deal with customs, or, if taxation was to continue to be treated locally, with the refusal of a member of the confederation at any future time to provide money for imperial defence. Then, too, some of the Executive Committee of the League have put forward elaborate schemes for close union diametrically opposed to the views now enunciated by others among their number. Sir Frederick Young, for example, has

General recognition of the need for caution.

Varieties of opinion in the Imperial Federation League.

written strongly in favour of colonial representation in the Imperial Parliament, a scheme which Mr. Forster, the first President, discouraged and which Lord Rosebery, the present President of the League, has condemned. Sir Frederick Young, writing before Home Rule had been taken up by the Liberal party, frankly admitted that true federation would necessitate the creation of local Parliaments in the various portions of the United Kingdom, and that "Viceroys" "in London, Edinburgh, and Dublin" must be supplied with executives composed of advisers taken from the local Houses.

Home Rule for Ireland.

The discussions on Home Rule for Ireland have indeed, at a later period, somewhat weakened the influence of the Imperial Federation League, although its speakers and its organ have been most careful to avoid committing themselves upon the question. The fact that Lord Rosebery, the President of the League, is in favour of Home Rule for Ireland has been a weakness to the League in Victoria, where the prevailing sentiments are what is commonly styled "anti-Irish"; while, curiously enough, at the same time the fact that the majority of the Committee of the League are Conservatives, and that it uses the word "Imperial" in that phrase "Imperial Federation"—which I believe was first invented by a Radical, Mr. Edward Jenkins—has been against the League in New South Wales and Queensland, where there exists at present a terror of the word "Imperial." Such an institution as the Imperial Federation League is necessarily exposed, in the present stages of the discussion which it has raised, to differences of opinion in its ranks, and to the publication of much which is "viewy" and "amateurish;" and when Mr. Froude, Professor Seeley, and Sir Rawson Rawson—the

"Imperialists."

most competent of judges—were set to allot prizes given by the London Chamber of Commerce (the secretary and founder of which is on the Committee of the League) to the authors of essays upon Imperial Federation, the result of their performance of their difficult task was the selection of prize essays containing arguments mutually destructive.

The Rhodes-Parnell correspondence.

One suggestion which is in the air, though it has not yet, I think, been made in print, has grown out of the relations between the Irish Home Rule party and some South African imperialists, which arose from the contribution given by Mr. Rhodes to Parnellite funds. The idea which has been broached is that of a permissive Federation—the establishment of a federal system, to be brought into being at once as regards England, Ireland, Scotland, and Wales, of which colonies, or federated groups of colonies, might severally become members by applying for admittance upon certain terms. In order to be allowed representation in the imperial as contrasted with local Parliaments, the colonies making application would have to contribute towards the cost of the common army and marine; for the authors of the plan (to which I daresay Mr. Parnell is in no way bound) intend to leave the fiscal system to each federal Province. The suggestors of this scheme couple it, however, with the adoption of the Hofmeyr or some similar plan, by which Canadian wheat (Indian they forget or do not name), Cape wine, West Indian sugar, and Australian wool would come into the United Kingdom on terms slightly more favourable than those accorded to the wheat of the United States, the wine and sugar of the European Continent, and the wool of South America. Besides the difficulty of obtaining the adhesion of Great Britain to such a protective scheme there are diffi-

culties upon the colonial side. It would be possible that New Zealand might apply for admission to the Federation, the whole of Australia remaining out, and that under the irritation which would arise New Zealand might become an Italy to Australia's France. Canada and Ireland, however, might conceivably agree in suggesting such a scheme, and it is this which gives it some importance.

Power of the Crown.

It must, I think, be admitted, whatever the political opinions or predispositions of those who deal with the question, that, even supposing that the obstacles to a customs union could be avoided, the conduct of foreign affairs and of wars would offer immense difficulties under a federation covering enormous distances, unless it were accompanied by an increase of the power of the Crown. If the Australians and the people of the United Kingdom were willing to give to the Crown in military affairs and in foreign affairs the same predominance which is assigned to it under the Austro-Hungarian constitution, or by the practice of the German Empire, no doubt many difficulties would be at an end; but the assent of the people of the United Kingdom, of New South Wales, and of Queensland to such a system would be doubtful, to say the least.

Colonial opinion.

It seems of little use to discuss the details of schemes for the future government of the Empire, involving a closer connection between the mother-country and the colonies than that which exists at present, unless colonial feeling generally would tolerate an attempt to draw more taut the ties that bind the component parts of the Empire to one another. In the chapters on the self-governing colonies it has been shown that many of the leading colonists and distinguished politicians that Greater Britain has produced are in favour of Imperial

Federation; but it has been seen that some of the communities they represent on other questions seem on this one disinclined to follow their lead, and that in the last two years there has been in the eastern Australian colonies a marked change in the direction of opposition to the idea of Imperial Federation. Recent change.

It is generally assumed in Great Britain that the subject of Imperial Federation is one regarded with much interest by colonists, while some think that there is in the colonies a positive enthusiasm for the cause. As a fact the majority of Australian colonists are disinclined to trouble their heads upon the question, and, when they are forced to do so, treat the suggestion as a dream, in much the same way in which we are inclined to behave towards ideas of Anglo-Saxon reunion. The references made to Imperial Federation by those of the leading men of Australia who are in favour of it are not taken up by popular feeling, and their authors are often looked upon as politicians of the past or ridiculed by the press for adherence to impracticable views. The feeling of the Australian democracy is that the existing bond with the mother-country may be one not actually hurtful to the colonies, and, if it does no good, a matter of no great consequence; but there is an unwillingness to discuss changes in the direction of strengthening the tie. Among the older settlers the leaning towards closer relations with the mother-country is connected with a conservatism in politics and in matters of property which places them out of sympathy with the ruling democracies of the Australian colonies; while the native-born Australians look upon imperial affairs with a languid interest, and are apt to turn impatiently from their discussion to matters which to them are more real and of more practical importance in their lives. The Australia.

bond between the old land and the new is more and more regarded as a sentimental tradition, and less and less as one of the facts of politics.

The late Mr. W. E. Forster seems to have come in contact chiefly with the leading men of the Australian colonies and those belonging to the land-holding and commercial classes, and the views held by the parent of the Imperial Federation League are not shared by those who have a more general acquaintance with Australia. It is doubtful, for example, whether a well-informed colonial governor, such as Lord Carrington, would be found to share the confident belief of some that the ties between the mother-country and Australia can be drawn much closer. The undertones of Lord Carrington's speeches seem to show that he shares the views of Sir Henry Parkes and Mr. Dibbs, the leaders of the two parties in his colony, and that he expects Australia to grow out of her allegiance to the Empire, and sees that the tendency among her population is towards independence. In laying the foundation-stone of the new Houses of Parliament at Sydney during the Centennial festivities Lord Carrington said, "In years to come Australia will be taking her place among the nations"; and although he insisted upon the advantage to Australia, which for military reasons the connection will continue to possess so long as the population of the new continent consists only of a few millions, his language seemed to point to the independence of Australia when those millions have expanded into numbers sufficiently great to hold their own against the world. Although for commercial reasons Canada is less hostile, as a whole, to a closer union, the Canadian speeches of Lord Dufferin and Lord Lorne contained many similar phrases. Now most Australians think,

Lord Carrington.

and rightly think, that they are already able to hold their own if united among themselves by a closer federation. Canada and South Africa, on the other hand, are exposed to local difficulties and dangers which are likely to hold in check the sentiment of independence; but a federation of the Empire without Australia would be as lame as a federation without India, while the difficulties of obtaining Australian consent are now as great as those of devising a system under which India can be brought in to take her share in the government of a democratic empire. It is probable that Australia will soon be united against the rest of Greater Britain in trade matters; brought into Australian federation on the basis of protective duties directed against the mother-country and against India. Commercial estrangement will in this case work against that union which the necessities of defence alone would, for a time, continue to promote.

Australian nationality.

Australia is gliding by insensible degrees into a national life, and, while an alliance between herself and the mother-country on the present conditions may long continue, any active attempt to replace it by a tighter hold is likely to be dangerous. The *Centennial Magazine* of Sydney in June 1889 published an article on the future of the Australasian colonies which is looked upon as having been representative of the sentiments of the young Australians, and the article was itself a Prize Essay at the University of New South Wales. The argument of the article was that the present relations between Great Britain and the colonies were not only anomalous, but also unlikely to be permanent, inasmuch as the colonies were exposed to be precipitated into war and to have their trade destroyed in a cause of which they might know nothing and care nothing. The author

maintained that the relationship of Australasia to the United States was as close as her relationship to England, and that the Union had as great a right to the friendship of Australasia as had Great Britain. He held, therefore, that the relations of the countries could not, in face of this fact, be decided by sentiment, but only by considerations of self-interest, while he maintained that Great Britain was by reason of her geographical position and of her hold on India so deeply involved in Continental complications that the interests of Australia made for separation.

Queensland and New South Wales.

Such views are so widely spread in Queensland as well as in New South Wales that it is unlikely that the Governments of those colonies would consent to take part in negotiations intended to draw closer the bonds which unite the mother-country to the colonies. To summon a conference of the colonies upon Imperial Federation, as suggested by Sir Charles Tupper, would be likely to produce a refusal from these two colonies; and to enter upon steps pointing to an Imperial Federation from which large portions of the Empire would be omitted would be a mistaken course. The difficulty may be removed by the creation of a real Australian federation, for in Australia as a whole there is less unwillingness, and a federal Government could be more easily sounded in advance than can the separate colonies. Mr. Parkin, when on his recent journey on behalf of the Imperial Federation League, was well received throughout Australasia, except at a public meeting in Sydney; but he made few converts, and Imperial Federation is now very generally described in the eastern colonies of Australia as "the subjection of Australia to England." Mr. Patchett Martin has said, probably with truth, that no body of practical politicians in

Australia will ever seriously contemplate a legislative union between Australia and the mother-country. As regards the greater portion of Australia, a good deal of difficulty will be found in establishing, even for defence purposes, a closer connection with the mother-country.

Lord Knutsford has consistently maintained on behalf of the home Government that any proposals for union must come from the colonies themselves, and must follow rather than precede complete Australian federation; but there are friends of Imperial Federation in Australasia who consider that Australian federation will be a step away from instead of a step towards imperial unity. Imperial unity would seem, however, to be impossible as long as the Australian colonies are consulted one by one. It has been assumed in England that the recent declarations of Sir Henry Parkes in favour of Australian union constitute a "new departure"; but the Prime Minister of New South Wales went little farther in his recent utterances than he had already gone two years ago. It is clear from the words with which he accompanied his suggestions that he looks forward to Australia, like Canada, remaining what has been called "a Federal Republic within the Empire," without any closer union. Sir Henry Parkes has, for all practical purposes, abandoned the suggestion, which he made in a Review article some years ago, that the British States of Australia should be represented on a council sitting in London, if by representation anything real is meant; while he undoubtedly continues to adhere to the view he then expressed that the functions of Governors should become ceremonial, and be unaccompanied by the practical use of the suspensory power as regards laws.

To summon a conference upon Imperial Federation

destined to show that it could not be brought about would be a step in the wrong direction, and Lord Salisbury will be justified in refusing to call a conference until Australian federation has become complete.

The right of secession.

Sir Julius Vogel, who was one of the first colonial statesmen who advocated Imperial Federation, has written in favour of declaring to the colonies at a Conference that the breaking up of the Empire by the secession of a colony or colonies would not be allowed, and has hinted that the real object of some of those who are pushing forward Australian Federation is to interpose a barrier to the consolidation of the Empire. I cannot agree with Sir Julius Vogel that a break-up of the Empire will be facilitated by Australian Federation. At the present moment there is a risk of a declaration of independence on the part of Queensland, and there can be no doubt that federation gives Victoria a great deal of power in preventing such isolated action by a single colony. If, on the other hand, the dominant feeling in Australia as a whole should at some future time become favourable to complete independence, it is certain that the mother-country would not attempt to coerce united Australia into remaining unwillingly in the connection.

Canadian view.

Canada has been named above as being less unfriendly to the idea of closer union than Australia, but it must not be imagined that even in Canada the way is clear for Imperial Federation. While the old United Empire feeling, which is still strong in the Dominion, leads some to a real wish for imperial union, they are but a minority unless joined by the representatives of the Canadian democracy at large. Such willingness to ally themselves to the cause of Imperial Federation as has been found among the Canadian electors is largely based upon the desire for a wider market, and when it

is seen, as there is reason to fear must be the case, that commercial union is as little practical as Lord Rosebery has already called it, this main support of the imperial unity idea in Canada will fall away. Then, too, many of the strongest friends of Imperial Federation among the Canadians of English, Scotch, and American-Loyalist race are strong Protestants, and the discovery that the Roman Catholic Church is and will continue to be politically predominant in large portions of the Dominion is alienating them from the Empire; so that a most distinguished Unionist writer—the best judge of British colonial feeling that I know, although I do not share all his views—has spoken of "a time when the British Canadians will link their fortunes with the people of the United States, if that should appear to them the only method of overcoming and amalgamating the foreign element in their midst." The French Canadians are divided upon the question of Imperial Federation, Mr. Laurier being more or less in favour of it, while Sir Hector Langevin is more or less unfriendly, and Mr. Mercier violently opposed to it. Generally speaking, the Canadian politicians have not held steady and uniform language upon this subject. Sir John Macdonald and Mr. Blake, formerly leader of the Opposition, have each of them been quoted upon both sides, while Sir Charles Tupper, who now suggests a convention for the discussion of Imperial Federation, was formerly, I believe, hostile to the idea. It must be accepted as a fact that both the Canadian Governmental party and the Canadian Opposition are divided with regard to closer union; but Sir John Macdonald and his friends may be said to take the view that federation is desirable if possible, but is of doubtful possibility, and that the Empire will con-

tinue to exist whether it federates or whether it does not. Sir John Macdonald is a member of the Imperial Federation League, and has put out a scheme of imperial defence based on the idea of the supply by the Dominion and by an Australian federation of auxiliary armies and fleets paid for by themselves; in fact, the old-world idea of contingents. Meanwhile Canada is taking a practical step towards imperial unity by sending a leading member of the Upper House to Australia on a mission for the promotion of commercial relations between Australia and the Dominion.

New Zealand opinion.

The dominant opinion in New Zealand has long been opposed to Australasian and favourable to Imperial Federation. In a debate of 1885 both the present Prime Minister and the present leader of the Opposition, although belonging even at that time to different parties, declared that Imperial Federation was possible and would come, but seemed to think that it would come only after the Imperial Parliament had created State legislatures for the principal parts of the United Kingdom. Sir Robert Stout, the former leader of the Liberal party, is also, like Sir Harry Atkinson and Mr. Ballance, a strong supporter of United Empire.

Mr. Parkin at Sydney.

When the Canadian orator of the Imperial Federation League lately attempted to convert New South Wales, in which colony I believe there exists no such formal organisation of the League as is to be found in most other colonies, he met with a bad reception. At his Sydney public meeting, although he had the support upon the platform of members of the two Houses who—like Mr. M'Millan, the Finance Minister —are by no means strong supporters of Imperial Federation, there were few persons present in the body of the hall except avowed opponents. Mr. Parkin's

lecture was a good deal interrupted; and when he sat down a resolution was moved by a member of the Upper House, and seconded by a member of the Lower House, to the effect "that the inevitable destiny of the Australian colonies is to unite and form among themselves one free and independent nation." The Chairman refused to put the motion on the ground that it did not concern the purpose of the gathering, and the meeting terminated in disorder. While the Liberal and Radical papers of the colony condemned Mr. Parkin's views, the Conservative *Morning Herald* gave him but cold comfort. It declared that the reports of Mr. Parkin's reception in New South Wales would be read in England with "surprise and disappointment," but that it was well "that in matters of such importance no illusions should be entertained"; and it ascribed the "patent" fact "that within the last few years the opponents of closer union—even the advocates of separation—have gathered courage . . . and taken an aggressive attitude" to the New Guinea and Pacific questions, and to the indifference of Australians "to interests that lie outside the Australian world." Mr. Parkin afterwards spoke to meetings less open to the colonial public, and was charged with having changed his tone by suggesting a union on a democratic basis, in which Great Britain would be only a junior partner or vassal state, never to move hand or foot except by previous colonial permission. The *Australian Star*, after this, assured Mr. Parkin that he would have to find "a different kind of salt to shake on the emu's tail."

The Western Australia debate.

Much light was thrown upon the feeling in New South Wales with regard to the future relations of the mother-country and the colonies by the already-named debate on the Western Australia Bill, which took place

in the Assembly at Sydney about the middle of 1889. Sir Henry Parkes, Mr. Dibbs (the leader of the Opposition), and Mr. Traill, who took part in it, all looked forward to the speedy creation of a united Australia, independent or semi-independent of the mother-country, and all looked upon Imperial Federation either as a dream or as possible only by union upon equal terms. Sir Henry Parkes not only put forward, as I have said, the doctrine of "Australia for the Australians," but urged the right of Australia, without reference to home opinion, to decide what the future of every acre of the continent shall be. He went out of his way to say that he could not bring himself to agree with that theory of Imperial Federation which had been promulgated by very eminent men at home, for the more he thought upon it the more sure he felt that there could be no federation "by a great central power with a number of weaker powers." The leader of the Opposition on his part declared that he looked forward to the existence of a different form of government in Australia, under which she would spring from the position of a dependency to that of an independent state, and maintained that Australia was already as closely bound to England as could ever be the case. The next speaker, Mr. Traill, the representative of the independent protectionists, agreed with the Prime Minister and the leader of the Opposition so far as he did not go beyond them. It seems clear that, if we call on New South Wales to give us her view of the future of the Empire, she is likely to agree with Queensland in suggesting the selection of Governors by the people, and the abolition of the practice of suspending Bills for consideration at home, and to make no proposal for closer union.

In Victoria, where he met with a far better reception than in New South Wales, Mr. Parkin's chief difficulty was the one already named—that Lord Rosebery, the President of his League, was a Home Ruler. The dominant party in Victoria, who are in theory favourable to the idea of closer union in the Empire, form, as has been seen, a coalition defending secular education, which of necessity has an anti-Roman Catholic and therefore an anti-Irish tinge. The conservative papers in Victoria, especially the *Argus* and the *Australasian*, were, nevertheless, generally friendly to Mr. Parkin's mission, while the democratic papers, notably the *Age* and the *Leader*, expressed the view that matters are well as they are, and that a closer connection is not needed. Moreover, the representatives of the colonial workmen seem to think that Imperial Federation is an upper class movement, chiefly favoured by the Court and aristocracy, and this view is calculated, if Federation is strongly pushed, to arouse among colonial artisans a separatist agitation. Mr. Bent, who has occupied a high position among the minority in Victoria, has declared that the majority of the native-born population, even in this most loyal of Australian colonies, look forward to something very like ultimate separation; and it must not be assumed that in the event of a consultation of colonial opinion the delegates of Victoria would be able to disassociate themselves from those of New South Wales. The colonies represented on the Federal Council of Australasia would probably adopt a common attitude, and this would of necessity be a compromise between the opinions of Victoria and of Queensland. It is still possible that in the event of a dangerous war, not unjust, but forced upon the mother-country, a wave of enthusiasm might

Victoria.

sweep across Victoria and some other portions of Australia; but all would depend upon the manner in which the circumstances of the day presented themselves to the men who were at the helm. The recent anti-Chinese agitation throughout Australasia has shown clearly that the Australians are determined that if the imperial policy comes into conflict with Australasian interests the latter must prevail. Alliance with China is important to the Empire, but Australia declines to consider that importance, and insists upon having her own way not only in fact but in form. This consideration is by no means encouraging to the prospects of a closer union.

The Cape.

The proposals of Mr. Hofmeyr have been already dealt with; but it must not be supposed that those are the only proposals that have been put forward from South Africa for imperial union. Mr. Merriman has adopted Lord Grey's suggestion for creating from the Agents-General a council of advice for the Secretary of State for the colonies. He admits that it will, if adopted, diminish the office of Governor of a colony to an ornamental sinecure; but he values the opportunity for bringing the colonial Ministry into direct touch with the imperial Government. Mr. Merriman points out, what is very true, that to some extent the change has already taken place, although he regrets that the new practice is only adopted by favour and out of courtesy, and not as of right.

The Agents-General.

The suggestion of the creation of a Council of the Agents-General may be taken in connection with that of the election by the colonies of their Governors. This change is advocated only in Australia, and Australian federation upon the Canadian plan will give the colonists the virtual election of the Provincial Lieutenant-Governors, the

Viceroy alone being named by the Ministry in the United Kingdom. Mr. Patchett Martin, who is favourable to colonial selection of Governors, has also put forward some practical suggestions which are of value, as, for instance, the gradual elevation of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council into the place filled by the Supreme Court of the United States, and the admission to it of a fair proportion of colonial legists. The colonial title "The Honourable" should be used on formal occasions by our Government for colonial Ministers when in England, as it is recognised in the colonies themselves. Something might be done to draw the mother-country and the colonies together by offering appointments in the Civil Service and by extending the system of offering employment in the army and navy to young colonists, by giving colonial governorships to distinguished colonists of other colonies (as was done in the case of Sir Ambrose Shea), and by drawing closer the ties which bind the colonial universities to the old English universities. There is more hope about such schemes than attaches to the larger systems of imperial union which have been devised.

A Council of Agents-General.

The creation of a Council of Agents-General would bring out the fact that the colonies, as a rule, have at present little interest in one another's business; but no such objection can be offered to an improvement in the position of the Agents-General. The practice might spring up of inviting Agents-General to attend meetings of the Cabinet when matters are under discussion on which their advice might be useful, just as generals about to proceed to take command of armies in the field, as well as law officers of the Crown, are invited, from time to time, to ministerial meetings. Sir John Gorst has wisely said that closer union should be

looked for in the more intimate concert of executives, for change is hardly sought except as regards defence and foreign policy (being impracticable as regards tariffs), and defence and foreign affairs are chiefly dealt with by executives. In many little matters, too, the position of the Agents-General might be better recognised. They should be treated as ambassadors as regards taxation, while at the present time many of them pay income-tax twice over. Their formal constitution as a Council is a more doubtful matter, for no one who knows Sir Henry Parkes would like him to feel that he was ruled by a Victorian; and Sir Arthur Blyth, another distinguished Agent-General, like Sir Graham Berry of Victoria, has strong opinions on Australian questions, though not the same opinions. A colony may be disinclined to allow the mother-country to declare that a thing cannot be done on account of imperial interests or imperial treaties, but each colony would admit the validity of such a declaration from the mother-country more readily than she would tolerate interference from the representatives of other colonies. At the same time, while it is difficult to make a Council of the Agents-General, there is no reason why we should not give them a nominal position which would correspond in dignity with the services that they already render. They are, in fact, taken individually, among the most trusted of the councillors of the Empire, and those who have held for some years the position, and who have had the confidence of successive Governments, might well be placed formally in the Imperial Privy Council.

No prospect of full confederation.

It cannot be said that the idea of imperial unity has made rapid progress of a practical kind. The idea is far from modern. It was pointed at as regards Canada

LONDON LIBRARY

by Adam Smith, and put forward by Montgomery Martin in his history of the colonies published before the present reign, to which, it is perhaps worth notice, both Her Majesty the Queen and Mr. Gladstone were subscribers. It is useless to underrate the difficulties in the way. Mr. Seeley has written of England proving "able to do what the United States does so easily, that is, hold together in a federal union countries very remote from each other." But the territories of the United States, with the exception of Alaska, which has no population, are contiguous territories; and even Professor Seeley seems inclined to "exclude India from consideration." He thinks that the British Empire of the future will be far stronger than what he calls the "conglomeration" of races "which we call Russia." But the vast majority of the people of Russia speak one tongue, and the Russian territories are contiguous. I, too, think that the British Empire of the future will be stronger than even the Russian Empire, powerful as that is; but its strength will not be promoted by attempts to force the Australian colonies into an imperial union for which they are not prepared. It may be conceded that in Australia itself there may possibly come a change in the direction of closer union. The Maritime Provinces of British North America rejected by large majorities the confederation resolutions but a short time before the Dominion became a single power; and New South Wales and Queensland may possibly come to see their interest in union. If such changes should take place at home as may put an end to Irish disaffection one enormous difficulty in the way of closer union will have been removed, for in Australia the Irish difficulty—both in Queensland and in New South Wales upon the one hand, and in Victoria on the other—stops the way.

Existing ties between various parts of the Empire.

I shall deal in my concluding chapter with some of those ties, increasing in strength by the operation of natural causes, which at present hold together the British Empire. A certain association between the various parts of the Queen's dominions is produced by the habit of wealthy men from all corners of the Empire to not only visit, but often settle in London; and some of our political and constitutional usages facilitate the merger of distinctions between the various parts of Greater Britain which takes place when the Queen's subjects leave one part for another part of the countries that are under her rule. The fact that gentlemen like Mr. Ghose, coming from even those dependencies of the United Kingdom which do not enjoy representative institutions, obtain the suffrage and the right to sit in Parliament (although they have as yet failed to secure election) when they come to England, forms a bond throughout the Empire that may grow in strength with time. It is a singular fact that the Hindoos and Mohammedans of French India have votes in India and lose their votes if they come to France, whereas the Hindoos, Parsees, and Mohammedans of British India who have no political votes in India possess votes in the United Kingdom when they fulfil, as many of them now do, the conditions of property or residence which are required by law.

Practical suggestions bearing on defence.

A most thoughtful paper read before the Royal Colonial Institute by Sir Graham Berry has suggested steps which might be taken in the way of a closer union for defence, and Sir Graham Berry, like Mr. Service, has declared that the Australian colonies should be prepared to bear some of the burdens of the Empire, which have hitherto almost exclusively fallen upon the "somewhat overweighted shoulders" of the old country. Sir Graham Berry saw that, as regards Australia, local

federation must be preliminary to satisfactory arrangements upon the larger matter, because each successful federation reduces the number of different and probably conflicting opinions upon the subject. I shall deal in the next chapter with the details of defence, but the present difficulties may be seen from the consideration of the fact that the moderate proposals of the Conference of 1887 are now known in Queensland as the "Naval Tribute Bill." Strong declarations have been made that Queensland will never suffer itself to be taxed by any body outside of Queensland, or even by its own representatives, by way of contribution towards moneys, any part of which is to be spent outside its boundaries. Not only was Sir Samuel Griffith defeated on his return from the Conference on the very ground of his "Imperialism," but it is doubtful whether, after what took place in Queensland, the Naval Defence Bill could have been carried, at a later moment than that chosen, in the adjoining colony—the mother-colony, New South Wales.

Victoria goes farther in the direction of federation for imperial defence than do the other Australian colonies; but since the days when the Bill of the Conference of 1887 was carried by all the Australian legislatures except one, Australian Nationalism has become a party cry. It would be difficult to induce Australian Parliaments, with the possible exception of the Parliament of Victoria, to contribute towards the support of the general defensive power of the Empire, and measures of defence will have to be presented to them as being merely what Mr. Wise has called "the most economical method of preserving their own shores from hostile attack."

An attempt was made not long ago to unite some

hundred young Australians and New Zealanders in residence at the two old English universities in favour of a scheme for the organisation of the Empire as a naval confederation, controlling a fleet paid for and manned by all portions of the Empire; but little came of it; and the Australians at Oxford and Cambridge, even had they agreed upon such a scheme, could not have been held to represent the opinions of Australian democracy. So great, however, is the importance of the defence problem that it must be considered in a separate chapter.

PART VIII

IMPERIAL DEFENCE

PART VIII

IMPERIAL DEFENCE

Self-governing colonies.

THE defence of Canada and of Australia has already been treated in the first two parts of this work, and it has been shown that Australia is in a position to defend itself from any attack that is likely to be brought against it, while the Canadian Dominion could not, with our present means, be defended at all against the United States. The Australian troops now number something like 30,000 men, or 40,000 with those of New Zealand, but these are divided into local forces, at present tied to their own ground; while Canada possesses some 36,000, under a single military organisation, aided by an excellent system for training officers.

Australia.

It is to be hoped and to be expected that in Australia powers will speedily be obtained for simplifying the command and enabling the forces of one colony to be moved if necessary into another without difficulties concerning discipline. The Australians are, however, to be congratulated upon what they have already done, and especially upon the perfection of the local defences of Melbourne—the best defended commercial city of the Empire. In his recent report to the War Office, Major-General Edwards, after inspecting the forces and the defences of the whole of the colonies, discouraged volunteers, as unsuited to the colonies, encouraged the

"partially paid" militia, and proposed an extension of rifle clubs. He pointed out a general deficiency in the Australian supplies of reserve rifles for arming increased forces in the event of sudden war. The proposals for the future included the organisation of the forces of Queensland and of South Australia in the form of a brigade from each, the Queensland field brigade to be united into a division in time of war with the northern brigade of New South Wales under the Queensland commandant, while the South Australian brigade with the western brigade of Victoria would form a division under the South Australian commandant. The five colonies of the Australian mainland have among them about a thousand permanently and fully paid regular soldiers to work their big guns and to manage their mine-fields and torpedo defences. These will doubtless ultimately be formed into an Australian fortress corps, and will take charge of King George's Sound, Thursday Island, and Port Darwin, as suggested in the report of Major-General Edwards.

Tasmania and New Zealand.

The defence of New Zealand and Tasmania is in a less satisfactory position than is that of the Australian continent, and except so far as Port Darwin is for the present exposed to occupation they are more likely to be attacked. In New Zealand the configuration of the coast necessarily scatters the defending troops and exposes to the enemy the railway system of the colony; and the coal-fields of the Westport district, which yield perhaps the finest steam-coal of the world, are open to seizure. General Edwards has reported of Tasmania "if the isolation of Western Australia and Port Darwin is a menace to Australia, the position of Tasmania is still more dangerous . . . and it might even become necessary to send troops from the other colonies to protect it in

time of war. No enemy could seriously threaten Australia, until he had established a convenient base near at hand, and such a base he would find in Tasmania with its numerous harbours and supply of coal." It is a curious fact that General Edwards' useful report attracted but little attention in Great Britain, and was not printed by the newspapers of the mother-country although it had appeared in the colonial press.

Canada. In the event of a war in which the United States was neutral, Canada would be able to strongly garrison the important station of Vancouver Island, and would be able and might be willing to supply a contingent of brave troops for imperial service. The three groups of colonies comprised under the names of British North America, Australasia, and South Africa have of drilled men a force of over 80,000, besides rifle clubs and cadets. The defence of India against the possible advance of Russia has been already treated in detail, and it now remains to examine the conditions of the defence of the Empire as a whole, and to try to find some general principle for our guidance.

India.

Naval defence. A school of naval officers, not without support from some authorities connected with the army, are accustomed in their writings to maintain that we should be safe if we put our trust in the dominion of the sea alone. They seem to assert that the navy is not only the first "line of defence," but the sole defence that is of value; and an impression is conveyed to the public mind that as the navy ensures the food supply of the British Isles, an inability on its part to perform its duties would at once reduce us to submission and to payment of the penalties that defeat would bring, including perhaps the surrender of colonies. The deduction is not unnaturally drawn from this argument that money spent upon

fortifications, except slight works to resist stray cruisers, is thrown away, or at least diverted from the only important end—the increase of the fleet.

Blockade of the enemy's ports.

We have been invited to believe that it is possible to make of the enemy's coast our frontier, and to so blockade the whole of his ports that it would be impossible for his fleets to issue forth. I was present in May 1888 at the Royal United Service Institution when Admiral Colomb read a paper upon blockade with special application to wars past and possible between Great Britain and France. He appeared to recommend the blockade of all French ports and a fleet in the Channel in lieu of land defences. As Sir Charles Nugent showed in reply, the Admiral's policy implied or required a superiority of naval force which we do not possess, and, I may now add, which we shall not possess even when the recent proposals for additions to the navy have been carried out. In four years' time we shall have the ships which were ordered in 1889, and probably enough guns for them as well as for our fortifications, but with an insufficient reserve of guns for a great war. At the same time, the French are spending ten and a half millions sterling a year upon the services under the Ministry of Marine, and although these figures include a certain amount of colonial expenditure, they are, on the other hand, reduced by the existence of a naval conscription, so that we must always remember that France is far from standing still.

One of Admiral Colomb's chief supporters in the discussion which followed the reading of his paper admitted that under present circumstances, and under any which could be foreseen as likely to exist for a considerable time, if we went to war with France alone we should be unable to maintain a blockade, and should be compelled to with-

draw from Egypt, abandon the command of the Mediterranean, and uncover Malta either to a blockade or to an attack in force. The difficulties of blockade in these days of steam, stated by me in a recent work,[1] have been illustrated by the naval manœuvres of 1888 and 1889. In the former year it will be remembered that although the blockading squadrons possessed a considerable superiority in force the blockaded ships escaped with the greatest ease, and the blockaders found themselves at once obliged to concentrate for the defence of London. Then commenced that harrying of our coasts by an enemy of inferior strength which aroused indignation among such persons as put their faith in the humanity of modern methods of war, and startled the dwellers on the banks of the Clyde by practical demonstration of the fact that their homes might be desecrated even on a Sunday morning during church time.

The navy and fortification.

It may be admitted that there is always a tendency among military engineers to over-fortify the countries in which they are allowed a free hand. Vauban himself built far too many fortresses even for an age when a siege was regarded as a pleasant relaxation from the hardships of campaigning in the open field. In 1888 the French war ministry decided that portions of the new French frontier had been over-fortified and would lock up garrisons which would be more useful as part of the field army. Still, there is no sign of the Germans allowing the works of either Metz or Strasburg, or of their eastern fortresses, to decay, nor of the French selling the forts of Paris as building sites, however valuable the ground may be on which they stand. As with land fortresses so with coast defence, and it is perhaps enough to say that the responsible authorities

[1] *The British Army*, pp. 374, 375. Chapman and Hall, 1888.

at the Admiralty are of all people the most urgent in their insistence that the fortifications now in progress at the coaling stations should be carried out, that the commercial ports should be defended from the shore, and that the fortification of the arsenals should be improved. It is the naval authorities rather than the War Office who have laid down the conditions under which coast defence and the defences of coaling stations should be provided, and the works which are being built are in fact the creations of the navy, though erected by the War Department.

Blockade in the manœuvres.

In 1888 the blockaded fleets escaped, and in 1889 the manœuvres proceeded upon the principle that it had been proved that an active enemy would be able to escape unless shut in by an overwhelming force, such as against France we could not now supply. The proportion which the British fleets bore in the manœuvres of 1888 to the enemy's fleet was, roughly speaking, that which our fleet in European waters bore to the French fleet at home. The fastest ships of the supposed enemy broke out, joined others, conducted raids, and forced the British admiral to raise his blockades and to sail for the Channel and the Thames. He was helpless, because the enemy might either have brought a superior force to bear against one of his squadrons, or have broken up into units, to trace and follow all of which by ships of superior size would be impossible. If, however, London had been able to take care of itself for a week or two, Admiral Baird might have acted with greater boldness, and followed the enemy, destroying or capturing such ships as he could catch. There could hardly be a better instance of the need for fortification and coast defence, or a better warning against neglecting to provide them in the

degree suitable to each case. The result of the 1888 manœuvres has been that the Admiralty have continued to press for the completion of coast fortifications, and of the protective measures that are being taken at the coaling stations. In 1889 the British admiral gave up the policy of blockade, and adopted that of masking the enemy's fleet. It became clear that under such a system the full protection of British commerce, without a vast increase in the number of our fast cruisers, would be impossible.

Defence of foreign stations by the navy.

It cannot be said that the naval manœuvres of either 1888 or 1889 have been encouraging to those who desire to leave all defence to the navy. We have hitherto considered the home case, but shall form, I think, the same opinion if we look abroad. British travellers who consult the superior officers of our fortresses across the seas as to their ability under present circumstances to defend the posts committed to their charge, receive an answer which might be stereotyped: "With existing means we could not hold out long against a serious attack, but we trust, of course, to the protection of the fleet." Supposing such combinations against us as are now within the sphere of practical politics, and upon the dread of which the present Government are rightly acting in their increase of armour-clad line-of-battle ships—that is, supposing two naval powers to unite against us, of which one was the second naval power of the world—our whole fleet, even when the new programme has been completely carried out, will hardly be more than equal to those of the second naval power and another power (other than Italy, the third). It is clear, and now I think admitted, that we could not blockade their squadrons, which would require a superiority, according to the report of the umpires upon our naval manœuvres,

such as we do not possess. The fleets of our enemies will be free, and the ordinary laws of strategy will govern the situation. Either the enemy will succeed in concentrating a superior force against an inferior force of ours, or we shall successfully carry out an attempt to do so against the enemy. In either case there must be concentration by us at a spot which the enemy will try to avoid, bringing his force to bear where we are weak. Instead of the fleet defending Malta and Gibraltar, we should be more likely to see those fortresses abandoned by our ships, forced under present circumstances to meet in home waters for purposes of home defence.

Proposed home defence by navy.

I do not for a moment question the statement that the British navy is fully able to defend the United Kingdom if it is concentrated in home waters. Nothing, however, in war is more certain to be ultimately fatal than to relinquish the power of the initiative and of attack. If our fleets are to be concentrated for home defence they must abandon the remainder of the Empire, of which only some portions are able to defend themselves, and we must sooner or later be ruined or partially starved in the British Isles. The abandonment of Greater Britain would involve the destruction of our commerce and would be as severe a blow to the Empire as the invasion of England and capture of London itself. When, therefore, the naval school which I have mentioned points to supposed facts in proof of the contention that a superior naval force in home waters could defend the country against invasion, I have only to ask what is the practical application of this platitude to a scheme of defence of the British Empire. If we were to concentrate at the Nore and in the Channel a fleet superior in strength to those of two European powers, they would not be mad enough to attack our huge armada, but

would sweep our cruisers from the ocean, capture our merchant ships, direct expeditions against our coaling stations and our colonies, and destroy the whole edifice of that commerce by which the population of the United Kingdom is supported. It would not have been necessary to argue this point at all but for a ridiculous tone of triumph in which some have pointed to the manœuvres of 1889 as proving a proposition which no one in his senses has denied.

Channel Islands.

To go no farther from our own shores than the Channel Islands, we find in them a part of the Empire which is either to be given up in the event of a war with France or to be entrusted to our overburdened fleet. The little army known as the Channel Islands militia, and based on general liability to military service without pay, has been recently described by a competent French critic in the *Revue Militaire de l'Étranger* as a mere paper force; and the armament which has been laid down as necessary for the Channel Islands has not been provided. It seems to be thought that, in the event of a war with France, ships detached to protect the islands, even if they could be spared, would be exposed to being caught in a trap, and to be understood that no defence will be attempted, the view having been taken by the authorities that if the French beat us they would insist on the cession of the islands, and that if we beat the French the islands would be restored to us in the treaty of peace. Public opinion in England is, however, probably not prepared to accept the private decision upon this point of the high authorities, and the loss of the Channel Islands at the beginning of a war would be visited on those who had so managed the defences of the Empire as to make it certain.

Increase of the navy.

While the statements which I have made concern the present and the immediate future, there may be those who think that by a great increase of the navy it would be possible to so meet the difficulties of blockade that we might revert to the policy (scientifically admirable if it be only possible of adoption) of blockade. No doubt it was the old English naval principle to consider the coast of our enemy as the first line of defence, and to protect at once our commerce and our shores by shutting up the hostile fleets in their own ports. This policy would need, if we had two possible enemies only, a fleet at least one-third greater than ours will be at the close of the new period of construction, and even then the chances would be against the permanent success of the blockade. The independence of wind and tide which steam procures, the difficulty of coaling at sea in rough weather, the invention of the torpedo-boat, the advantages as to information and communication which squadrons possess when in their own ports, over hostile fleets at sea, have made the blockade of warships in these modern days, in my opinion, virtually impossible, unless the blockaders have something like the superiority of force which the Great Powers brought against Greece a few years ago. If one squadron escapes, it steams off at once to assist any other squadron, with which it communicates by telegraph; their joint attack may overwhelm the blockaders at that point, and the last state of the country of the blockading fleet will be worse than it would have been if a wholly different policy had been followed.

Even with an increased navy, the policy of blockade to my mind is fatal to the other portion of the argument of its defenders—the sufficiency of the fleet as a means of home defence. For us safely to

blockade our enemy we should have to follow the advice which has already been given to us by some naval men—to double the fleet,—and even then make up our minds to resign the power of efficiently protecting commerce. The exaggerated opinion against which I am contending is really based on the supposition that in a future naval war it would be possible for us from the first to obtain the same overwhelming superiority at sea which Nelson won for us by the crowning victory of Trafalgar. No conceivable increase of strength would be sufficient to make us safe if we trust to naval defence alone, in face of the facilities for concentration which steam affords. Moreover, trade is given up in all such schemes, for it must be remembered that in the time of our greatest superiority at sea—when not only had we destroyed every hostile fleet, but had impressed the imagination of the world with the belief that all attempt to contend with us on the waters must be vain —the capture of British ships, even in the Channel, occurred daily. In dealing with the problem of the organisation of the British Empire against a possible attack, the navy should be estimated at its full value as by far the greatest factor in defence, but we must carefully guard ourselves against the view that, even putting aside the necessities of India, it can be the sole defence. Nothing can be more tempting at first sight than the argument that, as islanders, we have only to keep up a sufficient fleet to make invasion impossible. Unfortunately, apart from the case of India, the problem of Imperial Defence is a good deal too complicated to be solved so easily.

Alliances.

There exists another school which assures us that, by a proper choice of our alliances, our trade and colonies will be safe, and we ourselves protected against in-

vasion; and the adherents of this school generally end by advising us to join the "League of Peace." We are assured that without our moving a man of the land forces, without indeed our possessing land forces of a modern type, the British fleet would be of vast importance to German and Italian allies in their international contests, and that Prince Bismarck approves of the notion of our concentrating our whole attention on the navy. We have, however, to deal with what is possible, and Lord Salisbury thinks that it is impossible to find majorities in the House of Commons or the constituencies in favour of an alliance with the Central Powers. Moreover, our dangers do not lie in general European war, but in grounds of quarrel which will not bring Central Europe into the field.

Work of the navy.

It is possible then, I think, to lay down the proposition that the navy must be our chief agent in defence, but backed by fortification and by land forces; and it is necessary to consider what would be the tasks confided to our ocean fleets and cruisers which would form in war the connection between the various detached portions of the Empire. In these days in which hostilities spring up suddenly, in order that the attacking country may obtain the advantage of surprising its opponent, it is necessary that the British squadrons afloat in distant seas should be strong enough to hold their own without reinforcement against probable enemies on the same station. The possession of innumerable safe ports in all parts of the world forms one of the chief elements of our maritime power. There are few more astounding proofs of the curious carelessness with which Imperial Defence was treated some years ago than the fact that the coaling stations, as they are now called, were left by us in a condition in which they were unable to protect

Coaling stations.

themselves even for the shortest space of time. When, however, the country discovered in what degree its vital interests had been neglected in this respect an almost equally astonishing mistake was made. While the navy was indeed consulted as to the places to be fortified, no one asked the question "Fortified against what?" After a time, however, the necessary steps were taken to request the Admiralty to lay down for the guidance of the War Office the probabilities as to the strength of the enemy against which each individual coaling station ought to be prepared to guard. The answer showed that we had been overestimating the necessary works in some places, such, for example, as Bermuda, and underestimating them in others.

While congratulating ourselves upon the tardy adoption of measures for the defence of coaling stations based upon naval views it is well to ask ourselves whether there are other questions upon which the naval authorities should be consulted by the War Department. The forts and guns for the coaling stations are being gradually provided, but the garrisons are weak indeed. I raised this point in writing upon the British army, and it appears that the suggestion of calling for local levies for the defence of coaling stations has been acted upon, though tardily. It is obvious, however, to all who inquire into the provision made for garrisons for the coaling stations in time of war, that it is still incomplete, and it is a matter of importance that it should be settled in time of peace what reinforcement will be necessary on the outbreak of war, and how it is to be effected. It is important, for example, that the naval authorities should know whether they are expected to undertake the task of conveying or convoying troops to coaling stations, which would be an addi-

Their garrisons.

tion to manifold duties having to be suddenly performed in a moment of great pressure. The War Office are a little like the heroes of the novelist who periodically got their bills together, docketed them with care, and then went to bed with a consciousness that their duty to their creditors had been fulfilled. When I wrote upon the army two years ago I was at first accused of overstatement, but my criticisms have since been confirmed by the reports of committees, and by the admissions of the Secretary of State for War. This confirmation, however, is but the docketing of the bills, and as regards many of them we do not seem to be nearer payment. The matter of the garrisoning of the coaling stations has been considered, but, as far as I can learn, has not been settled. The only satisfactory arrangement will be to have the necessary troops on the spot in time of peace; but next to this, if that plan be in some degree impossible of adoption, it is needful to arrange with the navy exactly what is to happen in the case of sudden war. Until the one system or the other has been adopted for each case the defence of our coaling stations cannot be said to have been adequately considered.

Suez or Cape?

Before taking the coaling stations in detail I must touch upon another important question. It is necessary that we should be clear in our minds as to which route we are to rely upon in time of war for communication with the East—that by the Suez Canal, or that by the Cape. In the Mediterranean our enemies in the event of war might easily be too strong for us. We hold only Gibraltar, Malta, and Cyprus, of which the last in its present state is a source of weakness, not of strength, possessing as it does no sufficient guns or fortifications, or garrison for its own defence. We cannot pretend to

guard trade routes on the Mediterranean, and, unless we had Italy for an ally, it is probable that we should be overmatched in Mediterranean waters, at least in the early stages of a war. The French possess a series of magnificent bases on the Mediterranean, and would be able, were they opposed to us, in all probability to force us to relinquish, for a time at least, the Mediterranean line. This change would set India, as well as Hong-Kong and the Straits, much farther off from England, and would add to other pressing reasons for making the Indian Empire self-supporting in the matter of manufacturing war stores, guns, and ammunition for herself and for her British neighbours. Our interests on that side of the world are great enough to prevent us from continuing the present system of supply; but a frank recognition of the state of things would also bring out the fact that the naval authorities are not yet satisfied with the amount of dock accommodation which they have in eastern waters. It should be remembered that naval predominance does not rest on the number of ships alone, but on the power possessed by them of obtaining succour and supplies, and the possibility of denying these advantages to their enemy.

Suez Canal.

It is clear that a power which commands the sea can forbid the use of the Suez Canal to others by guarding all approaches to it; but in our case this would only be an additional task for a fleet already supposed to be almost ubiquitous. Moreover, it is not certain that in keeping out our enemies from it we could preserve the use of the canal for ourselves. The canal, considered as a means of communication in time of war, is as delicate as a thread of a spider's web. A ship or two sunk in it; two or three charges of dynamite exploded in the portion nearest

to the Gulf of Suez; a few torpedoes laid down in the night—none of these difficult matters to manage, especially when we remember that we are forbidden to take full military steps for watching the canal—would close the passage against ships for days or weeks, and would prevent the transport by the Mediterranean of anything except troops without baggage. It would be difficult to keep the canal open, even if it lay within the limits of the British Empire, and the task of guarding it would lock up a considerable force of troops, and that of watching the approaches to it a portion of our active fleet. But we possess no special rights as regards the canal, and have no power to prevent a dozen merchant ships from sinking themselves in mid-channel.

When nations have been some time at war the morality of peace gives way to a desperate craving for success, and many acts are done which international law condemns; but I doubt whether a British Cabinet would dare to found its system of Imperial Defence upon such a high-handed proceeding as the seizure of the canal at the outbreak of a war and the refusal of passage to all merchant ships except our own. If we cannot count on the use of the canal for ourselves, we should have to set aside a portion of our navy in order to forbid its use by others. We should probably rather welcome the interruption of this route in war-time, and base our plans upon making the sea road by the Cape of Good Hope our main reliance for communication with the East. So much for a war in which we were opposed by a great naval power. In the event of a single-handed war with Russia, and still more in that of a war in which the United Kingdom and Italy were opposed to Russia, the Suez Canal route

would be of value. Small reinforcements of troops for India, in the event of a war in which France was not against us, might go by Egypt; but the heavy stores of an army would even then be more safe if sent round the Cape. At the best, in my opinion, the Suez Canal can only be an alternative route for war purposes; and in enumerating coaling stations I will begin with those of the Cape route, although Gibraltar stands first in either case.

Gibraltar

The progress of modern artillery has to a certain extent deposed Gibraltar from its position of pre-eminence. While ships may still take refuge under the shadow of The Rock, they would not be safe from bombardment either from the sea or from Spanish territory. A Spanish artillery officer has written upon the subject a series of articles which show clearly how, in a war in which Spain was opposed to us, the bay could be closed to our shipping. Gibraltar, however, is still so important as a coaling station, and would be so annoying to us if in an adversary's possession, that we are forced to hold it or to substitute for it another port of equal value near at hand. Putting sentiment aside, it is certain that if a point upon the African coast were equally well fortified it would be as useful to us as Gibraltar; but the works would cost some millions, and take a long time to construct. Besides which, to make Ceuta really strong we should have to annex a considerable portion of the mainland of Morocco. As regards defence of Gibraltar against bombardment from the sea, it can be dealt with by the transference of artillery to higher levels, at which the fire of the bombarding ships becomes innocuous, while the guns of the defence can act powerfully against decks—at present the weakest points in most warships. It is impossible to add heavy deck armour to the

enormous weights which ironclads carry. They can protect their armoured decks against each other, but not against heavy land artillery directed from considerable heights and employing curved fire. If the French ever try to enter Spezia they will realise the truth of what I say. Old short muzzle-loading guns can be transformed by us, as they have been transformed by the Italians, into excellent howitzers for this purpose. The sea within range would be divided into sections, with the ranges marked at the batteries, and such defence supplemented by a few of the new breech-loaders would make The Rock as impregnable as ever from the sea. Bombardment of the port, however, from the sea can only be rendered absolutely impossible by means of an active defence by torpedo-boats. The French, who have a fine fleet, as well as a powerful army, have never dreamt of relying for the protection of any land station upon naval defence alone, and everywhere proceed upon the principle that bombardment must be guarded against by fixed defences supplemented by torpedo-boats. Against bombardment of Gibraltar from the land there is, owing to the configuration of the coast, no adequate possibility of defence, were Spain to join our enemies.

Sierra Leone.

Pursuing our journey to the Cape along the African coast we come next to Sierra Leone, passing, however, a French stronghold upon our way, as well as the tiny British colony of the Gambia, already almost swallowed up by her French neighbours. The navy clings to the possession of Sierra Leone as a coaling station, although it is questionable whether, according to our present plans, it is sufficiently guarded in the event of war with France. The French have so strong a position at Dakar that we should find Sierra Leone, where

the civil white population consists, I believe, of only between one and two hundred souls, a case in which naval defence would be called for, and which would help to cause a scattering of ships, rendering them liable to be destroyed by a concentrated attack of the hostile forces. If our naval authorities continue to desire the protection of Sierra Leone as a coaling station it must be made self-protecting and receive its war garrison; but this is a serious matter in the unhealthy climate of the central West Coast. Sierra Leone is one of the places which, if it is to be retained as a fortified coaling station, should receive a full garrison of black troops. It cannot be considered as now safe, for its small garrison of three or four hundred West Indian negroes could not defend it against attack from Dakar, and would need to be reinforced—from what point is not clear. The French keep in Senegal, considered apart from the remainder of their West Coast Settlements, about 2250 white troops and about 2000 native troops, and 250 sailors for the local fleet. This force of 4500 men is additional to the sailors who might be landed from the French Senegal squadron, which would, of course, be available to support an attack upon our settlements. Sierra Leone has the best harbour on the West Coast, and, if it were not a British, would become a French coaling-station.

Report of the Royal Commission.

The Chairman of the Commission of 1878 has lately said that Sierra Leone is a post which was after very careful consideration by the Commission reported to be strategically of high value, situate as it is half-way between Gibraltar and the Cape, on the track of our eastern commerce, and close to a French settlement where there is a large military force. The advice of the Commission has been so far followed that forts have been constructed; but Lord Carnarvon

tells us that there are neither gunners nor armament, and that, in the event of war with France, Sierra Leone would be immediately occupied by the enemy, the forts which we have built turned against us, and our line of communications broken. With regard to armament he urges that neither our home fortresses, nor our navy, nor our commercial ports are yet supplied, while the imperial stations abroad are unarmed, although Victoria, which supplies herself in the open market, has purchased, transported 12,000 miles, and placed in position guns of the most recent pattern. Even if modern guns are supplied to Sierra Leone, the difficulty of garrison remains, and the guns would only improve the value of the capture which the French would make. If it was intended not to garrison Sierra Leone in such a way as to protect it against Dakar, it was a singular mistake on the part of the War Office to approve the report of the Royal Commission in this respect, and to sanction the building of the forts; but if the Commission was right, then the supply of a garrison is obviously necessary to the defence of the forts which have been built.

Ascension. Ascension may be looked upon as a fixed storeship of the navy, and is so dependent on the sea that it must inevitably remain with, or fall to, the strongest naval

St. Helena. power. St. Helena might be made defensible, is more likely to be attacked than Ascension, and could not be defended at the present time, for it lacks a sufficient garrison. The population is scanty and decreasing, and as St. Helena, from its situation on the Cape route, must be retained, it is probable that in case of war it would suddenly be discovered that a garrison must be sent out to it. Here we meet with another of the tasks which would fall to our overtaxed navy, and which ought certainly to be

provided against in time of peace. The garrison at present consists of under 300 men, and the local militia organisation has been allowed to fall into decay.

The Cape of Good Hope.

Considered from the imperial, from the Indian, and from the Australian point of view, as an aid to our maritime power, no spot on earth is more important to us than the Cape with its twin harbours Table Bay and Simon's Bay. Table Bay is exposed to the wind in some of the worst months. Simon's Bay is sheltered against the winds to which Table Bay is open, but is not a very good harbour, although, on the whole, preferred by the Admiralty for the naval station. All other harbours are, however, inferior to this until we reach Delagoa Bay. Whatever use might be made of the Suez Canal in war; whether or not we could send troops and stores by that route to India, it is, as I have shown, certain that we could prevent states weaker than ourselves at sea from reaching the canal at either end, provided that our fleets are not tied to the British Channel by the defencelessness of the shores of the United Kingdom. But great as are our advantages at sea, they disappear without safe supplies of coal; and it must have struck any student of the naval manœuvres of 1888 and 1889 how frequently the ships had to return to harbour for coaling purposes.

If coaling is necessary in a short period of time spent in the narrow seas, how much more will the difficulty of want of coal be felt in a voyage of 10,000 miles to Colombo round the Cape? Every ton of armour piled on to ships or added to turrets, every additional ton weight of guns, every cubic yard filled with engines and machinery, is so much subtracted from the power of carrying coal. As a vessel steaming from British ports for India, or China, or Australia in time of

war begins to approach the point of exhaustion of its coal supply it finds itself in a region of storms, far from any shelter except that at the Cape of Good Hope. The position of that refuge and the certainty of being able to deny it to an enemy, combined with the command of the Red Sea route, even if only for the purpose of stopping it, draws therefore on behalf of England an almost impassable line on this side of the globe between the eastern and the western hemispheres.

French substitutes for the Cape.

Here is the reason for the fortification and torpedo-boat defence of Dakar, and acquisition on the part of France of Diego Suarez. Being unable to break her journey at the Cape she divides it into sections, and attempts imperfectly to replace the absence of a footing in South Africa by a fortified station in the northern tropics of the Atlantic, and another in the southern tropics of the Indian Ocean upon the island of Madagascar. Thus France strives to divide the immense stretch of ocean lying between her European ports and her possessions in the farther East. The difficulty which our ownership of the Cape places in the way of possible opponents, even more than the refuge afforded to our own ships, constitutes in war the supreme advantage of the possession of the Cape of Good Hope as a naval station.

Causes of past delay.

It is a remarkable instance of past imperial carelessness that the very principles upon which the burden of defence should be divided between ourselves and colonies, and of the proportions in which it should be borne, have never been settled. We have lived from hand to mouth as regards South African military expenditure. When we began to fortify the coaling stations we were met with the questions whether it was necessary to fortify both Simon's Bay and Table Bay, and who should pay for the erection of the works; and a fierce and prolonged

controversy arose. The Cape, although the most important, is the most easily defended of all our coaling stations. The iron-bound coasts of South Africa, as Lord Brassey has shown, are approachable only at few places, and the enemy could find no base.

There are now excellent defences at Table Bay, and at least one modern gun mounted on the latest principles of artillery science; while important works are in course of construction at both Table Bay and Simon's Bay, and a railway to connect them is all but complete. The Table Bay harbour and other works are being constructed, the railway extension to Simon's Bay made, and the forts erected that are deemed necessary by the War Office and Admiralty—all by the colony, which is also to garrison the forts; and the imperial Government are to supply the armament and ammunition, as to which, as usual, there has been much delay. Until very lately the dispute between the home Government and the Cape Government had left this most important of our stations unguarded, and even now it is not in an adequate position of defence.

Cape forces.

The Cape Mounted Rifles and the police are a fine force, but are none too numerous for the purposes for which they exist, and are not organised for the defence of works. The Cape Mounted Rifles consist of nearly 800 men with 600 horses; and the police, who may lawfully be employed for defence, consist of 800 men, now being increased to 1000, of whom about one-fifth are mounted. There are between four and five thousand volunteers, and there exists in Cape Colony a general liability to military service, regularised by the Burghers' Force and Levies Act of 1878, making every able-bodied man between eighteen and fifty years of age liable for military service, both within and without the colony. This

burgher service is intended for fighting against Kafirs, and does not produce a force readily available for the defence of coaling stations against European attack. During the Basuto war the Cape had 18,000 men under arms; and in 1878 the Cape volunteers were massed with the regular troops, and fought gallantly in several engagements on and beyond the Kei river, and their artillery was commended by the imperial officers in command. Generals are, however, sometimes forced to be diplomatic, and home military opinion denies the efficiency for regular war of the Cape volunteers.

Mauritius.

After rounding the Cape we come, in the Indian Ocean, to Mauritius, which has an admirable harbour and convenient coaling station. The additional works recommended by the Royal Commission are being built, and there is a local torpedo service corps directed by non-commissioned officers from the Royal Engineers. Here again also we find the garrison incomplete in time of peace. Until lately our defences at Mauritius have been altogether inferior to those which were thrown up by the French during the time of their possession of the island; and Port Louis was a fortified walled city until we allowed the fortifications to tumble down. It should be remembered that, as regards Mauritius, French military writers count upon a French expedition being welcomed by the sympathies of a portion of the French-speaking population. Another warning connected with the history of Mauritius is to be found in the fact that the French lost the island to ourselves by keeping there too small a garrison. We have seen in the Crown Colonies part of the present volume how fully M. de Lanessan counts on being able to conquer Mauritius for France, in the event of war, by means of an expedition from Réunion or from Diego Suarez.

Mauritius is so much nearer to India than to Great Britain that it is impossible not to regret the centralisation which makes all the coaling stations look towards England for help. It would seem to be a wiser system to affiliate them to the nearest considerable posts, and, without anticipating a closer union of the Empire, which may one day estimate at its full value and utilise the military strength of the Australasian and South African colonies, we might easily place Mauritius in dependence for guns and stores upon India, at a distance of little more than 2000 as against 8000 miles. A larger garrison will, however, be required. Military calculations should be exact—not left as political estimates are left to the gradual development of events, difficulties being met as they occur. Until the readjustment of our military centres takes place there should at least be a complete understanding between the army authorities and the Admiralty as to how the garrisons at such remote stations are to be reinforced in case of war against two naval powers.

Ceylon has two naval stations—Colombo and Trincomalee. Both are well forward in works and armament, and the neighbourhood of India in this case is an additional protection. There is a want of gunners, but the large number of planters in the island might supply volunteers in the event of a dangerous war. Additional trained men are needed for the heavy ordnance. Ceylon.

Eastward from Ceylon lies a portion of the world important to us whether considered in the light of trade or of Imperial Defence. In time of peace our squadrons in the China seas are now of sufficient strength, and if France and Russia or other powers were to increase their naval force we could do likewise; but it does not follow that hostile powers might not be able, by previous Singapore.

arrangement, to concentrate their force against a portion of our own. There never yet was a war in which even the winning side did not suffer some reverses, and a check in the West Pacific, in the China seas or the Archipelago, would place us in a position of much danger as regards coaling stations for the remainder of the war, if Singapore and Hong-Kong, Labuan and Port Darwin, were left without adequate protection. Our naval authorities have decided that Singapore should be strong enough to withstand attack not only from cruisers but from a squadron of moderate strength; and the provision of guns of a new pattern has caused delay. Money has been freely given towards the works by the wealthy inhabitants of the Straits Settlements, and Singapore will help to keep open for the navy and for trade the shorter passage to the China seas.

Australia.

On the south-east, upon the way to Brisbane and Sydney and New Zealand, between the coasts of Australia and of New Guinea, Torres Straits claim attention as an important line of naval communication. It has been decided to fortify Thursday Island, which, with King George's Sound, at the other extremity of Australia, and Port Darwin upon the north, are the three points upon the Australian continent as to which there has been some difficulty in providing for defence. Australia is so large that Port Darwin is unreachable for military purposes from South Australia which governs it, and Thursday Island from Queensland; while King George's Sound lies in Western Australia, which at present is neither populous nor rich. Hence has come the need for making application to the Australian colonies generally as regards such spots, and the Colonial Conference did not upon this matter come to a satisfactory conclusion. The completion of the defence

of the three places is essential to a full protection of the Australian trade.

Labuan and Hong-Kong.

To the north from Singapore or from Australia lie Labuan and Hong-Kong, of which the latter is a station of high political, commercial, and strategical importance. There we are in touch with China, a power with which it is most necessary to be on terms of friendship, as our interests in southern and eastern Asia are the same as hers, and bound up with the preservation of the *status quo*. Her strength is our strength, and her alliance in the case of war would be perhaps the most valuable that we could obtain. Lord Carnarvon has written to the *Times*, in the course of 1889, to complain that Hong-Kong still remains armed with guns of low calibre. The position of the harbour of Hong-Kong is one of the most defensible in the world, and our trade renders it a port of such vast importance that, apart from its value as a naval coaling station, no argument is necessary with regard to the wisdom of making it secure. When I was there, now fourteen years ago, the defences were weak in the extreme; but since that date, and especially in the last three years, a good deal has been done as regards every point except that of garrison. Hong-Kong has been called the Spithead of the east, for the anchorage is situate within an island; but it has hitherto been a Spithead without the Spithead or Portsdown forts or the Portsmouth garrison; and when Sir William Crossman, who in political life is the member for Portsmouth, became the designer of the works for the protection of Hong-Kong, he must have been struck with the difficulty of defending such a place with such small means as regards men. There exists a scheme for recruiting a local battalion from India, in addition to the local Sikh police, who are so recruited;

but I am struck with the time which has elapsed between the decision that the battalion is required and its creation. India, as matters stand, cannot spare troops; but India under a better organisation of Imperial Defence would become the eastern centre of defence from which our garrisons in half the world would be aided, and upon which, rather than upon home arsenals, they would depend for their supplies. Hong-Kong will never be safe so long as it is supplied and administered from this side of the globe.

Recruiting from India.

The resources of India as a centre for the East have been illustrated by the recruiting of the Burmah military police. 18,000 men have been raised, chiefly from the North-West frontier and the Punjab, and the majority of them were raw recruits who had not served previously as soldiers or policemen. They are under-officered, but, nevertheless, form a body of singular efficiency, and are in fact excellent troops.

Indian stations.

The condition of the Indian naval stations, such as Bombay and Karachi, forms to some extent a portion of the general question of Indian Defence which I have treated in the first chapter of this volume. India has been for six years awaiting 10-inch breech-loaders ordered six years ago, and there is as yet no sign of their arrival. It seems, moreover, important to point out in the present connection that if any serious damage should occur to the armament of, let us say, Bombay, there is no means of repairing it or of manufacturing a new gun in the Indian Empire. I have already written of the system of military centralisation which prevails throughout the British Empire, and is detrimental to all arrangements for defence. On a logical system of Imperial Defence India would possess the dockyards and the arsenals of the British

East, and the creation of an eastern Woolwich is an imperial need.

Returning towards England by the Red Sea route we find Aden, which has long been strong and which has of late been greatly further strengthened. Happily it is dependent upon India for its garrison. Aden is indeed, although distant nearly 2000 miles from Hindostan, a part of British India; although Singapore, which is nearer to Calcutta than is Aden to Bombay, has been wholly detached from the Indian system. Would that the sensible plan which has been adopted in the case of Aden had prevailed elsewhere in the eastern seas. While Aden is strong, Perim, which has an excellent harbour, and one which can be used for coaling with less loss of time, is virtually undefended. I lately had the opportunity of spending some hours upon the island, and was struck with the capacity and safety of the harbour, which I visited in a large steamer, and which would hold several ships of even more considerable size. Aden and Perim.

In Egypt we find coaling stations at Suez and at Port Said, which are intended to be neutral in time of war, and which are left to the Egyptians in time of peace, while the citadel at Cairo and the barracks at Alexandria contain a small British force. The present military position in Egypt affords a curious example of the way in which parliamentary questions in England wax and wane. Some years ago the military occupation by us of the capital and its port seemed to form the only question which was exciting to the British people, while now the occupation is almost forgotten. Daily in Parliament members used to ask "How long" the occupation was to continue—"A year?"—"Two years?"; and Governments were continually called upon to "name the date" at which they would leave the Egypt.

country. The occupation now continues, and no one says a word; yet all who have considered the question know that the occupation in peace of a country which in all probability would be abandoned in time of dangerous war can hardly be looked upon as a source of strength. At the same time—although I have been from the first a disbeliever in the wisdom of the occupation, and think, as I have said, that we should have left the country immediately after Tel-el-Kebir, giving diplomatic support to Sir Evelyn Wood and carrying out his military policy—impartiality forces me to admit that wars might conceivably arise in which our alliances would be such that a British garrison might continue to be maintained at Cairo with advantage to our interests.

Cyprus. It is difficult to write of Cyprus without raising party questions. The island is unfortified and virtually without a garrison, for the few British troops that are kept there would be wholly unable to defend it against serious attack. No money has been spent upon the harbour of Famagusta, which by a large expenditure might have been made into a good port, and Cyprus cannot be regarded as one of our chief military or naval stations.

Malta. If we are to attempt to hold the Mediterranean in time of war Malta is a station of first-class importance. It has, indeed, been called, by a great foreign military writer, the "pivot" of English maritime operations in southern and eastern Europe and in northern Africa. Even, moreover, if the Mediterranean route to India be considered unsuitable for a war road, this fact would not put an end to our Mediterranean interests and the necessity for their defence. It is intended by our Government that Malta, with its magnificent harbours, should be able to fully protect itself against

bombardment, as well as against attempted landing in the absence of the fleet. Malta was too long neglected, but its works are now being improved, its armament completed, and supplies organised. The principle of making use of troops drawn from local sources is being extended very wisely in the islands which we call by the name of Malta. Still, taking into account the full numbers of the necessary garrison, and including the local troops, there would remain to be provided from home in case of war at least 3000 men to make up the force required for the fortress. Even if, after war broke out, an energetic governor should exert himself to organise the whole able-bodied population for defence, officers would be lacking. The best informed among our authorities are of opinion that the places which would be attacked by a sudden rush on or before the declaration of war would be Sierra Leone and Malta, and that there exists special reason for seeing that their garrisons are sufficient if not complete.

Decentralisation of manufacturing establishments.

In France and Germany every Army Corps possesses works at which it is able to manufacture the greater part of its equipment. I have already suggested that India should be provided with the means for executing large repairs to heavy guns, which are certain to be necessary in future wars, as regards ordnance afloat and ashore, and I cannot but think that Malta, if it is to be retained and to lock up 12,000 men, should be provided with a similar establishment on a smaller scale. Naval guns are subjected to much wear and tear, because our ships carry on gunnery practice with heavy charges which rapidly destroy the interior of the bore and bring the guns into such a condition that the accuracy of shooting is affected. In war this fact would be detrimental to the efficiency of squadrons which were far from home,

and would prove a dangerous source of weakness to our fleets. If we were in alliance with Italy we could be helped at Spezia or at the Naples Armstrong-yard; but our greatest dangers will come upon us in a war in which Italy will be neutral. Modern ships concentrate a far greater proportion of their armament in one gun than has been the case in former wars, and the system of centralisation which requires that a gun should be sent to Woolwich to be "lined" stands of necessity condemned. When the requisite number of guns have been made for the fleet every ship will have reserve guns set aside for her; these should be available without the necessity of her leaving her station and coming home to seek them, and damaged pieces of ordnance ought to be repaired upon the spot. We should try to rouse ourselves to understand that the defence of our scattered Empire cannot be carried out successfully on the old lines.

The Western Seas.

With Gibraltar, of which I have already spoken, the eastern protected naval stations come to an end. The western seas are also studded here and there with our stepping-stones—coaling stations which are to the navy as depôts to the communications of an army in the field. In the western world, however, our dangers are not so great, because no powers ever likely to be hostile to us possess large establishments there, with the exception of the French, who have a strong garrison in Martinique. The naval power of the United States is at present small (though fast growing), and unlikely to be used against us. Halifax is strong, and is valuable as the winter port of Canada, the military power of which (by no means inconsiderable against an enemy coming from the sea) stands behind the Nova-Scotian capital to

Bermuda.

support it. Bermuda is also strong enough considering its position, for it is most unlikely that a European

naval power would send an expeditionary force 3000 miles at least from its base to a spot at which success would be of no great value. There would be too much risk of being caught by that superior force which we could provide, supposing that we possess adequate defence upon the coasts of the United Kingdom and are not forced to keep the greater portion of our ships at home. Bermuda has been a favourite spot for military engineers to exercise their wits upon, and there, more than anywhere else, has a risk existed of wasting our resources by over-fortification. A comparison of the best naval and military opinion has saved the nation from that mistake.

The West Indies.

Jamaica may perhaps be considered as fairly well provided with defence, but France, as has been seen, has troops in West Indian islands, and a change of the political situation would necessitate a reconsideration of the defences of Jamaica. It possesses a fine harbour and a dockyard, and in the event of the construction of a canal across the Isthmus, would become an important station for the fleet. St. Lucia has been selected as the principal coaling station of the West Indies, as the harbour of Port Castries is supposed to be less open to the possibility of bombardment by the long-range guns of a hostile fleet than are the stations at Barbados and at Port Royal in Jamaica. The island legislature has spent upon the wharves and other works for rendering the harbour suitable as a coaling station no less a sum than £70,000.

Falkland Islands and Fiji.

The station at the Falkland Islands will be useful for ships trading round Cape Horn and for our cruisers in the event of war. Of our stations in the Pacific, to which ships bound from British Columbia to Australia, or from Cape Horn to the China seas, would make their

way, Fiji is the most important, and is supplied by nature with admirable harbours.

Vancouver Island.

Upon the west side of America lies Vancouver Island, protecting Vancouver City and New Westminster, and containing the coaling station of Esquimalt, the importance of which, always great as regards naval operations in the North Pacific, has been increased by the opening of the Canadian Pacific Railway. The arrangements for its protection are unfortunately not yet complete, but in any war in which the United States is neutral Canada may be safely trusted with that defence. Esquimalt is, however, a station of such value, as shown by its selection as the site of a graving dock, that it is a disgraceful scandal that it should still be armed only with four heavy muzzle-loaders, mounted on obsolete and rotten wooden carriages, and some seven or eight old 64-pounder muzzle-loaders.

Coaling stations generally.

It must appear from the account which has been given that while some years ago we had no adequate conception of the necessity to the Empire of the coaling stations, their importance is now admitted. Fortifications have been built, mostly by the colonies, which have been imperfectly armed by the mother-country, and are as yet unprovided with sufficient garrisons to man the forts and work the guns. The result of this state of things must be, if war should break out soon and suddenly, that several of our possessions would pass into the enemy's hands. Sierra Leone and Castries are among those coaling stations which are near to large foreign garrisons and possess no sufficient garrisons of their own. Mauritius contains a smaller force than is kept up by the French at Réunion in its neighbourhood. It is a significant fact that, under the French mobilisation scheme, in the event of the anticipation of im-

mediate war, all "reservists" and persons belonging to the territorial army of French India (phrases which include a large number of the natives) are at once to leave for Diego Suarez in Madagascar.[1] The important stations of King George's Sound, Thursday Island, and Port Darwin, as we have seen, are not yet protected, and garrisons are needed for these, as well as for St. Helena and other stations that have been named.

French opinion.

It is of some interest to turn from the views of our own naval experts, as they are being worked out by the War Office, to the opinion entertained of our position in distant parts of the world by foreign observers writing for their own countrymen. There is one French politician, already named, not remarkable for hostility to this country, who has studied the question for himself and written much upon it. M. de Lanessan, who has held office under the French Government, and who long has been a deputy of the Seine, has, in his *L'Expansion coloniale de la France*, written upon the future movements of the war fleets of Europe in the remoter seas. He has pointed out the strength of the French position in the Pacific, and has throughout alluded to it as a position not of defence but of offence against foreign trade, and has recommended the conversion into an arsenal, similar to that of Dakar, of Noumea in New Caledonia. M. de Lanessan's statements go far to justify the terror with which some Australians regard the presence of the French in New Caledonia. The ground upon which Noumea is to be rendered strong is that it is near Australia, which is "extremely rich," and "would need enormous forces to protect the many points at which that continent is

[1] *Traité de Léyislation coloniale*, par Paul Dislere; 4ième partie Paris, Dupont, 1888.

vulnerable."[1] "It may easily be seen what could be done with a French fleet having New Caledonia for a base." With regard to New Caledonia, however, I think that in the event of war the Australians would themselves capture these French islands. The Republican deputy, and deputy with a future, calls for the use of Diego Suarez, of Obock on the Red Sea, of Saigon, and of Tahiti, as well as of Noumea, and of Martinique, and of Dakar, as posts from which France might undertake the destruction of the trade of the United Kingdom with Greater Britain. It will be remembered in connection with the French position in the Pacific how the French disregarded their engagement with regard to the island of Rapa. M. de Lanessan in arguing, before the question was finally settled, against any idea of quitting Rapa, said: "Rapa, it is true, is but a barren rock, but that rock has an excellent roadstead, and is situate on the route from the Isthmus of Panama to Australia. It forms, from the military point of view, a Gibraltar of the Pacific, and a military fleet basing itself upon this port, which would be for it both a shelter and a victualling spot, would bar the route of all traders crossing Oceania."

M. de Lanessan's policy, explained in the clearest language on the last page of his book, is to provide such ocean fortresses that "in the event of war between France and any European power, the trade of the latter would be immediately arrested by our fleets, and if that nation were England,—that enormous workshop unable to remain at rest during a few months without her social edifice crumbling,—peace would be brought about more easily by the complete stop to trade through the action

[1] *L'Expansion coloniale de la France*, p. 675.

of our fleet in all the seas of the globe than by battles in European waters."[1]

False security in France.

In 1870 France felt and showed the same confidence in her military superiority that we have in the naval supremacy of Great Britain. The general principles of organisation and of strategy for land and sea service do not differ. At sea, just as much as on shore, a strong force will beat a weak one, and concentration is a necessary step towards strength. A number of weak forces, though in the aggregate they may be superior to an enemy, may be beaten one after another if they are scattered. It is as dangerous for us to postpone the arrangements for the reinforcement of our garrisons until the last moment as it was for France to fail in due organisation of her mobilisation arrangements before the war of 1870; and in our case, as in hers, nothing is more likely to lead to disaster than the neglect to study the strength as well as the weakness of an enemy in advance. The German official account of the war of 1870 begins by saying of the French: "An error was committed in assuming that the concentration of an army could be effected with order and precision without thorough preparation." In August 1870 was seen the result of the want of calculation in time of peace. It had been taken for granted that a system which had once raised France to a pinnacle of military glory was good enough for the present and the future, and that, when war began, dash and valour would suffice.

In Great Britain.

When our authorities talk of reinforcing garrisons and mobilising reserves, I do not feel sure that they know exactly and have settled in advance how the garrisons of Gibraltar, Malta, and all the naval stations, some of them on the other side of the globe, are to be raised at

[1] P. 1007.

the beginning of a war to their proper strength, and I should prefer to see the garrisons in existence in time of peace. It is not likely that Great Britain will declare war in haste; but she cannot possibly be sure that war will not be declared against her suddenly, or even practically commenced by the necessary mobilisation of naval and military forces before an official state of war exists. We should be warned, too, by the past. The confessions which have been wrung from Ministers from time to time have shown how blindly we have been trusting in the past to a supposed readiness for war which did not exist. The more we recognise how much depends upon the complete fitness of both army and navy in all respects for the duties which they will have to perform, and that our naval superiority is based as much upon the safety of the coaling stations and sufficiency of their garrisons as on the number of our ships, the more determined should we be that they should be in a state of readiness even in time of peace. It is essential that the mobilisation and concentration of our squadrons should not be delayed for want of guns and stokers, that we should not have to burden our ships at the commencement of the war with the task of carrying out reinforcement for the garrisons and for India, and that our whole navy should be prepared to assume the initiative immediately that its reserves are ready. The very establishment of a Naval Intelligence Department is a measure of recent adoption. The public hardly seems to have estimated at its full force the circumstance that during the manœuvres of 1889 the arrangements for obtaining information from the commanders of the ships were in working order for the first time. The British public was awakened last year upon this question, but it must remain awake, and not trust to ministers or

officials, however able, to carry out in time of peace preparations in which the country shows no interest.

The colonies and the fleet.

Colonial defence against an enemy coming by sea is reasonably provided for by a superior fleet supplied with fortified coaling stations when, but when only, these have been provided with their garrisons. The fleet itself is imperial, and, with slight exceptions, paid for from the imperial exchequer. Australasia, except Queensland, has taken voluntarily a share in our naval burdens, not as regards general but only as regards local defence. Australia had, however, already shown an exceptionally good example to Greater Britain in other ways. Her people have made, as we have seen, some of her ports the strongest commercial harbours in the Empire, and have raised defensive forces which are really trustworthy. But the contributions of the colonies towards the navy are inconsiderable, and there has been much difficulty in the case of some colonies in obtaining grants towards the defence of coaling stations needed for their trade as well as ours. The example of Victoria seems to show that as the colonies grow up they may possibly become more ready to assume honourable burdens, fairly proportioned to the protection which they claim and receive.

Land defence of Greater Britain.

As for defence against attacks across land frontiers there is little to be said except that which has been already said of Canada and India, for in Australia and South Africa no danger is to be discerned at present. Mr. Rhodes seems ready without the help of British regular troops to push his way in Africa, as in America our colonists made their own way, in all self-reliance, two or three centuries ago. Frontier questions at the Cape seem likely to solve themselves. The trepidation shown by some at home as to the condition of South

Africa is without sufficient cause, and we have only to look on for a few years as spectators—though with interest and sympathy—to find that there will be no more need there for British troops, and no objection on the part of the colonists to accept due burdens for defence.

Food supply and trade in time of war.

Before turning to the question of the home defence of the nucleus and the capital of the Empire there is a question which concerns all parts of it, but especially the mother-country, which must be considered. It is necessary to gain some definite notion how the food supply is to be kept up in the event of war, both with reference to isolated stations and also to the British Isles. India, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Canada may be looked upon as self-sufficing as regards food; but that cannot be held to be the case with many of the small stations, and it is wholly untrue of the United Kingdom. As for the remote settlements, it would be difficult for us to find a sufficient fleet to have ships always upon duty near the ports of entry. Captures would undoubtedly be made by enemies' cruisers, probably even in large numbers, but captures not comparable in importance to the lists which adorned the reports sent in by naval officers after the late manœuvres. It is one thing to lie in wait on a well-known track of commerce, but quite another thing to catch the swift steamers which more and more are monopolising all commerce of importance. In peace manœuvres a mail steamer does not turn out of her track to avoid or race with a warship of a so-called enemy. In war the capture of fast-steaming merchant ships would be extremely difficult. No attempt, however, to carry out a system of blockading an enemy in his ports could possibly prevent his placing cruisers on the ocean to prey upon our trade. The fast cruisers are exactly

those vessels which are most likely to break blockades, and this fact tells indeed in favour of a bolder strategy. Instead of allowing the enemy to neutralise our superior force by remaining patiently in port, while we wore out our ships by hanging round his harbours, we should try to defeat his squadrons in the open sea, after which we should be in a better position to find and capture his scattered cruisers. No doubt we should put many cruisers of our own upon the waters, and make use also of a large number of mercantile steamers in addition to the fast ships of the navy, yet, when all is done, the vast extent of the ocean traversed by our merchantmen could not be watched. Were there not other chances in our favour, no reasonable increase of the fleet could of itself fully protect our mercantile marine.

Advantages possessed by Great Britain.

There is, however, a point, already suggested in what I said about the Cape, which from the beginning of a war would tell strongly in our favour, and might do so still more greatly as time went on. It is an advantage which we did not possess in former naval wars, when the enemy's ships might stay for many weeks or even months at sea without putting into port at all. In these days they must coal, and the opportunities of an enemy for so doing would be fewer than our own, because his coaling stations would be less numerous. As whalers know that whales must rise to the surface that they may breathe, so we should know that an enemy's cruisers must in the long-run come to the shore to coal. For a short period they might be supplied at sea by coalships, and in the manner described in *The "Russia's Hope,"*[1] but the coalships themselves would be a considerable time at sea, or, if

[1] Chapman and Hall, 1888.

steamships, would require coal for the long voyages which they would have to make. To say nothing of the many chances in our favour of catching the coal-ships, depôts on land would have to be established, which we could find and burn, for we have seen in the manœuvres how difficult and uncertain is the operation of taking in coal at sea. Our policy would be to cut off the enemy's supplies of fuel by attacking and capturing not only his coalships but his coaling stations; and our squadrons would be better employed in such active work as burning up or stealing the enemy's coal than in crawling about the home waters by way of protecting the end only of our long lines of communication. If I am right in supposing that we could make most of the distant oceans as inhospitable to the enemy's cruisers as is an Arabian desert to a European traveller, simply by our possession of almost all the coaling stations, it is difficult to see why the process of starving-out should not be applied to the sea trade of a hostile power. As for our own vessels the tendency of trade is to make more and more use of large and fast steamships, which need not always follow the well-known tracks where they would be looked for. If sighted by an enemy they must trust to speed and to the protection of the darkness. They will not be dependent on the winds, and may turn in any direction under cover of the night.

Fuel. As some armies are now adopting smokeless powder, with great gain to their efficiency, so will that naval power have an advantage which adopts the nearest approach to smokeless fuel; and there could be no discovery which would be of much greater value in war to a maritime nation than the invention of a cheap and effective means of obtaining motive power without

smoke. Much may even now be done by improved methods of feeding engine fires, and even by skilful stoking. The lack of skilled stokers during the late manœuvres was shown, among other proofs, by the volumes of smoke which could be seen blackening the horizon even when the ships were hull-down or themselves invisible. Among the many facts which illustrate the recent progress made by Italy in preparation for naval warfare there is none more remarkable than the success of the school for stokers in the form of the great steamer, formerly employed in British trade, which sets to sea each morning from Spezia carrying between two and three hundred apprentice stokers of the Italian fleet engaged in learning the artifices of their trade. In the meantime Great Britain possesses, as has been shown by Lord George Hamilton, the best steam coal of the land hemisphere, and New Zealand, I may add, has the best of the water hemisphere, so that in this respect the Empire holds a predominant situation.

If we succeed in rendering it impossible for an enemy's cruisers to exist in large numbers on our trade routes, our necessary supplies both for coaling stations and for the British Islands will be secure; and I am so far in accord with the party who propose to trust entirely to the navy, that I consider the rapid attainment of overwhelming superiority at sea as the most essential point of Imperial Defence. I only begin to differ when they use what appears to me exaggerated language which might lead the country to believe that the only way of protecting the home islands from invasion is to keep always in home waters a fleet superior to any that might be brought against it even for a short period.

It is not at all certain that if we lost for a time

Home food supply.

the command of the sea it would be so easy to starve us here at home that no nation would be at the trouble to organise an invasion. The word "investment" has been freely used to describe the condition of partial blockade in which we should have to live if our command of the seas were gone. "Investment" is a military term applied to the early stage of a siege, and means the process of occupying all the approaches to a fortified place so thoroughly as to exclude the possibility of the reception of supplies; but, for investment to be fatal, it must be complete. The proportion between the mouths to be fed inside and the land defended must be such that sufficient food cannot possibly be produced for the supply of the garrison and the civil population after accumulations have been exhausted; and in order to produce complete investment the besiegers must have a force proportioned to the extent of the circumference which is to be invested, while the military strength of the country within which the investment takes place must have been so broken down that there is no power to raise the siege. The whole of these conditions are not likely to be fulfilled in the case supposed—a struggle of the British Empire single-handed against two naval powers. No doubt we should suffer some reverses at sea in the future as always in the past, but it is difficult to believe that the United Kingdom could possibly be invested in the early stages of a war.

Absolute "investment" almost impossible.

The first effect of a naval struggle would be to raise the price of all commodities dependent on sea transport. Our sailing ships would be laid up, and the least fast among our merchant steamers transferred to other flags. One result would be a considerably increased production of food at home. There would also be an

immense sudden importation in view of rising prices. In the eleven days between the 4th September and the 15th September 1870 Paris was supplied with five months' food; and although the conditions are not the same, still, even in the case of England, the country would to a large extent victual itself in advance by the ordinary operations of trade. Much waste of food would cease through enforced economy, and every inch of soil would be occupied in the production of grain or meat. While great accumulations of food would have taken place at the very commencement of the war, the quantity of food bought and consumed would somewhat diminish, and the United Kingdom would come much nearer to providing for its own necessary supplies than it has done for many a year. If ever complete investment took place there would, of course, be hardship; but it is not certain that that hardship would be unbearable, or that we could be starved out of resistance. The cessation of commerce would be harder for us to bear than the pinch of actual hunger. Moreover, even after investment had been attempted, I doubt whether the United Kingdom could be debarred from receiving any supplies by sea.

"Temporary" investment.

Sir John Colomb, with whom I so often agree that I always regret to differ from him, says in his *Defence of Great and Greater Britain*[1]: "Consider for one moment on what the presumption of possible invasion rests. It rests on this—the loss, temporary or permanent, of the command of the waters surrounding the British Islands. But remember that the lines of communication all radiate from these waters; the loss, therefore, of our command here cuts

[1] *Defence of Great and Greater Britain*, by Captain J. C. R. Colomb. Edward Stanford, 1880.

every one of the imperial lines; and what is this but investment?" There is a good deal of confusion in this sentence. The argument was useful as one among many that are intended to break down in the minds of a popular audience the idea which still exists only too largely that the defence of the Empire means nothing more than the defence of the United Kingdom from invasion. But it has been quoted and made use of for other purposes, and it is, therefore, necessary to suggest weak points. In the first place there is no object in a "temporary" investment. No commander would attempt investment if he supposed it to be only temporary, because if once investment be broken its whole object is defeated, and the process has to be begun over again, unless attack—that is, in this case invasion—has been carried out at the same time; and even then it is the attack and not the investment which has been useful.

Lines of communication.

The second weak point is the vague use of the words "lines of communication." For ships on the sea the phrase is only applicable in the sense that certain points, such as coaling stations, may be said to form a chain of communications. A ship starting, say, from Canada or from the United States with wheat for the United Kingdom, is as free from lines of communication as is a Bedouin chief. The captain may go, if he please, by Iceland or by Antwerp, and may land his cargo at almost any part of our enormously extended coast line. During the whole period of our overwhelming maritime supremacy after Trafalgar we never succeeded in stopping France from receiving supplies by sea. There never was a case of such a complete superiority at sea in time of war as that possessed by the United States of America over the Southern rebellious states in the

latter part of the civil war. Yet blockade-running was a regular trade, and large fortunes were made by those who practised it; and only as the ports were captured did this profitable commerce cease.

The United States.

England's extremity would be America's opportunity; and that in a different sense from the construction which has sometimes been put upon the phrase. Holland and Belgium and the Scandinavian powers would buy the majority of our merchant ships, unless the United States should change her present system of refusing to confer her privileges upon ships built abroad. It is probable, however, that this change of law will, in view of possible wars in which England will be engaged, be effected in the United States, and in this case the greater portion of our commerce will pass in case of war under the American flag. High prices would attract American enterprise: the United States would cover with the stars and stripes an immense food traffic; and the fleets that were "investing" us would have to meet the combined energies of the British Empire and of the republic. The carrying trade of the world would pass, doubtless, from our hands, and if we should come out victors from the struggle it would be at the cost of heavy sacrifices. The trade of all the belligerents would be to some extent transferred to other flags, though that of our enemies would suffer more greatly than our own, on account of their inability to secure fuel, if our coaling stations were properly defended by adequate garrisons; but we should not be starved at home. I am arguing on the improbable supposition, too, of such a collapse of our naval power as would render the interception of supplies on a large scale possible; and I submit that even in this case it would be the interest of the United States to maintain a strict

neutrality, and the interest of our enemies to carefully avoid steps which might lead to quarrel between them and the Americans. As the Union is becoming a naval power, it would even be doubtful if our enemies would dare to declare food to be contraband. On the whole, I am unable to accept the possibility of a complete investment, excluding supplies from without, even in the event of a disaster to our fleets. Partial transference of trade to other nations; high prices by which many would suffer, might be expected; but not such pressure as would, without invasion, force us to accept any terms which might be offered.

Difficulty of maintaining a commercial blockade of the United Kingdom.

This opinion is strengthened when we consider how enormous would have to be the disposable force of an enemy before he could undertake the gigantic task of blockading the coasts of the United Kingdom. Our seas are stormy during a great portion of the year, our ports are innumerable, and the difficulty which was found by the United States in hermetically sealing the few harbours of the Confederacy would be magnified a hundredfold in the case of an attempted blockade of the British Isles. Moreover, fleets must scatter to "invest," while, if our navies were not absolutely destroyed, the approach of any British force from outside the enemy's lines would force him to concentrate to fight it—raising the blockade and allowing of our being victualled from the United States or from India and the colonies. No single naval catastrophe could produce a condition in which our naval power would be so thoroughly broken down that no attack would be made by us upon any part of the investing line. It is only when Sir John Colomb, and more lately his imitators, begin to argue upon the supposition that temporary loss of command on the home waters would bring about starvation, and when

we are told by some naval men that for this reason we must eschew land defences and trust entirely to a navy —the defeat or the absence for strategical reasons of which would place us in such a position—that it is time to say that neither the premises nor the conclusion of the argument are justified by known facts. Our manufactures would be seriously assailed, our food supply would become precarious under the circumstances which have been stated, but we should not be brought to the point of surrender by absolute starvation, and the possibility of invasion is not excluded, as some of the naval school pretend, by the fact that it would be unnecessary.

Invasion.

On the other hand, a defeat or a temporary absence of the fleet might lead to bombardments, attacks upon arsenals, and even to invasion, if our mobile land forces, our fortifications and their garrisons, were not such as to render attacks of any kind too dangerous to be worth attempting. There is this difference between the United Kingdom and the colonies and coaling stations: that, while our general command of the sea would make the risk of long voyages for attacking our foreign stations too great for an enemy to face, at home we are within a few hours' steam of military ports which may belong to that enemy, and which are furnished with the naval means of preventing blockade, in the shape of great fleets of torpedo-boats. To these ports can be brought in a few days as many troops and guns as could possibly be required for invasion, and more than one high military authority has lately stated that at least one foreign power could at any moment put her hand on ships able to carry to these shores a large army of invasion. From such danger the colonies are protected by our own general command of the seas, and by our possession

of the fortified coaling stations—when these receive their garrisons. So great is the difference between the United Kingdom and South Africa or Australia in such matters that it would be likely that a naval power with which we were at war would give up all idea of attacks upon the colonies, and would concentrate at home for blows in the Mediterranean and even nearer London.

While it is difficult to disembark cavalry and artillery, without which there can be no complete army, yet no difficulty would be found, in the absence of our fleet, in transporting and landing a large force of picked infantry sufficiently strong to overcome all resistance which could be offered on the shore, for no large defence force could move with the same rapidity as ships carrying an equal or greater number of men. Resistance to invasion ought to be calculated on the supposition that an enemy could certainly land a large body of infantry, but that the disembarkation of artillery and stores would be so much slower as to give time for the assembling of a greater defensive force of all arms if it was organised and ready. At the present time, and even after all the preparation of which the Government boast, I do not hesitate to say that such a force is not prepared to take the field at home.

If there is any use, as I think there is the greatest, in such a home defensive force as that which might be supplied by the volunteers, the resistance to invasion is obviously a task for which they should be prepared, and in fulfilling it they would render the highest service to the Empire as a whole by releasing the fleet for its true work. The difficulties of transporting and landing an invading army, and above all of using it for offence after it was landed, would be so great that the possession of our existing bodies of troops, if they were properly equipped

and organised for immediate movement, would render invasion a forlorn hope. The peculiar position of Great Britain does not make invasion impossible, but only enables us to resist it with a small army, if that army be highly organised for rapid war, as effectually as we could resist with millions of troops if we had land frontiers. The difficulty of invasion reduces to comparatively small dimensions the force by which we could be attacked on shore; but, on the other hand, such a force would be composed of the flower of our enemies' troops.

In the absence of the fleet the landing could not be prevented. There are many parts of our coast where it would present no difficulties, and to try to guard them all would be a fatal strategy, for we should be weak everywhere, and rapid concentration would be impossible. We do not need an immense number of ill-trained, badly-equipped, and unorganised troops, but an army completely ready to take the field and fight in the open —supplied with a well-trained field artillery. Possessed of such a force we might sleep peacefully in our beds, even though the bulk of the fleet were away settling the question of our command at sea for the next half-century to come. If we are not so prepared on shore, then a large portion of our naval forces must be kept uselessly and ingloriously inactive, watching for an enemy who in this case may never come to us, but who may direct expeditions against our colonies and trade. In either case invasion would be prevented; but in the second supposition at a terrible sacrifice. The concentrated fleets of the two powers might sweep all before them in another hemisphere, cripple our trade, capture our coaling stations, and destroy our scattered squadrons.

Defence of the coasts of the

The French and Germans are now engaged on completing the defence of their coasts upon a scientific

United Kingdom.

system; and Colonel Lonsdale Hale has clearly shown in the Journal of the Royal United Service Institution how perfect are the arrangements adopted for coast defence by Continental powers. We have done much lately in the direction of naval mobilisation, although even in this point we are still, I think, behind the Italians and the Germans, and only on an equality with the French. In other countries the principal officers appointed to reserve ships are always ready, knowing even in time of peace the positions that they have to take up in time of war. Captain Henderson has excellently said that the power of rapid mobilisation which has been the chief modern development of Continental armies has spread to their navies, and that the critical point of modern war, not only in Continental cases, but where we ourselves are concerned, will in the future be reached almost at the moment of declaration of war. The principle upon which the French and Germans are proceeding is that, in the absence of success at sea, two classes of attempts are to be guarded against on shore—invasion, by mobile land forces (attacking the enemy after they have landed), and bombardment, by protecting with fortification and similar means the place likely to be bombarded.

As regards invasion, I am glad to be able to quote Sir John Colomb, as he thought in 1880, upon my side. In a chapter upon colonial defence he says: "I do not for a moment underrate the . . . absolute necessity of being prepared to render invasion impossible by purely military forces. If we are not so prepared, we stake the fate of the Empire on, perhaps, a single naval engagement. A temporary reverse at sea might . . . be converted into a final defeat on land, resulting in a total overthrow of all further power of

resistance. It is necessary . . . that invasion be efficiently guarded against, so that, should our home fleet be temporarily disabled, we may, under cover of our army, prepare and strengthen it to regain lost ground, and renew the struggle for that which is essential to our life as a nation and our existence as an Empire." This seems sound sense, for it puts each service in its proper place for the defence of the country. It is very different from the talk of the last two years, that the navy is our only "line of defence," and that not a sixpence should be spent on land defences until the navy has been brought into some ideal condition of strength, calculated on the supposition that it is to be able, without doubt, both to prevent all chance of invasion or of bombardments, and everywhere to guard our commerce upon the seas.

While I think the recent outlay upon the navy necessary, yet, even with the additions to be obtained from the extra sums voted for expenditure during the next four years, our navy will not be such as to give us a reasonable superiority of strength against the combination of two considerable naval powers, either in the class of battle-ships or in the class of swift cruisers. The provision now being made might be sufficient if the other powers should stand still; but recent debates in France and recent action on the part of Russia negative the supposition that they will merely complete their ships that are on the stocks, and then rest, or build only sufficiently to replace old ships struck off the lists. What is wanted, as I have urged, is a well-considered combined scheme in which the navy and the army should occupy each its allotted place under such a scientific consideration of our needs as has been recently given to these matters by the German Empire, according to the showing

of Colonel Hale. The moneys that the British Empire spends upon defence are immensely great, and what is wanted is that those moneys should be spent as is decided by the best advisers who can be obtained, without the present contention between the services, carried on as though they were rival establishments in trade. Such questions must not be left to the decision of engineers, or artillerymen, or sailors, but discussed and settled as parts of a joint scheme on which the best naval and military talent in the country has been consulted.

Land forces.

French and German statement of principles for preventing invasion declares for the use of "mobile" forces on land. There is only one true way to checkmate an enemy, and that is by beating him in the field; and for this purpose the greater portion of our force must be capable of marching and manœuvring, and must not be tied down to some spot called a "position." Armies which fight wars of positions are always beaten, and I see with apprehension the adoption of position warfare as the highest attainment to which the volunteers are to aspire. If there were chains of mountains with narrow passes to defend on the London, as on the Indian frontier, there might be good position work for volunteers to do; but writing, as I do, these words at Pyrford, in a room from which I see the low lines of the Hog's Back and of the North Downs, cut through by the Mole and Wey, continually crossed with ease in our own manœuvres, I find no positions which cannot easily be turned, nor any opportunity for a British defending force to so place itself that it cannot be attacked in flank, as Frederick used to attack the armies of Maria Theresa. The plight in which the volunteers are placed is due to the fact that there is in this country no field artillery for them, and

indeed only just enough for our two army corps (with a few additional troops), which themselves, I am sorry to hear, are not yet in that "mobile" state, or even state of readiness for immediate mobilisation which every Continental power regards as essential in these days. One army corps is ready in a fashion; that is, ready to go abroad at short notice, having a great part of its equipment placed at ports of embarkation where it would be out of the way in case of invasion; but the second army corps wants much to complete it, and the artillery is still, except that of the first corps, armed with guns of a variety of pattern which would create immense confusion. Mr. Stanhope claims so much credit for having partially supplied 12-pounder guns that there is some reason to fear he has not faced the question of the 20-pounders, which are, I believe, ready for adoption, but are not being manufactured for supply; and we are, though not in so absolutely destitute a condition as we were when I wrote my work upon *The British Army*, still without a mobile force capable of standing against invasion.

No mobile land force in England.

We have no longer the old excuse that no one knows what a mobile land force should be. Whatever may be the case with fortifications, there is no party which denies the wisdom of constituting a thoroughly mobile force complete in all respects, out of the heterogeneous mass of military material which exists in Great Britain. Yet we have not even now completed the organisation of our regular forces. It is still true that if the two army corps should be completed, and be sent out of the country on an expedition, for example, to aid in the defence of India, there would remain no mobile force at all for home defence, and hardly any field artillery. A small commencement has been made

towards forming ammunition columns, which, were they fully organised, would release the condemned batteries from their dread of absorption into ammunition columns. The late measures have been in the right direction, but they all halt after the first step. Portions of the auxiliary forces have been told off for garrisons, but it is still the case that the main body of our armies have no mobile organisation enabling them to take the field, and that the fleet is hampered with the necessity of providing against invasion. We remain, in short, in the position, which I quoted Sir John Colomb as describing, of staking the fate of the Empire upon "perhaps a single naval engagement." No fault is to be found with the Admiralty, I am convinced, as regards the provision for home defence. The highest naval authorities have never abandoned the view, stated by them now fifty years ago, that were an undue proportion of our own fleet tied to the Channel the enemy would be set free, to the great danger of our commerce; while, conversely, if the fleet is to perform its proper duties and to carry out its strategical movements unhampered, our arsenals must be defended by fortification and our capital by a mobile army.

Fortification of dockyards and commercial ports.

We have seen how strong Melbourne has been made, and it is impossible to pretend that Liverpool or Bristol, to which in the event of war more trade would come than would face the Channel route to London, are in the same condition of protection. Whatever difference there may be between the fortification of distant stations, and of the dockyards, arsenals, and commercial harbours of our coasts at home, is all in favour of the heaviest guns and works being in the United Kingdom, because they are more likely to be attacked by fleets of battle-ships, instead of merely by squadrons of cruisers.

If the fleet would be hampered by having to guard Sierra Leone and St. Lucia, it would be almost equally tied if the mouth of the Thames and Medway, and the entrances to our commercial harbours, should be unable to hold an enemy at bay for a short time; and such ports would, in the absence or temporary disablement of the fleet, be exposed to more serious attack than would be Hong-Kong or Singapore or Melbourne. All harbour defence of the modern type must, in order to be complete, include a local naval force with torpedo-boats and steam-launches, and shore batteries for the protection of the mine-fields. It is to be regretted that the naval volunteer movement appears to have failed to establish itself on a large scale; and the provision of local works from local resources seems also as yet to have been a failure. Military science has worked out the whole scheme of the defence of commercial harbours; but little has yet been done except on paper. Probably the most important point, as has been proved by colonial example, is the selection for the command of the defence at each spot of an officer possessing scientific knowledge of the principle of the joint working of mine-fields, shore guns, torpedo-boats, and steam-launches to guard against boat attacks upon the torpedo lines, rather than the qualities which shine best upon parade.

Command.

The question of command is indeed a grave one. It is necessary for a good defence that artillery, engineering, and boat work should be carried on under one impulse, and I am told that this is far from being the case at present. We may be certain that the good feeling of the services would be made manifest in the case of pressing danger, but that would be a little late. If peace manœuvres have any meaning, they are

intended as preparations for war, and, while I see troops of all arms practising perpetual marching drill, I fail to notice the daily habit of setting soldiers and sailors to work together on that all-important business—the protection of the vital portions of the seaboard. It puzzles one to see the guardianship of the Thames defences[1] and of those of Chatham committed to generals sprung from the infantry or cavalry, while Woolwich, which has no works or heavy guns, and little room for the manœuvres of field artillery, is commanded by an artillery officer.

Counter-attack.

In treating the subject of Imperial Defence I have hitherto confined myself to measures necessary for mere protection; but it is idle to suppose that war could be brought to a termination unless we are prepared in some way to obtain advantages over the enemy such as to cause him to weary of the struggle. The *riposte* is as necessary in warfare as in fencing, and defence must include the possibility of counter-attack. In case of war with a maritime power we ought to be able to use our command of coaling stations to complete the advantages which we possess at sea. We ought to deprive the enemy of such coaling stations as he now has, and attack his establishments in countries where the population is hostile to his rule. In the event of a war in which we had not to fight Russia for the possession of India, the outlying posts and territories of our enemy across the seas would be our natural prey; but as against Russia we have no such means of counter-attack. It is futile, however, to discuss in detail the conditions of wars which would depend upon the grouping of the powers.

Officers.

In view of almost any conceivable hostilities we ought to be prepared to supply arms and officers to native levies which would support our Empire in various

[1] Up to 9th January 1890.

portions of the globe. Our ability to do so is an old tradition of the British Empire, and one of the chief items of our military strength has always been the power of winning the confidence of native forces, inspiring trust, and almost creating courage where it did not exist. When we remember the condition to which the Egyptian troops had been reduced before our organisation of that army, and the abject terror shown by them in presence of such Arabs as they now beat with ease upon the Nile, it may be taken for granted that the old faculty, by the use of which we conquered India, is still ours. But the men chosen for such work must be trained and skilled officers, and I do not know where they are to come from. We have none too many for all the requisites of the regular army in case of war. India, as I have shown, would make a call not only for immediate needs, but to meet the heavy drain of a campaign. Neither the militia nor volunteers are fully officered, and the auxiliary forces would take a large number of additional officers in the event of mobilisation. The same principle of full preparation should govern the supply of arms, their manufacture and repair. The stocks should be larger than they are, and an end should be made to exclusiveness in production. India at least should be able to manufacture guns, carriages, rifles, and ammunition, and should hold large reserves with a view of giving aid to Mauritius, Ceylon, the Straits Settlements, Hong-Kong, Labuan, and North Borneo, and for the purpose of arming eastern races from which we might draw levies. Gordon showed how Chinese may be led to victory; and the very Chins whom we are now slowly subduing, and who are, I fear, too good for our Madras troops, would soon enlist under our banners if we could arm and officer them. We should have before us schemes

Arms.

Levies.

for developing our military strength in time of war, such as are not yet prepared, and it is also not encouraging to those who would federate the military organisations of the Empire that we have not yet succeeded in putting together a satisfactory organisation for the large forces that we possess at home.

A General Staff.

The main thing needed for a joint organisation of the whole of the defensive forces of the Empire is the creation of a body of men whose duty it would be to consider the questions raised and to work out the answers. The problem is more difficult for the British Empire than for any other state, and yet we are the only power spending vast sums upon defence who have no General Staff. A General Staff needs a Chief of the Staff at the head of it, who in our country would be, as he is in France, the right-hand man of the Minister of War, while in Germany he is the adviser of the Emperor, who commands in chief himself, as well as of the Minister of War. The duty of a General Staff is to teach the art of war and advise on all matters relating to plans of campaign, and the organisation necessary to make them successful. There is little hope of our ever being ready for war, or carrying out a military federation of the Empire, or, indeed, even organising the home forces, until we possess a well-organised General Staff. That office must be no slavish copy of the Prussian office, excellent though the Prussian system is, but must give us at the least what every other army has in the shape of a powerful Staff Department.

The attitude of the British public to the office created, rather than developed, by Count von Moltke, has been one of awe and veneration; of open-mouthed wonder, and hopelessness of ever possessing anything like it. Yet there is nothing to prevent us from

LONDON LIBRARY

having an organisation of the same nature, modified to suit our special needs. The Great General Staff at Berlin—other modern armies have copied it—is nothing more than the application to military purposes of the principle upon which civil businesses are conducted. In each case what is first needed is the best information upon the facts. Then plans are formed, anticipating those of others who are likely to become opponents. The difficulty met with in discovering the principles which were to guide us in the fortification of the coaling stations shows that we have at present no such system in force, and no similar system possessed of adequate power. A Chief of the Staff having to deal with such a question as coaling stations would determine, from the information accumulated in his department, what forces would be likely to be brought against the posts selected, and thus would judge what forts and guns would be required.

The working out in advance of the problems of war, perfectly performed in Germany, involves not half the complication that presents itself in the case of the British Empire. Germany has three lines to defend, and two directions of possible initiative, while the British Empire has enormous frontiers, world-wide interests, and numerous possible enemies—small or great—as well. Of all the nations ours should be that trusting the most to well-ordered knowledge and well-elaborated plans. Yet from time to time we are shocked by revelations of our unprepared condition, and, a strong popular feeling having been thus created, Government follows the impulse and appoints a committee or a commission to obtain information and make recommendations to it. Reports overlap and sometimes contradict each other, and frequently the result of neutralising forces is that no action at all is taken.

A General Staff forms an organisation which is itself a standing committee on all subjects which embrace preparation for war; and, although financial limits must of course be imposed upon it, there is at all events this reason for a change—that under the present plan no British Government succeeds in managing naval and military matters with either economy to the taxpayer or with efficiency as regards the services. The present Intelligence Department of the army performs only a small section of the duties which would devolve upon a General Staff, and the only wonder about it is that it is alive at all. The work that has been given it to do has been well done; but in the British army the Intelligence Department is a humble servant, if not a drudge.

Errors to be avoided in the creation of a General Staff.

In advocating the creation of a General Staff, in the modern sense, it is necessary to guard against a misunderstanding which might easily arise. Nothing could be worse than the introduction of the old French system (partly at one time imitated in other countries, and now abandoned by France herself for a staff upon the German model) of making the staff of the army a permanent organisation—separated from the regimental portion of the services by a strict line of demarcation. To produce a separate institution with interests opposed to those of the fighting army, and to develop a class of sedentary officers, unused to practical work and unfit to take the field in full vigour of body, would be a step in the wrong direction.

What it should be.

The modern system is one of a permanent institution worked by shifting units, continually receiving fresh men into the office, to whom it imparts that knowledge and training which it alone can give, and sends them forth again to be distributed through the

entire army. The French General Staff is a body of this kind, although some complaint is made as to the want of sufficient interchange between staff and regimental work in France. The German Great General Staff has some permanent officials who are chosen for their special qualities, as collectors and co-ordinators of information, and are not intended to take the field. But the great majority of the officers at any moment within the walls of the Berlin department are there only for a time, during which they practise the more intellectual portion of the work of staff officers, and pass out again to their corps, where they have to deal with the practical details of service; never, however, ceasing to design manœuvres that illustrate the strategy and tactics of belligerents. The best men, and nearly all those who become generals, are some three times in the office in the course of their career, leaving it for regimental duties in the various ranks and again returning to it by selection for merit. The system has been admirably described by Mr. Spenser Wilkinson in *The Brain of an Army*,[1] and the *Manchester Guardian* also deserves credit for having kept the General Staff system steadily before the British public as a model.

Such an organisation in England would have no power to interfere with the duties of the Commander-in-Chief or of the Minister of War. It would neither inspect troops nor regulate the promotion of the army, but it would decide the principles which would arrange the distribution of the imperial forces, and do all the mass of work which is included under the head of preparations for mobilisation. It would, however, be less of an administrative office than a school of generalship. If the present Adjutant-General, Lord Wolseley, It duties.

[1] Macmillan and Co.

is to be the head of it when created he must be freed from most of the administrative duties which he is at present called on to perform.

A General Staff and the colonies.

The very existence of a General Staff would constitute a form of Imperial military Federation. The Chief of the Staff would have an intimate knowledge of the resources of every colony. The Cabinet would be told what was wanted for each colony, and in what each colony was deficient. Government could then propose to colonies definite schemes, which would carry the weight which would deservedly attach to a highly competent opinion, while at present we are able to do little more than ask vague questions. How ready our children across the seas are to take up clear and distinct proposals is now evident in Australia, where great attempts are being made, as has been seen above, to meet the wishes of the General Officer commanding at Hong-Kong. Men of business are given to fall in with businesslike suggestions, and several of the colonies would at once be willing to take a share in a scheme which could be shown to be a part of an all-embracing organisation for Imperial Defence. Each colony or group of colonies would have its staff, lent from or trained in the General Staff at home, and would send to England its ablest officers for instruction. The Australians are already despatching their best officers to India and to England.

A General Staff and the coaling stations.

A General Staff would also calculate the necessary garrisons for the coaling stations that have been chosen by the navy, and would concert with the naval Intelligence Department, itself raised into a school of naval strategy, measures for bringing these garrisons to war strength in the easiest manner. In some cases it would be necessary to keep them always at war strength, while

in others this would not be required. These are points which can only be settled by mutual agreement, and arrangement in time of peace, between the services, with the heads of which would rest the final decision. The main point is to have such questions worked out with authority by officers trained to the investigation of these problems, and having for their business the duty of leaving no difficulties of the kind unfaced.

The fixing of responsibility.

One result of the existence of a General Staff would be that responsibilities would be marked out; and if ever the Empire found itself ill served in war it would know the officials upon whom reproof should fall. At the present moment the Intelligence Department has not sufficient authority to secure the adoption of its views. That department has, it is known, worked out a complete plan of mobilisation of the home forces; but this is immediately handed over to another department, and the executive branches may overrule, with imperfect knowledge, the principles laid down upon fuller knowledge by those who have studied the masses of facts accumulated in the office. In our present system there is a confusion between the reflecting and calculating and the executive powers; and no one could be held responsible if our mobilisation schemes broke down, for the original designers and the executive would be able to throw the responsibility backwards and forwards upon each other. When our mobilisation arrangements fail, and there seems a risk that the Empire will go to pieces, there is too much reason to fear that the people will not wait to argue out the interminable question of the distribution of blame, but will turn blindly against the highest authorities that it can reach.

The present Intelligence Department.

Army organisation and the volunteers.

Organisation rather than numbers must continue to be the main topic for discussion when we deal with

Imperial Defence, because it would be vain to call for additional men so long as those we have, in spite of the enormous cost of our system, are not equipped and prepared for war. There may be ignorance, but there is no backwardness on the part of the public as regards the steps to be taken for defence. Everything that has been done in this direction in the last few years has been done in obedience to outside pressure, which has been rather resisted than encouraged by the leading men. There never was in history a more curious example of topsy-turvy patriotism than the recent self-taxation of the community to make good the default of the Government to equip the volunteers.

The militia. Another force which is available and cheap is the militia, a source of strength capable of large development in time of war; but here we are met by the difficulty that it has not been decided where the arms and officers which will be needed upon the mobilisation of this force are to be found.

Cost. The British Empire bears for war expenditure an enormous charge; the heaviest borne by any nation in the world. The Empire spends on its defence between fifty and sixty millions sterling in the year, and upon the British and Indian army alone spends more than the German and far more than the French army costs. The French and German Empires each spend on war, through their military and naval departments, about the annual sum which is provided for the year 1890-91 in the German budgets, namely £37,250,000. Although the comparison which I instituted in my former book between the financial charge for the British and that for the German army is, as I then showed, in many of its figures vitiated by the existence in Germany of a conscription, yet there is the fact that our army ex-

penditure in India and in England together is so enormous that not even the figures relating to pay and provisions, and many others which are affected by conscription, account for the difference, in numbers and organisation, of the force kept up by the United Kingdom and by Germany. When statements of this kind are made it is common to find men saying that those who make them do not take into account the extraordinary war expenditure of France and Germany but look only to their ordinary budgets. As far as I am concerned this is not the case. The German figures are confused through the difficulty caused by the existence of separate accounts for Bavaria and some other states, but in the case of France the figures can easily be given.

French army expenditure smaller than ours.

France keeps up half a million of men in time of peace, and is now able to call into the field two and a half millions in time of war and to supply them with their equipment. That country, in the heaviest year, after the last war, of renewal of material and of fortification, when the whole of that wonderful series of fortresses which now face Germany was under construction, reached the extreme figure of £32,000,000 army expenditure in twelve months. In 1888 the French total war expenditure was less considerable. In 1889 we find the figures creeping up again, and the estimates are for an ordinary expenditure of over twenty-two millions and an extraordinary expenditure of seven, or twenty-nine and a half millions in all, if we include the extra military expenditure in Tonquin. The budget of 1890 shows figures which are very nearly the same as those of 1889, and provides for a total expenditure, ordinary and extraordinary, through the Ministry of War, of £28,420,000. Even if we include the cost of the marine infantry, the French army expenditure is only

thirty millions to our thirty-eight, thirty-nine, or forty millions of various recent years—not including that on our marines who serve on board ship as well as, like the French marines, on shore. There is colonial expenditure on certain colonial stations which does not appear in our imperial accounts, but which corresponds to some fortification expenditure, and expenditure in the French West Indies and in Senegal which does figure in the French accounts. The French thirty millions includes, roughly speaking, in 1889 a million on fortifications, a million on melinite shells, and two millions upon new rifles.

What we obtain for the payments that we make.

Rejecting as we do the modern foreign system of training a huge force, organised for instant action, we maintain a small regular force in time of peace, with untrained reserves, and hope to create a large army out of material ready to our hand when war looms large. Our very plan itself is unsatisfactory, because it stakes too much upon the doubtful chance of a single naval battle; but when we adopt it there at least should follow the full elaboration in advance of that mobilisation which forms a portion of our principle. Great as are our resources, their development would require an enormous time if our precautions had not been fully taken in time of peace. Of all possible courses open to us that of trusting blindly to the large resources of the Empire, without calculating beforehand how they are to be used, is the most foolish. Our only mobilisation scheme for the land forces at present in existence ties the volunteers and their "marching 40-pounder batteries" to the defence of "positions" or entrenched camps on the south-east and the north-east of London, and is obviously insufficient as a scheme of Imperial Defence. If a full scheme were worked out against all eventualities

by a competent Chief of the Staff in a proper Staff Department, and set by the Cabinet upon its own responsibility before the nation and the Empire as a whole, I am convinced that it would be accepted by the public of Great and Greater Britain as the close of a controversy which at present seems interminable.

Example to the colonies.

The mother-country, with her concentrated population and her possession of skilled military talent, ought to set an example to her children, by working out a practical system, in which many of them would gladly take their part. At present we set a bad example of jealousy, friction between different authorities, and absence of organisation. When the approaches to the capital of the Empire are defended by the existence of a well-prepared though small mobile army, our seaports protected, our coaling stations armed and garrisoned, and the schooling of generalship organised in a real Staff Department, we shall be able, with more advantage than we possess at present in so doing, to call upon the colonies to follow our example in organisation and to take their places with us in a scheme of mutual defence. If we cannot even establish a General Staff because of the jealousies of the departments, we have no right to wonder that some Australian colonies recently refused to send their forces into the territory of another colony for a general review. If we have never faced the problem of arming and officering and putting in the field the whole of our own militia and volunteers, we have little right to quarrel with Canada for a deficiency in arms and in training on the part of her militia. We do not seem at present in a position even to give lessons in such simple matters as coast defence. Australia long ago supplied herself from England with disappearing and with quick-

firing ordnance such as our committees are only now beginning to recommend. At present it would seem as if our attitude towards the great colonies should be rather one of gratitude for the good nature with which they accept our shortcomings than of doubt whether they will consent to bear their legitimate part in Imperial Defence. No colony can work out a defence scheme for the Empire as a whole. We, and we only, can suggest it; and we shall be unable, in my belief, to do so until we are possessed of a first requisite in the form of a sufficient organisation of skilled advice.

Foreign opinion.

Our system is condemned by every foreign writer who has considered it. A skilled political observer in the person of Eduard von Hartmann has lately written upon the subject, and has told us that we have everything to fear if we delay the necessary preparations for defence and military reorganisation. Able foreign writers such as Major Wachs and Dr. Geffcken have recently pointed out that, while the material resources of Great Britain are immense, she would not in a really dangerous struggle have time to draw upon them. Fleets and armies, they have shown, do not start into existence at a word; the art of war has been revolutionised by the existence of national armies capable of taking the field in four days' time, and while the army of the United Kingdom has slowly grown, the vulnerability of England has increased a hundredfold in the last fifty years. Her navy is not equal to that which would be formed by a combination of the next greatest fleet with one of the second rank, and her capital is so ill protected that she would be forced to rely upon her marine not only to defend her trade but also to guard her coasts. Several of her stations upon the road to India are, as these writers have shown, insufficiently

garrisoned; and Russia, which it was supposed was separated for ever from India by many hundreds of miles of desert and by inaccessible ranges of mountains, has, by the pertinacity and perseverance of her policy, advanced within easy striking distance of points which Great Britain must either defend, or weaken her Indian Empire by giving up. The ultimate struggle between Russia and the United Kingdom is, according to German observers, inevitable, and the result likely to be decisive as regards our position in the world. Dr. Geffcken says of us: "If the condition of the fleet is at present so far below the duties required of it, that of the British land forces is simply pitiable;" and again: "The supreme direction of the army is in even a worse plight than that of the navy." If it be objected that these witnesses are German, and therefore interested in strengthening the army and navy of a power which they fancy might possibly come into the field upon their side, I must reply that I have already quoted in *The British Army* French works in which precisely the same doctrine is put forward, and have shown that foreign military opinion is unanimous as to the deficiencies of our organisation.

General consideration of the defence problem.

Sir John Colomb once complained that the public mind was too much set upon home defence and too little upon that of the colonies and of the trade routes. He was right at the time, but the tendency has lately been the other way; and we need more than ever to beware of such a neglect of home defences that, while the enemies' fleets are free, ours must be tied to our own shores. A main necessity in Imperial Defence is well-organised land defence at home, such as to secure the capital of the Empire from invasion and the dockyards against bom-

bardment; preventing the possibility of panic, and leaving the fleet free to move. If Imperial defensive Federation in any form is to be brought to a successful issue the colonists will wish to know whether the fleet, which is to be our main contribution to the safety of their trade and of their shores, can be spared for its world-wide work, or must be kept selfishly in the Channel, because we have not organised for England that land defence which we ask them on their part to have ready for themselves. If we were so prepared on land that we could laugh at the notion of invasion our superiority at sea would be certain, and we should have no reason to fear for any of our colonies or posts. Our own communications will be safe, and we can guard our trade by naval means, depriving the enemy of access to that fuel without which he can no more prey upon our merchant steamers than a sword-fish without tail or fins can chase a whale. One main task of our navy in such a case would be to capture and destroy the enemy's coaling stations, and in this way to give as much protection to our trade routes and colonies as could be afforded by the mere cruising of a dozen fleets. Great indeed would be the power which in the event of war we should enjoy at sea, provided our navy were not forced to guard its ungarrisoned coaling stations, or tied down by the necessity of protecting England, alone of European countries unprepared to defend itself against invasion.

Share of India and the colonies in defence.

India, Canada, Australasia, and South Africa are able to defend their own sea frontiers from any force which could be sent against them from a naval base. While we watch and sweep the seas upon the system which I have described, no naval expeditions could be despatched, without utter recklessness, by an enemy not in possession of ports and coaling stations, situate near

the place to be attacked, and strong enough to form the starting-places for naval operations. If our strategy at the beginning of a war were first to beat the main fleets of an enemy, and then to destroy his chances of forming bases, we should do all that the colonies could ask from us, and could fairly call upon them to take their share in our operations. The mother-country has at vast expense, and by dint in many cases of hard fighting, secured the possession of most places on the surface of the globe which could be used as bases for attacks upon the chief colonies; and it would be her business in case of war to obtain the command of any others which might at that time be in the enemy's hands. We should do the naval part of such operations, and the colonies might be fairly asked to contribute the troops which would be required to perform a work undertaken chiefly for their sake. For example, M. de Lanessan has proposed, as has been seen, to use Noumea as a base for attack upon the Australian shores. If our fleet were free to roam the seas in the event of a war with France it would be wise to destroy the enemy's base in that chief New Caledonian port, and this could best be done by Australian troops convoyed by British men-of-war. The jealousies which prevail in peace would disappear, I think, upon the first sign of danger; and as Prussia and Bavaria came together in 1870, so war would produce union even between Victoria and New South Wales. But Germany's success was due to the fact that the dangers of the situation had been foreseen, and the arrangements for combined action made in advance. This is the task which now falls to the administrators of the British Empire. When we call the colonies into consultation upon the subject we must be prepared with those definite

proposals which we alone can make, drawn up, not by a series of committees, but by a General Staff, which should be the brain of Imperial Defence.

Conclusion.

The result of this survey of Imperial Defence is to bring before the mind a clearer image of the stupendous potential strength of the British Empire, and of our equally stupendous carelessness in organising its force. The incredulity with which some statements that I made in *The British Army* were received, afterwards gave way to an admission of their truth, but although much has been done on paper, little has been done in fact to remedy the deficiencies of which I complained. In spite of the abundant zeal and patriotism of the country, its enormous wealth and vast resources, the chief success in organisation which has been lately met with has been achieved by the vulgar experiment of "sending round the hat." When a popular Lord Mayor goes begging for subscriptions to equip a portion of the forces of the Queen the astonishment of the world is great. This illustration of our peculiar methods of preparing for defence is not, however, much more startling than is that provided by the consideration of our habit of managing Imperial Defence by temporary committees, while we neglect the uniform experience of other nations in favour of the selection for the purpose of the best men, specially trained. Those of my readers who have followed me in a consideration of the entire subject must, I think, be equally struck by the latent strength of the British Empire and astounded at its latent weakness.

Prince Bismarck has said of the British Empire that it would be supremely powerful if it understood and organised its means for offensive war; but our ambition is not for offensive strength, and not only

home-staying Britons but our more energetic colonists themselves decline to accept such organisation of our power, with the temptations that it would bring. We wish only to be safe from the ambition of others, and the first step towards safety must be the arrangement of consistent plans for supporting the whole edifice of British rule by the assistance of all the component portions of the Empire. As all have helped to raise the fabric, so may all combine to secure it by the adoption of a settled plan of Imperial Defence. At the present moment the words made use of by the Queen, in which the very italics are Her Majesty's own, with regard to our home defences, have become true of those of the Empire treated as a whole: "That it is most detrimental and dangerous to the interests of the country that our defences should not be at all times in such a state as to place the Empire in security from sudden attack; and that delay in making our preparations for defence *till the moment when the apprehension of danger arises* exposes us to a twofold disadvantage.

"1st, The measures will be necessarily imperfect and expensive as taken under the pressure of the emergency and under the influence of a feeling which operates against the exercise of a cool and sound judgment.

"2d, Our preparations will have to be made at a time when it is most important, for the preservation of peace, neither to produce alarm at home nor by our armaments to provoke the power with which we apprehend a rupture."

CONCLUSION

In our survey of the British Empire we have seen, in the Canadian chapters, what a miracle has been wrought by confederation in converting a backward colony into a flourishing power. In the Australian section we have found reasons for believing that the adoption of complete federal institutions for Australia, if not for Australasia, is at hand. Under the head of South Africa we have been able to judge that the harm done by a premature attempt to force confederation upon countries which were not ready for it, and by the annexation of the Transvaal against the wish of the inhabitants, has been remedied by time and by the wise policy of conciliating Dutch colonists whose interests are identical with our own. In India we have been struck with the existence of difficulties in our way (chiefly military and financial) greater than those which attend the continuance of the rule of the Queen in the self-governing colonies, and have seen cause to think that, of all false policies offered for our acceptance, the most dangerous would be that of inviting Russia to draw southward into Afghanistan. In the general chapters of the second volume we have noted the result of social and political experiments which are being tried for us by men of our own race, under conditions which make it likely that many novelties of colonial invention may one day be imitated

by ourselves. In the parts of this work which are concerned with the future relations to one another of the various portions of the Empire and with Imperial Defence, we have found that it lies rather with ourselves than upon the colonists of Canada, and Australasia, and South Africa, to meet the greatest of the dangers to which the Empire is exposed.

Turning to matters less important, indeed, than those which have been named, but full of interest to the United Kingdom, we have found that the time seems to have come for the adoption in the peninsula of Hindostan of a gradual modification of our system of government in the direction of a development, from among the present elective municipalities, of Provincial councils dealing with most matters except finance and war; while the as yet unachieved union of India for military purposes should be completed by the abolition of the Presidency system. In those of the Crown Colonies which are mainly inhabited by the negro race we have discovered reasons for thinking that elective institutions might also wisely be extended, as has been done by France in the more prosperous French Antilles. In the chapters on the colonial democracy of the self-governing daughter-countries we have noted, as regards Religion, the wonderful development of creeds that flourish in the absence of the establishment of any church; while as regards liquor laws we have seen the rapid spread of the principle of Local Option, which may before long be adopted here. The success of federalism in Canada; the likelihood of a speedy expansion of that system among our colonies of the South Seas as the result of conference between New South Wales and the Federal Council of Australasia; the facts which recommend it in the West Indies; the

growth of the principle of customs union in South Africa, as well as the spread of the Provincial system in India itself, have received attention. The danger of the isolated secession of single colonies will be arrested by the federal principle; and, while at first the direct tie to the mother-country will become weaker by its adoption (inasmuch as only a small number of viceroys will be named by us instead of a large number of colonial governors, and the practice of reserving Bills with a view to veto will become extinct), yet the raising of at least Australia to the footing of a power connected with us by a personal union, will undoubtedly diminish many risks and smooth down many petty jealousies. If the future of the Empire lies only in the close alliance of three or four Federations having no cause of quarrel that can be as yet discerned, that alliance may long endure. But it is at least possible that the association of the various British federations for common defence, and the interest which they will possess in the peaceful government of all portions of the Empire, and especially of India and of the Cape, may lead to closer ties being voluntarily undertaken by the powerful federal groups. If we pursue a prudent policy in Hindostan, and unmistakably evince our power to defend it against attack, no war dangers seem to threaten the peaceful progress of the outlying portions of the Queen's dominions; and if we not only guard our Indian frontiers but our stations on the seas, as well as the shores of England and the capital of the Empire, the power of Great Britain may prove as indestructible as already is the world-wide position of our race.

It is not unusual for men to argue as though we were on the way to lose an Empire which had de-

scended to us from our forefathers; but it is worthy of remark that our real colonial Empire, as Professor Seeley and other historians have well shown, is the creation of a century, and almost of our own time. The full development of the British power in India itself belongs to the present reign, and the rise of Australia and Canada and New Zealand is entirely of our day. The West Indies which were much thought of by our forefathers are still ours to the same extent to which they owned them, but are unimportant as compared with the vast bulk of our modern dominions and the magnitude of their trade. Our forefathers lost and embittered against us the American states, and it is in the present century that the British Empire has been both rapidly developed to its full extent, consolidated, and made prosperous and happy. Other countries have owned at various times colonies such as were the colonies of the Regency and of George IV and William IV, but no country has ever owned, and it may be safely said no other country will ever own, such magnificent daughter-states as those of Australasia, South Africa, and the Canadian Dominion — full of wealth, and force, and pleasant life.

I have spoken in my work, and especially in the Australasian chapters and the portions of the general chapters which bear upon Australia, of that wellbeing of our colonial people to which I have here again referred. The type of the Anglo-Saxon of the future, growing up in Canada, and in South Africa, and in Australia, may not everywhere be the same; the South African English are browner than the Canadians; the Australians taller and more given to outdoor sport; but essentially the race continues everywhere to be ours;—differentiated from the people of the old country and from the

Americans of the United States by a healthier cheerfulness of life. To the generosity, breadth, self-reliance, readiness of resource, and proneness to wander which, as has been remarked by many observers, our colonists share with our American descendants, they add a happiness in the act of living which is their own. If the colonies lack something of the depth of earnestness of the New Englanders, they are beginning to share their temperance and sobriety. If, too, a certain boastfulness and habit of self-assertion are common to the colonists and to the majority of the Americans, these defects are inevitable in the early life of peoples which have rapidly pushed themselves into a foremost position in the world.

Statisticians, and statesmen who base their arguments upon the writings of statisticians, are too much inclined, I think, to argue the question of the wisdom of making sacrifices to keep the colonies in the Empire upon grounds which have to do with what is called "trade" in a somewhat limited sense, and are too little given to look outside the figures which concern mere commerce. It is doubtful whether the political relation, for example, between Australia and Great Britain, has much to do with the large export and import of commodities which takes place between them; but, on the other hand, it most certainly has an essential bearing upon the enormous investment of English capital in the South-Sea colonies of the United Kingdom. It has been computed that £800,000,000 of British money are invested in Australasia, Canada, India, and the other colonies and dependencies of the Empire; and this vast sum is lent at a comparatively low rate of interest largely on account of the political connection that exists, inasmuch as it is lent more freely and in an increasing rate to portions of

the Empire as compared with the amounts lent to countries under a different flag.

Not only is it the case that the feeling of security produced by the peaceful relations which are involved in the present tie leads the British investor to his favourite field, but the connection is also to be powerfully supported by other less material arguments. The widening of the moral and intellectual horizon by the world-wide character of the British Empire is of equal advantage to the colonist and to the home-staying Briton; and there is some reason to fear that, if the Australian continent should separate its destinies from our own, a certain consequent narrowing of the interests of life would be a result perceptible on both sides. The connection, even though it be little more than nominal, which exists between the United Kingdom and countries like Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa stimulates the energy of the English people; but it also prevents the growth of a hopeless provincialism in the colonies themselves.

If we fail to discern these facts, foreign observers see them, and nothing can be more eloquent and at the same time more bitterly prophetic than the passage upon "the future" with which Prevost-Paradol ended his last book,—*La France Nouvelle.* Prevost-Paradol preached to the French that, if they would not see their country pine away by comparison with the new Anglo-Saxon lands, they must find their field in Africa and spread themselves at least through the whole north of that continent, in order that, if the Pacific was to be an English lake, the Mediterranean might at least become a French one. Since Prevost-Paradol wrote, and died, his prophecies have been in part accomplished, and the progress in numbers and in power of the English-speaking rivals

of the French has proportionately been even more rapid than he foresaw.

The world's future, more clearly than it did twenty years ago when Prevost-Paradol's book appeared, belongs to the Anglo-Saxon, to the Russian and the Chinese races; of whom the Chinese in their expansion across the seas tend to fall under the influence of India and of the Crown Colonies of Great Britain. France may grow in military and naval power; and Germany in this respect, as well as in population, trade, and wealth; yet so far more rapid is the increase in the strength and the riches of the British Empire and of the United States that, before the next century is ended, the French and the Germans seem likely to be pigmies when standing by the side of the British, the Americans, or the Russians of the future. In spite of German efforts at colonisation the vast majority of the German colonists are being swallowed up in the Anglo-Saxon race, to which they contribute an element of strength. Seven millions of Germans are amalgamating with the Irish and the British and the old Americans of the United States, and will lose all trace of separate life and separate tongue; and the Germans of Canada, of Australasia, and of British South Africa are adding to British power. Not only the offshoots of Germany but also the numerous descendants of the Scandinavian races who flock to the United States and to western Canada are becoming English in habits and in speech. The expansive force of the British people, originally shown mainly in the colonisation of the United States, is now as much exemplified by its power to fuse the descendants of the other colonising nations, as by the growth of Canada, the civilisation of Australia, or the consolidation of the Indian Empire.

In the days when Campanella wrote men looked for a universal dominion in the world to fall to Spain. Spain has lost her colonies, although throughout the American continent south of the border line of the United States the Spanish has till lately been the predominant civilisation. The Spaniards across the seas have failed to show their power to fuse the Italian and other immigrants who are now beginning to flock in to the South American republics; and Spanish America seems likely to fall gradually under the political and commercial leadership of the United States.

The wealth and the ubiquity, and even the race force of the Anglo-Saxons, will not, however, of themselves preserve the British Empire from meeting the fate of that of Spain. We have frontiers which place us in contact with the only powers of the future that will count greatly in the world—with Russia, with China, and with the United States. While it may be hoped that the people of the American Union may never again wage war upon ourselves, and while the skilful foreign policy of the Indian Government may retain China as a friend, it is difficult to view without anxiety the military situation of an Empire so little compact, and so difficult in consequence to defend. No country can be less homogeneous than a nation which includes within its territories the Oriental despotism of British India and States as democratic as Queensland; but that which is our weakness is also in a sense our strength, as making Greater Britain, if she learns her task, the most intelligent as well as the most cosmopolitan of States.

GUILDHALL
LONDON
LIBRARY

INDEX TO VOLUME II

ABDURRAHAM KHAN, see Afghanistan, Ameer of
Aborigines' Protection Society, 455
Abyssinia, 173
Acts—
Act of Congress, 310
Acts concerning Representation (New Zealand) 258
Arms Act in India, 143
Berlin Act, 1885, the, 169 ; and protectionist legislation in the Congo State, 181
British North America Act, 359
Burghers' Force and Levies Act (Cape Colony), 523, 524
Colonial Acts against the Chinese, 305
Convicts' Prevention Act (Victoria), 306
Defence Bill (Queensland) 476
Divorce Bill (New South Wales), 282
Dominion Franchise Act (Canada), 257
Education Act, (Victoria), 379
English Factory Acts, 298
—— Truck Acts, 298
Hospitals and Charitable Institutions Act, 1885 (New Zealand), 325
"Imbecile Passengers Act" of New Zealand, 314
Jesuits' Estates Bill (Canada), 395
Labourers' Wages Act (Cape Colony), 299
Liquor License Act (Canada), 1883, 438
Local Option Acts, Australasia, 458
Naval Tribute Bill (Queensland), 497
Neglected Children's Acts (Victoria), 329
Provincial Liquor Acts, 1887 and 1888 (Ontario), 433, 439
Public Health Act (New Zealand), 305
Scott Act (Canada), 431-433, 435, 438, 439
Torrens Act, 275
Trades Arbitration Act (Ontario), 288, 289
Voluntary Act (Cape of Good Hope), 419
Adams, Sir F. O., K.C.M.G., C.B., 263
Adelaide, university, 375 ; Sabbath observance, 413 ; the Corporation of, and local option, 445 ; referred to, 247, 401
Aden, defence and garrison, 529 ; referred to, 157, 169, 170
—— Gulf of, 163
Admiralty Islands, curiosity in division of, 184
Admiralty, the, and home defence, 556 ; referred to, 506, 513, 521, 523, 525
Advance Australia ! 451
Advice, Boards of, 366; and see Education
Afghanistan, as it is, 15 ; Russian action in, in the event of the present Ameer's death, *ib.* ; advance through, possibilities of, 17 ; its results, 20 ; impossibility of safely using Southern troops in, 43 ; inviolability of, as opposed to partition, 56 ; policy of partition, 65 ; referred to, 9, 11, 14-16, 20, 21, 24, 39, 43, 57-60, 65, 70, 73-75, 116, 576
—— Ameer of, his understanding of our promises, 16 ; referred to, 9, 10, 14-16, 20, 33, 57-59, 65
—— Northern, the occupation of, by Russia, and our pledges, 9 ; our course in case of a Russian occupation, 10
Afghan army, 57
—— policy, our past, and English public opinion, 11 ; Mr. Gladstone's, 14
—— succession, 11
—— Wars, 28, 51
Afghans, their preference for Russia, 64 ; feeling towards our Indian subjects, *ib.* ; referred to, 8, 9, 60, 76

Africa, development of, 161 ; its present position, size, and how occupied, 168 ; proportion of external trade of, with United Kingdom, British India, and France, 179 ; value of what we have obtained in, 193, 194 ; referred to, 4, 5, 85, 159, 163, 166, 167, 173, 177-179, 184, 190, 193, 195, 211, 530, 581
—— British East, 173, 174
—— British South, the Germans in, 582
—— Central, trade of, its outlet, 173 ; the British and introduction of arms into, 176 ; referred to, 164, 167, 168, 172, 184, 212
—— Crown Colonies in, 162
—— East, 164, 166, 171, 194
—— German East, its trade and currency, 174 ; 178
—— South, wages in, 290 ; truck in, 299 ; anti-Indian agitation in, 313 ; Indian coolies of, 313 ; religious life in, 415 ; Dutch Reformed Church, 415, 417 ; religious life of the Boers, 417 ; influential individuals, *ib.* ; the Doppers, *ib.* ; Scotch ministers, 418 ; disestablishment, *ib.* ; Church of England, 419 ; Wesleyans, 421 ; Roman Catholics, 422 ; Jesuits, *ib.* ; Salvation Army, *ib.* ; Sunday observance, *ib.* ; local option, 452 ; Sunday closing, 453 ; licensing, *ib.* ; habits of the population, 454 ; memorials from temperance bodies as to the Transkei, 455 ; vineyards, *ib.* ; trepidation as to condition of, 539 ; defence, 572 ; confederation, 576 ; imperial defence, 577 ; customs union, 578 ; Anglo-Saxon type, 579 ; referred to, 3, 158, 161, 162, 164-166, 175, 178, 191, 201, 202, 231, 233, 249, 250, 256, 264, 275, 280, 285, 291, 312, 356, 383, 472, 492, 522, 523, 540, 581
—— West, 166, 194
—— West Coast of, British share in the recent "scramble," 179 ; reasons for absence of cattle stations on the, 180 ; our position satisfactory, 182 ; referred to, 456
—— West Coast Settlements of, 162, 519
African College, the South, 384
—— Company, the National, 180
—— Conference at Berlin, 158, 166, 456
—— Lakes, German, Portuguese, and English action as to the territory adjoining, 175, 176
—— —— Company, their reputation, and connection with Church of Scotland and Free Church Missions, 175, 178 ; and Arab slave hunters, 176
Afridis, the, 30, 38, 40, 42, 43, 69, 72
Afrikander party, 473, 475
Age, see Melbourne *Age*
Agents-General, the, 492, 493 ; a Council of, 493
Agra, 151
Agriculture, State, 267
Akbar, government of, 116
Alaska, 495
Alexander II of Russia, 105
—— III of Russia, his treatment of local elective freedom in Russia as applied to our attempts in India, 105
Alexandria, 529
Algeria, Arabs of, 112 ; natives of, and the suffrage, 208 ; 113, 178
Ali, Jam of Lus Beyla, 31
Alikhanoff, Colonel, 117
Allahabad, 136
—— Congress, 112, 136, 137, 140
Alliances—Russian, 7, 9 ; Turkish, 61 ; Chinese, 310 ; arguments of adherents of the school of, 512 ; 511
Amalgamated Engineers, The Society of, 289
America, Indians and Spanish in, 312 ; referred to, 534, 539 ; and see United States
—— British North, education, 358 ; United Methodist Church, 391 ; United Presbyterian Church, 392 ; Baptist Church, 395 ; Maritime Provinces of, and Confederation, 495 ; referred to, 232, 312, 366, 383, 419 ; and see Canada
—— —— —— Australasia, and South Africa, force of, 503
—— Central, Spanish race in, 208 ; 219
—— Crown Colonies in, 162
—— North, 161
—— South, 318, 479, 583
American Commonwealth, The, 228
American Protestant missionaries in India, 423
Amritsar, temple at, 150
Andamans, the, 157
Anglican Church, 380 ; see Religion
—— United Synod of Montreal, 391
Anglo-Indian satire, 93
—— -Indians, 91
—— -Russian alliance, 7, 9
—— -Saxon race, 191, 582, 583
Angra Pequena, 191
Anguilla, 214
Annam, French inhabitants of, and votes, 208
Antigua, 214 ; educational system, 387
Antilles, French, negroes of, 207 ; representative government in, 208 ; 577
Antonines, the, 123

Antwerp, 546
Arabs, the, and Madras and Bombay troops, 43 ; rifles of the, on the Lakes, 172 ; so-called, in Transvaal and Free State, 313 ; 174
Arbitration, compulsory, French system of, in Lower Canada, 288
—— trade, in Melbourne, 288 ; Canada, *ib.* ; Ontario, *ib.*
Archipelago, the, effects of a check in the Malay, 526
Architecture, colonial, 249
Argentine Republic, 71, 83
Argus, see *Cape Argus*
—— see Melbourne *Argus*
Argyll, Duke of, and an Indian tobacco *régie*, 89
Armenian frontier, 74
Armies of native states, 66
Arms, 70, 559
Army, the, and colonists, 493
—— Commission of 1879 and abolition of Presidency system, 50
—— cost of, 566
—— general, 554
—— Indian, 54, 56
—— native Indian, 38, 42
—— organisation, 565, 566
—— staff, French, 563
—— —— German, 563
Arnold, Sir Edwin, 92
Art, colonial, 248
Artisan, colonial, and his privileges, 300 ; his feeling towards the dark-skinned labourer and the Chinaman, *ib.*, and see Labour
Ascension, 158 ; fixed storeship of the navy, 520
Asia, 76, 94, 110, 527
—— Central, position of the Russians in, 73 ; referred to, 21, 55, 71, 73, 74, 75, 119
—— Crown Colonies in, 162
—— Eastern, *status quo* in, 310
—— Russian Central, 18 ; and see Asia, Central
—— Southern, 62
—— Western, 62
Asiatic Quarterly Review, 16, 67
Asiatics, 116, 117, 174
Assam, 19 ; English and Scotch planters in, 160
Atheism, 414
Atkinson, Sir Harry, 256, 270 ; and Protection in New Zealand, 350 ; and Imperial Federation, 488
Atlantic, 202, 522
—— islands, British, local government in, 213
At Last, Kingsley's, 386
Attock, 22-24, 32, 35, 45
Auckland, 157, 259
Australasia, graduation of death duties in, 231 ; no large white foreign element in, with a lower standard of comfort, 238 ; savings bank depositors, 321 ; life insurance, *ib.* ; education, 365 ; systems of education, resemblances and differences of, 368 ; compulsory education, 370 ; religious teaching, *ib.* ; Roman Catholics and schools, 371 ; universities, 375 ; technical education, 376 ; Wesleyans in, 392 ; Church of England organisation, 402 ; Roman Catholic population, 404 ; Presbyterians and Methodists, 406, 408 ; Wesleyanism, 407 ; Baptists and Congregationalists, 408 ; smaller religious bodies, 408 ; Salvation Army, 409 ; Protestantism, 410 ; Roman Catholic Church, *ib.* ; Presbyterians and Wesleyans in, 424 ; habits of the people, 450 ; temperance, 451 ; relation to United States, 484 ; and our naval burdens, 539 ; defence, 572 ; imperial defence, 577 ; British money invested in, 580 ; Germans, 582 ; referred to, 3, 82, 83, 86, 161, 227, 228, 239, 309, 312, 356, 378, 383, 492
—— Crown Colonies in, 162
—— Federal Council of, 184
—— United Steam Navigation Company, 308
Australasian, the, 491
Australasian Progress, Half a Century of, Mr. Westgarth's, 309
Australasian Wesleyan Methodist Church, 407
Australia, aborigines, 98, 194 ; Northern Territory of, 159 ; no dark-skinned element in, excluded from political power, 238 ; hours of labour in, 285 ; artisans and house rent in, 292 ; Chinese labour, 295 ; occupations of Chinamen in, 301 ; feeling against Chinese immigration unconnected with protection, 309 ; and New Zealand, 312 ; emigration schemes, 318 ; Roman Catholics and education, 373 ; primary education, 387 ; educational statistics, *ib.* ; Church of England, 396 ; State aid, *ib.* ; effects of its abolition, 397 ; subscriptions for Church purposes, *ib.* ; unwisdom of Church establishments, 398 ; ecclesiastical organisations and politics, *ib.* ; High Church movement, 400 ; Queensland clergy, 401 ; Roman Catholic Church in, 404 ; money spent on churches, 405 ; national temperament, 414 ; Irish and the liquor trade, 457 ; marriage with deceased wife's sister, 469, 470 ; grain, 474 ; federa-

tion, 476, 480; power of the Crown, 480; Imperial Federation, 481-483, 485, 486; nationality, 483; union with Great Britain, 485; Agents-General, 492-494; the Irish difficulty in, 495; local federation, 496; troops, 501; defence, 501, 502; commercial harbours, 539; attack upon, 573; federal institutions, 576; Anglo-Saxon type, 579; political relation between, and Great Britain, and exports and imports, 580; referred to, 86, 93, 150, 159, 163, 166, 187, 188, 201, 202, 211, 224, 230, 231, 233, 236-238, 246, 247, 249, 250, 252, 255, 277, 284, 294, 311, 313, 318, 319, 321, 327, 328, 330, 336, 351, 354, 356, 366, 422, 479, 488, 492, 498, 503, 521, 527, 533, 535, 536, 540, 564, 569, 578, 581

Australia, Impressions of, Dr. Dale's, 273

Australian cities, great size of the, 246

—— colonies, political activity of the wage-earning class in the, 232

—— Liberal party, legislation of, and sale of land, 235

—— newspapers and religious matters, 415

—— opinion as to management of public enterprises, 266

—— party, the native, 3

—— railways, 266

—— railways, State control of, and the supremacy of railway kings, 237

Australian Star and Mr. Parkin, 489

Australian Steam Navigation Company and Chinese labour, 308

—— workmen, questions to which they attach most importance, 269

Australians, the, and government of New Guinea, 186; their qualities, 235; and the crowding of capitals, 246; and the creation of centres in each state, 247; referred to, 83, 185, 191, 238, 239, 243

Austria, 334

Austrians, 191

Austro-Hungarian Constitution, 480

Ayoub Khan, 15

Baboos, Bengali, 99, 114

Baden-Powell, Sir G., and yield of land in Jamaica, 200; 338

Bahamas, 161; legislature of, 156; its legislative assembly and franchise, 204; descendants of American Loyalists in, 208; school system, 387; local option, 456; sale of intoxicants to minors, *ib.*

Baird, Admiral, 506

Baleli, 23

Balfour, Mr. A., 190

Balkh, 8, 11, 16, 19, 20, 21, 33, 34, 55-57, 59, 63, 72

Ballance, Mr., 256, 281; and Imperial Federation, 488; and nationalisation of land, 269, 270

Ballarat, Bishop of, and the relation of the Colonial Church to the Church of England, 403

—— population of, 248; 376

Ballot, the, 256

Baluchistan, 30, 31, 51, 157, 213

Bamangwato, 178

Bannu, 22, 23, 27

Banyans, 174

Baptists, 394, 395, 408, 424, 426, 428; in British North America, 395, 396; in Crown Colonies, 424, 426; Cape Colony, 416; South Africa, 415

Barbados, legislature of, 156; Chief Justice of, 204; representative institutions, *ib.*; success of its mixed constitution, 206; white settlers in, in time of Charles I. and Charles and James II, 222; education, 385; school attendance and scholarships, 386; concurrent endowment, 425; Church of England, 425, 426; Sunday closing, 455; referred to, 199, 215, 533

Barbuda, 214

Barry, Dr., late Bishop of Sydney, in New South Wales, and Church federation, 403; and the erection of a marble of the Crucifixion in St. Andrew's Cathedral, Sydney, 412; and federation of Protestant Churches, *ib.*

Basutoland, prohibition, 456

Basuto war, 524

Batavia, resemblance of Indian cantonments to, 151

Bathurst (New South Wales), 401

Batoum, story of, and Russian promises, 10

Bavaria, 567; and Prussia, 573

Bazar valley, 30

Beaconsfield, the Earl of, and our policy in Herat, 11, 57; and offers of territory, 190; and the Congo and Cameroons, 164

Bechuanaland, 159, 317; sale of liquor, 456; referred to, 162, 171, 178

Beetroot sugar, 197

Belgians, King of the, and development of the Congo region, 182

Belgium, 86, 284, 295, 336, 337, 355, 547

Benares, river front of, 150

Bengal, 39, 46, 47, 51, 91, 97, 107-109, 126, 137, 139, 144, 150

—— army, good troops in the, 40; referred to, 41, 44, 46, 48, 59

"Bengali Baboos," 99, 114
Bengalis, 42
Benguela, 175
Bent, Mr., 491
Bequest, freedom of, 278
Berber, 173
Beresford, Lord C., and the Suez Canal route in time of war, 169
Berlin, 10
—— African Conference at, 158, 166, 178, 194, 456
Bermuda, legislative assembly of, 156, 204; powers of parochial boards in, 213; school system, 387; military engineers and over-fortification, 533; referred to, 161, 513
Berry, Sir Graham, his paper on union for defence, 496; referred to, 262, 494
Bevan, Dr., 408
Bhinga, Rajah of, his anti-Congress pamphlet, 137
"Bible and State Schools League," 372
—— Christians, 391, 407, 408
"Bims," the, and representative institutions, 204
Birdwood, Sir G., 87
Bishops, Australasian, 401, 403
Bishoprics, 394
Bismarck, Prince, 244; and our navy, 512; and British organisation for offensive war, 574
—— Archipelago, 184
Black Mountain expedition, 31
—— Sea, 56, 61, 62
Blake, Sir H., 215
—— Mr. Edward, and the power of veto, 283; and Imperial Federation, 487
Blockade, 504, 505, 510
—— -running, 547
—— commercial, 548
Blyth, Sir Arthur, 494
Boarding-out of poor children, 329
Boer National Church, 416
Boers, religious life of the, 417
Bokhara, Ameer of, 74
Bolan pass, the, 12, 30, 37
—— railway, 34
Bombay, 29, 30, 48, 49, 50, 85, 86, 97, 108, 109, 118, 127, 174, 528, 529
—— army, 38, 39, 44, 46, 49, 59, 68
—— Government, 32, 51, 79, 96, 108
Bonghi, Signor, 256
Bonvalot, M., 124
Borneo, British position in, 188; 189, 309, 559
—— North, 158, 159, 162; charter of Company, 165, 166, 170
Bori valley, the, 14, 15
Borrowite, a, 409
Bosphorus, the, 7; seizure of, 61
Boulger, Mr., 67
Bourinot, Dr., 261; and the power of veto, 282
Boycotting, 284
Bradlaugh, Mr., and the opinion of Indian Council, 102
Bradshaw, Mr. J., 325
Brahouis, the, 55
Brain of an Army, The, 563
Brand, President Sir J., 313
Brassey, Lord, 523
Brisbane, 401, 526
Bristol, defence, 556
British architecture, 249
British Army, The, and difficulties of blockade, 505; 555, 571, 574
British Association, 33
—— Baluchistan, 71; and see Baluchistan
—— Columbia, provincial taxation in, 277; white miners of, and the Chinamen, 301; education, 365; schools, 371; and the Scott Act, 431; High License system, 435, 436; referred to, 287, 305, 353, 366, 533
—— East Africa Company, 160; and see Africa, East
—— Empire, one of the oddities of the, 219; existing ties between various parts of the, 496; and Prince Bismarck, 574; referred to, 5, 114, 115, 159, 165, 238
—— Government, the, and economy in naval and military matters, 562; referred to, 26, 51, 61, 94, 100, 108, 118, 121, 125, 133-135
—— Guiana, prosperity of sugar planters of, 197; curious survival of Dutch rule in, 205; powers of parochial boards in, 213; system of education, 385; referred to, 159, 162, 212, 221
—— Honduras, 199; system of education, 385
—— India—Finance, its special importance, 77; land-tax, possibility of imposing a higher, 79; or of reducing civil expenditure, *ib.*; revenue, nature of, 80; income-tax, *ib.*; debt, its nature, 81; railways, 82; trade, 83; as a manufacturing country, 84; trade and manufactures, future of, 86; drawbacks, 87; increased military expenditure, need for, may be avoided, 88; the native states, increased revenue from, 89; tobacco-tax or *régie*, *ib.*; revenue, other possible sources of, 91; moral progress, as contrasted with material, *ib.*; literature which illustrates, 92; problems, difficulty in stating opinion upon, 93; commonplaces, the two great, 94; country, India not one, *ib.*; unity, want of,

illustrated by proceedings of National Congress, 97 ; British government in, Professor Seeley on, 98 ; India not yet fused, 99 ; Conservatism and change, 100 ; House of Commons, interference by, *ib.* ; not prevented by the Council of India, 102 ; its result and partial nature, 102, 103 ; municipal institutions, 104 ; local elective system, wisdom and difficulty of its extension, 106 ; provinces, extension of the system to, 107 ; their federation, 108 ; Sir George Chesney's views on, and expediency of acting on them, 108 ; federation, provincial, upon an aristocratic base, possible, but its expediency doubtful, 110 ; its consistency with British interests, *ib.* ; representative institutions, political, 111 ; French example, 112 ; representative government, inevitable extension of, 114 ; native states and rulers, 116, 117 ; Kashmir, 118 ; British rule, officials of native states on, 119 ; foreign observers, opinion of, 120 ; Darmesteter, M., 123 ; Saint-Hilaire, M. B., 124 ; goodness of our government, drawbacks to the, *ib.* ; the police, 125 ; retrenchment, unpopularity of, 126 ; other grievances, 127 ; inquiry, *ib.* ; Hübner, Baron von, 128 ; Townsend, Mr. Meredith, 129 ; the future, 131 ; educated natives, position of, 132 ; Strachey, Sir J., 134 ; National Congress, 135 ; the other view, 136 ; anti-Congress pamphlet, the Rajah of Bhinga's, 137 ; Hunter, Sir W., and others, their attitude towards the Congress, 139 ; its policy and demands, 140 ; the great transition, 142 ; British press in India, views of, 143 ; Congress movement natural, 144 ; smallness of the difference upon the question, 146 ; spirit in which the movement should be met, *ib.* ; our duty, 147 ; great change at hand, *ib.* ; persons less important than system, 148 ; Sir Frederick Roberts, *ib.* ; Indian scenes, 149 ; the Indian problem, impossibility of grasping its difficulties in the cold weather, 151 ; Hindoos, Parsees, and Mohammedans of, and votes in England, 496 ; referred to, 68, 179, 529, 583

British India Steam Navigation Company, 170

—— Isles, 503, 508, 540, 548

—— money invested in Australasia, Canada, and India, 580

—— Parliament and protection of Pacific islanders, 185

British planters and cessation of slave labour in the Crown Colonies, 162

—— Sound, 210 ; and see Diego Suarez

—— states of Australia, 467, 485

—— war expenditure, 566, 567 ; what we obtain for the payments, 568

Britons, 173

Broome, Sir Napier, and colonisation schemes, 317

Brotherhood of the New Life, a member of the, 409

Brunei, 163 ; purpose of protectorate over, 188

Bryce, Mr. J., M.P., democracy in the United States, 228, 229 ; on the wage-earning class in the United States, 231 ; and legal restriction of fortunes in the United States, 276 ; and the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States, 394 ; State organisation of religions in the United States, 398 ; 230

Building societies, 320

Bulletin, The, 349

Burmah, its political relation to India 157

—— military police, 528 ; referred to 6, 19, 25, 43, 51

—— Upper, 51 ; the Chinese in, 190

—— Lower, 51

Burns, Robert, 380

Bushmen, 312

Cabinet-making, Chinese, 303

Cacao, competes with sugar in Trinidad and Grenada, 199

Cadet system, 376

Caine, Mr., and the opinion of Indian Council, 102 ; his views upon liquor excise, *ib.*

Cairo, British garrison, 530 ; referred to, 129, 168, 529

Calculations, military, 525

Calcutta, 85, 95, 99, 104, 125, 137, 144

—— Congress, 99, 140

California, workmen in, their alliance with the landed democracy, 228 ; 356

Cambridge, 375, 387, 498

Cameron treaty, 164

Cameroons, 164, 166, 178, 182, 183, 194

Camoens, 170

Campanella and Spain, 583

Campbell, Sir G., and the military position in India, 6 ; and popularity of our Government in rural districts of India, 97

Canada, no dark-skinned element in, excluded from political power, 238 ;

259; Dominion Franchise Act, 257; weakness of its senate, 260; wages in, 290; the poor in, 330, 332, 334; view of protection, 352, 353; education, 358 *et seq.*; religious organisations, 389; Church hostility, 390; educational statistics, 387; membership of Church of England, Roman Catholics, and Methodists, 392; Church of England in, 393; peculiarity of signatures of bishops, 394; Reformed Episcopal Church, 395; Congregationalists, 396; Protestantism, 410; Roman Catholic Church, *ib.*; Protestant orthodoxy, 414; liquor laws, 430; Scott Act, 431; Temperance Act (Scott Act), votes since its passing, 432; intoxicating liquors, 433; North-West Territories, liquor laws, 436, 437; prohibition, 437, 438; peculiarities of liquor legislation, 437; Licensing Act, 438; Provincial Liquor Acts, 439; local option law, 440; local option, 458; marriage with deceased wife's sister, 469, 470; customs union, 471-473; reciprocity treaty, 474, 475; Imperial Federation, 475, 486, 487; federation, 476, 479, 480, 482, 483; Roman Catholic Church, 487; imperial unity, 494; troops, 501; defence, 503, 572; confederation, 576; federalism, 577; imperial defence, *ib.*; Anglo-Saxon type, 579; British money invested in, 580; Germans, 582; referred to, 3, 5, 86, 159, 166, 201, 202, 222, 223, 227-229, 232, 237-240, 246, 247, 249, 250, 252, 253, 256, 257, 264, 280, 283, 285, 287, 305, 313, 314, 317-319, 321, 330, 343, 348, 353-355, 357, 370, 378, 390, 402, 407, 415, 422, 444, 448, 452, 461, 466, 467, 479, 485, 495, 534, 546, 581

Canadian Church Union, 390, 391

—— Pacific Railroad, 237, 317; political influence of, 534

—— Royal Commission, and a nine-hour day, 287

Canadians, the, 6; good qualities of, 235

—— French, see French Canadians

Canterbury, Archbishop of, and the vacancy in the see of Natal, 419, 420

Cape Colony and its Upper House, 260; curious land system in, 270; truck legislation of, 299; poor, 331; system of education, 383; Roman Catholics and Sir J. Herschel's system, 383; scholarships, 384; higher education, *ib.*; religious denominations in, 416; concurrent endowment, 418; disestablishment, 419; local option, 452; Sunday closing, 453; licensing, *ib.*; temperance party, their accusation against Dutch farmers regarding the Kafirs, 454; wine-growing, 458; grain, 474; its paramount importance to us, 521; French substitutes for, 522; causes for delay as to defence, 522, 523; forces, 523, 524; frontier questions, 539; referred to, 9, 158, 159, 210, 211, 215, 249, 253, 256, 259, 317, 332, 389, 456, 467, 479, 516, 517, 519, 524, 578

Cape Argus, The, 250

"Cape Cockneys," 256

—— Government, return by, of communicants, 416; and sale of liquor in the Transkei, 455

—— Comorin, 120

—— Guardafui, 163

—— Horn, 533

—— Mounted Rifles, 523

Cape Times, The, 250

Cape Town, 168, 250, 259, 320; Wesleyans, 422

Cardinals, rank of, at Dublin, 404

Caribs, 160

Carlyle, Mr., 244

Carnarvon, The Earl of, and the defence and occupation of Sierra Leone, 519, 520; and calibre of guns at Hong-Kong, 527; referred to, 465-467, 476

Carrington, Lord, 307, 404; and federation, 482

Caspian, the, 60

Castlemaine, population of, 248

Caucasus, the, 71, 74

—— Southern, 74

Cavalry, Indian, 46

Centennial Magazine, 267, 348, 483

Central India Horse, 45, 48

Centralisation, military, 528, 532

Ceuta, 517

Ceylon, authority of the Council in, 155; tea and coffee in, 199; councils of native village communities in, 213; an instance of British pluck, 217; planters and the tea trade, 218; export of tea to United Kingdom, *ib.*; exportation of coffee, *ib.*; Ceylon and China and Indian tea in the United Kingdom, 219; likely to command the Australian market, *ib.*; general fruitfulness of the island, *ib.*; Buddhist system, 220; Indian coolies, *ib.*; Government monopolies, *ib.*; drawbacks, *ib.*; its present position and the autocratic Crown Colony system, *ib.*; landscapes of, 223; school system, 386; liquor question, 459; naval stations, 525; referred to, 83, 112, 157-159, 162, 163, 212, 456, 559

Challemel-Lacour, M., 334
Chalmers, Rev. Mr., and New Guinea, 186, 428
Chaman, 58
Channel, the English, 506
—— Islands, 158 ; and war with France, 509 ; its militia, *ib.*
Charles I., 205
—— II, 209
Chartered Companies are absorbed, 182—
British East Africa Company, 160, 166 ; slave trade, 171 ; and the value of the country handed over to the, 172 ; referred to, 170
British North Borneo Company, 188 ; and Mr. Gladstone, 190 ; their report as to the Chinese, 309
Imperial British East Africa Company, see British East Africa Company
Royal Niger Company, 180-183
Chatham, defences, 558
—— Island, 157
Chesney, Sir G., 37 ; his proposals on the Presidency system, 50 ; and the federation of Indian provinces, 108
Chicago, 238, 356
"Children, Destitute," replacing of the term, 330
Chili, 173
Chilianwala, 48
China, military strength of, 75 ; in relation to Indian defence, *ib.* ; export of tea from, to United Kingdom, 218 ; referred to, 75, 83, 85, 212, 310, 492, 521, 525, 527, 533, 559, 583
—— seas, effect of a check in the, 526
Chinamen, occupation of, in Western America, 301 ; in Australia, *ib.*
Chinese alliance, 60, 61 ; and the Indian problem, 75, 76 ; and French colonies in Further India, 189 ; magistrates at Penang, *ib.* ; in Upper Burmah, 190 ; immigrants in Mauritius, 209 ; competition, and Australian and Canadian workmen, 299 ; immigration and the colonial working class, 299, 300 ; their characteristics and occupations, 301 ; in Australia, British Columbia, and South Africa, *ib.* ; nature of Canadian and Australian feeling against them, 302-304 ; merchants in Sydney, 302 ; defended by Sir H. Parkes, *ib.* ; treaties, 304 ; declaration of an Australian intercolonial conference as to, *ib.* ; high-handed action of New Zealand Government against, *ib.* ; language of the colonies with regard to Chinamen, 305 ; in tropical colonies, 309 ; population in the United States and colonies, 311 ; labour in British Columbia, 353 ; agitation, the anti-, in Australasia, 492 ; referred to, 78, 86, 160, 284
Chinese Empire, 192
—— Government, 76 ; effect upon the, of Australian action as to Chinese immigrants, 310
—— race, 582
Chins, the, 43, 559
Chisholm, Mr., 290
Chitral, 19, 32
Christchurch (New Zealand), 259
Christianity and schoolbooks, 379 ; influence of, in the colonies, 398
Christian missions in India, 423, 424
Church attendance, 402
Churches, 389-429
Churchill, Lord R., and British officers in the Indian army, 47 ; and the Presidency system, 51 ; Lord R., and our Government in India, 79 ; Lord R., and inquiry into Indian grievances, 127
Church Missionary Society, 173
—— of England, and legislation on Church matters, 53 ; religious teaching, 371, 372 ; Canada, 389, 390 ; membership in Canada, 392 ; position of, in Canada, 393 ; reports of Bishops of the, *ib.* ; dominant tone, 395 ; Ontario, *ib.* ; Australia, 396 ; New South Wales, *ib.* ; Crown Colonies, 396, 424 ; State aid, and effects of its abolition, 396-398 ; organisation in Australasia, 400, 402 ; Orange element in, 401 ; question of precedence, 403 ; in Australia, clergy and Wesleyan and Presbyterian ministers, 411 ; in the self-governing colonies, *ib.* ; New South Wales, 411, 412 ; South Africa, 415, 419-421 ; Cape Colony, 416 ; Church Council of, in Natal, and the vacant see, 419, 420 ; in the colonies and Home Rule, 421 ; and Colensoites, 421 ; India and State aid, 423 ; Barbados, 425, 426 ; West-India Islands, 426 ; disestablishment in the colonies, 427 ; referred to, 384, 386, 390, 391, 404, 405, 418, 419, 428, 455
—— of Rome, 391 ; and see Roman Catholic Church
—— of Russia, 417
—— of Scotland (Canada), 392
—— of Sweden, a member of the, 409
—— precedence, 403
Cingalese population, their effeminacy accounted for, 220
Cities, great size of, in Australia, 246
Civil Damage Clause, 433
—— Service (the Indian), 137, 145 ; and colonists, 493

Clarke, Marcus, 253
Clergy, colonial, and party strife, 399
Clerical conservatives, 415
Closure, 256
"Cloth of Gold, Field of the," 71
Clubs, 443
Clyde, the, 173, 505
Coal, 502, 521, 541, 543
Coaling stations, 512, 517; their importance, 534
Coal-miners of New South Wales and Melbourne trades, 285
Coalships, 541, 542
Coasts of the United Kingdom, defence of the, 551
Cobden Club, the, and Indian defence, 6
Cochin-China, 114, 159; representative government in, 208
Cocoa, see Cacao
Cocos, The, 158
Code Napoléon in Mauritius, 212
Colenso, Bishop, and the vacancy in Natal, 419, 421
—— controversy, Natal, 416
College of the Immaculate Conception, 386
Colleges, 384, 386; technical, 376; and see Universities
Colomb, Admiral, at the Royal United Service Institution, on blockade, 504; Sir C. Nugent's reply, *ib.*
—— Sir J., his *Defence of Great and Greater Britain* quoted, 545; on invasion, 552; and home defence, 571; referred to, 548, 553, 554
Colombo, 521; defence, 525
Colonial Conference, 466, 467, 526; and see Conference
—— defence, how provided, 539
—— democracy, see Democracy, colonial
—— education, peculiarities, 377; its future, *ib.*
—— Governments, and the Chinese, 307
—— Institute, the Royal, 199, 280, 496
—— life, high standard of, 244
—— liquor legislation, 457
—— Office and annexation of New Guinea, 191; veto, 282; and disestablishment, 427; referred to, 155, 156, 216, 318, 455
Colonies, the, and army service, 56; English tropical, organisation of, 207; electoral and parliamentary peculiarities of, 256; religious organisation, 389; withdrawal of State aid to Churches, 428; Sunday observance, Sunday Schools, religious edifices, clergy, and church attendance, 429; self-governing, 501; and the fleet, 539; and a General Staff, 564; example to the, by the mother-country as to a practical system of defence, 569; and the work of the British fleet, 572; share of the, in defence, 572, 574; temperance and sobriety, 580; and see Crown Colonies
Colonies, The, 164
Colonisation schemes in Newfoundland, Natal, and Western Australia, 316, 317
Command, question of, 557
Commercial Geography, Handbook of, 290
Commercial union, see Customs unions
Commission, the Joint, 16
Commissionaires, 315
Communication, lines of, 546
Communism, 357
Companies, see Chartered Companies
Compensation, 431, 445, 449
Competition, negro, 311; Chinese, 312
Compulsion, 370
Concentration in capitals, its effect on national character, 248; naval, 538
Conclusion, 576
Confederation, local colonial, 213; no prospect of full, 494; naval, 498
Conference, colonial, 467; future conferences, 468; subjects to be treated, 468, 469; decisions of, 476, 526
Congo, its free navigation a gain to us, 181; referred to, 166, 167, 173, 191
—— State, the, 178; and Tippoo Tib, 172; and France and Germany, 181; and absorption by sale to France, 183; freedom from import duties, *ib.*; and British traders, *ib.*
—— Treaty and Portugal, 183
—— Upper, 175
Congregationalists, 408; in Canada, 396; Cape Colony, 416, 424
Congress, Indian National, 141
Conseil supérieur des Colonies, 257
Conservatives, military, and Indian defence, 6
—— the, and refusal by Liberals of Zanzibar protectorate, 191
Consideration, general, of the defence problem, 571, 572
Constantinople, 62
Convicts, British, and Melbourne inhabitants, 305
Coolie immigration, its effect on negro proprietors, 202; in the West Indies, 196, 202
Coolies, Indian, 313
Co-operation in the colonies, 296; American opinion, *ib.*; reports from Philadelphia and Australia, 296, 297; and the inter-colonial trade union congress, 297
Cossacks, the, 47
Cotton, Mr., his *New India*, 93; 146

Counter-attack, 558
Covenanted Civil Service, 145
Covenanters, Scotch, 417
Cricket in the colonies, 233
Crimea, the, 61
Crispi, Signor, 256
Cross, Lord, and the Indian military system, 53, 54
Crossman, Sir W., M.P., and the protection works of Hong-Kong, 527; and yield of land in Jamaica, 200
Crown, the, 480
—— Colonies, the, 104; present and future, popular and scientific meanings of the term, 155; varieties, 156; dependencies of dependencies, 157; British territory separate from United Kingdom, Colonies, and India, 158; tropical settlements, *ib.*; English governed countries across the sea, two classes of, 159; some Crown Colonies unsuited for European labour and residence, 161; slavery, 162; sugar, *ib.*; of what the colonies consist, *ib.*; protectorates and spheres of influence, 163; change of policy by Great Britain in 1884, 164; results, 166; Berlin Conference, *ib.*; present position of Africa, 168; Egypt, *ib.*; East Africa, 169; Somali coast, *ib.*; Imperial British East Africa Company, 170; chartered companies, 171; value of the country dealt with by East African charter, 172; German East Africa, 174; the Lakes, 175; Portuguese claims, 176; German claims, 177; the West Coast, 179; the Gambia, Sierra Leone, Gold Coast, and Lagos, 179; the Niger, 180; the Congo, 181; the Oil rivers, 182; spheres of influence, protectorates, and colonies, *ib.*; the Pacific, 184; its future, 187; New Guinea, 185; Fiji, 186; protectorates in Malay Archipelago, 188; policy of extension of territory or responsibility, 190; value of what we have obtained, 193; old Crown Colonies, 195; military stations, *ib.*; naval and trade posts, *ib.*; the West Indies, *ib.*; results of emancipation, 196; coolie immigration, *ib.*; beetroot sugar, 197; the Sugar Convention, *ib.*; process of manufacture, *ib.*; British Guiana, *ib.*; the St. Lucia experiment, *ib.*; Mauritius, 198; other tropical colonial products, 199; cacao, *ib.*; fruit, *ib.*; negro peasant proprietors, *ib.*; crop-time, 200; taxation upon necessaries, 201; export duties, *ib.*; taxes on land, trade, *ib.*; effect of coolie immigration on negro proprietors, 202; negro view of these questions, 203; negro democracy, *ib.*; representative institutions, 204; representative institutions in French colonies, 207; white population, 208; Crown Colonies with a white foreign element — Trinidad, Dominica, and Mauritius, 209, 212; France and Madagascar, 210; local government in the West Indies, Ceylon, and Fiji, 212; local confederation, 213; Leeward Islands Confederacy, 214; Windward Islands, *ib.*; West Indian federation of the future, 215; Cyprus, 216; Ceylon, 217; tea, 218; general fruitfulness of the island, 219; drawbacks, 220; Hong-Kong and Shanghai, 221; peculiarities of Crown Colony legislation, *ib.*; conclusions, 222; the chief need of the Crown Colonies, 223; tropical scenes, *ib.*; the poor in, 331; education in, 385; disestablishment, 424; Christian churches, position of, *ib.*; Roman Catholics and Protestants, 425; liquor laws, 455; tariffs, 475; elective institutions, 577
—— Colony system of nominated legislatures, the ground of its defence, 206
Cruisers, fast, 540, 541
Cuba, 86, 91
Culture, colonial, 248
Cumulative vote, 259
Cunningham, Mr. C. D., 263
Curzon, Mr. G., 16; and Afghanistan, 9; on railways in Seistan, 33; the Russian bridge across the Oxus, 34; treatment of Asiatics by Russians, 117
Cust, Dr., and the superiority of our Indian rule over French government of Algeria 113; quoted, on the increase of the Indian excise, 460
Customs unions, a, 471, 578; Mr. Hofmeyr's scheme, 472-475; 487, *et seq.*
Cycling in the colonies, 233
Cypriote-Greeks and their remedies for the poverty of Cyprus, 217
Cyprus, electoral districts and constitution of, 216; Mohammedan and Greek-Cypriote voters, *ib.*; our administration too costly, 217; remedies for its poverty, *ib.*; its defence and garrison, 530; referred to, 63, 161, 162, 190, 456, 514

Daily Telegraph (Melbourne), 415
—— —— (Sydney), 349
Dakar, the French at, 518; 519, 522, 535, 536
Dakota, North and South, prohibition, 437

Dale, Dr., and State ownership of land, 273 ; and the sinking of Australian wages, 295 ; and excisions in the Nelson Series, 379
Damaraland, German, 178
Dardanelles, the, 7, 9, 62
Darmesteter, M., and our rule in India, 122, 123
Deakin, Mr., 229, 256, 298, 338, 400
Death duties, 276
Debts, colonial, 470
Debt, Indian, 81
Defence, 468, 473
—— Bill ; see Naval Defence Bill
—— Imperial — Self-governing colonies, 501 ; Australia, *ib.* ; Tasmania and New Zealand, 502 ; Canada, 503 ; India, *ib.* ; naval defence, *ib.* ; blockade of the enemy's ports, 504 ; navy and fortification, 505 ; blockade in manœuvres, 506 ; foreign stations, defence of, by the navy, 507 ; home defence, proposed, by navy, 508 ; Channel Islands, 509 ; the navy, increase of, 510 ; alliances, 511 ; work of the navy, 512 ; coaling stations, *ib.* ; their garrisons, 513, 514 ; Suez or Cape ? 514, 515 ; Suez Canal, 515-517 ; Gibraltar, 517, 518 ; Sierra Leone, 518, 519 ; Report of the Royal Commission, 519, 520 ; Ascension, 520 ; St. Helena, *ib.* ; the Cape of Good Hope, 521, 522 ; French substitutes for the Cape, 522 ; causes for the delay, 522, 523 ; Cape forces, 523, 524 ; Mauritius, 524, 525 ; Ceylon, 525 ; Singapore, 525, 526 ; Australia, 526, 527 ; Labuan and Hong-Kong, 527, 528 ; recruiting from India, 528 ; Indian stations—Bombay and Karachi, *ib.* ; Aden and Perim, 529 ; Egyptian stations—Suez and Port Said, *ib.* ; Mediterranean—Cyprus, 530 ; Malta, 530-532 ; Western Seas—Halifax, 532 ; Bermuda, 532, 533 ; the West Indies, 533 ; Falkland Islands and Fiji, 533, 534 ; Vancouver Island, 534 ; coaling stations generally, *ib.* ; French opinion, 535-537 ; false security, 537 ; readiness in Great Britain, 537-539 ; the colonies and the fleet, 539 ; land defence of Greater Britain, *ib.* ; food supply and trade in time of war, 540, 541 ; Great Britain, advantages possessed by, 541, 542 ; fuel, 542, 543 ; home food supply, 544 ; "investment," absolute, 544, 545 ; "temporary" investment, 545 ; lines of communication, 546 ; the United States, 547 ; United Kingdom, difficulty of maintaining a commercial blockade of the, 548 ; invasion, 549-551 ; defence of the coasts of the, 551-554 ; land forces, 554 ; no mobile land force in England, 555 ; fortification of dockyards and commercial ports, 556 ; command, 557 ; counter-attack, 558 ; officers, *ib.* ; arms, 559 ; levies, *ib.* ; General Staff, a, 560 ; errors to be avoided in its creation, 562 ; what it should be, *ib.* ; its duties, 563 ; and the colonies, 564 ; and coaling stations, *ib.* ; responsibility, the fixing of, 565 ; the present Intelligence Department, *ib.* ; army organisation and the volunteers, *ib.* ; the militia, 566 ; cost, *ib.* ; French army expenditure smaller than ours, 567 ; what we obtain for the payments that we make, 568 ; example to the colonies, 569 ; foreign opinion, 570 ; defence problem, general consideration of the, 571 ; India and the colonies, share of, in defence, 572 ; conclusion, 574
Defence, Indian, pre-eminent importance of, 3 ; reasons for its separate treatment, 5 ; consensus of opinion on its importance, 6 ; India, effects of loss of, 3-5 ; Russian alliance, idea of a, 7 ; what we should lose by it, 9 ; the Tsar, 8 ; our pledges, 9 ; views expressed on, in *Greater Britain* and in 1887, 12 ; troops, insufficiency of their number and organisation, 13 ; Mr. Gladstone's Afghan policy, 14 ; Afghanistan as it is, 15 ; Russian invasion, possibilities of, 17 ; Russian advance, difficulties of, 19 ; its results, 20 ; Afghan co-operation, importance to Russia of, 21 ; defence, the problem of, *ib.* ; schemes for—what has actually been done, 22 ; lines of, *ib.* ; the Quetta line, 23 ; fortifications, 24 ; the Khyber line, *ib.* ; transport, 25 ; steps to be taken, 26 ; rifles and ammunition, *ib.* ; the frontier, 27 ; Sandeman, Sir R., and the frontier, 29 ; uniform policy, need for, 30 ; frontier policy, object of, *ib.* ; Sandeman system, 31 ; other steps to be taken, 32 ; Kafristan and Kashmir, 32, 70 ; further Russian advance, action in the event of, 33 ; force, increase of, in that event, 35 ; the Reserve, *ib.* ; present force, insufficiency of, for the eventuality, 36 ; and of transport, 37 ; tribes, *ib.* ; native army, 38 ; good troops, number of, 40 ; army, whence it should be recruited, 42 ; Southern troops, im-

possibility of safely using them in Afghanistan and for chief garrisons, 43, 44 ; the force in India, 45 ; mobilisation, 46 ; cavalry, *ib.* ; commanding officers, 48 ; the Presidency system, *ib.* ; reforms, 50 ; Simla Commission, *ib.* ; representation by Indian Government in 1888, 51 ; the Secretary of State and the Indian military system, 53 ; Indian army and present and future difficulties, 54 ; separate army, need for, 56 ; Afghanistan, inviolability of, as opposed to partition, *ib.* ; Kandahar, occupation of, 58 ; Russia in the Pacific, present vulnerability of, 60 ; her invulnerability elsewhere, and in the future everywhere, 61 ; Turkish alliance, *ib.* ; Persia, 63 ; Herat, *ib.* ; partition, virtual, 64 ; India Office and Indian Government, difference of opinion between the, 65 ; armies of native states, 66 ; native states and defences 68 ; Sikh states, 70 ; arms, *ib.* ; Russia, comparison between ourselves and the Russians, 71 ; her advantages, 72 ; Indian opinion, *ib.* ; Russians, their position in Central Asia, 73 ; notions, mistaken, 74 ; China, 75

Defence, land, 539

—— practical, suggestions bearing on, 496

Delagoa Bay, 174, 521

Delhi, 151

—— riots, 106

Democracy, Part vi, chap. i. p. 227

—— artisan, how regarded, 231

—— Colonial — Australian as compared with American democracy, 228 ; absence in, of faults attributed to democracies, *ib.* ; its merits, 230 ; no class tyranny, 231 ; classes, 232 ; colonial workmen, social condition of, 233 ; their opinions, 234 ; general characteristics, 235 ; difference between our chief colonies and United States, 238 ; Anglo-Saxon as contrasted with Latin democracy, 239 ; political observers and, 240 ; popular government, weak points of, 241 ; improvement, 242 ; public men, 243 ; colonial life, high standard of, 244 ; Australian cities, great size of the, 246 ; town life, change in conditions of, 247 ; effect on the democracy, 248 ; culture, *ib.* ; architecture, 249 ; journalism, 250 ; the colonies, resemblance of, to United States of Tocqueville's time, *ib.* ; literature, 252 ; politics, 253 ; members of Parliament, position of, 255 ; electoral and parliamentary peculiarities, 256 ; suffrage, 257 ; colonial representatives in France, payment of, 257 ; minority representation, 259 ; Upper Houses, 259-262 ; the *Referendum*, 262 ; "Socialism" or "State-socialism," 264 ; *laisser faire*, 265-267 ; Socialism, drift of colonial opinion with regard to, 267-269 ; land, nationalisation of, 269 ; land systems, existing, 270 ; future, opinions regarding the, 271-273 ; State ownership of colonial lands, contradictory opinion on financial advantages of, 273-275 ; taxation, 275 ; progressive taxation, 276 ; bequest, freedom of, 278 ; progressive taxation in France, *ib.* ; experiments, colonial, 279 ; women, position of, 281 ; marriage and divorce, 282 ; veto, the Colonial Office, *ib.* ; independent Australian statesmen, Sir Alfred Stephen and other, 283

Democracy, future of, and Switzerland, 262, 263

—— negro, 203

—— tendency of, in taxation, 276

Democratic assemblies, weakest point of, 242

—— communities, literary life of, 251

Democrats, young, of Switzerland, programme of, as contrasted with Australia, 265

Demonstration Day, 285

Depretis, Signor, 256

Deputies, Chamber of, Paris, 112

Dera Ghazi Khan, 22, 23, 29, 45

—— Ismail Khan, 19, 22, 23, 30, 35, 45, 99

Dibbs, Mr., and Imperial Federation, 482, 490 ; 349

Diamond mines of South Africa, 299

Dickens (Charles), 512

Diego Suarez, effect of French possession of, on Mauritius, 210 ; 522, 524, 535, 536

Difficulties, racial, 322

Direct taxation and Protection, 355

Disembarkation of cavalry, etc., 550

Disendowment, 397 ; effect of, 398

Disestablishment, 397, 404, 418, 424, 425, 428 ; in South Africa, 419

Dislere, M., 257, 535

Disraeli, Mr. ; see Beaconsfield, The Earl of

Divorce, 282

—— Bills, 469

"Dockers," London, and Melbourne trades, 285

Dockyards, fortification of, 556

Dominica, white foreign element in, 209 ; 199, 214

Dominion Franchise Act, 257
Doppers of South Africa, 415, 417
Double votes, and Liberal Party of Victoria, 257
Downer, Sir J., 467
Downing Street and the government of the Crown Colonies, 223 ; 230
Downs, the North, 554
Drill, military, 376
Druids, the, in Canada and South Africa, 320, 321
Dublin, 478
—— Archbishopric of, 405
Dufferin, Lady, and Indian reviews, 149
—— The Marquis of, and the Army Commission, 50 ; quoted, 82 ; referred to, 14, 54, 72, 482
Dunedin, 259
Durban, 321
Dustypore, 93
Dutch architecture, 249 ; homesteads, *ib.*
—— at the Cape, 384, 576
—— colonists and teaching, 384
—— Indies, 309
—— Reformed Church, 389 ; South Africa, 415, 416, 417-419
Dwellings, workmen's, condition of in Montreal and Toronto, 294

Ecclesiastical organisations and politics, 398
Economist, the, 322
Economists, Radical, and Indian defence, 6
Edinburgh, 375, 478
Edinburgh Review and Central Africa, 172
Education—British North America, 358 ; the Dominion, *ib.* ; Ontario, 359 ; extraordinary liberality of the Ontario system, 360 ; Quebec (province), 361 ; Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island, 363 ; New Brunswick, *ib.* ; Manitoba, 364 ; British Columbia, 365 ; North-West Territories, *ib.* ; Canadian Universities, *ib.* ; Australasia, *ib.* ; New South Wales, Victoria, and South Australia, 366-368 ; Australian systems, resemblances and differences of, 368 ; schools, free, *ib.* ; education in the colonies, sacrifices made for, 369 ; Tasmania, *ib.* ; compulsion, 370 ; the religious difficulty, *ib.*—in Victoria, 371 ; Roman Catholics in Australia, 373 ; higher instruction, *ib.* ; Universities, Australasian, 375 ; newspaper education, 376 ; technical education, 376 ; educational peculiarities, 377 ; colonial education, future of, *ib.* ; public school system, permanence of the, 378 ; secular system, proposals of opponents of the, 380 ; the reply, 381 ; the Cape, 383 ; Natal, 384 ; Crown Colonies, 385 ; Trinidad, 386 ; other West-India islands, *ib.* ; conclusions, general, 387
Education Act, Victoria, 372, 379
—— Boards, New Zealand, 259, 377
Edwardes, Mr., his report to Foreign Office on American State liquor systems, 435
Edwards, Major-General, his report to the War Office on the colonial forces and defence, 501, 502 ; defence of Tasmania, 502, 503 ; 564
Egypt, tobacco revenue of, 90 ; our special interest in, 168 ; the result of our occupation, *ib.* ; pledges as to nature of occupation, 169 ; present military position, 529, 530 ; referred to, 87, 90, 173, 178, 505, 517
Egyptian army, our organisation of the, 559
Eight-hour day, 285 ; in Australia, 268 ; Australasia and Victoria, 286 ; Canada, 287 ; results of, in Australia, 288
—— —— Bills, 285
Elections, colonial, 257
Elective system, Indian local, 106, 107
Elizabeth, Queen, 117
Emancipation, 196
Emigrants' Information Office, London, circulars of, on cost of living, 290
Emigration and English workmen, 316 ; grant for, from Church surplus by Irish Government, 318
Emperors' League, the Three, 10
Encumbered Estates Court and the West Indies, 196
Endowment, concurrent, 418, 425, 426, 427
England and Russia in Central Asia, 67
England, Church of, and legislation in the House of Commons, 53
English Channel, 504, 508, 511, 521, 556
—— Factory Acts, 287
—— Truck Acts, 298
Episcopal Methodists (Canada), 391
Episcopalian Synods and the Jesuits' Estates Bill, 395
Esquimalt, naval operations in the North Pacific, 534 ; armament, *ib.*
Established Church, absence of, and multiplication of sects, 408
Estates, large, effect of breaking up, 278
Euphrates, the, 9, 62
Europe, 33, 62, 80, 85, 86, 91, 94, 104, 121, 159, 197, 237, 244, 250, 252, 264, 293, 295, 336, 337, 345, 346, 364, 388, 479, 530, 535
—— Central, 191, 512
—— Crown Colonies in, 162

Europe, North-West, 165
Eves, Mr. Washington, on the West Indies, 195; and Dominica, 207
Expenditure, Indian civil, 79
—— war, 566-568
Expropriation of owners in New South Wales, 272

Factory Acts and inspection, 287, 297
—— legislation, superiority of the colonies as to, 297
Falkland Islands, 195; trading ships and cruisers, 533
Famagusta, harbour of, 530
Farrah, 33
Fawcett, Professor, and Indian competition in the Civil Service, 142; and old Radicalism, 268; 296
Federal Council of Australasia, 214, 261, 280, 476, 491, 577
Federalism, 577
Federation, Australasian and Imperial, 338
—— Church, 403
—— financial, 470
—— Imperial, 472; and the tariff question, 475; essays on, 479; colonial opinion, 480; recent change, 481; Australia, 481-483, 485; Lord Carrington, 482; Queensland and New South Wales, 484; conference, 485; Sir Julius Vogel, 486; Canadian view, 486-488; French Canadians, 487; New Zealand, 488; Western Australia debate, 489, 490; Victoria, 491; the Cape, 492; Mr. Hofmeyr, *ib.*
—— —— military, 564
—— Indian provincial, 108, 110; West Indian, 215
—— local, 476, 496
—— of Protestant Churches, 412
—— permissive, 479
—— trade, 285
—— West Indian, difficulties of, not insuperable, 215; and Canada, 216
Federations and unions, West Indian, nature of their government, 213
Field artillery, 551, 554
Fiji, our system of government of, 186; treatment of the natives contrasted with that by the French in New Caledonia, *ib.*; results of annexation, 187; a favoured land, *ib.*; once the Alsatia of the Pacific, *ib.*; local district institutions of, 213; sale of liquor, 456; harbours, 534; referred to, 31, 162-164, 188, 190
Finance, colonial, experiments in, their special interest for ourselves, 279, 280
—— Indian, 77
Finch-Hatton, Mr. 451
Finland, 97
Fleet and the colonies, 539
Food supply in time of war, 540
Football in the colonies, 233
Foreign Office, 170, 436
Foreigners, indigent, 313
Foresters, the Ancient Order of, 319-321, 405
Forster, Mr. W. E., 172, 465, 466; and colonial representation, 478; 482
Fortification, 505, 506
—— of dockyards and commercial ports, 556
Fortifications, Indian, 24
Forts, 513
France and India, 4; and the Congo State, 183; colonial representatives, 223; in the West Indian Islands, 533; in 1870, and her military superiority, 537; referred to, 24, 82, 86, 87, 90, 96, 112, 159, 161, 167-169, 177-179, 181, 184, 185, 191-194, 197, 210, 211, 240, 250, 262, 278, 310, 335, 336, 354, 480, 504, 509, 517, 520, 522, 546, 552, 553, 563, 582
—— Army Corps of, and equipment, 531
"——, Isle of," British, planters in, and payment of their labourers, 198; 210; and see Mauritius
France, L'Expansion coloniale de la, 535, 536
France Nouvelle, La, 581
Franchise, woman, 281; municipal and school board, women ratepayers in the colonies and the, 282
Frederick the Great, 554
Free Church of Scotland, 418
—— Gardeners, 320
—— Libraries, English, 252
Freemasonry, 321
Free State; see Orange river Free State
Free thought, 414
—— trade, 332-335, 337-341, 347-349, 351, 352, 354, 355, 474
French, the, native population of their "Indian" and West Indian colonies, and political power, 114; settlements in neighbourhood of Calcutta and Madras, 188; democratic institutions in Martinique and Guadeloupe, effect of, 204; colonies, representative institutions in, 206; do. and privileges to French trade, 474; success of, in Martinique and Guadeloupe, 207; population and self-government in Mauritius, 210; at Diego Suarez, 211; architecture, 249, 250; on the Mediterranean, 515; opinion on our position in different parts of the world, 535, 536; and coast defence, 551; system as to army staff,

562 ; war expenditure, 566 - 568 ; referred to, 76, 164, 165, 169, 180
French-Canadian labour, 334
—— -Canadian Roman Catholics, 415
—— Canadians and Imperial Federation, 487
"—— concession" at Shanghai, 221
—— Evangelicals, 428
—— Guiana, blacks of, 114, 207
—— India, Hindoos and Mohammedans of, and votes in France, 496 ; reservists of the army of, and the mobilisation scheme, 534, 535
—— Roman Catholics, 428
—— West Indies, prosperity, and our action as to the political future of West Indian negroes and coloured people, 208
Friendly societies in the colonies, 319 ; in South Africa and Cape Town, 320
Frontier, Indian, 23, 25, 27
Froude, Mr., on the West Indies, 195; 478
Fruit, growth of, and negro peasant proprietors, 199
Fuel, smokeless, 542, 543
Future relations, part vii. *passim*

Gaffarel, M., quoted, on Madagascar, 212
Gama, Vasco da, 175
Gambia, development of the, 179 ; school system, 385 ; 518
Ganges, the, 150
Geelong, 248, 376
Geffcken, Dr., and Great Britain in time of war, 570, 571
General Staff, a, and its duties, 560, 563 ; position of the Chief, 560 ; not to imitate slavishly the Prussian system, 560 ; errors to be avoided, 562 ; what it should be, *ib.* ; the colonies and a, 564 ; coaling stations and a, *ib.* ; responsibility, the fixing of, 565 ; referred to, 569, 574
—— —— the Great, at Berlin, 561 ; special qualities of its officials, 563
—— —— French, 563
Geok-Tepe, 71
George, Mr. H., and land-tax, 273 ; nationalisation of land, 275, 297
—— IV, 579
German islands, right to trade in, 184 ; population in the colonies and United States, 238 ; war expenditure, 566, 567 ; colonists and the Anglo-Saxon race, 582
—— Empire, 10, 161, 165, 244
—— Government and troops for Africa, 174 ; their quarter of New Guinea, 183 ; East African sphere of influence, *ib.* ; and Damaraland, *ib.*
Germans, the, and the Niger Company, 183 ; beer-drinking, 457 ; prohibitory law in Iowa, *ib.* ; and the works of Metz and Strasburg, 505 ; coast defence, 551 ; referred to, 165, 174, 191
Germany, and India, 4 ; territory lost by British to, on east coast of Africa, 178 ; and Manchester, dislike of Portugal, 181 ; working out problems of war in, 561 ; referred to, 5, 10, 86, 87, 141, 159, 168, 177-179, 184, 185, 191-194, 268, 279, 284, 324, 456, 480, 512, 552, 553, 573, 582
—— Army Corps of, and equipment, 531
—— Emperor of, 62
Ghazni, 16, 19, 25, 27
Ghose, Mr., 496
Gibbons, Cardinal, 405
Gibraltar and modern artillery, 517 ; bombardment of, from sea and land, 517, 518 ; referred to, 162, 195, 514, 519, 532, 536, 537
Gilgit, 19, 28, 33, 70
Gillies, Mr., Prime Minister of Victoria, 256 ; and the Chinese, 307 ; 338
Giriskh, 23
Gisborne, Mr., and Protection, 350
Gladstone, Mr., his second administration, and Northern Afghanistan, 9 ; Afghan policy, 14 ; and the Cameroons, Zanzibar, and New Guinea, 164 ; the occupation of Egypt, 169 ; offers of territory, 190 ; charter to North Borneo Company and annexation of Fiji, *ib.* ; the divisions of the electorate, 258 ; Government life insurance, 323 ; referred to, 9, 54, 165, 188, 495
Glasgow, 247, 337, 375
Gold Coast, development of, 179 ; system of education, 385
Goltz Pasha, von der, 62
Gomul pass, 19, 25, 27, 30, 31, 35, 38
Goorkha regiments, dash of, 42
Goorkhas, 40, 52, 69, 72
Gordon, A. Lindsay, 253
—— General, and Zebehr Pasha, 172 ; and the Chinese, 559
—— Sir A., 304
Gorst, Sir J., 190 ; and the Indian liquor excise, 102 ; the concert of executives, 493, 494
Goschen, Mr., succession duty in England, 277 ; and *laisser faire* in Australia, 265
Graduated taxation, 276, 277, 279 ; and see Succession
Grafton, 401
Grahamstown, Church disputes at, 421 ; boys' school, 224

Granville, The Earl, 334
Great Britain, land defence, 539 ; advantages possessed by, 541 ; *et passim*
Great and Greater Britain, Defence of, 545
Great Powers, the, and Greece, 510
Greater Britain, colonial, democracy of, 229 ; absence in, of jealousy, or reluctance to pay for good service, 230 ; English character of its colonial democracy, 239 ; what its abandonment involves, 508 ; referred to, 422, 448, 461, 536, 539, etc.
Greater Britain, political change in India since publication of, in 1868, 96 ; and the value of the Indian Council, 102 ; parliamentary institutions in India, 112 ; and American and Australian relations, 187 ; and the swelling of Australian cities, 246 ; and colonial protection, 332 ; referred to, 125, 150, 188, 281
Greater Britain, The Schools of, 360
Greece, 192 ; and the Great Powers, 510
Grenada, Assembly of, passes a Bill for its own extinction, 205
—— 214 ; export duties of, 201 ; powers of parochial boards, 213 ; school system, 387
Gresham, Mr., and land nationalisation, 272, 273
Gresswell, Mr., and financial union, 471
Grey, Sir G., 269, 383
—— The Earl, 259, 465, 492
Griesbach, Captain, and the Ameer of Afghanistan, 57
Griffin, Sir L., and the Ameer of Afghanistan, 16, 17 ; rulers of Indian native states, 118 ; European settlers in Kashmir, 118 ; 146
Griffith, Sir S. (Queensland), and distribution of wealth, 267 ; referred to, 256, 286, 467, 476, 497
Guadeloupe, 159 ; blacks of, 114 ; manhood suffrage in, 207
Guardafui, 174
Guinea, 175
—— Gulf of, 164, 173
—— New, 164 ; quarrel between Colonial Office and Australians as to annexation, 191
Guns, 513, 523, 525, 527, 528
Gunton, Mr. G., and legal regulation of adult labour, 286, 287
Gwadur, 34

Hale, Colonel Lonsdale, and coast defence by Continental powers, 552 ; 554
Halifax, 294 ; asylum, 331 ; winter port of Canada, 532
Hamburg, 188
Hamilton, the corporation and the poor, 331 ; 395
—— Lord G., and the steam coal of the Empire, 543
Harbour defence, 557
Harrismith, 313
Harrison, Sir H. Leland, and support of Congress ideas, 146
Hartington, The Marquis of, and the Simla Army Commission, 50
Hartmann, Eduard von, on our defence and military reorganisation, 570
Havana cigars, 91
Hawaii, Americanisation of, and the future of the Pacific, 187
Hayter, Mr., and development of land system in Australian colonies, 272
Hazaras, the, 65
Heligoland, 162, 195 ; children of, taught English and German, 221
—— system of education, 385
Helmund, the, 9, 24, 58, 65, 70
Henderson, Captain, and rapid mobilisation of Continental armies, 504, 552
Herat, the possibility of attacking the Russians at, 63 ; referred to, 8, 11, 12, 16, 18-21, 33, 34, 36, 55-60, 63, 65, 72, 89
Heresy hunting, 406
Heretic, a, 409
Herschel, Sir J., Astronomer-Royal, and education in the Cape, 383
Hicks disaster, 169
High Church movement, 400
Higinbotham, Mr., Chief Justice of Victoria, 229, 230, 272, 273
Himalaya, the, 86, 120, 149
Hindoo education, 385
Hindoos, the, and anti-Christian agitation, 424 ; of British India and votes in England, 496 ; of French India and votes in France, *ib.* ; referred to, 114, 129, 160, 174, 194
Hindostan, its nobles and princes in relation to good government, 80 ; an Oriental scholar on our position in, 119 ; democratic experiments, 138 ; native landlords in, 160 ; modification of system of government, 577 ; referred to, 80, 95, 97, 98, 103, 117, 119, 138, 141, 142, 159, 313, 529, 578 ; and see India
Hindu Kush, 8, 35, 65, 89
Hobart, Sunday observance, 413 ; 447
Hofmeyr, Mr., his scheme for a customs union, 472-475 ; and Imperial Federation, 492 ; referred to, 256, 419, 479
Hogg, General, 170
Hog's Back, the, 554
Holland, 159, 161, 418, 547

Home defence, proposed, by the navy, 508, 509
—— food supply, 544, 545
—— Rule for Ireland, 478, 479, 495
Honduras, British, 159, 162; logwood and mahogany in, 199; Crown lands, 201
Hong-Kong, education, 385; political, commercial, and strategical importance, 527; guns, *ib.*; harbour and defences, *ib.*; the Spithead of the East, *ib.*; recruiting, *ib.*; safety, 528; referred to, 162, 195, 212, 221, 339, 384, 526, 557, 559, 564
"Hoodlums" of United States, 232
Horne, Mr. Van, 238
Hospital, Roman Catholic denominational, in Sydney, 327
Hospitals, 327
—— and Charitable Institutions Act (New Zealand) 1885, 325
Hotham, Sir C., second Governor of Victoria and the Chinese in Australia, 299
Hottentots, 312
Hours of labour, 285
House of Commons, interference by, in Indian government, 100; and chartered companies, 172; Portuguese claims on the Congo, 181; debate in, on charter to North Borneo Company, 190; the liquor policy of the Indian Government, 459, 460; colonial representatives, 465; alliance with the Central Powers, 512; referred to, 53, 54, 94, 100-104, 115
—— of Lords, and colonial representatives, 465
—— rent, 292
—— -tax of United States, 278; in Paris, 279
Houssas, the, 43
Hova Government and the Patrimonio Treaty, 210
Hübner, Baron von, quoted, 67; on our rule in India, 120, 122; and our education system in India, 128
Hudson Bay Company, 171, 183
Huguenot, a, 409
Humanitarian, a, 409
Hunter, Sir W., and textile manufacture in India, 85; on the position of women in India, 137; his attitude towards the Congress, 139, 140; on the great transition, 142, 143; referred to, 93, 144, 146
Hyderabad memorandum of 1886, quoted, 67
—— contingent cavalry and artillery, 40; 45, 48

ICELAND, 546
Iconoclast, an, 409
"I. D. Bs.," 299
Ilbert Bill, the, and concessions to natives in India, 132
Ili province, 76
Immigrants, 271, 318; undesirable, 307
Immigration, coolie, 196, 202; pauper, 305; convict, *ib.*; Chinese, 299, 300, 304, 308, 309, 313, 346; assisted, 314, 315; State, 316; coloured, 312; white, 314; referred to, 202-204, 311, 319
Imperial defence, see Defence, Imperial
Imperial Federation, 477
Imperial Federation League and colonial legislation, 280; the moderate programme, 466; caution, general recognition of the need for, 477; varieties of opinion, *ib.*; Home Rule, 478; in Victoria, New South Wales, and Queensland, *ib.*; referred to, 245, 465, 467, 471, 482, 484, 488
"Imperialists," 478
Impôt progressif in France, 278, 279
Income-tax, progressive, 276
—— Indian, 80
Independents, South Africa, 415; and see Congregationalists
India, effects of loss of, 3-5; defence, see Defence, Indian; result of our regimen in, 78; Free Trade and the factory system in, 81; railroads, 82; cultivable waste, 86; irrigation works in, prejudice against, *ib.*; fresh taxation in, English opinion on, 88; tendency of our Government in, 96; abolition of cotton duties in, native opinion on, 101; under the Marquis of Dufferin, article on, 120; its prosperity under our rule, 121; British-born subjects in, 130; the National Congress and the declarations of 1833, 1835, and 1858, 135; the other view, 136; anti-Congress pamphlet, 137; attitude of Anglo-Indians, 139; future of Burmese provinces of, 190; export of tea from, to United Kingdom, 218; education in, 385; progress of Christianity in, 423; Churches and missionary societies, work of, *ib.*; State aid to Church of England, *ib.*; Christian missions, *ib.*; Salvation Army, 424; liquor question, 459; Protection against, 475; federation and, 483; defence, 503; troops, 528; recruiting, *ib.*; nature of the recruits from the North-West frontier, *ib.*; breechloaders, *ib.*; repairs to heavy guns, 531; manufacture of munitions of war, 559; share in defence, 572; military and financial difficulties, 576; development

of British power, 579; British money invested in, 580; referred to, Part IV *passim*; 155, 157-160, 164, 168, 174, 188, 189, 201, 211, 212, 220, 346, 387, 456, 469, 484, 495, 511, 517, 521, 525, 527, 529, 538, 539, 559, 564, 582; and see Hindostan and British India
India, Central, 117
—— Company, the East, 79, 183, 459
—— Council of, 79, 93
"—— Democracy not suited to," 138
—— French, Hindoos of, 114
—— —— language of natives of, 208
—— Further, 5
—— Governor-General's Council of, 93
—— Horse, the Central, 45
India in 1887, 151
India, North-West, 42, 47, 52, 99, 107, 109, 126
—— Office and Indian Government, difference of opinion between the, 65; opposed to a tobacco *régie*, 89, 90; referred to, 47, 53, 87, 89, 90, 108, 125, 169
—— Provincial Governments of, 96
—— Southern Presidencies of, 109
—— Southern, 42
India, the *Voice of*, and Indian problems, 144
India, *Times of*, on the native army, 39, 40
Indian fortifications, 24; transport, 25, 37; frontier policy, 27, 30; railway bridges, 27; mobilisation proposals, 46; cavalry, *ib.*; feudatory chiefs, rights and privileges of, 69; trade, 83; art work, 84; tobacco and the revenue, 89; cigars, 91; problems, difficulty in stating opinion upon, 94; silver-plate tax, 103; cotton duties, repeal of, *ib.*; native opinion, difficulty of trusting, 104; import duties, abolition of, 127; gold and silver plate duties, *ib.*; parade, description of, 149; of service at a Christian mission church, 150; scenery and climate, diversity of, *ib.*; coolies in Ceylon, 220—in Natal, 301
—— Army, and the latest weapons, 26; present and future difficulties, 56; referred to, 47-49, 54, 56; whence it should be recruited, 42; commanding officers, 48; and see Defence, Indian, *passim*
—— —— corps, first and second, 36, 37
—— Civil Service and the Congress, 142; referred to, 79, 80, 122, 130, 131, 137, 145
—— Commander-in-chief, and the Presidency system, 48; referred to, 37, 48, 50, 51, 68, 69, 72, 108, 109, 119, 149
Indian Council and the Presidency system, 52; and the House of Commons, 102
—— Covenanted Civil Service, 143, 145
—— Defence, see Defence, Indian
—— —— Committee, 66
—— Government and the Presidency system, 51; the liquor laws, 460; referred to, 24, 27, 29, 46, 49-51, 53, 55, 64, 65, 75, 79, 80, 82, 83, 85, 89, 90, 94, 95, 100-102, 105, 117, 121, 122, 124, 125
—— Mobilisation Committee, their general conclusions, 57; and the inviolability of Afghanistan, 58
—— Mohammedans, 97, 140
—— Mutiny, 135
—— National Congress and want of unity in India, 97; 135; and its critics, 136; anti-Congress pamphlet, 137; attitude towards the, of Sir W. Hunter and others, 139; Mussulman opposition, 140; its policy and demands, *ib.*; language used at, 141; Congress movement natural, 144; smallness of the difference upon the question, 146; spirit in which the movement should be met, *ib.*; the liquor system, 460; referred to, 79, 80, 93, 94, 97, 99, 100, 105-107, 134-136, 139, 140
—— native army, its value as against the Russians, 38, 39, 41
—— —— Congress and parliamentary institutions, 112
—— —— police, their occasional corruption a financial question, 77
—— —— States, armies of, 66; defence, 68; arms, 70; increased revenue from the, 89
—— Ocean, 173, 210, 522, 524
—— officers, and our action if Russia is permitted to advance to Herat, 59, 60
Indian Polity, 108
Indian Provincial Governments, 96
—— Viceroy, 29, 49, 65, 68, 102, 103, 109, 119, 128
Indians of North America, 194
Indies, Dutch, 91
Indo-China, 5
Indore, 67
Indus, the, 22-24, 27, 32, 35, 82, 151
Industries, native, protection of, see Protection of native industries
Initiative, the, 264
Institutions, Indian political representative, 111; colonial representative, 204; French, 207
Instruction, higher, 373
Insurance, life, 321; general State, 324
Intelligence Department, army and the

duties of a General Staff, 562; its position in the British Army, *ib.*; and mobilisation, 565
Intelligence Department, naval, 564
Intemperate persons and liquor-sellers, 433-435, 438, 442, 446
Invasion, 549, 551; Sir J. Colomb on, 552
"Investment," absolute, 544; "temporary," 545, 546
Iowa, prohibition, 457
Ireland, federation, 479, 480; referred to, 29, 121, 178
Irish, and the liquor trade, 457
Ismail Pasha, 173
Italy, education of apprentice stokers, 543; referred to, 83, 99, 168, 239, 256, 480, 507, 512, 516, 532, 552

Jacob, General, quoted, 74
Jamaica, exports from, 199; fruit trade, *ib.*; holdings, 200; crop-time, *ib.*; export duties, 201; taxation, *ib.*; wealthiest inhabitant of, 204; powers of parochial boards in, 213; and local confederation, *ib.*; education, 387; State aid to Churches, 425; defences, harbour, and dockyard, 533; referred to, 86, 215
Japan, 83
Japanese, the, 76
Java and the Dutch, 31; referred to, 91, 159, 224
Jelalabad, 19, 32, 59
Jenkins, Mr. E., 478
Jesuits' Estates Bill, 390, 395
Jesuits, the, and education in South Africa, 422
Johannesburg, 250; abnormal condition of, 291
Johore, 182, 189
Journalism, colonial, 250
Jumna Musjid, the, 106

Kabul, 12, 15, 16, 19-21, 24, 57, 63, 65, 66, 74
Kafir education, 385
Kafirs, the, and truck, 299; 312, 313, 453
Kafristan, 32
Kaiser Wilhelm Land, 184
Kalabagh, 27
Kandahar, occupation of, dangerous to our policy, 58; referred to, 14, 16, 19, 23-26, 33, 36, 37, 55, 58, 59, 65
Kansas, prohibition, 436, 437
Karachi, 25, 32, 528
Karen, the, 39
Kashmir, 19, 22, 33, 63, 68, 70, 118, 119, 150, 151
—— Maharajah of, 70, 118
Kearney constitution in California, 228
Kei river, 524
Kendall, Henry, 253
Kenia, Mount, 170
Kermadec Islands, 157
Khamaland, 178
Khan Mahomet Kot, 38
Khartoum, 173
Khojak, the, 23, 149
Khyber line of defence, 24; referred to, 22-26, 30-32, 34, 45, 58, 63, 120
—— Rifles, 41
"Kiezers, The College of," 205
Kilimandjaro, 170
Kimberley, 259; abnormal condition of, 291; mining population of, and canteens, 454
—— The Earl of, his proposed committee on Indian grievances, 127; and the Simla inquiry, 128; the Army Commission, 50; 54
King George's Sound, 502, 526, 534
Kingsley, Canon, 386; on the religious condition of Trinidad, 425
Kingston, Mr., late Attorney-General of South Australia, on the second branch of the legislature, 261
Kipling, Mr., 93
Kirk, Sir J., 173
Knutsford, Lord, 307; and colonial union, 485
Kohat, 22, 23, 31, 32, 44
Königsberg, 10
Koran, the, 129
Kruger, President, and the Transvaal Volksraad, 417
Kuram, 27; civil and military officers at, 28
—— river, 19

Labour, cheap, legislation against, 311
—— colonial—Unions in the colonies, power of, 284; hours of labour in Australia, 285; eight-hour day, effect of, in Australia, 286, 288—in Canada, 287; arbitration, 288; labour in Australia, American opinion on position of, 289; wages, *ib.*; house rent, 292; board, 293; rents in Canada, 294; high wages, permanence of, in the colonies, 295; co-operation, 296; factory inspection and sweating, 297; truck, 298; Chinese, 299-301—their occupations, *ib.*—nature of Australian and Canadian feeling against them, 302-304—treaties, 304; immigration, convict, 305; immigrants, undesirable, colonial action against, 307; immigration, Chinese, examples of strength of colonial feeling on, 308—Australian opinion on, not connected with Pro-

tection, 309 ; effect upon the Chinese Government, 310 ; legislation, anti-foreign, *ib.* ; races, English and native, 311 ; agitation, anti-Indian, in South Africa, 313 ; foreigners, indigent, *ib.* ; immigration, assisted, 315 ; the unemployed, *ib.* ; immigration, State—colonisation schemes, 316-319
Labour, pauper, 354
Labuan, 159, 162, 188, 526, 527, 559
Laccadives, 157
Lagos, development of, 179 ; 182 ; school system, 385
Lahore, 19, 35
Laisser faire in Australia, 265
Lalla Musa, 35
Lambert, Sir John, 258
Lambeth proposals for Christian unity, 390
Lancashire, 84, 85, 86, 127, 336
Land forces, 554 ; no mobile land force in England, 555
—— nationalisation, 267-269
—— reformers of Europe, and transfer of land in the colonies, 235
—— -tax of Victoria, 275, 276
—— —— and Mr. H. George, 273
—— —— Indian, 79
Lands, colonial, State ownership of, contradictory opinions as to its financial advantages, 273
Lanessan, M. de, and Indian immigration, 203 ; French encouragement of coloured people in the West Indies, 207 ; quoted, on French possessions in Madagascar, 210, 211 ; the position of France in "Indo-China," 212 ; conquest of Mauritius for France, 524; on the movements of war fleets, 535, 536 ; the French in New Caledonia, 536 ; Rapa, *ib.* ; attack upon Australia, 573
Langevin, Sir H., and Imperial Federation, 487
"Larrikins," Australian, 232
Lascars, 284, 308
Launceston (Tasmania), 447
Laurier, Mr., and Imperial Federation, 487
Laval University, 365
Lawrence, Lord, 14 ; and the loyalty of the Indian native army, 131
Laws, liquor, see Liquor Laws
—— prohibitory, weak point in, 436
"League of Peace," 512
Leeward Islands, their federal constitution in the time of William and Mary, 214 ; and Mr. Gladstone's first administration, *ib.* ; places included in the Confederacy, *ib.* ; constitutional powers, 214 ; educational system, 387 ; education in, *ib.* ; Sunday closing, 455
Leh, 33
Leroy-Beaulieu, M. A., and our rule in India, 122
—— —— M. Paul, and the extension of representative political institutions, 112 ; follows Macaulay as to the language of a conquered country, *ib.* ; on our rule in India, 122 ; quoted, on modern colonisation, 191 ; the English in India, 192 ; on Madagascar, 193 ; taxation in Ceylon, 220
Lethbridge, Sir Roper, and committee on Indian grievances, 127
Levies, 559
Liberation Society, 397
Libraries, free, 376
License system, the High, 435, 436, 450
Lincoln (Ontario), 288
—— President, 243
Lines of Communication, 546
Liquor Act of Ontario, 439
—— Laws—Canada, 430 ; local option under the Scott Act, 431 ; intoxicating liquors, other Canadian laws upon, 433 ; Quebec, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, 434 ; Manitoba, 435 ; High License system, British Columbia and the, *ib.* ; the Territories, 436 ; peculiarities, minor, 438 ; the Liquor License Act, 1883, *ib.* ; Prohibition, 440 ; New Zealand, 441 ; Queensland, 443 ; licensing laws, other Australian, 444 ; Victoria, *ib.* ; compensation, 445 ; South Australia, *ib.* ; Tasmania, 446 ; New South Wales, 448, 449 ; Western Australia, 450 ; habits of the people, *ib.* ; temperance, 451 ; South Africa, 452-454 ; Natal, 454 ; habits of the population, *ib.* ; Crown Colonies, 455 ; colonial liquor legislation, 457 ; wine-growing and Prohibition, *ib.* ; local option, supposed failure of, 458 ; India and Ceylon, 459 ; restriction, 461 ; 577
—— License Act (Canada), 1883, 438
—— sellers in Australian colonies and intemperate persons, 435
Liquors, intoxicating, Canadian laws upon, 433
Literature, American, 252
—— colonial, 252
—— Indian, 92
Liverpool, defence, 247 ; 556
Living, cost of, 290
Loans, 470
Local Government Board, 258
—— Option, supposed failure of, 458, 459 ; referred to, 431, 443-449, 451, 452, 457, 577
London, 247, 296, 303, 309, 318, 375,

467-469, 478, 485, 496, 506, 508, 550, 556, 568 ; dock labourers' strike, and absence of middle-class hostility against workmen in the colonies, 236 ; Bishop of, 455 ; defence, 554
London (Canada), the poor at, 331
—— Chamber of Commerce and Imperial Federation, 479
—— Missionary Society, in India, 423 ; in Crown Colonies, 424 ; 428
—— University, 375, 386, 387
Longfellow, 380
Loodiana, 42
Loralai, 35, 44
Lord Howe Island, 157
—— Mayor, a popular, and equipment of the forces of the Queen, 574
Lorne, The Marquis of, 482
Louisiade Archipelago, division of, 184
Low Church, 395, 401, 412
Lowe, Mr., Chancellor of the Exchequer (Viscount Sherbrooke), 318
Loyalists, American, in Bahamas, 208
"Lumpers'" strike, 285
Lundi Kotal, 23
Lunis, the, 38
Lusiad, 170, 175
Lyall, Sir A., 93 ; quoted, 148
Lytton, Lord, 14 ; and the Army Commission, 50

Macaulay, Lord, and education of Indian people, 100 ; minute of, 128 ; foresight of his minutes and speeches, 135
Macdonald, Sir J., and woman franchise, 281 ; Imperial Federation, 487, 488 ; referred to, 230, 256, 352
McGill University, 365
MacGregor, Sir C., and a Russian advance on India, 8, 17, 18, 19 ; his suggestion as to an attack on Russian trade, 62 ; estimate of the armies of native states, 66
McIlwraith, Sir T., 256
McMillan, Mr., declaration to East Sydney electors on immigration, 310 ; 349, 488
Madagascar, and France, 210, 212 ; referred to, 4, 165, 191, 424, 522, 535
Madras, English and Scotch planters in, 160 ; referred to, 29, 30, 42, 43, 46-49, 51, 68, 97, 108, 109, 127, 559
—— army, 38, 39, 43, 44, 46
—— cavalry and infantry, 40
—— Congress, 140
—— Government, 51, 79, 96, 108
Maimena, 63
Maine, Sir H., and the nature of democracy, 240, 241
Maiwand, 15, 37, 59
Majorities, colonial, and "one man one vote," 257
Majority rule, 244
Malay Archipelago, protectorates in the, 188 ; 220
—— peninsula, our success in, and the Chinese, 189 ; results of good government, 189 ; 163, 309
Malaya, future of, 190
—— British, 160
Malays, the, 43, 160 ; Javanese, 31
Maldives, 158
Malta, composition of Council of Government of, 221 ; system of education, 385 ; Roman Catholics and Protestants in, 425 ; sale of intoxicants to minors, 456 ; its first-class importance, 530 ; magnificent harbours, *ib.* ; defence, 531 ; manufacturing establishment, *ib.* ; referred to, 162, 259, 426, 505, 508, 514
Manchester, 247, 279
Manchester Guardian and the General Staff system, 563
Manchester Unity of Oddfellows, 320, 406
Mangrotha, 30
Man, Isle of, 158
Manitoba and its Upper House, 261 ; education, 359, 364, 365 ; Protestants and Catholics, 390 ; Scott Act, 431 ; licenses and sale of liquor to intemperate persons, 435 ; referred to, 371, 415, 419
Manning, Cardinal, 405
Manœuvres, naval, 505
Manufactures, Indian, 86
Maories, the, and temperance, 441 ; 216, 312
Maria Theresa, 554
Maritime Provinces, 390, 419, 495
Maritzburg, 321 ; cathedral services, 421
Marmora, Sea of, 9
Marriage with a deceased wife's sister, 282, 469, 470
Martin, Mr. Patchett, and union with Australia, 484 ; the colonial selection of governors, 493 ; colonial legists and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, 493
—— Sir J., 351
Martin's history of the colonies, 495
Martini-Henry rifles, 26
Martinique, manhood suffrage in, 207 ; French garrison, 532 ; referred to, 114, 159, 536
Massowa, 173
Matabeleland, 178
Maurice, Colonel, and alliance with the Central Powers, 61
Mauritius, the, authority of the Council in, 155 ; demand in, for imperial

aid in diffusing information regarding sugar manufacture, 198 ; planters of, and a silver standard, *ib.* ; white foreign element, in, 209 ; Hindoos, *ib.* ; the French and self-government, 210 ; its importance and the difficulty of holding it increased, 212 ; laws, *ib.* ; school system, 386 ; Christian Churches and concurrent endowment, 426, 427 ; sale of intoxicants to minors, 456 ; harbour and defences, 524, 525 ; M. de Lanessan and conquest of, for France, 524 ; referred to, 157-159, 163, 187, 202, 217, 534, 559
Mayo, The Earl of, 146
Mediterranean, the, route to India, 530 ; referred to, 62, 173, 505, 514-516, 550, 581
Melbourne *Age*, 491 ; and land nationalisation, 274
—— *Argus*, do., 491 ; 274
—— *Australasian*, 491
—— *Daily Telegraph*, 415
—— *Leader*, 491
—— *Review*, and land nationalisation, 274
—— suburbs, working men proprietors in, 292; University, 375; Working Men's College, 376 ; the Bishops, 401 ; Salvation Army, 410 ; publication of the "Sunday Times," 413 ; Sunday observance, *ib.* ; defence, 501, 556 ; referred to, 246-248, 296, 305, 306, 343, 422, 452, 557, 569
Members, colonial, their position, 255 ; payment of, 256, 257
Mennonites of Manitoba, 415
Mercier, Mr., and Imperial Federation, 487
Merriman, Mr., 419 ; and the Agents-General, 492
Merv, 71, 73
Methodist Church (Canada), 390, 391, 407
—— Conference, 391 ; and national prohibition, 432
Methodists, 421, 426,—Canada, 389, 390 ; British North America, 390
Metz, 505
Milans, West Indian, 215
Militia, the, 559 ; and mobilisation, 566
Mill, Mr. J. S., and Indian government, 120 ; 296
Millerite, a, 409
Mina Bazar, 38
Mine-fields, 557
Miner representatives, 287, 288
Minghetti, Signor, 256
Ministers of religion, how regarded in the colonies, 399
—— of religion and parliamentary membership, 399
Minority representation, 259 ; work on, published in France, incomplete, *ib.*
Missions, 398, 423, 427, 428
Mobile land force, 555, 556
Mobilisation, 538, 565, 566
—— Indian, 46
—— naval, 552
Moghul emperors, 78
Moghuls, 122
Mohammedan negroes as military police, 180
Mohammedans, Indian, 42, 43 ; Northern Indian, 48 ; Punjab, 40, 48, 52 ; North-West, 52; and the National Congress movement, 136 ; of British India and votes in England, 496 ; of French India and votes in France, *ib.* ; referred to, 12, 107, 174
Molteno, Mr., 260
Moltke, Count von, 560
Mombassa, 170, 173, 174
Mongolians, 150
Montana, Prohibition, 437
Montreal, out-door relief, 330 ; University, 365 ; referred to, 95, 246, 247, 294, 296, 362, 390, 395
Montserrat, 214
Moorhouse, Dr. (Bishop of Manchester), 372 ; and educational grants to Roman Catholics, 380 ; his influence in Victoria, 400 ; his connection with irrigation schemes, *ib.* ; and exchange of pulpits, 403 ; prayer for rain in Victoria, 411, 412
Moran, Cardinal, and Church precedence, 403, 404 ; and Roman Catholics in Australasia, 404 ; his election as cardinal, 405 ; prohibition as to societies, *ib.*
Morgha, 38
Moriori tribe, 158
Morocco, 178, 517
Morris, Mr., 199
Mortality, infantile, 294
Moscow, 141
Moslem troops, 42
Mother-country, the, not yet an example to the colonies as to a practical system of defence, 569
Mozambique, 170, 173, 175, 178
Multan, the fortification of, 65, 66
Municipal institutions, Indian, 104
Murray, Rev. A., 418
—— river, 348, 349
Musgrave, the late Sir A., and Jamaica fruit trade, 199 ; and coolie immigration, 203
Mussulmans, Indian, opposition of, to National Congress, 136, 139, 140

Napoleon III, 279

Napoleonic code, 278
Natal, legislature of, 156 ; land system, 271 ; immigrants and homestead system, *ib.* ; demand for skilled artisans, 291 ; the poor, 331 ; system of education, 384, 385 ; vacancy in the see of, and the Church Council, 419, 420 ; liquor laws, 454 ; drunkenness, *ib.* ; sale of liquor, 456 ; referred to, 158, 162, 174, 206, 215, 301, 317, 320, 321
National Anthem, 379
Nationalisation of commerce and industry, 265
—— of land, 235, 274
Nationality, Australian, 483, 484
Native industries, protection of, see Protection of native industries
Natives, educated Indian, 132
Naval defence, 503, 504
—— —— Bill, 476, 497
—— Intelligence Department, 538, 564
—— struggle, first effect of a, 544
—— Volunteer movement, 557
Navy, the, and colonists, 493 ; fortification, 505, 506 ; defence of foreign stations, 507, 508 ; proposed home defence by the, 508 ; increase of the, 510, 511 ; work of the, 512 ; and our superiority of strength, 553
Neglected Children's Acts, 329
Negro democracy and Hayti, 203 ; contrast in Liberia, and in Martinique and Guadeloupe, *ib.*
—— education, 387
—— labour, 311
—— peasant proprietors, and fruit growing, 199 ; a factor in the West Indian problem, 200 ; and coolie immigration, 202
—— poor, medical care of the, 206
Negroes, in French Antilles and Réunion, 207 ; and Baptists, 424
Nelson, Admiral, 511
—— Bishop of, and the Wesleyans, 403
—— Readers Series, 371 ; expurgation in, 379
Nepal, 116
Nevis, 214 ; educational system, 387
New Britain, 184, 185
—— Brunswick, education, 358, 359 ; primary education, 387 ; Baptists, Church of England and Presbyterians in, 395 ; Scott Act, 431 ; liquor laws, 434 ; 369
—— Caledonia, French treatment of natives of, 186, 187 ; the French in, and the Australians, 535, 536 ; referred to, 164, 573
—— England, 254
Newfoundland, education, see vol. i. p. 13 ; local federation, 476 ; referred to, 259, 298, 317, 358, 390, 392 467
New Guinea, protectorate of, reason for its annexation, 182, 185 ; jurisdiction over foreigners, 185 ; High Commissioner of, and his jurisdiction, *ib.* ; present government an experiment, 186 ; referred to, 5, 163-166, 183, 188, 489, 526
—— —— German, 184
—— Hanover, 184
—— Ireland, 184, 185
—— Mecklenburg, 184
—— Pomerania, 184
—— South Wales, factories of, musicians and debating societies in the, 233 ; Upper House, 260 ; the poor, 327 ; Government management, *ib.* ; private trusts, subsidy of, *ib.* ; boarding-out system, *ib.* ; hospitals of, and the "mixed system," *ib.* ; public money spent on charity, 328 ; and Victoria, fallacy of comparing them, 339, 340 ; population figures, 340 ; revenue, 341 ; general view of the comparison by free traders and protectionists, 342 ; value of its export and import for five years, 343 ; small value of the figures, 344 ; the position in, 345 ; arguments for Protection, 346, 347 ; free traders and Roman Catholics, 348 ; protectionists and the daily press, 349 ; education, 366, 377 ; schools, 368 ; Roman Catholics, Episcopalians, and religious teaching, 371 ; higher instruction, 373 ; university, 375 ; technical education, *ib.* ; State aid to Church of England, 396 ; disendowment, 397 ; Presbyterian minister in Upper House of, 399 ; Protestantism, 401 ; Low Church, *ib.* ; Church of England and the Orange Lodges, *ib.* ; Presbyterians, 406 ; Roman Catholics and secret societies, *ib.* ; Independents, 408 ; Church of England, 411 ; concurrent endowment, 418 ; liquor laws, 448, 449 ; local option, 448 ; Good Templars, 449 ; wine-growing, 458 ; federation, 476 ; power of the Crown, 480 ; Imperial Federation, 484, 488-491 ; war and union, 573 ; referred to, 157, 184, 186, 197, 227, 230-233, 240, 243, 247, 248, 254, 256, 282, 283, 285, 307, 308, 314, 315, 329, 332, 333, 350, 351, 356, 357, 370, 380, 402, 404, 407, 419, 444, 466-468, 483, 485, 495, 497, 502, 577
—— Westminster, 534
—— York, 247
—— Zealand, Acts concerning repre-

sentation, 258 ; freeholders, 269 ; progressive taxation, 276 ; the poor in, 325; poor law, *ib.* ; Boards, *ib.* ; funds, *ib.* ; powers of Boards, 325, 326 ; system, resemblance of, to our own, 326; view of protection, 349, 350 ; expenditure upon education, 370 ; religious teaching, 371 ; secondary education, 374 ; universities, 375 ; technical education, 376 ; cumulative vote, 377 ; Presbyterians, 380, 400, 405, 406 ; educational statistics, 387 ; primary education, *ib.* ; Salvation Army, 410 ; Sunday observance, 413 ; liquor laws, 441, 442 ; excessive drinkers, 442 ; clubs, 443, 452 ; licensing bodies, 444 ; local option, 459 ; federation, 476, 480 ; Imperial Federation, 488 ; troops, 501 ; defence, 502 ; steam coal, 543 ; referred to, 157-159, 184, 187, 188, 216, 218, 224, 231, 240, 246, 247, 256, 257, 259, 270, 271, 275, 278, 281, 314, 324, 327, 339, 343, 365, 366, 368, 407, 422, 446-448, 467, 498, 526, 540, 579, 581

New Zealand of To-day, 325

—— —— *The Colony of*, 350

Newspaper education, 376

Niagara, African, 178

—— Falls, 288

Niger, the, 162, 163, 166, 173, 182

—— Company, the Royal, 160 ; and German traders, 180, 181 ; recognition of the, by Berlin Conference, 181 ; the Germans and non-observance of stipulations by the, 183

—— Lower, 158, 166 ; our sphere of influence on the, 179 ; its free navigation a gain to us, 181

—— Upper, 165

Nile, the, 173, 175, 559

Nine-hour day, 285, 287 ; effect of, in Cape Colony, 288

Nizam, 67

Nore, the, 508

Norfolk Island, 157 ; its Assembly, 204 ; peculiarity as regards immigrants, *ib.*

Noumea (New Caledonia), 535, 536 ; and attack upon Australia, 573

Nova Scotia, 287 ; charitable asylums, 331 ; education, 363 ; schools, 371 ; Presbyterian Church in, 392 ; Scott Act, 431, 433 ; liquor laws, 434

Nowshera, 22

Nugent, Sir C., on blockade, 504

Nushki, 32-34

Nyassa, Lake, 175 ; and Portuguese claims, 176, 177

—— region, trade of, 175

OBOCK, 536

Oddfellows in the colonies, 319 ; Manchester Unity of, in Victoria, New South Wales, South Australia, and South Africa, 319, 320, 405

Officers, 558 ; Indian commanding, 48 ; naval, and the "line of defence," 503 ; militia, 559 ; volunteers, *ib.*

Oil rivers, why so called, 181 ; their position and administration, 182

Ontario, the indigent poor, 330 ; education, 360 ; liberality of the system, *ib.* ; secondary education, 374 ; primary education, 387 ; Protestants and Roman Catholics in, 390 ; report by Church of England Bishop of, 393, 394 ; Presbyterians in, 400 ; Church of England and Orange Lodges, 401 ; Sunday excursions, 413 ; Scott Act, 431-433 ; licenses, 433 ; sellers of liquor, and death during intoxication, 433, 434 ; relations of intemperate persons, 433 ; Liquor Act, 439 ; Prohibition, 440 ; wine-growing, 457 ; referred to, 260, 288, 318, 361-364, 369, 371, 376, 419

Operatives, Canadian, parliamentary influence of, 287

Opinion, foreign, on our defence, and naval and military organisation, 570

Organisation and strategy for land and sea service, general principles of, 537

——, army, and the Volunteers, 565, 566

—— religious, 389

Orange River Free State, the Dutch and sale of drink to natives, 313, 455 ; grain, 474

Ottawa, 395

Ownership, State, of colonial lands, 273

Oxford, 375, 387, 498

Oxus, 34

PACIFIC, partition of the islands of, 184 ; future of, 187 ; effect of a check in the, 526 ; referred to, 5, 7, 60, 61, 83, 159, 163, 164, 166, 167, 191, 193, 195, 210, 489, 533, 535, 536, 581

—— Island missions, 427, 428

—— Slope, 311

—— South-West, 164

—— Western, 184, 188, 526

Pahang, 189

Palmerston, Lord, offers of territory declined by, 190

Pambete, 175

Pamir, 33

Panama, Isthmus of, 533, 536

Papuan Island, see New Guinea

Paradol, Prevost-, on "the future," 581, 582

Paris, American studios of, 251 ; forts

of, 505; and food supply in 1870, 545
Parkes, Sir H., quoted, on the Chinese, 302; and the Chinese, 305, 307, 309; assisted passages, 315; and Imperial Federation, 482, 485; referred to, 230, 256, 260, 262, 282, 467, 490, 494
Parkin, Mr., and Imperial Federation, 484; at Sydney, 488, 489; in Victoria, 491; referred to, 280, 465, 466
Parliamentary peculiarities, 256
Parliaments, colonial, composition of, 254
Parnell-Rhodes correspondence, 479
Parsees of British India and votes in England, 496
Pathans, 40, 52, 69, 72
Patrimonio Treaty, French and Malagasy text of, 210
"Pauper," "pauperism," "poorhouse," how regarded in the colonies, 328
Paupers, white, 313
Payment of members, 231, 255-257, 280
Payne, Mr. E. J., 164
Pearson, Dr., Education Minister of Victoria, 229; his report on education, 367; and Bible teaching in schools, 379, 380; Roman Catholic opposition to school systems in Victoria and New South Wales, 380, 381
Peiwar Kotal, 27
Pekin, 75, 76
Penang, Chinese magistrates at, and Great Britain, 189
Peninsular and Oriental Company, the, and Lascars, 308
Penjdeh, 18, 19
Perak, 189
Perim, 157, 169; the harbour of, its capacity and safety, 529
Persia, division of, with Russia, 63; referred to, 11, 29, 33, 57, 60, 63, 74-76
—— Northern, 63, 74
—— Shah of, 74
Persian Gulf, 28, 34
Peshawur, 15, 22, 25, 32, 35, 44, 45, 65, 66
Peru, 173
Pietermaritzburg; see Maritzburg
Pindi, the, 45
Pishin, 23, 35
Pitcairn, 157, 195
Plantations, the Council of Foreign, 209
Playfair, Sir Lyon, on protection and wages, 356, 357
Playford, Mr., 256; and local option, 446
Plural vote, 234
Police, Indian, 125; military, 527, 528
Policy, Court of, 205
—— uniform Indian, 30; frontier, *ib.*
Political peculiarities, colonial, 256
Politics, colonial, 253
Polish Quadrilateral, 10
Poll-tax, 277, 302
Polynesia, 5, 187; and see Pacific
Polynesians, the, and French and Germans, 186
Pondicherry, 112, 113
Poor, the—In New Zealand, 325; New South Wales, 327; Victoria, 329; other Australian colonies, 330; Dominion of Canada, *ib.*; South Africa and Crown colonies, 331
Popular Government, 240
Popular Government, 244
Port Castries, harbour, 533, 534
—— Darwin, military purposes, 526; referred to, 502, 526, 535
—— Elizabeth, 422
—— Hamilton, 29
—— Louis, 210; fortifications, 524
—— Phillip, 273
—— of Spain, Roman Catholic Archbishop and English Bishop of, 425; and see Trinidad
—— Royal, 533
—— Said, coaling station, 529
Ports, commercial, fortification of, 556
Portsdown, 527
Portsmouth, 527
Portugal, 161, 168, 176-178, 181
Portuguese, the, 113; claims in the Lakes territory, 175; and railroads in their West African possessions, 179
Posen, 10
"Position" warfare, 554
Positivist, a, 409
Postage, 469
Posts, naval and trade, 195; and see Coaling Stations
Powers, the Central, 60
Prague, 141
Predikants, 418
Prendergast, General, 27
Presbyterianism, 406
Presbyterians, Scotch, and the African Lakes Company, 176; and Roman Catholic schools, 380, 381; in Canada, 389, 390; membership in Canada, 392; Cape Colony, 416; in Crown colonies and Australasia, 424; referred to, 390, 396, 400, 402, 405, 411, 455
Presidency Governments, 50
—— system, the, 48; fatal to vigour of action, 49; reforms, 50; Army Commission of 1879 and abolition of, *ib.*; representation by Indian Government in 1888, 51; its consequences in civil and military affairs, 52

Press, colonial, 253
Pretoria, 250
Prevost-Paradol, 581, 582
Primitive Methodists (Canada), 391; 407, 408
Prince Edward Island, 260; education, 363; schools, 371; Scott Act, 431, 433; sale of liquor to Indians and minors, 434
Progressive taxation, 276-7, 279
Prohibition, 430-433, 436, 438, 440, 443, 444, 446, 451, 456-458
—— party and high license system, 436
Property, growth of, 278
Proportional representation, 259
Proprietors, negro-peasant, 199, 202
Protection, 231, 255, 268, 269, 272, 273, 279, 283, 309, 331 *et seq.*, 472, 475
—— arguments for, 346
—— Australasian, 338
—— colonial, in 1868, 332; subsequent experience, effect of, 333; bearing of, on imperial and Australasian federation, 338
—— compensates Australian and Canadian manufacturer, 295
—— of native industries—Protection, colonial, in 1868, 332; subsequent experience, effect of, 333; Victoria under protection, 334; local manufactures, growth of, 335—goods manufactured, kinds of, 336; federation, Australasian and imperial, bearing on, of colonial protection, 338; comparison between Victoria and New South Wales, fallacies of, 339; population figures, 340; revenue, 341; other figures, *ib.*; comparison between the colonies, general view of, 342; the figures, small value of the, 344; the position in New South Wales, 345; arguments for protection, 346; Roman Catholics, 348; party funds, subsidies to, *ib.*; smuggling, *ib.*; New Zealand view, 349; Queensland view, 350; Canadian view, 352; union, commercial, 353; direct taxation, support gained for protection by the unpopularity of, 355; wages, effect of protection upon, 356
Protectionists and votes in Sydney, 257
Protective system and national finance and prosperity, 342; and trade, 343
Protectorates and spheres of influence, 163; grow into colonies, 182; sale of liquor, 456
Protestant Episcopal Church (United States), growth of, 394; Mr. Bryce and membership of the, *ib.*
—— Union, 390, 411
Protestantism, 401, 410
Provident Societies, 319 *et seq.*
Prussia and Bavaria, 573
Public duty, standard of, in the colonies, 254
—— houses and Sunday closing, 413
—— -school system, 378
—— the, and defence, 566
—— works, 286
Pulpits, exchange of, 402
Pulsford, Mr. (Sydney Chamber of Commerce), and Victorian gold, 340
Punjab, recruits from, nature of, 528; referred to, 15, 23, 25, 29, 42, 52, 68, 95, 107, 109, 118, 139
—— Frontier Force, 40, 50
—— Government, 27, 30, 37, 38
Puritans, English, 417
Pyrford, 554

Quarterly Review, editor of, and natural rights, 239
Quebec (city), 250, 294
Quebec (province) maintenance of poor persons, 330; (prov.) education, 358, 359, 361, 362; Protestants and Roman Catholics in, 390; Roman Catholic Church, 410; liquor sellers and relations of intemperate persons, 433; local liquor laws, 434; referred to, 162, 259, 288
—— Scott Act, 431-433
—— University (Roman Catholic), 365
Queen, H.M. the, and home defences, 575; referred to, 92, 132, 134, 495
Queensland, view of protection, 350, 351; compulsory education, 370; religious teaching, 371; "mixed schools," 377; disendowment, 397; High Church element, 401, 402; local option, 443; defence, 473; power of the Crown, 480; Imperial Federation, 484, 490, 491; taxation, 497; organisation of forces, 502; referred to, 160, 186, 198, 231, 240, 254, 256, 259, 280, 282, 286, 296, 329, 365, 366, 368, 407, 452, 467, 468, 495, 526, 539, 583
—— Northern, 180
Quetta line of defence, 23; referred to, 12, 14, 19, 20, 22-26, 32, 34-36, 44, 50, 51, 55, 58, 63, 65
Quick, Dr., and land tenure in Victoria, 272
Quilimane, 175

Races, native, destruction of, by English, in Pennsylvania, United States, and Canada, 311, 312
Radicalism, dominant, of the colonies, its position, 268
Railway material, colonial, 253

Railways, Indian, 82
—— State, 265
Rajputana, 117
Rajputs, 43, 113
Rapa, the island of, and the French, 536
Rawson, Sir Rawson, and exports from the Gambia and Lagos, 179; and growth of property in Australian colonies, 278; 478
Rawul Pindi, 22, 24, 35, 36, 44, 45, 48
Rechabites, the, in Australia, Canada, and South Africa, 321, 405
Recruiting, 528
Redistribution Bill, 258
Red Sea, 163, 529, 536; route, 522
Referendum, the, 262-264
Reformed Episcopal Church in Canada, 395
Reforms, Indian, 50
Regency, colonies of the, 579
Relations, future, between the mother-country and the remainder of the Empire, 465; financial federation, 470; a customs union, 471; common tariff, difficulties of a, 475; the Rosebery-Salisbury correspondence, 477; Rhodes-Parnell correspondence, 479; the Crown, power of, 480; colonial opinion, 480; recent change, 481; secession, the right of, 486; the Western Australia debate, 489, 490; the Agents-General, 492, 493; a Council of them, 493; confederation, full, no prospect of, 494, 495; existing ties between various parts of the British Empire, 496; defence, practical suggestions bearing on, *ib.*
Religion—Religious organisation of the colonies, variety of the, 389; Dominion of Canada, *ib.*; Protestant Union, 390; United Methodist Church of British North America, 391; United Presbyterian Church of do., 392; Church of England in Canada, 393; Reformed Episcopal Church, 395; Baptists, *ib.*; Australia, 396; abolition of State aid, effects of the, 397; Church of England in Australia, 400; High Church movement, *ib.*; organisation of the Church of England in Australia, 402; question of precedence, 403; Roman Catholic Church, 404; Presbyterianism, 406; Methodism, Wesleyan, 407; other Methodists, *ib.*; Congregationalists and Baptists, 408; smaller bodies, *ib.*; Salvation Army, 409; Protestantism, Australian, 410; Sunday observance in the colonies, 412; tendencies, colonial, in religious thought, 414; South Africa—Religious life in, 415; the Boers, religious life of, 417; the Doppers, *ib.*; Scotch ministers, 418; Disestablishment, *ib.*; Church of England, 419-421; Wesleyans, 421; Roman Catholics, 422; Salvation Army, *ib.*; Sunday observance, *ib.*; India, 423; Crown colonies, 424—Trinidad, 425; other West India Islands, 426; Mauritius, *ib.*; disestablishment, 427; Pacific Islands and other missions, *ib.*; conclusion, 428, 577
Rents, at, Toronto, Montreal, Quebec, St. John's (New Brunswick), Halifax, and Ontario, 292, 294, 295; in mining districts of Canada, *ib.*
Representation, attempt to deal with, in New Zealand, 258
—— colonial, 478
Representative institutions in French colonies, 206
Responsibility, fixing of, 565
Retrenchment, Indian, 126
Réunion, blacks of, 114; manhood suffrage in, 207; negroes of, *ib.*; referred to, 159, 210, 524, 534
Revenue, Indian, 80, 89, 91
Revolutionary Socialism, how regarded by workmen in the colonies and United States, 265, and see Socialism
Revue Militaire de l'Étranger and the Channel Islands, 509
Rhodes, Mr., 237; and Parnellite funds, 479; in Africa, 539
—— -Parnell correspondence, 479
Rio de Janeiro, 211
Ripon, The Marquis of, 54; and the Army Commission, 50; and the powers of Indian municipalities, 146
Ritualism, Australian, 400
Riverina, 343, 347
Roberts, Sir F., his position at Kuram, 28; and the defence of Chitral, 32; Indian transport, 37; his popularity, influence, and characteristics, 148, 149; 13, 29
Robinson, Sir W., Governor of Trinidad, and coolie immigration in the West Indies, 202
—— Governor of Western Australia, on the government of an ordinary Crown colony, 206
Rochdale, 296
Rockhampton, 401
Roman Catholic Church in Australia, 404; money spent on churches, 405; and secret societies, 405, 406; Australasia and Canada, 410; India, 423; Canada, 389, 487
—— —— membership in Canada, 392; population in Australasia, 404, 405

Roman Catholics and protection, 348; schools, 371-373; in Australia, 373; and religious teaching, 378; education, 359, 360, 362, 363, 364, 365, 368; secular and religious teaching, 380; educational grants, *ib.*; teachers in public schools, 382; and education in the Cape, 383; Trinidad, 386; South Africa, 415, 422; Cape Colony, 416; Mauritius, 426, 427; 419
Romans, government of the, 116
Rome, 122, 169
Rosebery, the Earl of, and Imperial Federation, 465, 466, 476; and a customs union, 471, 475; colonial representation, 478; Home Rule, *ib.*; referred to, 487, 491
—— -Salisbury correspondence, 477
Roumania, 192
Royal Colonial Institute, 496
—— Commission and "indentured" labour in Trinidad and Demerara, 202
Russell, Mr. J., 360
Russia, importance of Afghan co-operation to, 21; her vulnerability and invulnerability, 60, 61; comparison of, with ourselves, 71; her advantages, 72; and our means of counter-attack, 558; and India, 571; referred to, 4-13, 17-21, 33-35, 56-63, 65, 70, 72-77, 82, 88, 89, 91, 105-107, 111, 122, 124, 147, 191, 244, 310, 417, 495, 503, 516, 525, 553, 576, 583
—— Emperor of, 8, 10, 14, 36
Russia in Central Asia, 9
Russian alliance, a, and Indian defence, 6; invasion, 17; advance, 19; further advance, 35
—— Empire, 36, 122
—— Government, 122
—— race, 582
Russians and tea-drinking, 219; cost of railways and bridges, 34; referred to, 9-11, 13-21, 33, 34, 36-39, 41, 42, 47, 54-56, 58, 63-65, 69-71, 73, 74, 101, 117, 119, 146
Russia's Hope, The, 541

Sacrifices, colonial, for education, 369
Saigon, 536
"St. Christopher (St. Kitts) Nevis," 214
St. Helena system of education, 385
—— its garrison, population, and local militia organisation, 520, 521; referred to, 158, 535
Saint-Hilaire, M. B., quoted on the Presidency system, 52
—— —— on our rule in India, 122, 124
St. Kitts, 214; educational system, 387
St. Lucia, landscapes of 223; experiment of Government interest in a central sugar factory a success, 198; coaling station, 533; referred to, 214, 557
St. Patrick's Cathedral, Melbourne, 405
St. Vincent, 214; Sunday closing, 455; sale of intoxicants to minors, 456
Salisbury-Rosebery correspondence, 477
Salisbury, The Marquis of, and the Sultan of Zanzibar, 193; Imperial Federation, 486; alliance with the Central Powers, 281, 305, 404, 512
Salmon, Mr., on the West Indies, 195, 196; existing Crown Colony institutions, 206; confederation, 215; taxation in Ceylon, 220
Salt Range, the, 48
Salvation Army, 409, 410; in South Africa, and the Hottentots, 422; and Dutch ministers, *ib.*; in India, 424
Samarcand, 17, 74
Samoa and United States, 187
Sandeman, Sir R., 14, 19; his chief assistant and Russian occupation of Afghanistan, 20; the Indian frontier, 29; his local levy system, 31, 32; and the tribes, 37; survey of the Gomul, 38; referred to, 27-30, 213
Sandford, Sir F., 258
Sandhurst, 376
San Francisco, 211
Sankeyite, a, 409
Sarakhs, 18, 74
Sarawak, 163, 182; purpose of protectorate over, 188
Sargeant, Rev. G., President of West Indian Wesleyan Conference, and the revenue of slave colonies since emancipation, 200
Savings banks, 321, 342
Scandinavians, 582
Scanlen, Sir T., 260
Scenes, Indian, 149; tropical, 223
Sceptic, a, 409
Scholarship system, 374
Scholarships, 386; State, 377
School attendance, 387
—— Boards, 366
—— books and Christianity, 379
—— fees, 368, 369, 374
—— tax, city, of Montreal, 362
Schools, Roman Catholic, 359, 360, 362, 371, 373, 378, 380, 381; free, 368; of Mines, 376; "mixed," 377; private, *ib.*; "dissentient," *ib.*
—— boarding, grants to, 383; farm, *ib.*; State-aided, 386
Schreiner, Miss O., 253
Scotch ministers and the Dutch Reformed Church, 418
Scotland, 290, 392, 412, 413, 418, 479
Scott Act (Canada), 431, 432, 435, 438-440, 448, 458

Seaboard, protection of the, and soldiers and sailors, 558
Secession, the right of, 486, 578
Secondary education, 374 ; and the working classes, *ib.*
—— instruction, colonial, 253
Secular school system, proposals of opponents of, 380 ; the reply, 381
Security, false, 537
Seeley, Professor, on British government in India, 98 ; and federal union, 495 ; referred to, 478, 579
Seine, the, 535
Seistan, 19, 33, 34
Sella, Signor, 256
Sendall, Sir Walter, 215
Senegal, French force in, 519 ; referred to, 114, 181, 568
Senegambia, the French and national money spent on, 180
Service, Mr., and improved legislation, 283 ; referred to, 229, 256, 334, 496
Settlements, tropical, 158
Seychelles, 158
Shanghai, 221
Shea, Sir Ambrose, and fibre in Bahamas, 199 ; 493
Shearers in Australia, 316
Shepstone, Sir Theophilus, 420
Ships, fast-steaming merchant, 540, 541
Shire, the, 175
Shore batteries, 557
"Shouting," 450
Siberia, 76, 87
Sibi, 26, 35
—— -Pishin Railway, 34
Sicily, 97
Sidney, Sir P., 244
Sierra Leone, development of, 179 ; national expenditure on, by Imperial Parliament, 180 ; school system, 385 ; question as to sufficiency of its defence, 518, 519 ; black troops, 519 ; harbour, *ib.* ; Report of Royal Commission as to its strategical value, 519, 520 ; Lord Carnarvon on its occupation in the event of war, *ib.* ; referred to, 531, 534, 557
Sikh police, 527
—— regiments, steadiness of, 42, 43
—— States, army of, inspection and efficiency, 70
Sikhs, the, 39, 40, 52, 69, 72, 97, 113
Simla, 104
—— Commission of 1879 and the Presidency system, 50, 128
Simon's Bay, 521-523
Sindh, 23, 55
Singapore, 188 ; development of trade, 189 ; the Chinese, 309 ; referred to, 195, 221 ; as a coaling station in time of war, 527
Singh, Rajah Rampal, his confusion of metaphors, 95
Single tax and Mr. H. George, 297
"Sixpenny Restaurants" in Melbourne, 291, 293
Skobeleff, 8 ; his officers, and their treatment of native chiefs, contrasted with that of the British, 71
Slavery, 162
Slavonic delegates at Prague and Moscow, 141
Smith, Adam, and imperial unity, 495
—— Mr. W. H., and Imperial Federation, 477
—— Mr. Goldwin, 354
—— Mr. Murray, and Protection in Victoria, 335
Smuggling, 348
Snider ammunition, 26
Socialism, colonial opinion regarding, 267 ; referred to, 264, 279, 280, 296, 324, 357 ; and see State-socialism
Social Welfare, Subjects of, 356
Societies, Government friendly, in New Zealand, 322 ; a failure in the mother-country, *ib.* ; high percentage of population insured in New Zealand, 323 ; temperance section, *ib.*
—— provident — friendly, 319 — in South Africa, 320 ; savings banks, 321 ; racial difficulties, 322 ; Government friendly societies, *ib.* ; State insurance, general, 324
—— secret, 405
Socotra, Sultan of, 170
Soldiers and political offices, 28
Solomon Islands, division of, 184
Somali protectorate, its annexation, 169
—— Territory, 163
Soudan, 29, 42, 164, 168, 169, 173, 178
South African Republic, 178 ; and see Transvaal
—— Australia, and the Chinese, 302 ; the poor in, 330 ; education, 366, 368 ; free schools, 368 ; compulsory education, 370 ; religious teaching, 371 ; universities, 375 ; technical education, 376 ; educational peculiarities, 377 ; High Church clergy, 402 ; Bible Christians, 408 ; local option, 444, 445 ; Prohibition, 446 ; publicans and loitering, *ib.* ; wine-growing, 457 ; organisation of forces, 502 ; referred to, 230, 240, 248, 256, 259, 282, 285, 286, 314, 329, 336, 343, 350, 383, 384, 407, 452, 467, 526
Spain, her colonies, 583 ; failure to fuse Italian immigrants, *ib.* ; referred to, 161, 354, 517, 518

Spaniards, the, 113, 168, 386
Spanish America, 583
—— artillery officer and the closing of the Bay of Gibraltar, 517
Spezia and the French, 518 ; 532, 543
"Spheres of influence," 163, 182 ; and sale of liquor, 456
Spithead, the, of the East, 527
Sprigg, Sir Gordon, 419, 453, 455
Staff, a General, 560
Stanhope, Mr., and the Imperial Federation League, 467, 468 ; Imperial Federation, 477
Stansfeld, Mr., 318
State Aid and State Interference, 338
State aid to Churches, 396-398, 423
—— schools in the colonies, and immigrants, 238
State-socialism, 227, 264, 267, 280, 357
States, native Indian, 116, 117, 119
Statesmen, colonial, 243, 244, 255 ; and parties, and the rights of Upper Houses, 262 ; Australian, their knowledge about Canada or South Africa, 280 ; Canadian, and Australia, *ib.* ; independent Australian, 283
Statistics, and rural districts and towns, 247
—— educational, 387
Stations, coaling, 513 ; their garrison, *ib.*, 514 ; coaling stations and a General Staff, 564
—— foreign, defence of, by the navy, 507, 508
—— Indian naval, 528
Steam-launches, 557
Steamship lines, subsidies of, 469
Stegmann, Mr., 418
Stellenbosch, 384, 418
Stephens, Mr. Brunton, 253
Stephen, Sir A., 229, 282 ; his legislative services, 283
—— Sir J., 283
Stevenson Road, 178
Stewart, Sir D., 66
Stokers, skilled, lack of, 543
Stonyhurst, 422
Story of an African farm, The, 253
Stout, Sir R., 256, 267, 269, 270, 281, 371 ; and Imperial Federation, 488
Strachey, Sir J., his estimate of a monopoly of tobacco sale in India, 90 ; and taxation of land in Bengal, 91 ; his *India*, 93 ; and educated natives in India, 133 ; judicial appointments, 134 ; 146
Straits Settlements, authority of the Council in the, 155, 157 ; native education in the, free to natives, but not English, 221 ; school system, 386 ; inhabitants of the, and defence of Singapore, 526 ; referred to, 158, 162, 217, 304, 309, 386, 515, 559 ; and see Singapore
Strasburg, 505
Suakim, 173
Succession-duty, 275 ; graduated, in Victoria, 277
Suez Canal, delicacy of the, as a means of communication during war, 515 ; difficulty of keeping open and of watching, 516 ; an alternative route, 517 ; referred to, 9, 132, 168, 251
—— coaling station, 529
—— Gulf of, 516
—— or Cape route, which ? 514, 515
Suffrage in the Colonies, 257, 281
Sugar, 162, 473, 479
—— Convention, 1888-89, probable effect of a Bill founded on the, 197 ; and owners of sugar estates in the West Indies, *ib.*
—— trade, West Indian, depression in, how accounted for, 197 ; prosperity of sugar planters of British Guiana, 197 ; experiment of Government interest in a sugar factory in St. Lucia, *ib.* ; Mauritius, a sugar-growing colony, 198 ; demand for imperial aid regarding sugar manufacture, *ib.* ; its effect on fruit production, 199
Sukkur, 23
—— Bukkur, 27
Sulieman range, 37
Sunday closing, 434, 435, 442, 444, 449, 452, 453, 455
—— observance, 412, 429 ; in South Africa, 422
—— railway traffic, 414
—— School system, colonial, 373, 398, 429
"Sunday Times," 413
Sutherland, Mr. Alexander, and land nationalisation in Victoria, 274
Swat, 33
Swaziland, 174
Sweating, 297 ; Victorian sweating clause, 298 ; report by Victorian chief-inspector, *ib.*
Swiss Confederation, The, 263
Switzerland, 279, 477 ; *The Referendum* and the future of democracy, 262, 263
Sydney ; merchants and free trade, 347 ; University, 375 ; Presbyterian minister in Lower House, 399 ; the Bishops, 401 ; Centennial Banquet, Church precedence at, 403 ; Salvation Army, 410 ; Sabbath observance, 413 ; Good Templars, and compensation, 449 ; Imperial Federation, 488, 490 ; referred to, 157, 211, 246, 272, 308,

345, 346, 348, 404, 422, 482, 484, 526
Sydney Bulletin, 349
—— *Centennial Magazine* and the future of the Australasian colonies, 483, 484
—— *Daily Telegraph*, 349
—— *Morning Herald*, 413; and religious matters, 415; imperial federation, 489; referred to, 349
Syme, Mr., and Australian protection, 272, 273; 274, 275

Table Bay, 521-523
Tahiti, 536
Taj, the, 150
Tanganyika, Lake, 175, 177, 178
Tariff, common, difficulties of a, 475
Tashkend, 74, 119
Tasmania, free schools, 368; religious teaching, 371; universities, 375; local option, 446, 447; drunkards, 448; defence, 502, 503; referred to, 230, 259, 314, 350, 384, 401, 407, 452
Taxation, colonial, 275, 278, 474; progressive, 276; provincial, 277; progressive, in France, 278; graduated, 278, 279
Tea-drinking, and the Canadians, Australians, Americans, and British, 219
Technical education, 375
Teheran, 74
Tel-el-Kebir, 530
Temperance, 323, 451
Temple, Sir R., and Kabul, 20; the relative positions of the Madras, Bombay, and Bengal armies, 44; cultivable waste in India, 86; the local elective system in India, 106; Indian inquiry, 128; 134
Tennyson, 380
Thames, the, 557; defences, 558
Theatres, proprietors of, and Sunday entertainments, in Australia, 413
Theosophist, 409
Thomas, Mr. Julian, and the French in New Caledonia, 187
—— the late Mr., on the West Indies, 195
Thorn, 10
Thursday Island, 502; fortification, 526; 535
Tippoo Tib, 172
Tobacco-tax, Indian, 89
Tobago and local confederation, 213
Tocqueville, accuracy of his observations and views on democracy, 239; and the Second Empire in France, *ib.*; and the effect of democracy on art, literature, and science in the United States, 231, 250, 251; 399
Tochi, 19, 25, 27, 30
Tonquin, natives of, and the suffrage, 208; referred to, 4, 103, 114, 165, 191, 567
Toronto, 294, 296, 390; grants to charitable organisations, 330; University of, how maintained, 361, 365; liquor matters, 433, 434
Torpedo-boats, 557
"Torrens Act," 275
Torres Straits, 189, 526
Tourists, English, and Indian life, 151
Townsend, Mr. Meredith, and the loss of India, 129-131; his article on the retention of India, comments on, by Indian British press, 143, 144
Toynbee Hall, speech at, its effect in Australia, 245
Trade and revenue in the Crown colonies, 222
—— Indian, 83, 86
—— in time of war, 540
—— unions, 284; and see Labour
Trades Arbitration Act of Ontario, 288 289
Trafalgar, 511, 546
Traill, Mr., and imperial federation, 490
Traité de Législation coloniale, 257, 535
Transfer of land, 275
Transkei, memorials regarding sale of liquor by Cape Government in the, 455; influence of the Churches, 455
Transport, Indian, 25, 37
Transvaal—South African Republic, 178 cost of living in the, 178, 290, 291; annexation, 576; referred to, 71, 250, 257, 290, 318
—— Volksraad, and Sunday observance, 422
Travellers, British, and officers of fortresses, 507
Treaties, Chinese, 304
Trincomalee, defence, 525
Trinidad, white foreign element in, 209; and local confederation, 213; its educational history, school system and population, 386; State college, *ib.*; Roman Catholics and Protestants, 425; 384, 426
Tripoli, 173
Tristan d'Acunha, 195
Troops, Indian, 13, 40; southern, 43, 44
Truck, 298
Tsar, the, 36; and Indian defence, 8
Tunis, 165, 191; French inhabitants of, and votes, 208
—— protectorate, 193
Tupper, Sir C., and Imperial Federation, 484, 487

Turcoman tribes, 21, 43, 47
Turins, West Indian, 215
Turkestan, 12, 30, 57, 75, 76
Turkey, 7, 61, 62, 90, 334
Turkish authorities, their opinion of a tobacco tax, 90
—— Alliance, 61, 62
Turks Islands and local confederation, 213
—— the, 62, 173

Unemployed, the, 315 ; in Sydney and Melbourne, 316
Union, commercial, 352, 353 ; Canadian Government against, *ib.* ; colonial, 485
Unitarianism, 414
United Kingdom, 480, 508 ; Government of the, and French domination in Madagascar, 212 ; difficulty of maintaining a commercial blockade of the, 548, 549 ; invasion, 549 ; where a naval power would concentrate to attack us, 550 ; resistance to invasion, *ib.* ; difficulty of, 551 ; landing, *ib.* ; what we need, *ib.* ; defence of the coasts, *ib.*
—— —— Alliance, 445
—— Methodist Church of British North America, 391
—— —— Free Churches, 407, 408
—— Presbyterian Church of British North America, 392
—— States and political privileges to the blacks of the Southern States, 115 ; and Samoa, 187 ; chief market for West Indian sugar, 197 ; Senate of, its conduct of foreign affairs, 242 ; progressive income-tax in, 277 ; cost of living 290 ; "mixed schools," 377 ; negro education, 387 ; Baptists, 395, 424 ; Roman Catholics, *ib.* ; absence of State organisation of religion, 398 ; the clergy and party strife, 399 ; Roman Catholic population, 404 ; money spent on churches, 405 ; Southern States of the, 426 ; negroes, the, and church giving, *ib.* ; local option, 458 ; reciprocity treaty, 474 ; naval power, 532 ; food traffic in time of war by Britain, 547 ; neutrality, 548 ; blockade of Confederate harbours, *ib.* ; referred to, 5, 71, 82, 83, 86, 87, 92, 113, 158, 183, 185, 199, 201, 202, 219, 227, 228, 231, 232, 235-238, 240, 241, 243, 244, 246, 247, 249, 251, 252, 255, 263, 269, 277, 278, 281, 282, 285, 296, 297, 310, 317, 318, 322, 328, 348, 352, 354-356, 370, 373, 377, 388, 406, 415, 417, 430, 435, 457, 473, 479, 493, 495, 503, 534, 546, 580, 582, 583
Universities, 375, 483 ; colonial, 253, 493, 498 ; Canadian, 361, 365
—— Mission of the Church of England and African Lakes Company, 176
Upington, Sir T., 419, 455
Upper and Lower Houses, colonial, disputes between, how they end, 262 ; referred to, 255, 259-263, 399

Vancouver City, 534 ; licenses, 435
—— Island, 503, 534
Van Horne, see Horne, Van, 238
Vauban and fortresses, 505
Vaud (Switzerland), progressive income-tax in, 276
Veto, the Colonial Office, 282, 578
Victoria, enforcement of laws, 229 ; factories of, bands and debating societies in the, 233 ; trades unions of, and London dock labourers' strike, 236 ; Upper House, 261 ; Chinese, 301 ; savings bank depositors, 321 ; the poor, 329 ; State support, *ib.* ; neglected children, generous treatment of, *ib.* ; boarding-out, 330 ; under protection, 334 ; local manufactures, growth of, 335 ; goods manufactured, kinds of, 336 ; comparison between, and New South Wales, fallacies of, 339 ; population figures, 340 ; revenue, 341 ; general view of the comparison by free traders and protectionists, 342 ; value of export and import for five years, 343 ; small value of the figures, 344 ; education, 366, 368 ; system of elementary schools, 369 ; endowment of school system, 370 ; absence of religious teaching, 371 ; Roman Catholics and school system, 373 ; higher instruction, *ib.* ; Universities, 375 ; technical education, 376 ; cadet system, *ib.* ; educational peculiarity, 377 ; schoolbooks, 379 ; Presbyterians of, and Roman Catholic schools, 380, 381 ; politicians and the secular school system, 381 ; Roman Catholic teachers, 382 ; public school system, *ib.* ; disendowment, 397 ; Presbyterians and Wesleyans, 400 ; Low Church, 401 ; High Church movement, 402 ; Presbyterianism, 406 ; heresy, *ib.* ; Bible Christians, United Methodist Free Church, 408 ; Independents, *ib.* ; curious feature of the religious census, 409 ; Roman Catholic Church, 410 ; Anglicans and Presbyterians, 411 ; absence of Sunday newspapers, 413 ; local option, 444, 445 ; compensation, 445 ; Sunday closing, 452 ; wine-growing, 457 ; Imperial

Federation League, 478; Imperial Federation, 491; federation for Imperial defence, 497; transport, 520; example as to burdens, 539; war and union, 573; referred to, 186, 221, 227, 230-232, 234, 240, 243, 247, 254, 256, 259, 268, 282, 285, 297, 307, 308, 312, 314, 315, 332, 334-337, 339, 347-350, 357, 365, 366, 368, 407, 452, 466, 492, 494, 495, 502
Victoria Age, 274, 491
—— *Argus*, 274, 491
—— *Australasian*, 491
—— *Daily Telegraph*, 415
—— *Leader*, 491
—— *Review*, 274
—— Falls, 178
—— Nyanza, 173, 176, 177
Vineyards, 455
Virgin Islands, 214
Vladivostock, 61
Vogel, Sir J., 269, 281; and secession, 486
Volga, the, 60
Volksraad (of Transvaal), 257, 417, 422
—— (Orange Free State), 313
Voluntary Act (Cape of Good Hope), 419
Volunteers, the, 550; and position warfare, 554; field artillery, *ib.*; and army organisation, 565, 566; referred to, 559, 569
Vote, cumulative, 377
—— plural, in local elections, how regarded by colonial workmen, 234
Vuelta Abajo cigars, 91

Wachs, Major, and the immediate use by Great Britain of her material resources in time of war, 570
Wages, 289, 290; high, 295
—— and protection, 355
Waldenses, the, 409
Wales, 479
—— H.R.H. The Prince of, celebration of his birthday in Victoria, 377
Wallace, Professor R., and our Indian rule, 151
Walsh, Dr., R.C. Archbishop of Toronto, 390
—— Dr., R.C. Archbishop of Dublin, 405
Walter, Sir E., 315
Warburton, Colonel, Khyber system of, 30
War, food supply and trade in time of, 540
—— expenditure, British, and Indian, 566, 567; French and German, 566-568
War of 1870, the German official account of, 537
—— Office scheme, 1887, 40
—— —— the, and arms and stores in India, 27; referred to, 27, 56, 506, 513, 514, 520, 523, 535
Warsaw, 10
Washington, President, 243
Water-works, Government, 267
Wazaris, 31
Wealth, 236; and political power in the colonies, 237; in South Africa, *ib.*
Wealth and Progress, 286
Wedderburn, Sir W., and the National Congress, 139, 146
Wellesley Province, 171
Wellington (New Zealand), 157, 259
Wesleyan Conference, 407
—— Kalendar, 407
—— Methodist Church, the, South Africa, and Boers and Dutch, 421, 422
—— Methodist Missionary Society in India, 423, 424
Wesleyans in Australasia and South Africa, 392, 396, 400, 402, 421; Cape Colony, 416; Crown Colonies and Australasia, 424; West Indies, 426; referred to, 428, 455
West Coast settlements, 163
Western Australia, legislature of, 156; and its Upper House, 260; religious teaching, 370; Methodism, 408; liquor law, 450; drunkards, *ib.*; debate on Imperial Federation, 489; referred to, 162, 163, 203, 206, 318, 328, 350, 368, 385, 452, 502, 526
Westgarth, Mr., and growth of property in Australian colonies, 278; referred to, 309, 340, 350
West-India Islands, Church of England and other Protestant bodies in, 426; referred to, 159, 160, 162, 384
—— Indian Islands, and the growth of tobacco and tea, 199; problem, dominant factor of the, 200; colonies, legislatures in majority of, how nominated, 205
—— —— sugar trade, its chief market, 197; depression in, how accounted for, *ib.*
West Indies, the, and self-government, 157; revival of interest in, 195; effect on owners of sugar estates in the, of legislation based on Sugar Convention, 197; Messrs. Froude, Salmon, and Eves on, 195; results of emancipation, 196; Encumbered Estates Court and capital in the, *ib.*; coolie immigration, *ib.*; transformation as regards produce

of estates, 199 ; result in the, of importation of East Indian coolies, 202 ; white population of, 208 ; Baptists, 424 ; and sale of sugar, 473 ; annexation to the American Union, *ib.* ; coaling stations, 533 ; referred to, 161, 163, 201, 202, 331, 354, 473, 479, 533, 577
West Indies, The, 195
West Indies, The English in the, 195
West Indies, British, 159 ; and the attraction of the United States, 222
—— —— French, 568
—— seas, coaling stations of the, 532
Westport district (New Zealand), 502
Wey, the, 554
Whitehead, Sir James, 574
Wife's sister, marriage with a deceased, how regarded in the colonies, 282, 469, 470
Wilkinson, Mr. Spenser, and the General Staff, 563
William IV, 579
Windward Islands, grouping of, 213 ; their government, 214 ; results of confederation in, 215 ; disestablishment, 425
Wine-growing and Prohibition, 457
Winnipeg, licenses, 435
Wise, Mr., late Attorney-General of New South Wales, on Catholicism as bearing on Protection and free trade, 348 ; 405 ; quoted, 497
Wolseley, Lord, 563
Women, and the franchise in Canada, 281 ; position of, in Canada and Australia, *ib.* ; and universities, 375
Wood, Sir E., his military policy in Egypt, 530
Woolwich, 529, 532
—— command, 558
"Workhouse," horror of the word, 328
Working classes, 233, 254, 294 ; and see Labour
—— man, colonial, his normal condition represented, 291
—— men proprietors, 292
Workman, colonial, bugbear of, 284 ; and cheap labour in British Columbia and South Africa, 301
Workmen, colonial, Christianity of, 303
—— members in the colonies, 254
—— white, and Chinese labour, 353 ; and see Labour

Yorkshire, 336
Young, Sir F., and colonial representation, 478 ; Home Rule, *ib.*
Yule, Mr., 146

Zambesi, free navigation of the, and Portugal, 177 ; referred to, 163, 175, 178
Zanzibar, Sultan of, and levying of duties, 174 ; referred to, 158, 164-166, 170, 173, 177, 178, 194, 210
Zebehr Pasha, 172
Zenana Medical Missions and Indian gentlemen, 137
Zhob valley and occupation, 27, 28, 35, 38
Zollverein, a, 338, 465, 471, 475, 476
Zululand, sale of liquor, 456

THE END

Printed by R. & R. Clark, *Edinburgh.*